Polybius' concept of pragmatike historia: constitution decline and the struggle for the Peloponnese by Hunt, PC
Polybius'  concept  of  pragmatike  historia; 
Constitutional  Decline  and  the  Struggle  for  the  Peloponnese. 
A  dissertation  submitted  for  the  degree  of  Ph.  D. 
At  the  University  of  London 
By  Paul  Christopher  Hunt 
Department  of  History 
University  College  London 
MI"  a 
UCCýC.  iý. Acknowledgements 
Many  theses  begin  with  a  formal  debt  of  gratitude  towards  one's  parents. 
However,  words  are  completely  and  utterly  insufficient  to  convey  the  debt  of 
gratitude  that  I  owe  to  my  parents,  my  brother  John  and  my  Uncle  Patrick,  who 
throughout  my  time  as  a  student  have  been  sources  of  strength,  support  and 
love.  I  know  that  I  am  very  lucky  to  have  them  as  my  family. 
On  a  more  academic  level,  John  North  -  ich"l 
ý,  -G.  ^ 
comments  on  vanotxs  stages  of  this  work.  Thomas  Heine 
Nielsen  of  the  Copenhagen  Polis  Centre  also  kindly  sent  me  sections  of  his  work. 
Andrew  Erskine's  advice  was  of  immense  help,  and  they  might  never  be  able  to 
distil  the  countless  bottles  of  Paddy  I've  promised  to  give  him  in  return. 
Translations  and  references  to  Polybius'  histories  and  Plutarch's  lives  are 
adapted  from  W.  R.  Paton's  Loeb  edition. 
On  a  more  personal  note,  some  of  the  staff  at  the  Western  Eye  Hospital  made  my 
time  working  there  enjoyable  and  happy.  I'd  like  to  thank  my  Colleague  John 
Kearney,  Manager  Parmi  Walia,  Patsy  in  Visual  Fields,  Sister  Jo  Coleman, 
Brigitta  and  Chantal  in  Outpatients,  Sister  Jackie  Paterson  in  the  Alex  Cross 
Ward  and  everybody  else  who  made  me  aware  of  the  necessity  of  private  health 
insurance.  Nor  could  I  ignore  the  contributions  made  by  friends  like  Mary 
Ruskin,  Claudia  Betti  and  Emma  Weingartner,  or  long-  suffering  flatmates  like 
Peter  Caley,  Dilia  Zapparova  and  Andrew  Faith.  In  particular  I'd  like  to  thank 
Joe  Clayton,  whose  ability  to  keep  me  amused  at  coffee  whilst  recounting  his 
inherent  ability  to  pick  the  wrong  women  probably  also  kept  me  sane  at  times. 
The  contributions  made  by  Maria  Cannata,  Naomi  Holibarton,  Anna  Gibson  and 
Vina  Tsakali  were  also  important. The  Patrol  Officers,  Constables  and  Field  Reservists  of  the  British  South  African 
Police's  Anti-Terrorist  Unit,  stationed  at  Bitika,  whom  I  knew  as  a  child,  also 
taught  me  one  or  two  things  that  made  me  think  about  imperialism  later  on  in 
life. 
Finally,  this  section  would  not  be  complete  without  mention  of  Stefania  Bernini.  I 
know  you'll  never  read  this,  but  if  you  do,  I  admit  it:  you  were  right  and  I  was 
wrong:  but  only  about  what  we  discussed  while  we  waited  for  the  bus  to 
Greenwich.  I  do  sincerely  hope  that  Laterina  is  the  same  as  when  you  left  it.  They 
say  that  as  he  approached  death,  Beethoven  reflected  on  his  life,  especially  his 
relationship  with  his  nephew  Karl.  In  his  last  string  quartet,  which  he  entitled, 
"Der  schwer  gefasste  Entschluss",  the  last  movement  is  based  entirely  on  the  two 
motifs  which  he  believed  summed  up  life,  Muss  es  sein?  Es  muss  sein!  But  in 
reality  he  was  wrong,  in  life,  Es  könnte  auch  anders  sein. Abstract 
This  thesis  will  contend  that  Polybius'  stress  on  Achaean  unity  was 
related  to  his  need  to  contrast  how  tyche  and  anacyclosis,  the  two  vital 
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in  Achaean  democracy.  This  process  continued  in  his  portrayal  of  later  events; 
Polybius  was  detained  by  the  Romans  because  of  his  sympathy  for  Perseus 
during  the  Third  Macedonian  War;  however  he  blamed  Callicrates  because  at 
this  point  he  wished  to  present  the  corruption  and  decline  that  was  occurring 
in  the  Achaean  league.  This  process  ended  with  the  destruction  of  Corinth  in 
146BC,  where  Polybius  emphasises  the  madness  and  irrationality  of  the 
Achaean  mob  and  leadership.  This  was  to  provide  his  readers  with  the 
consolation  that  their  society  would  emerge  renewed  and  strengthened  at  a 
time  that  the  Roman  Republic  began  its  eventual  decline  through  the 
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Introduction. 
Polybius  begins  his  histories  by  stating  that  he  intended  to 
write  a  universal  history  that  would  deal  with  the  questions  of 
how  and  under  what  system  of  polity  the  Romans  came  to 
control  the  Mediterranean  world.  Taking  as  his  starting  point  the 
140th  Olympiad  in  220BC,  Polybius  contended  that  before  this 
point  the  history  of  the  world  had  been  a  series  of  unconnected 
events,  separate  in  their  origins  and  effect.  Afterwards  the  rise  of 
Rome  unified  the  histories  of  four  regions,  Africa,  Asia,  Greece 
and  Italy,  leading  to  Polybius'  claim  that  he  was  writing  a 
universal  history  that  would  explain  Rome's  dominance  to  his 
readers.  Polybius'  chief  concern  was  with  educating  the  active  or 
aspiring  statesman,  who,  he  believed,  would  learn  from  his 
history  practical  lessons  that  they  could  apply  to  their  future 
dealings,  terming  his  writings,  pragmatike  historia.  Polybius' 
stated  aim  in  writing  history  was  to  explain  Roman  rule  over  the 
Mediterranean  world  to  his  readership.  His  intention  was  to 
record  the  past  so  that  Greek  political  leaders  would  be  able  to 
understand  Rome's  extraordinary  success.  The  explanation  for 
this  success,  Polybius  believed,  lay  in  the  suspension  of  the 
natural  deterioration  of  constitutions  in  the  Roman  system 
government,  which  Polybius  termed  anacyclosis. 
1 This  thesis  will  assess  the  extent  to  which  Polybius'  writings 
can  be  taken  by  present  day  historians  as  a  framework  for 
understanding  Rome's  advent  into  the  Greek  world;  in  particular 
how  Polybius  presented  the  information  he  collected  to  instruct 
his  Greek  readership.  Polybius'  concept  of  history  was  that  it 
was  a  genre  whose  primary  purpose  was  to  give  political 
instruction.  As  a  result,  he  presented  the  Achaean  league,  a 
political  organisation  that  dominated  the  Peloponnese  during 
the  Hellenistic  period,  as  a  single  polis,  so  that  he  could  contrast 
the  influence  that  anaciyclosis  had  on  its  system  of  government 
with  Rome.  His  intention  in  doing  so  was  to  instruct  his 
readership  about  the  decline  that  had  taken  place  in  Greece, 
which  allowed  the  Romans  to  gain  mastery  over  it.  Present  day 
historians  attempting  to  understand  the  Hellenistic  world  cannot 
use  Polybius'  writings  as  source  for  reconstructing  events 
without  taking  into  account  how  Polybius'  stress  on  the  role  of 
tyche  and  anacyclosis  in  explaining  historical  events  distorts  our 
understanding  of  the  situation  in  the  Peloponnese. 
Polybius,  who  was  born  sometime  around  200BC  at 
Megalopolis  in  Greece,  le,  d  an  active  political  life,  attaining  the 
office  of  hipparch,  the  second  highest  position  in  the  Achaean 
league,  before  he  was  detained  in  Italy  by  the  Romans  in  the 
aftermath  of  the  Third  Macedonian  War.  Whilst  in  detention 
Polybius  began  to  write  a  history  that  he  believed  would  provide 
his  readers  with  an  answer  to  the  question  he  posed  them  in  the 
2 N 
introduction  to  his  work.  As  such,  Polybius'  writings  are  of 
immense  interest  to  present  day  historians  attempting  to 
understand  the  circumstances  surrounding  Rome's  conquest  of 
the  Mediterranean  world.  He  was  a  contemporary  source  who 
claimed  to  have  taken  part  in  many  of  the  events  that  he  wrote 
about.  More  importantly,  although  during  his  lifetime  Greece 
had  come  under  Roman  domination,  Polybius'  histories  are  seen 
as  those  of  a  Greek  who,  despite  his  detention,  came  to  accept 
Roman  domination  and  admired  Roman  institutions. 
However,  the  stress  in  the  introduction  to  his  work  on  the 
role  that  the  Roman  Republic's  system  of  government  played  in 
allowing  it  to  achieve  domination  over  the  Mediterranean  world 
may  be  the  key  to  understanding  Polybius'  depiction  of  events. 
Polybius  believed  that  tyche;  a  supernatural  force  which  had  a 
profound  influence  on  human  affairs,  rewarding  the  virtuous 
and  punishing  the  wicked,  played  an  important  role  in  allowing 
Rome  to  achieve  its  conquest.  As  he  argued,  historians, 
especially  those  writing  a  universal  history,  should  take  into 
account  the  role  that  tyche  played  in  influencing  events,  since: 
3 Just  as  tyche  has  steered  almost  all  the  affairs  of  the  world  in  one 
direction  and  forced  them  to  converge  upon  one  and  the  same 
goal,  so  it  is  the  task  of  the  historian  to  present  to  his  reader 
under  one  synoptical  view  the  process  by  which  she  has 
accomplished  this  general  design.  I 
How  should  present-day  historians  view  pragmatike  historia, 
especially  since  Polybius  wrote  his  histories  in  the  belief  that  that 
tyche,  a  capricious  force,  influenced  the  events  surrounding 
Rome's  conquest  of  the  Mediterranean  world?  The  basic  premise 
of  historians  is  that  they  should  critically  examine  the  evidence 
that  is  available  to  them,  in  order  to  achieve  a  rational 
explanation  of  past  events,  taking  into  account  their  own  unique 
vantage  point.  In  doing  so,  they  should  take  into  account  in  their 
writings  how  others  have  interpreted  the  same  evidence, 
accounting  for  circumstances  that  have  changed  since  their 
predecessors  approached  the  subject.  Yet,  despite  their  concern 
with  the  past,  historians  are  placed  in  the  unenviable  position  of 
being  a  prisoner  of  their  own  present.  They  cannot  foretell  how 
changing  circumstances  in  the  future  will  influence  their  work. 
Ultimately,  all  historians  can  do  is  present  their  work  in  the  hope 
that  it  will  give  instruction. 
Present  day  historians  trying  to  reconstruct  the 
circumstances  surrounding  Rome's  conquest  of  the 
Mediterranean  world  are  presented  with  Polybius'  writings, 
'Polyb.  1.4.1-3. 
4 essentially  fragments  of  a  much  wider  history  written  by  a  Greek 
who  lived  in  the  Second  Century  BC.  Polybius  was  a  historian 
who  approached  the  subject  of  history  in  a  similar  fashion  to  that 
which  is  outlined  above.  Polybius  did  not  intend  or  write  his 
histories  to  serve  as  a  source  of  information.  Like  all  other 
historical  writings,  Polybius'  writings  were  the  product  of  one 
man's  perspective  on  events,  written  to  instruct  his 
contemporaries  as  to  how  the  Romans  had  conquered  them. 
They  were  written  at  a  point  where  Greek  society  had 
undergone  an  abrupt  change,  although  the  long-term 
consequences  were  unknown  to  Polybius.  As  Polybius  notes  at 
one  point  in  his  histories,  in  his  own  time,  Greeks  had  tended  to 
devote  themselves  primarily  to  intellectual  and  scholarly 
pursuits.  They  had  not  done  so  primarily  from  choice.  It  was  a 
situation  they  were  forced  into  because  their  traditional  avenues 
to  political  and  military  power  and  responsibility  had  been 
closed  to  them  by  the  advent  of  Rome?  In  these  circumstances, 
how  should  present  day  historians  view  the  pragmatike  historia 
written  by  Polybius? 
The  historian's  basic  role  is  to  critically  analyse  evidence; 
those  dealing  with  Polybius'  writings  are  faced  with  a  problem. 
They  are  dealing  with  the  writings  of  a  historian  like  themselves, 
writing  under  the  same  influences  and  with  his  own  unique 
prejudices,  who  shaped  evidence  available  to  him  to  give 
2  Polyb.  3.59.4. 
5 instruction  to  future  Greek  politicians.  In  this  case,  can  present 
day  historians  use  the  information  they  derive  from  a  source  like 
Polybius,  without  taking  into  account  how  his  viewpoint  on  the 
past,  and  belief  in  the  role  that  his  writings  would  play  in  his 
own  present,  influenced  his  presentation  of  events? 
In  particular,  was  pragmatike  historia  a  political  weapon  that 
Polybius  intended  as  a  means  for  instructing  his  readership  as  to 
how  the  situation  they  faced  had  come  about,  and  to  provide 
them  with  hope  as  to  what  direction  tyche  would  take  in  the 
future?  Literature  had  become  the  primary  outlet  for  the 
expression  of  a  political  elite  who  found  themselves  denied 
access  to  their  traditional  roles.  Polybius'  stated  intention  as  a 
historian  was  to  instruct  this  class.  His  method  of  instructing  his 
contemporaries,  tyche  and  anacyclosis,  influences  our 
understanding  of  his  writings. 
Polybius  presented  tyche  in  his  writings  as  the  supreme 
force  that  governed  historical  events.  The  vital  element,  Polybius 
believed,  that  had  allowed  Rome  to  achieve  its  domination  over 
the  Mediterranean  world,  was  its  system  of  government.  In  light 
of  his  opening  remarks  about  the  importance  of  this  factor  in 
Rome's  rise  to  greatness,  tyche's  influence  on  the  Roman 
constitution  and  the  systems  of  government  in  the  states  that 
Rome  came  into  contact  with  is  fundamental  in  understanding 
Polybius'  presentation  of  events.  Polybius  argued  that 
constitutional  development  and  change  in  poleis  occurred  in  a 
6 cyclical  manner  which  he  termed  anacyclosis.  During  this  cycle 
the  system  of  government  in  a  polis  underwent  three  separate 
stages.  Initially  monarchy  arose,  followed  by  oligarchy  after 
monarchy  descended  into  tyranny,  then  finally  democracy, 
which  resulted  in  the  state  collapsing  into  anarchy,  chaos  and  a 
single  destructive  event.  After  this  the  cycle  re-started.  Polybius 
contended  that  the  Romans  gained  their  empire  because  they 
had  managed  to  achieve  a  balance  between  the  three  forms  of 
government  in  the  cycle  of  anacyclosis  in  their  system  of 
government,  delaying  the  process  of  anacyclosis  during  their 
conquest  of  the  Mediterranean  world?  However,  as  Polybius 
makes  clear  at  the  conclusion  of  book  six,  this  suspension  was 
not  permanent  and  eventually  the  cycle  of  anacyclosis  would 
resume  in  the  Roman  system  of  government. 
Polybius'  account  of  anacyclosis  is  seen  as  an  attempt  by  a 
Greek  to  rationalise  the  Roman  system  of  government  in  a 
manner  that  was  familiar  to  his  native  readership.  "  However, 
Polybius'  intention  was  not  to  explain  the  Roman  constitution  as 
such;  it  was  to  explain  how  Rome  achieved  the  balance  in  its 
system  of  government  that  created  the  circumstances  that  led  to 
its  conquest  of  the  Mediterranean  world.  "  Polybius  makes 
'  Polyb.  6.3.1ff. 
'  Polyb.  6.57.1-4. 
5  Cornell  (2001)  p.  47. 
'Powell  (2001)  p.  24  "  The  Platonic  or  Polybian  theory  is  there  only  to  explain  how  Rome 
reached  that  condition;  thereafter  it  fades  out". 
7 mention  of  a  number  of  other  states,  both  Greek  and  barbarian, 
such  as  Carthage  and  Sparta,  which  had  previously  managed  to 
achieve  the  same  balance  as  Rome  had  in  their  systems  of 
government.  '  By  implication,  the  systems  of  government  in  all 
poleis  were  subject  to  anacyclosis  including  democracies  like  the 
Achaean  league,  which,  Polybius  claimed,  resembled  a  polls. 
Tyche,  or  fortune,  had  favoured  the  Romans.  They  had  achieved 
balance  in  their  system  of  government,  they  had  access  to  natural 
resources,  political  acumen  and  an  unrivalled  military  system: 
they  were  even  barbarians  who  ruled  Greeks.  However,  Rome 
had  achieved  all  this  at  a  time  when  tyche  had  been  unfavourable 
to  Greek  states  in  whose  system  of  government  the  process  of 
anacyclosis  had  not  been  delayed. 
Polybius  did  record  the  events  surrounding  Rome's 
conquest  of  the  Mediterranean  world,  collating  the  available 
evidence  to  the  best  of  his  ability.  What  should  be  questioned  is 
whether  or  not  his  presentation  of  this  evidence,  as  an  author  of 
pragmatike  historia,  is  distorted  by  two  interrelated  factors. 
The  first  is  Polybius'  need  to  explain  to  his  readers  how  the 
Romans  had,  through  the  workings  of  tyche  and  anacyclosis, 
managed  to  conquer  the  Greeks-  a  topic  that  has  never  been 
adequately  assessed.  I  shall  contend  that  Polybius'  emphasis  on 
the  early  unity  of  and  the  subsequent  decline  of  the  Achaean 
league,  was  designed  to  show  the  workings  of  anacyclosis  at 
'For  Sparta  see  Polyb.  6.10.1-11;  Carthage  Polyb.  6.51.1-8. 
8 work  in  both  their  systems  of  government;  Polybius  deliberately 
presenting  a  picture  of  decline  in  Greece  to  account  for  Rome's 
success.  This  thesis  will  contend  that  Polybius'  stress  on  the 
Achaean  league's  almost  utopian  unity  was  to  show  how  tyche 
had  been  favourable  to  the  people  and  city  of  Rome  at  a  time 
when  it  had  been  unfavourable  to  the  Achaean  ethnos.  Polybius 
presents  the  Achaean  league  in  his  Res  Graecae  as  the  entire 
Peloponnese  resembling  a  single  polls.  His  intention  was  to  show 
how,  through  the  capricious  force  that  was  tyche,  the  Achaean 
league  had  degenerated,  through  the  workings  of  anacyclosis, 
from  initially  dealing  with  Rome  on  an  equal  basis  under 
Philopoemen  and  Aristaenus'  leadership,  into  mob-rule  and 
anarchy  by  the  time  of  Corinth's  destruction  in  146BC. 
The  second  factor  is  how  Polybius'  stress  on  the  unity  of  the 
Achaean  league  in  his  histories  distorts  our  understanding  of  the 
actions  undertaken  by  Greek  states  in  the  Peloponnese  before, 
and  during,  the  Roman  conquest.  Throughout  his  work, 
Polybius,  though  he  was  a  native  of  Megalopolis  in  Arcadia,  calls 
himself  an  Achaean.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  evident  from 
Polybius'  narrative  that  Megalopolitans  like  Philopoemen, 
Lycortas,  Aristaenus,  Diophanes,  Critolaus  and  Diaeus  played  a 
dominant  role  in  Achaean  politics.  Although  Polybius  describes 
the  Achaean  league  as  a  democracy,  it  was  in  reality  an  oligarchy 
in  which  Megalopolis  had  an  extremely  powerful  position. 
Given  that  pragmatike  historia  was  intended  to  instruct,  is 
9 Polybius'  presentation  of  events  in  the  Peloponnese  related  to  his 
wider  objective  to  explain  anacyclosis  '  influence  on  the  Achaean 
and  Roman  systems  of  government  when  they  began  to  interact 
with  each  other? 
Roman  intervention  in  Greece  had  taken  place  in  the 
aftermath  of  the  Social  War  between  the  Achaean  and  Aetolian 
leagues,  which  was  itself  caused  by  the  alliance  concluded 
between  the  Achaean  league  and  Macedonia  during  the 
Cleomenic  War.  Polybius  portrays  Aetolian  actions  during  this 
period  as  those  of  irrational  pirates  bent  on  wreaking  havoc  on 
the  Peloponnese,  especially  during  their  raids  on  Messene  and 
Cynaetha  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Social  War.  Although 
Polybius  may  have  believed  that  what  he  wrote  about  Aetolian 
actions  in  the  Peloponnese  was  an  accurate  account  of  events  I 
shall  suggest  that  they  only  give  us  his  own,  Arcadian, 
perspective.  It  would  appear  that  the  Aetolian  league  claimed  a 
mythical  kinship  relationship  with  the  Eleans  and  that  the 
Achaean  league's  alliance  with  Macedonia  had  placed  the 
Aetolian  league  in  an  extremely  dangerous  position.  Though  the 
threat  from  Sparta  to  the  Achaean  league  explains  the  decision  to 
call  on  Macedonia,  Polybius  does  not  mention  the  fear  that 
Cleomenes  would  export  social  reforms  throughout  the 
Peloponnese  as  a  factor  in  the  decision.  From  the  resistance  in 
Corinth  and  Sicyon  after  the  entry  of  Macedonian  troops  into  the 
Peloponnese,  it  would  appear  that  there  was  widespread 
10 opposition  to  this  move,  which  was  not  solely  based  on  socio- 
economic  factors.  The  earlier  expansion  of  the  Achaean  league 
into  the  Peloponnese,  especially  into  Arcadia,  was  carried  out  in 
conjunction  with  the  Aetolian  league,  with  the  intention  of 
removing  the  pro-Macedonian  tyrants  in  this  region. 
However,  once  Arcadian  poleis  like  Megalopolis  had  been 
absorbed  into  the  Achaean  league,  there  was  an  alteration  in  the 
orientation  of  its  policy  towards  these  communities'  interests 
that  provoked  conflict  with  Cleomenes'  Sparta  and  damaged 
Elean  interests.  Polybius  was  a  Megalopolitan;  his  presentation 
of  events  in  the  Peloponnese  prior  to  Rome's  involvement  in 
Greek  affairs  was  bound  to  be  favourable  to  the  interests  of  his 
native  polls.  No  matter  how  justified  Aetolian  actions  in  the 
Peloponnese  may  have  been,  to  Polybius  they  were  aggressive 
acts. 
Yet  in  some  respects  this  is  the  crux  of  the  matter.  Polybius 
wrote  to  explain  to  his  readers  how  the  Romans  came  to  control 
the  Greek  world.  He  did  so  in  terms  of  the  cyclical  nature  of 
history,  stressing  how  tyche  benefits  certain  states  at  a  time  when 
it  is  unfavourable  to  others.  By  stressing  these  factors,  and 
emphasising  the  unity  of  the  Achaean  league  so  that  he  could 
explain  its  eventual  decline,  Polybius,  whose  intention  was  to 
give  his  contemporary  readership  political  instruction,  could  not 
have  imagined  that  readers  who  came  from  a  completely 
different  society  would  read  his  histories.  As  such,  elements  of 
11 pragmatike  historia,  which  may  have  appeared  straightforward  to 
the  readership  Polybius'  writings  were  aimed  at,  are  alien  to  us.  I 
shall  suggest  that  Polybius'  stress  on  Achaean  unity,  and  his 
presentation  of  it  as  a  single  polis,  unwittingly  masks  the  true 
situation  in  the  Peloponnese.  The  Achaean  identity  that  Polybius 
stresses  throughout  his  work  was  in  reality  that  of  an  Arcadian 
who  was  a  member  of  a  political  federation  called  the  Achaean 
league,  resulting  in  a  partisan  depiction  of  the  actions  of  states 
like  Aetolia  and  Sparta.  Furthermore  that  the  competing  interests 
of  the  various  powers  and  regional  differences  in  the 
Peloponnese  brought  about  Rome's  initial  involvement  in  Greek 
affairs,  and  were  later  exploited  by  Romans  like  Flamininus  to 
further  Rome's  imperial  control. 
So  if  tyche's  affect  on  the  process  of  anacyclosis  in  Rome  and 
Greece  is  the  key  to  understanding  Polybius'  portrayal  of  events, 
does  this  have  any  implications  for  our  understanding  of  Roman 
imperialism  and  Polybius'  portrayal  of  it?  Polybius  has  in  the 
past  been  seen  as  a  man  who  adopted  a  positive  view  of  Rome's 
presence  in  the  Greek  world  after  the  destruction  of  Corinth  in 
146BC'  The  view  that  the  Hellenistic  period  was  a  time  of 
immense  social  upheaval  in  Greece  is  based  largely  on  Plutarch's 
account  of  the  lives  of  Agis  and  Cleomenes  which  laid  emphasis 
on  the  influence  that  Stoic  philosophy  played  in  their  reforms. 
This  view  leads  to  a  belief  that  the  Hellenistic  period  was  a  time 
'Walbank  (1972)  pp.  166-83. 
12 of  social  upheaval  in  Greece,  culminating  in  Corinth's 
destruction  in  146BC  9  Should  this  be  accepted?  In  Polybius' 
account  of  Cleomenes'  reign,  which  survives  intact,  Polybius 
makes  no  mention  of  either  Agis  or  Cleomenes  being  influenced 
by  Stoic  philosophy.  Although  Cleomenes  undoubtedly  carried 
out  some  reforms  at  Sparta  during  some  part  of  his  reign, 
Polybius  does  not  mention  them  directly. 
Does  this  have  any  implications  for  our  understanding  of 
Polybius'  depiction  of  later  events?  There  is  an  assumption  that 
the  events  of  146BC  and  Corinth's  destruction  by  the  Romans 
were  to  some  extent  motivated  by  socio-economic  problems  that 
existed  in  the  Peloponnese  during  the  Hellenistic  period.  The 
role  of  the  mob,  its  irrationality  and  madness  is  evident  in 
Polybius'  account  of  events  leading  up  to  Corinth's  destruction 
in  146BC.  Pausanias,  drawing  on  Polybius,  draws  attention  to 
the  sordid  corruption  of  the  Achaean  leadership  that  caused  the 
dispute  that  ignited  this  conflict.  " 
However,  Corinth's  destruction  was,  as  Polybius 
emphasised,  the  single  greatest  misfortune  to  have  occurred  in 
9  For  the  most  recent  discussion  of  the  role  of  the  masses  in  Corinth's  destruction,  see 
Eckstein  (1995)  pp.  135-6,  who  suggests  that  an  aristocrat  like  Polybius  feared  and 
detested  the  role  that  the  common  people  played  in  this  affair. 
'o  Paus.  7.12.1-4. 
13 Greece.  "  It  was  exactly  the  sort  of  event  that  occurred  at  the  end 
of  the  cycle  of  anacyclosis,  democracy  degenerating  into  mob 
rule,  anarchy  and  a  single  destructive  event,  before  a  strong 
leader  emerged  to  save  men  from  their  weakened  state.  " 
Polybius  portrayed  in  his  histories  how  Rome  expanded  its 
control  over  Asia,  Africa,  Greece  and  Italy  from  220BC  onwards, 
the  point  where  Polybius  began  his  histories,  claiming  that  the 
rise  of  Rome  had  unified  the  affairs  of  these  four  regions  13  The 
fortunes  of  the  Achaean  league  had  become  entwined  with  those 
of  Rome  from  that  point  onwards;  a  period  when  tyche  benefited 
the  Romans  while  the  -  cycle  of  anacyclosis  was  corrupting  the 
Achaean  league's  democracy.  Corinth's  destruction  ended  this 
and  as  the  process  of  anacyclosis  resumed  in  Rome,  Greek  society 
would  renew  itself,  its  political  classes  drawing  inspiration  from 
Polybius'  histories,  learning  how  tyche  had  allowed  the  barbarian 
Romans  to  gain  mastery  over  Greece,  so  that  this  situation 
would  not  re-occur. 
The  first  four  chapters  will  deal  with  the  events  in  the 
Peloponnese  prior  to  Rome's  advent  into  the  Greek  world,  and 
will  examine  whether  the  account  given  in  Polybius'  pragmatike 
historia  is  a  neutral  one  or  related  to  his  wider  theme  of 
"  Polyb.  38.1.2.  "For  though  both  Greece  and  her  several  parts  had  often  met  with 
mischance,  yet  to  none  of  her  former  defeats  can  we  more  fittingly  apply  the  name  of 
misfortune  with  all  it  signifies  than  to  the  events  of  my  own  time.  " 
12  Polyb.  6.9.9. 
13  Polyb.  5.33.1-5. 
14 explaining  Roman  imperialism.  The  first  chapter  will  be  a  very 
brief  examination  of  Polybius'  attitude  towards  the  writing  of 
what  he  terms  as  pragmatike  historia,  which  is  contemporary 
political  history.  The  second  chapter  will  examine  the  links, 
through  proxenia  and  mythical  kinship,  that  the  Aetolian  league 
had  in  the  Peloponnese,  to  see  if  they  might  provide  a  different 
viewpoint  on  the  Aetolian  league's  interests  in  the  Peloponnese 
from  that  presented  by  Polybius.  From  there  the  expansion  of  the 
Achaean  league  under  Aratus  and  the  influence  that  it  had  in 
bringing  the  Achaean  league  into  conflict  with  Sparta  will  be 
examined.  I  shall  argue  that  once  Cleomenes  had  effectively 
gained  control  over  the  Peloponnese,  Arcadian  poleis  in  the 
Achaean  league,  such  as  Megalopolis,  appealed  to  their 
traditional  ally  Macedonia  for  assistance,  even  though  this  was 
at  variance  with  the  wishes  of  the  inhabitants  of  poleis  such  as 
Corinth  and  Sicyon. 
The  third  chapter  will  look  at  how  accurate  Polybius' 
depiction  of  the  development  of  the  Achaean  league  during  the 
Hellenistic  period  actually  is  and  how  it  compared  with  the 
evolution  of  the  Aetolian  league.  Unlike  the  Achaean  league, 
which  appears  from  its  inception  to  have  been  a  political 
organisation,  the  Aetolians  from  the  archaic  period  onwards 
formed  an  ethnos  and  were  a  distinct  people  in  the  same  manner 
that  the  Arcadians  were.  Thus,  although  the  Aetolian  league 
expanded  during  the  Hellenistic  period,  Aetolians  from  the 
15 ethnos  retained  control  over  the  office  of  strategos.  However,  in 
the  Achaean  league  the  office  of  Achaean  strategos  was 
dominated  firstly  by  Aratus  of  Sicyon  and  later  by 
Megalopolitans.  While  there  was  traditionally  an  assumption 
that  both  leagues  evolved  in  a  similar  fashion,  the  archaeological 
evidence  would  seem  to  suggest  otherwise,  the  Achaean  identity 
espoused  by  Polybius  being  essentially  artificial. 
This  has  ramifications  for  our  understanding  of  Aetolian 
actions  during  the  Social  War,  which  will  be  the  topic  of  the 
fourth  chapter.  Aratus'  expansion  into  Arcadia  had  been  carried 
out  in  conjunction  with  the  Aetolian  league,  with  the  stated  aim 
of  ridding  the  Peloponnese  of  pro-Macedonian  tyrants.  Once  the 
Macedonians  had  re-entered  the  Peloponnese,  the  Aetolian 
league  was  placed  in  a  dangerous  strategic  position.  Instead  of 
viewing  Aetolian  actions  prior  to  the  Social  War  as  irrational  acts 
of  piracy,  as  Polybius  presents  them,  the  raids  launched  on 
Messene  and  Cynaetha  were  actually  part  of  a  military  strategy 
conceived  by  the  Aetolian  league's  leadership  to  defend  their 
mythical  kinsmen  in  Elis.  The  intention  is  to  find  out  whether 
Polybius'  contention  that  the  cause  of  these  two  wars  was  merely 
avaricious  behaviour  by  the  Aetolian  league  is  defensible. 
The  fifth  chapter  will  focus  on  how  Rome  exploited  the 
situation  in  the  Peloponnese  to  further  its  imperial  ambitions. 
Instead  of  viewing  the  treaty  between  the  Aetolian  league  and 
Rome  in  212/211BC  as  a  joint  looting  expedition,  I  shall  suggest 
16 that  the  Romans  approached  the  Aetolian  league  because  they 
knew  of  the  difficult  situation  it  faced  after  the  Macedonian 
entry  into  the  Peloponnese  and  sought  to  exploit  it.  The 
reference  in  Livy  to  the  Romans  promising  to  restore  parts  of 
Acarnania  to  Aetolian  control  suggests  that  the  treaty  was 
concluded  to  assist  the  Aetolians  in  their  effort  to  regain  some  of 
the  ground  that  they  had  lost  to  the  Macedonians.  Furthermore, 
the  mention  of  so  many  allies  of  the  Aetolian  league  as  Roman 
adscripti  in  the  Peace  of  Phoenice  indicates  that  the  Romans  were 
successful  in  finding  a  pretext  for  a  further  intervention  in  the 
Greek  world  when  the  Second  Punic  War  was  over. 
From  there  the  chapter  will  turn  towards  the  Second 
Macedonian  War,  in  particular  the  alliance  between  the  Achaean 
league  and  Flamininus  in  198BC.  Once  the  alliance  with  the 
Aetolian  league  had  served  its  purpose  Flamininus  allied  with 
the  Achaean  league,  taking  advantage  of  Megalopolitan  fears 
that  they  would  find  themselves  isolated  when  they  faced  a 
renewed  threat  from  Sparta  under  Nabis.  I  will  suggest  that  the 
treaty  of  *alliance  between  Rome  and  the  Achaean  league  was 
concluded  much  earlier  than  previously  thought. 
The  sixth  chapter  will  examine  the  fruits  of  co-operation 
between  the  Achaean  league  and  Rome.  Polybius  presents  the 
initial  phase  of  the  relationship  between  Rome  and  Achaea  as 
one  between  equals.  In  reality,  Megalopolitans  within  the 
Achaean  league  appear  to  have  co-operated  with  the  Romans, 
17 foiling  the  plot  to  bring  Antiochus  to  Greece  swiftly,  because 
they  sought  to  profit  from  the  defeat  of  the  Aetolian  league.  I 
shall  argue  that  Flamininus  rewarded  the  Megalopolitan 
leadership  of  the  Achaean  league  by  granting  them  control  over 
Sparta,  Elis  and  Messene  in  return  for  their  support  during  the 
Aetolian/Syrian  War. 
When  this  war  was  over  Philopoemen  began  to  direct  the 
Achaean  league  towards  renewing  its  alliances  with  a  number  of 
Hellenistic  monarchs.  The  Romans,  who  expected  their  subjects 
to  behave  in  a  different  manner,  exploited  grievances  at  Sparta, 
and  later  Messene,  to  undermine  the  Megalopolitan  position  in 
the  Achaean  league.  I  shall  suggest  firstly  that  Callicrates' 
actions  in  180BC,  in  particular  his  settlement  of  Spartan  affairs, 
drew  Polybius'  ire  because  he  broke  the  dominance  that 
Megalopolitans  had  held  over  the  Achaean  league  for  at  least 
twenty-five  years  beforehand.  Secondly,  that  Polybius  depicted 
Callicrates'  mission  as  marking  the  onset  of  the  final  stage  of 
anacyclosis  in  the  Achaean  system  of  government,  and  that  from 
this  point  onwards  Achaean  democracy  began  its  degeneration 
into  mob-rule,  anarchy  and  a  final  destructive  event. 
The  final  chapter  will  look  at  resistance  in  the  Achaean 
league  towards  Rome,  in  particular  Polybius'  attitude  towards  it. 
Before  the  outbreak  of  the  Third  Macedonian  War, 
Megalopolitan,  who  felt  that  their  interests  had  been  betrayed 
by  Callicrates'  settlement  in  Sparta,  tried  to  push  the  Achaean 
18 league  towards  supporting  Perseus  and  that  Polybius' 
subsequent  behaviour  during  the  Roman  invasion  of  Macedonia 
resulted  in  his  detention.  Although  Polybius  holds  Callicrates 
personally  responsible  for  his  detention,  I  shall  suggest  that 
Callicrates  merely  used  Roman  suspicion  at  Polybius'  actions  to 
remove  one  of  his  rivals  and  advance  the  interests  of  his  own 
region  at  the  expense  of  the  Arcadian  communities  within  the 
Achaean  league.  Furthermore,  that  by  placing  the  blame  solely 
on  Callicrates,  Polybius  was  attempting  to  show  how  anacyclosis 
had  resulted  in  corrupt  politicians  gaining  control  of  the 
Achaean  league 
From  there  the  chapter  will  look  at  the  events  surrounding 
the  Achaean  War  of  146BC,  a  problematic  question  since 
Polybius'  account  of  it  is  extremely  fragmentary.  I  shall  suggest 
that  the  causes  of  the  war  itself  were  not  socio-economic 
tensions.  Rather,  that  when,  after  the  death  of  Callicrates,  a  new 
generation  of  politicians  from  Megalopolis  began  to  re-assert 
their  position,  regional  tension  within  the  Peloponnese  resulted 
in  Sparta  attempting  to  secede  from  the  Achaean  league. 
Furthermore,  that  Polybius'  depiction  of  these  events  shows  not 
that  he  considered  the  leaders  of  the  revolt  to  have  been 
demagogues  who  threatened  to  bring  socio-economic  upheaval 
to  the  Peloponnese.  Rather  that  his  emphasis  on  the  mob  and 
anarchy  was  an  attempt  to  show  his  readers  that  the  cycle  of 
anacyclosis  in  the  Achaean  system  of  government  was  over.  His 
19 intention  in  doing  so  was  to  point  out  to  his  readers  that  the 
Achaean  league  would  renew  itself  at  the  same  time  as  the 
Roman  Republic  began  to  decline  from  within. 
Traditionally,  Polybius  has  been  seen  as  a  descendent  of 
Thucydides,  writing  contemporary  political  history  with  the 
intention  of  instructing  his  readership.  Even  in  antiquity  the  link 
between  historians  and  exile  or  separation  from  their  homeland 
was  noticed.  14  Thucydides  was  exiled  from  Athens  for  his  failure 
at  Amphipolis  and  both  Herodotus  and  Xenophon  spent  long 
periods  away  from  their  homelands. 
Unlike  these  earlier  historians,  Polybius  was  not  exiled;  he 
was  detained  at  the  hands  of  an  alien  power  that  had  destroyed 
his  society,  ended  its  independence,  and  imposed  its  own 
authority  and  rule.  The  question  arises  whether  Polybius  came  to 
accept  Roman  domination  and  wrote  so  that  both  the  Greeks  and 
Romans  would  come  to  understand  each  other?  Or  whether  the 
intention  of  pragmatfke  historia  was  to  explain  to  his  Greek 
readers  how  the  barbarian  Romans  had  managed  to,  achieve  the 
unthinkable,  thus  providing  -them  with  the  consolation  that, 
although  it  had  happened,  the  cyclical  nature  of  history  was  such 
that  eventually  they  would  regain  what  they  had  lost. 
14  P1ut.  Moralia  605C. 
20 Chapter  One 
The  purpose  of  pragmatike  historia 
Introduction 
At  the  introduction  to  his  histories  Polybius  explains  his 
decision  to  write  them  in  the  form  of  a  question,  aimed  at  his 
contemporary  readership,  pointing  out  that: 
Who  is  so  lacking  in  curiosity  and  so  worthless  as  not  to 
wish  to  know  by  what  means  and  under  what  system  of 
polity  the  Romans  have  succeeded  in  under  fifty  three  years 
in  bringing  almost  the  entire  inhabited  world  under  their 
control,  an  event  unique  in  history.  ' 
Taking  as  his  starting  point  the  140th  Olympiad  in  220BC, 
Polybius  contended  that  before  this  point  the  history  of  the 
world  had  been  a  series  of  unconnected  events,  separate  in  their 
origins  and  effect.  Later  the  rise  of  Rome  unified  the  histories  of 
four  regions,  Africa,  Asia,  Greece  and  Italy,  leading  to  Polybius' 
claim  that  he  was  writing  a  universal  history  that  would  explain 
the  rise  of  Rome  to  his  readers?  Polybius'  chief  concern  was  with 
'  Polyb.  1.2.5.  At  the  conclusion  to  his  histories,  (Polyb.  39.8.7.  )  "As  I  said,  students  by 
this  treatment  will  attain  the  best  and  most  salutary  result,  which  is  to  know  how  and  by 
what  system  of  polity  the  whole  world  was  subjected  to  the  single  rule  of  Rome,  an 
event  without  any  parallel  in  the  past". 
2Polyb.  5.33.1-5.  Walbank  (1972)  pp.  1-18  addresses  the  question  of  Polybius'  readership 
and  intentions,  arguing  that  Polybius  intended  his  histories  to  be  used  as  a  guidebook 
for  Greek  politicians  in  their  dealings  with  Rome. 
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educating  the  active  or  aspiring  statesman,  whc,  ., 
he  believed, 
would  learn  from  his  history  both  practical  lessons  and  general 
wisdom-  as  he  termed  it,  pragmatike  historia. 
Polybius'  stated  aim  in  writing  history  was  to  explain  Roman 
rule  over  the  Mediterranean  world  to  his  readership.  His  intention 
was  to  reconstruct  past  events  in  a  fashion  that  would  provide 
Greek  political  leaders  with  an  explanation  for  Roman  rule  over 
the  Mediterranean  world.  The  model  he  chose  to  explain  this 
conquest  was  Rome's  system  of  government  and  the  influence  of 
anacyclosis'  suspension  on  it.  This  chapter  will  assess  Polybius' 
attitude  towards  the  writing  of  history;  in  particular  how  he 
presented  the  information  he  collected  to  instruct  his  readership. 
Polybius'  concept  of  history  was  that  it  was  a  medium  whose 
primary  purpose  was  to  give  political  instruction.  As  a  result  he 
presented  the  Achaean  league,  a  political  organisation  that 
dominated  the  Peloponnese  during  the  Hellenistic  period,  as  a 
single  polis  so  that  he  could  contrast  the  influence  that  anacyclosis 
had  on  its  system  of  government  with  that  of  Rome.  His  intention 
in  doing  so  was  to  instruct  his  readership  about  the  decline  that 
had  taken  place  in  Greece,  which  had  allowed  the  Romans  to  gain 
mastery  over  it.  It  will  question  the  extent  to  which  present  day 
historians  can  use  Polybius'  writings  as  a  source  for 
reconstructing  events  during  the  Hellenistic  period  without 
taking  into  account  how  his  stress  on  the  role  of  tyche  and 
22 anacyclosis  in  historical  events  distorts  our  understanding  of  the 
situation  in  the  Peloponnese. 
Polybius  on  the  writing  of  history 
In  book  twelve  of  his  histories  Polybius  examines  the 
approach  of  other  Hellenistic  historians,  finding  fault  with  his 
contemporaries'  methodology,  and  then  proceeds  to  expound 
his  own  approach  to  historia  at  great  length.  For  Polybius, 
history's  sole  purpose  was  to  give  instruction  to  future 
politicians?  Polybius  believed  that  those  who  had  practical 
experience  in  politics  were  best  qualified  to  perform  this  task 
and  he  extensively  criticised  historians  whose  knowledge  of  past 
events  did  not  come  from  personal  experience,  which  he 
believed  was  vital.  Polybius  had  been  hipparch  of  the  Achaean 
league  before  his  detention  in  Italy:  his  father  Lycortas  and  his 
family's  close  ally  Philopoemen  had  dominated  the  office  of 
3  See  Sacks  (1981)  pp.  21-96  for  the  best  discussion  of  Polybius'  narrative  method,  which 
focuses  on  book  six.  Sacks  identified  three  important  terms  that  Polybius  used  to  define 
his  intention  in  writing  history.  Autopatheia,  or  personal  experience,  (p.  32)  and  empeiria, 
or  actual  experience  (p.  35)  were  for  Polybius  the  key  factors  necessary  for  those  writing 
pragmatike  historia.  More  problematic  in  any  discussion  of  Polybius'  attitude  towards 
historia  is  his  use  of  emphasis,  both  in  book  six  and  elsewhere.  Sacks  discusses  Polybius' 
use  of  emphasis  in  detail,  (pp.  36-56)  contending  that  despite  Polybius'  varied  use  of  this 
word  in  different  contexts,  emphasis  has  one  basic  meaning,  "they  (all)  describe  a 
transference  of  knowledge  from  the  person  creating  the  emphasis  to  the  intended 
recipient"(p.  36). 
23 Achaean  strategos  for  long  periods!  Furthermore,  Polybius 
claimed  to  have  travelled  extensively  throughout  the 
Mediterranean  world  because  of  his  detention  in  Rome  and 
friendship  with  Scipio  Aemilianus,  as  reflected  in  book  thirty- 
four  where  he  writes  on  the  geography  of  Europe  and  Africa.  ' 
Book  twelve  is,  in  reality,  largely  devoted  to  a  polemic 
against  other  historians'  methods.  Timaeus,  who  wrote  a  history 
of  Sicily,  though  his  work  has  survived  only  in  fragments,  has 
his  writings  singled  other  for  particular  reproach  by  Polybius. 
According  to  Polybius,  a  historian  of  political  affairs  should  have 
proficiency  in  three  areas:  the  study  of  written  sources,  a  detailed 
knowledge  of  the  places  that  he  is  writing  about  and  personal 
experience  in  political  affairs.  "  Historians  such  as  Timaeus  were, 
Polybius  believed,  unable  to  write  history  properly,  since  they 
were  neither  proficient  in  political  affairs  nor  widely  travelled. 
As  Polybius  states  about  Timaeus'  methodology: 
He  believed  that  by  settling  in  Athens  for  nearly 
fifty  years  and  acquainting  himself  with  what  his 
predecessors  had  written,  he  had  thoroughly 
prepared  himself  to  write  history,  a  very  deluded 
supposition  in  my  view.  ' 
`See  Eckstein  (1995)  p.  3  for  Polybius'  background  and  political  connections. 
s  Walbank  (1979)  pp.  563-4. 
6  Polyb.  12.25E.  1.  Also  at  12.25G.  1. 
Polyb.  12.25.  D.  1. 
24 In  criticising  Timaeus'  approach  to  history,  Polybius  argued 
that  historians  should  not  deal  with  events  that  took  place  in  the 
distant  past.  Polybius  contended  that  history  should  instead 
deal  with  contemporary  events.  Regarding  his  own  work  and  the 
period  that  he  wrote  about,  Polybius  states  that  it  coincided  with 
his  own  generation  and  that  of  his  father  thereby  allowing  him  to 
draw  on  his  own  political  experiences  and  those  of  his 
contemporaries.  Polybius'  detention  in  Italy  and  later  his  travels, 
allowed  him  a  unique  view  of  the  world  he  wrote  about,  such  as 
his  description  of  the  destruction  of  Carthage-  an  event  Polybius 
claims  to  have  witnessed  at  Scipio's  invitation  and  by  his  side. 
As  for  other  historical  approaches,  Polybius  forcefully  states 
that  historians  like  Timaeus,  writing  about  genealogies,  the 
foundation  myths  of  poleis  and  such  matters,  were  unable  to 
comprehend  history  properly.  As  he  argued,  such  a  historian: 
Either  must  repeat  what  others  have  said,  while  passing  it 
off  as  his  own,  which  is  very  wrong,  or,  if  he  refuses  to  do 
this,  his  work  will  prove  quite  useless,  since  he  will  as  a 
result  concede  that  what  he  writes  and  thinks  about  is 
what  his  predecessors  have  adequately  dealt  with  before.... 
accordingly  it  was  my  decision  to  write  contemporary 
history,  first  because  new  events  are  constantly  taking 
place  and  require  treatment  for  the  first  time....  secondly, 
because  this  is  the  most  instructive  type  of  history! 
e  Polyb.  9.2.2-6. 
25 Polybius'  approach  to  history  was  in  the  tradition  set  by 
Thucydides,  rejecting  an  exploration  of  events  in  the  distant  past, 
along  with  mythological  factors,  in  favour  of  contemporary 
political  and  military  history!  Through  his  extensive  knowledge 
of  internal  Greek  politics,  from  his  own  experiences  as  Achaean 
hipparch,  or  through  those  of  his  father  Lycortas-  the  Achaean 
league's  strategos  on  a  number  of  occasions,  it  appears  that 
Polybius'  histories  were  based  on  first  hand  experience.  His 
detention  in  Rome  may  have  allowed  Polybius  the  opportunity 
to  question  both  the  actions  of  his  fellow  detainees  and  more 
importantly,  the  actions  of  influential  Romans,  giving  him  the 
ability  to  understand  the  reasoning  and  motives  of  those  who 
took  differing  positions  to  his  own  1°  Finally,  Polybius  appears  to 
have  been  familiar  with  some  archive  material;  his  account  of  the 
alliance  between  Philip  V  and  Hannibal  appears  to  have  been 
based  on  the  Punic  original.  " 
Despite  this,  problems  with  Polybius'  writings  have  been 
identified.  Scholars  see  Polybius'  application  of  causation  at  best 
as  a  mechanical  copy  of  Thucydides;  Polybius  never  gives  us  any 
Hoinblower  (1994)  p.  60  draws  attention  to  a  number  of  passages  that  indicate 
Polybius'  knowledge  of  Thucydides.  He  suggests  that  Polybius  had  a  clear  view  of 
Greek  history  from  480BC  onwards. 
'0  Walbank  (1972)  p.  75  draws  attention  to  Polybius'  detailed  knowledge  of  events  in 
Philip  V's  court  during  the  last  years  of  his  reign,  information  that  Polybius  could  only 
have  obtained  from  somebody  who  was  there,  presumably  one  of  his  fellow  detainees. 
26 indication  of  the  motivation  and  reasoning  behind  many  of  the 
actions  that  he  describes  in  his  work,  notably  Antiochus'  motives 
at  the  outbreak  of  the  Aetolian/Syrian  War,  despite  expounding 
his  theory  of  causation  at  length.  12  More  importantly,  as  Walbank 
pointed  out,  although  Polybius  claimed  to  be  writing  a  universal 
history,  the  history  of  the  Achaean  league  was  an  important 
secondary  theme  in  his  writings.  Walbank  suggests  this  was  due 
to  Polybius  basing  his  history  on  earlier  works.  According  to 
Walbank's  hypothesis,  before  his  detention  in  Rome,  Polybius 
had  already  composed  a  life  of  Philopoemen,  which  he 
expanded  into  a  history  of  the  Achaean  league  from  where 
Aratus'  Memoirs  left  off  in  220BC.  Eventually,  Walbank  suggests 
that  Polybius  used  these  two  earlier  works  as  the  basis  for  his 
universal  history.  13  Walbank  argues  that  a  close  examination  of 
what  remains  of  the  histories  shows  us  that: 
The  parts  of  the  histories  that  deal  with  Achaea  and  the 
unification  of  the  Peloponnese  seem  to  fit  naturally 
enough  into  the  greater  work,  where  they  constitute  a 
"  Gruen  (1984)  p.  60.  Walbank  (1972)  pp-82-83  suggests  that  Polybius'  access  to  archival 
material  was  probably  limited,  though  he  did  make  use  of  this  source  when  possible. 
'2  For  an  exploration  of  Polybius'  theory  of  causation,  see  Derow  (1994)  pp.  73-90. 
Though  Derow  acknowledges  that  Polybius  widened  the  notion  of  causation  from 
"how"  to  "why",  he  nevertheless  insists  that  one  of  the  fundamental  problems  of 
Polybius'  histories  fail  to  explain  the  causes  with  all  their  intricacies  and  full  complexity. 
13  See  Walbank  (1972)  p.  14.  Since  neither  of  these  two  works  survives,  it  should  be  noted 
that  there  is  actually  no  evidence  for  this  view.  Walbank  describes  this  possibility  as  not 
impossible,  but  dependent  on  speculation. 
27 minor  variation  on  the  major  theme  of  oecumenical 
unity  under  the  guidance  of  Rome  14 
However,  events  in  the  Peloponnese  take  up  a  significant 
portion  of  Polybius'  surviving  text.  Polybius'  concern  with  this 
region's  affairs,  especially  those  of  the  Achaean  league,  heavily 
influences  his  presentation  of  Rome's  advent  in  the  Greek  world. 
Polybius  admitted  that  it  was  impossible  for  a  historian  not  to 
write  about  his  homeland  with  favouritism  and  held  that  this 
was  acceptable  as  long  as  it  did  not  contradict  the  facts  15  It  has 
been  acknowledged  that  opponents  of  the  Achaean  league  such 
as  Aetolia  and  Sparta  receive  negative  treatment  at  Polybius' 
hands.  16 
As  for  Polybius'  attitude  in  his  histories  towards  the  actions 
of  states  and  individuals,  Walbank  argues  that  Polybius  was 
almost  Machiavellian,  in  that  he  exercised  a  utilitarian  and 
ruthless  standard  of  judgement  in  assessing  others.  Success, 
according  to  Walbank,  was  important  to  Polybius  at  all  costs; 
being  the  ultimate  criterion  that  governed  human  behaviour,  no 
heed  was  to  be  paid  to  ethics  17  More  recently  Eckstein  has 
suggested  that  Polybius'  work  was  part  of  the  moralistic  genre  of 
literature  that  was  widespread  in  the  Hellenistic  period  and  that 
"  Walbank  (1972)  p.  15-16. 
'5  Polyb.  16.14.6. 
16  See  for  example  Luce  (1997)  p.  132  who  describes  Polybius'  criticism  of  the  Aetolian 
league  as  a  minor  lapse  from  his  standards  of  veracity. 
"  Walbank  (1972)  p.  164. 
28 many  of  Polybius'  judgements  on  states  and  individuals  derive 
from  his  aristocratic  background.  18 
An  interesting  example  of  the  differences  between  Walbank 
and  Eckstein  comes  in  book  four,  in  two  passages  where 
Polybius  suggests  that  Messene  and  Arcadia  should  ally,  a 
comment  which  he  follows  up  with  the  suggestion  that  war  is 
not  the  greatest  of  all  evils  19  Eckstein  suggests  that  Polybius  was 
actually  expressing  his  own  carefully  thought-out  opinions 
about  the  ethics  of  peace  and  war  and  that  the  examples  that  he 
gives  are  not  actually  relevant,  simply  ones  that  his  readers 
would  find  familiar!  '  Walbank  earlier  contended  that  these  two 
passages  represented  clever  strokes  of  policy,  all  aimed  at 
strengthening  the  Achaean  league  against  Sparta-  the 
Arcadian/Messenian  co-operation  suggested  by  Polybius  has  the 
explicit  goal  of  balancing  Spartan  power  21  As  Walbank  points 
out,  Polybius'  advice  to  Elis  to  become  permanently  neutral 
subtly  achieves  the  same  result  since  its  neutrality  would 
deprive  Sparta  of  an  ally  '  Given  that  Megalopolis  and  Sparta 
18  See  Eckstein  (1995)  especially  pp.  1-25,  which  examines  Walbank's  "Polybius",  and 
draws  attention  to  earlier  writers,  such  as  Dryden  and  John  Adams,  who  both  regarded 
Polybius  as  a  moralist. 
19  Polyb.  4.30.5.  and  Polyb.  3.33.12. 
20  Eckstein  (1995)  pp.  60-61. 
21  Polyb.  4.33.11. 
Walbank  (1957)  p.  478  and  (1972)  p.  20.  He  suggests  that  these  passages  are  later 
insertions  just  before  publication  of  the  first  fifteen  books,  and  was  probably  written 
29 were  long-standing  rivals,  Polybius'  concern,  according  to 
Walbank,  appears  to  be  to  secure  the  Achaean  league's  position 
in  the  Peloponnese. 
Was  Polybius'  account  of  events  in  the  Peloponnese  a 
dispassionate  one,  especially  given  his  intention  to  instruct?  Or 
was  it  related  to  his  intention  to  explain  Rome's  conquest 
through  tyche's  influence  on  the  process  of  anacyclosis  in  systems 
of  government?  Polybius  stated  that  he  was  writing  a  certain 
type  of  history  that  would  appeal  to  those  interested  in  public 
life,  and  that  as  a  result,  his  writings  were  not  aimed  at  the 
general  reader.  Polybius  clearly  differentiates  pragmatike  historia 
from  other  histories  that  featured  myths,  legends,  genealogies 
and  stories  surrounding  the  foundation  of  poleis  and  colonies  o 
Despite  Polybius'  contention  that  those  writing  pragmatike 
historia  should  ignore  mythological  factors,  focusing  instead  on 
military  and  political  affairs,  recent  epigraphic  evidence  suggests 
that  claims  of  pan-Dorian  brotherhood  between  states  was  an 
important  factor  in  determining  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
Aetolian  league  in  the  late  Hellenistic  period.  Polybius  was 
aware  of  the  role  that  claims  of  mythical  kinship  played  in  the 
conduct  of  relations  between  states,  mentioning  kinship 
relationships  between  Sparta  and  Selge,  and  Rome  and  Ilium  24 
around  150/149BC,  when  relations  between  the  Achaean  league  and  Sparta  were 
deteriorating. 
23  Polyb.  9.1.2. 
Z4  For  Polybius'  awareness  of  kinship  relations,  see  Polyb.  5.76.11. 
30 In  the  past  scholars  have  discounted  the  importance  of  kinship 
links,  but  they  appear,  on  the  basis  of  epigraphic  evidence,  to 
have  been  an  important  factor  in  governing  the  relations 
between  Greek  states.  Evidently  there  were  two  schools  of 
history  in  the  late  Hellenistic  period,  one  represented  by 
Polybius  writing  pragmatike  historia,  and  the  other  represented  by 
Timaeus,  whose  writings  presumably  placed  more  emphasis  to 
the  mythological  aspects  of  the  relations  between  states  2' 
Polybius  and  Achaean  Unity;  Federalism  and  the  socio- 
economic  question  in  the  Peloponnese 
Not  only  is  Polybius  the  only  surviving  contemporary 
source  for  Rome's  advent  in  the  Greek  world  but  his  histories  are 
also  the  only  contemporary  literary  source  that  deals  with  the 
situation  in  the  Peloponnese  during  the  Hellenistic  period. 
Polybius  paid  particular  attention  to  the  unity  of  this  region 
under  the  Achaean  league,  but  was  Polybius'  depiction  of  the 
situation  in  the  Peloponnese  related  to  his  primary  concern  in 
writing  pragmatike  historia;  providing  his  readers  with  an 
explanation  for  Roman  control  over  the  Greek  world?  Although 
the  Greek  world  contained  a  large  number  of  federal  states,  it  is 
astonishing  that  there  is  a  complete  and  utter  lack  of  any 
"  Writing  in  the  First  Century  BC,  the  noted  critic  Dionysius  of  Halicarnassus  identified 
three  major  types  of  historical  writing:  local  chronicles,  larger  scale  histories  as  written 
by  Herodotus,  and  the  intermediate  type,  best  exemplified  by  Thucydides.  See  Sacks 
(1981)  p.  98. 
31 explanation  from  the  ancient  sources  about  how  these  states 
actually  functioned.  In  Polybius  this  omission  is  even  more 
startling.  Polybius  had  been  hipparch  of  the  Achaean  league 
before  his  detention  in  Rome  and  was  extremely  interested  in 
constitutional  matters.  Polybius  should  have  been  the  right 
person  to  tell  us  in  detail  about  the  organisation  and  workings  of 
the  Achaean  league,  yet  he  is  remarkably  silent  on  this  topic  Z6 
This  omission  is  even  more  surprising  since  in  his  histories 
Polybius  depicts  a  situation  far  removed  from  the  one  that 
pertained  in  the  classical  period.  Throughout  his  work  Polybius 
refers  to  himself  as  an  Achaean,  though  he  was  a  native  of 
Megalopolis  in  Arcadia,  since  in  235BC  Megalopolis  had 
become  a  member  of  the  Achaean  league.  According  to 
Polybius,  the  Achaean  league  had  developed  to  a  point  where 
all  the  poleis  that  became  members  of  it  shared  the  same  law 
courts  and  Boule  27 
This  situation  came  about,  he  argued,  because  of  the 
freedom  the  Achaean  league's  system  of  government  gave  its 
members,  since: 
'  Lehmann  (2001)  pp-49-53  suggests  that  Polybius  may  have  had  a  detailed  description 
of  how  the  Achaean  constitution  functioned  in  one  of  his  later  books. 
27  Polyb.  2.37.10. 
32 One  could  not  find  a  political  system  and  principle  so 
favourable  to  equality  and  freedom  of  speech,  in  a  word, 
so  sincerely  democratic.  " 
Despite  these  claims,  scholars  have  long  accepted  that 
Polybius  exaggerated  the  unity  of  the  Achaean  league.  '  The  area 
around  Dyme,  Patrae,  Pharea  and  Tritaea,  the  poleis  that 
originally  formed  the  Achaean  league,  appears  to  have  had  a 
form  of  local  government  distinct  from  the  rest  of  the  Achaean 
league  during  the  Hellenistic  period  30  Poleis  that  were  members 
of  the  Achaean  league  regularly  sent  embassies  to  each  other  as 
if  they  were  independent  states  31 
Polybius  stresses  the  freedom  and  equality  within  the 
democratic  Achaean  league  in  his  histories;  he  also  makes  it 
apparent  that  many  of  its  members  during  the  Hellenistic  period 
joined  unwillingly.  As  he  admitted: 
2'  Polyb.  2.38.6.  Despite  Polybius'  claim  that  the  Achaean  league  was  a  democratic 
organisation,  modem  scholars  have  tended  to  doubt  this.  Aymard  (1938)  p.  17  n.  10  and 
Walbank  (1957)  p.  222,  both  argue  that  it  was  an  oligarchy.  Lehmann  (2001)  pp.  58-61 
argues  that  Polybius  is  making  reference  in  this  passage  to  Aristotle's  claim  that  the 
tribal  states  of  Greece  had  the  structure  of  mere  symmachies,  and  that  this  reference  is  a 
response  to  Aristotle's  claim  that  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  build  a  wall  around  the 
Peloponnese. 
Larsen  (1968)  pp.  215-240,  though  accepting  Polybius'  account  of  the  development  of 
the  Achaean  league,  exercises  some  caution,  accepting  that  (p.  219)  "this  unity  may  seem 
artificial  and  unnatural". 
'°  Larsen  (1968)  p.  339. 
31  Larsen  (1968)  p.  238. 
33 Some  of  the  Peloponnesians  chose  to  join  it  of  their  own  free 
will,  it  won  many  others  by  persuasion  and  argument,  and 
those  whom  it  forced  to  adhere  to  it  when  the  occasion 
presented  itself,  suddenly  underwent  a  change  and  became 
quite  reconciled  to  their  position  32 
As  Walbank  pointed  out,  states  that  became  members  of  the 
Achaean  league  can  be  divided  into  two  categories;  those  who 
joined  voluntarily  and  those  who  were  forced  into  it  against  their 
will  '  Catherine  Morgan  has  recently  disputed  Polybius'  account 
of  the  development  of  the  Achaean  league  from  the  archaic 
period  onwards;  pointing  out  that  the  archaeological  evidence 
contradicts  much  of  what  he  writes.  She  argues  that  the 
Achaeans  did  not  form  a  distinct  nation,  or  ethnos,  during  the 
archaic  period.  She  suggests  it  is  probable  that  the  Achaean 
league  was  an  artificially  based  political  organisation  whose 
members  came  together  due  to  their  need  for  mutual  protection, 
contending  that  Polybius'  account  of  early  Achaean  history  was 
an  attempt  to  create  a  historical  past  for  the  Achaean  league  of 
his  own  day.  '  In  light  of  this,  should  Polybius'  assertion  that  the 
development  of  the  Achaean  league  resulted  in  the  various  ethne 
of  the  Peloponnese  uniting  to  form  one  ethnos  be  accepted?  In 
particular  should  we  accept  that  Polybius,  an  Arcadian  from 
32  Polyb.  2.38.7. 
'3  Walbank  (1957)  p.  222. 
34  Morgan  (1996)  p.  195. 
34 Megalopolis,  adopted  an  Achaean  identity?  Scholars  in  the  past, 
looking  towards  the  United  States  of  America  as  a  model, 
suggested  that  the  Achaean  league  during  the  Hellenistic  period 
came  to  form  a  strong  centralised  government  which  united  the 
disparate  peoples  of  the  Peloponnese  into  a  single  state. 
However,  the  United  States  of  America  is  merely  one 
example  of  a  modern  political  federation.  Polybius'  presentation 
of  the  destruction  of  Corinth  in  146BC;  anarchy,  an  irrational 
leadership,  and  its  constituent  members  attempting  to  secede, 
echoes  the  demise  of  one  of  the  most  important  political 
federations  of  the  20'  century,  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist 
Republics,  which  collapsed  in  similar  chaotic  circumstances.  The 
whole  concept  of  modern  federalism  has  also  evolved;  like  the 
Achaean  league,  the  European  Union  has  common  law  courts, 
standardised  weights  and  measurements,  and  with  a  few 
exceptions,  a  common  currency.  Despite  this  unity  regarding 
certain  matters,  countries  within  the  European  Union  retain  their 
own  national  governments.  Though  elements  of  a  centralised 
administration  such  as  a  parliament  do  exist,  its  powers  are 
limited,  the  constituent  members  of  the  European  Union 
remaining  sovereign  states.  The  states  of  the  Peloponnese  did 
belong  to  some  form  of  a  political  union  during  the  Hellenistic 
period.  This  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  they  considered 
themselves  to  be  a  single  ethnos,  or  people.  As  Polybius'  histories 
relate,  many  of  the  states  that  were  members  of  the  Achaean 
35 league  during  the  Hellenistic  period  were  forced  into  it,  notably 
Corinth,  Argos,  Sparta,  Elis  and  Messene.  At  various  stages  both 
Sparta  and  Messene  tried  to  leave  the  Achaean  league,  Messene 
attempting  to  secede  from  the  league  in  183BC,  while  a  similar 
attempt  by  the  Spartans  to  leave  provoked  the  crisis  that  led  to 
the  Roman  sack  of  Corinth  in  146BC. 
The  leadership  of  the  Achaean  league  was  not 
representative  of  its  members;  the  dominance  of  Megalopolitans 
over  the  office  of  Achaean  strategos  has  been  noted  35  Despite 
this,  the  influence  that  Megalopolitan  dominance  over  this  office 
may  have  had  on  the  events  leading  up  to  Rome's  involvement 
in  Hellenic  affairs  has  not  been  assessed.  Of  particular  interest 
are  the  decision  by  the  Achaean  league  to  invite  Antigonus 
Doson  into  the  Peloponnese  in  220BC  to  seek  his  assistance 
against  Cleomenes  of  Sparta,  and  later  the  decision,  under 
Aristaenus'  influence,  to  ally  the  Achaean  league  with  Rome  in 
198BC.  Polybius  presents  these  actions  as  decisions  that  were 
forced  on  the  Achaean  league  by  circumstances  beyond  its 
control.  In  reality,  the  first  changed  the  balance  of  power  in 
Greece  in  favour  of  the  Macedonians,  the  traditional  rivals  of  the 
Aetolian  league;  the  second  appears  to  have  affected  the  interests 
that  the  Aetolian  league  had  in  the  Peloponnese  and  endangered 
the  position  of  its  kinsmen  in  Elis.  The  influence  that 
Megalopolitan  membership  of  the  Achaean  league  had  in 
"  O'Neil  (1984-86)  pp.  34-36. 
36 provoking  conflict  between  the  Achaean  league  and  Sparta  from 
235BC  onwards,  with  Megalopolitans  playing  an  important  role 
in  opening  the  negotiations  leading  to  the  alliance  with 
Macedonia,  has  been  noted  ' 
According  to  Plutarch,  Aratus'  first  instinct  was  to  appeal  to 
the  Aetolian  league  for  assistance  against  Cleomenes  and  it  was 
only  when  they  refused  that  he  reluctantly  agreed  to  call  on  the 
Macedonians  37  The  earlier  alliance  between  the  Aetolian  league 
and  Aratus  during  the  Achaean  league's  expansion  into  the 
Peloponnese  has  been  frequently  overlooked  38  The  decision  by 
the  Achaean  league  to  invite  Antigonus  Doson  to  re-enter  the 
Peloponnese  placed  the  Aetolian  league  in  a  dangerous  strategic 
situation,  leading  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Social  War  and 
subsequently  the  Aetolian  alliance  with  Rome  during  the  First 
Macedonian  War  39 
Were  the  crimes  that  Polybius  depicts  Aetolians  committing 
in  the  Peloponnese  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Social  War  in 
reality  an  attempt  to  gain  a  strategic  foothold  in  this  region?  For 
example,  Polybius  portrays  the  Aetolian  league's  raid  on 
Cynaetha  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Social  War  as  a  betrayal  by 
malcontent  exiles,  who  had  been  restored  to  this  polis  shortly 
'See  Scholten  (2000)  p.  188  for  the  pressure  exerted  on  Aratus  by  former  Antigonid 
clients  in  the  Achaean  league. 
37Plut.  Arat.  41.2.  Scholten  (2000)  pp.  187-88. 
''  It  has  not  been  entirely  ignored,  see  Larsen  (1975)  pp.  159-79. 
39  Scholten  (2000)  p.  230. 
37 beforehand.  40  Cynaetha  was  situated  at  the  centre  of  an 
important  communication  route  in  the  Peloponnese  and  had 
been  earlier  forced  into  the  Achaean  league  by  Aratus,  even 
though  some  of  its  inhabitants  favoured  an  alliance  with  Elis  41 
The  restored  exiles  who  betrayed  Cynaetha  to  the  Aetolian 
raiding  force  are  usually  seen  as  members  of  the  lower  classes 
who  hoped  for  a  re-distribution  of  property.  In  light  of  the 
earlier  attempt  by  some  inhabitants  of  Cynaetha  to  ally  with  Elis 
the  possibility  exists  that  the  exiles  had  been  created  in  the 
aftermath  of  Cynaetha's  entry  into  the  Achaean  league. 
Polybius'  reference  to  the  re-distribution  of  property  may  be 
linked  to  the  desire  of  these  restored  exiles  to  regain  on  their 
return  the  land  they  had  possessed  before  their  exile  42 
So,  although  Polybius  portrays  the  Peloponnese  in  his 
histories  as  unified  under  the  Achaean  league  to  the  extent  that  it 
came  to  resemble  a  single  polls,  we  only  have  his  assertion  that  it 
was.  Given  the  total  dominance  that  Megalopolitans  held  over 
the  office  of  Achaean  strategos  between  205  and  181BC,  the 
40  Polyb.  4.17.4.  "Constant  mutual  massacres,  banishment,  the  robbery  of  people's  goods, 
and  even  the  redistribution  of  lands".  Eckstein  (1995)  pp.  136-38  discusses  this  passage 
in  the  context  of  Polybius'  fear  of  the  lower  orders.  Polybius  makes  no  mention  of  this  as 
a  factor,  suggesting  that  the  Cynaethans,  living  as  they  did  in  the  harshest  part  of 
Arcadia,  needed  gentleness  and  mildness  in  their  educational  system  that  music  could 
supply  (Polyb.  4.21.3-5.  ). 
"  Scholten  (2000)  pp.  288-94. 
4'  For  the  events  surrounding  Cynaetha's  earlier  forced  entry  into  the  Achaean  league 
see  Walbank  (1936)  pp.  67-71. 
38 period  covering  Rome's  initial  involvement  in  the  Greek  world, 
that  which  Polybius  presents  as  the  Achaean  league's  policy  was 
actually  carried  out  entirely  by  Megalopolitans  such  as 
Philopoemen,  Aristaenus,  Diophanes  and  Lycortas.  It  would 
appear  from  the  unwilling  entry  of  Sparta,  Elis  and  Messene  into 
the  Achaean  league  between  192-188BC  that  there  was  a  close 
degree  of  co-operation  between  the  Megalopolitan  and 
Flamininus  and  that  the  Achaean  league  benefited  from  Aetolia's 
defeat  by  absorbing  its  allies  in  the  Peloponnese. 
Does  Polybius'  assertion  in  his  histories  that  he  was  an 
Achaean  and  his  stress  on  the  unity  of  the  Achaean  league  have 
any  implications  for  our  understanding  of  Roman  imperialism? 
During  the  19`'  and  20`h  centuries,  European  imperial  powers 
exploited  ethnic  and  religious  divisions  amongst  the  indigenous 
peoples  they  came  into  contact  with  so  that  their  subjects 
remained  divided  and  were  unable  to  unite  in  resistance  against 
colonial  rule.  During  their  conquest  of  Italy,  the  Romans  had 
exploited  differences  between  various  Italian  peoples,  playing 
off  the  different  ethnic  groups  against  each  other  in  order  to  gain 
mastery  over  the  peninsula.  Although  it  is  tempting  to  suppose 
that  in  the  late  Hellenistic  period  the  boundaries  of  the  polls 
became  more  permeable,  leading  to  the  development  of  koina, 
political  federations  that  united  previously  disparate  peoples,  it 
must  be  asked  whether  or  not  these  institutions  were  able  to 
overcome  old  rivalries.  In  the  Peloponnese,  the  Eleans 
39 maintained  close  links  with  their  mythical  kinsmen  in  Aetolia, 
despite  the  fact  that  they  were  separated  from  each  other  by  the 
Gulf  of  Corinth,  and  fought  alongside  the  Aetolian  league 
during  the  Social  and  First  Macedonian  Wars,  and  later  against 
Rome  in  192BC.  When  Elis  subsequently  became  a  member  of 
the  Achaean  league  did  it  accept  its  membership  willingly?  Or 
did  the  Spartans  willingly  accept  membership  of  an  Achaean 
league  dominated  for  long  periods  by  Megalopolitans? 
Polybius,  Rome  and  anacyclosis 
Polybius  gives  an  account  of  Greek  society  that  stresses  the 
unified  nature  of  the  Peloponnese  under  the  Achaean  league 
though  his  narrative  suggests  that  communities  within  it 
retained  many  of  their  old  animosities  and  allegiances.  Again, 
one  should  question  Polybius'  motivation  in  writing  his 
histories,  especially  his  attitude  towards  Rome.  This  section  will 
contend  that  Polybius  presents  Rome  in  idealised  terms  during 
its  conquest  of  the  Mediterranean  world  because  he  wished  to 
instruct  his  readers  as  to  how  the  process  of  anacyclosis,  a  cycle 
that  poleis  experienced  in  their  systems  of  government,  had  been 
disrupted  there.  This  suspension  created  the  circumstances  that 
resulted  in  Rome  achieving  mastery  over  the  Mediterranean 
world. 
40 Anacyclosis  is  frequently  is  seen  as  an  attempt  by  Polybius 
to  explain  the  Roman  constitution  to  his  Greek  readership  in 
terms  that  would  be  familiar  to  them.  Should  it  be  seen  only  in 
this,  isolated  context?  Polybius  was  writing  historia,  a  type  of 
literature  that  derived  from  the  Greek  oral  and  epic  traditions, 
with  the  stated  purpose  of  explaining  Roman  imperialism  to  his 
readership.  At  the  outset  of  his  work,  Polybius  stresses  that  the 
Roman  system  of  government  was  vital  in  allowing  Rome  to 
gain  control  over  the  Mediterranean  world,  and  at  the  start  of  his 
third  book,  he  re-iterates  the  vital  role  that  Rome's  system  of 
polity  played  in  its  conquests  43  He  devoted  his  sixth  book 
entirely  to  a  discussion  of  the  Roman  system  of  government;  the 
significance  of  this  factor  in  his  wider  work  cannot  be  ignored. 
Again,  one  should  remember  the  extent  to  which  historia 
had  developed  by  the  time  that  Polybius  was  writing  44  By  the 
fourth  century,  historians  had  already  begun  to  divide  their 
works  into  books.  If  one  looks  at  the  way  that  Polybius  devised 
his  work,  there  appears  to  be  a  hexadic  structure  in  his  first 
thirty  books,  Polybius'  intention  being  to  have  five  books 
discussing  events  around  the  Mediterranean  and  then  a  book 
consisting  of  a  digression  devoted  to  a  particular  subject  45  The 
first  five  books  are  an  introduction,  dealing  with  the  First  Two 
43  Polyb.  3.2.6. 
4°  Derow  (1994)  p.  84  remarks  on  Polybius'  professionalism. 
4  'See  Hornblower  (1994)  p.  16-17,  which  suggests  that  possibly  Polybius'  geographical 
book  was  intended  to  be  twenty-four  instead  of  thirty-four. 
41 Punic  Wars  and  the  expansion  of  the  Achaean  league,  ending 
with  the  conclusion  of  the  Social  War  and  Philip  alliance  with 
Hannibal.  At  that  point  Polybius  introduces  his  account  of  the 
Roman  system  of  government  in  book  six.  Between  books  seven 
and  eleven  Polybius  deab  with  events  in  Greece  after  the  alliance 
between  Philip  V  and  Hannibal  and  events  in  Italy  during  the 
Second  Punic  War,  digressing  on  the  role  and  purpose  of  historia 
in  book  twelve.  Books  thirteen  down  till  seventeen  deal  with 
events  leading  up  to  the  end  of  the  Second  Punic  War  and  the 
turn  eastwards  of  the  victorious  Roman  Republic.  Book  eighteen, 
although  incomplete,  in  its  surviving  fragments  concentrates  on 
the  period  in  Greece  between  198-196BC,  immediately  after  the 
alliance  between  the  Achaean  league  cif 
Iome, 
containing 
Flamininus'  declaration  of  Freedom.  In  books  nineteen  till 
twenty-three  Polybius  presents  Rome  and  the  Achaean  league 
acting  almost  as  equals.  Polybius'  twenty-fourth  book,  again  far 
from  complete,  relates  the  circumstances  surrounding  the  break 
down  of  this  relationship,  Callicrates'  embassy  to  Rome  and  his 
decision  to  tell  the  Romans  that  they  should  regard  the  Greeks  as 
subjects.  Books  twenty-six  to  twenty-nine  deal  with  the  decline 
in  the  Achaean  league  and  growing  Roman  encroachment  into 
its  affairs  until  the  battle  of  Pydna  which  occurs  in  book  thirty. 
In  the  extension  to  his  work,  books  thirty-one  to  thirty  nine 
Polybius  presents  tyche  as  the  supreme  force  governing  human 
affairs  and  men's  behaviour,  corrupting  the  senate  and  Roman 
42 youth,  and  in  Greece,  dominated  by  corrupt  men  such  as 
Callicrates,  Polybius'  historia  culminates  with  the  destruction  of 
Corinth. 
The  intention  of  this  section  will  be  to  examine  the  concept 
of  anacyclosis  in  Polybius'  histories,  to  find  out  if  it  was  an 
attempt  to  rationalise  the  Roman  conquest  for  his  readers.  By 
stressing  that  Rome's  success  had  occurred  because  the  systems 
of  government  in  Greek  states  had  being  undergoing  a  decline, 
Polybius  was  indicating  to  his  readers  that  subjection  to  Roman 
rule  had  occurred  because  Rome  was  temporarily  superior  to 
Greek  states  where  the  process  of  anacyclosis  had  not  been 
suspended.  As  Polybius  made  evident,  eventually  anacyclosis 
would  resume  in  the  Roman  system  of  government,  thereby 
destroying  the  circumstances  that  had  led  to  Rome  achieving 
domination  over  the  Mediterranean  world.  As  Rome  was  re- 
entering  a  period  of  decline,  the  Achaean  league,  having  suffered 
the  final  destructive  event  that  occurred  at  the  end  of  the  cycle  of 
anacyclosis,  would  have  emerged  renewed. 
Assessing  Polybius'  attitude  towards  Rome  is  difficult,  since 
at  no  point  does  Polybius  clearly  state  how  he  regarded  Roman 
rule  over  the  Mediterranean  world.  In  explaining  his  decision  to 
extend  his  work  from  the  battle  of  Pydna  as  originally  conceived 
down  to  the  sack  of  Corinth,  Polybius  stated  that  he  hoped  that 
his  work  would  serve  the  purpose  of  explaining  Roman  rule 
since: 
-S 
43 It  is  evident  that  contemporaries  will  thus  be  able  to  see 
clearly  whether  the  Roman  government  is  acceptable  or  not, 
and  future  generations  whether  it  should  be  considered  to 
have  been  worthy  of  praise  and  admiration  or  rather  of 
blame.  " 
Although  Polybius  provides  the  evidence,  he  leaves  it  up  to 
his  readers  how  they  should  judge  Rome's  rule,  without  adding 
his  own  opinion  which  has  been  seen  by  various  scholars  as  pro- 
Roman,  anti-Roman,  impressed,  embittered,  ambivalent  and 
cynica147  At  times  Polybius'  presentation  of  Rome  appears 
almost  contradictory.  He  portrayed  the  Greeks  as  regarding 
Rome  as  an  aggressive  power  set  on  conquest  and  more 
importantly,  as  barbarian  during  the  First  Macedonian  War  48  At 
the  same  time,  there  is  no  doubt  that  Polybius  also  portrays 
Rome  during  its  struggle  with  Carthage  in  the  part  of  his 
histories  that  survive,  his  first  five  books,  in  almost  ideal  terms 
and  individuals  like  Flamininus  and  Scipio  are  depicted  in  a 
favourable  light  49  In  book  six  of  his  histories,  which  is  almost 
46  Polyb.  3.4.7. 
47  Erskine  (2000)  p.  1382. 
See  Walbank  (1985)  p.  150-1  for  a  discussion  of  five  passages  where  Polybius  has 
Greeks  argue  that  Rome  was  an  aggressive,  barbarian  state. 
9'  For  an  example  of  Polybius  describing  the  Romans  as  barbarians  in  a  direct  voice,  see 
Campion's  discussion  of  Polyb.  12.4b.  1-c.  1.  Histos  (2000),  dealing  with  Polybius'  account 
of  Timaeus'  depiction  of  the  October  horse  ceremony,  which  was  celebrated  to 
commemorate  the  disaster  at  Troy.  Polybius  states  that  Timaeus  is  incorrect  to  link  this 
with  the  fall  of  Troy,  and  that  the  Roman  custom  was  a  common  practice  amongst  all  the 
44 intact,  Polybius  gives  a  glowing  account  of  the  Roman  system  of 
government  and  institutions,  drawing  attention  to  its  many 
virtuous  features.  Scholars  who  in  the  past  have  doubted  the 
aggressive  and  imperialistic  nature  of  the  Roman  Republic  have 
drawn  attention  to  a  supposed  contradiction  in  Polybius,  whose 
narrative  presents  not  Rome,  but  rather  its  enemies  as  being 
responsible  for  starting  many  of  the  wars  they  fought  5°  Walbank 
suggested  that  despite  Polybius'  assertion  that  Rome  was 
aggressive,  his  interpretation  was  not  only  factually  incorrect, 
but  could  be  shown  to  be  from  his  own  text.  He  argued  that 
Polybius  stated  that  Rome  was  aggressive  because  he  assumed 
that  it  was  the  duty  of  any  sovereign  state  to  expand  51  However 
despite  his  glowing  account  of  Roman  institutions,  Polybius  is 
careful  to  point  out  to  his  readers  that  the  Romans  are  different 
from  the  Greeks.  In  the  case  of  Roman  religious  practices, 
Polybius  points  out  how  the  Roman  elite  manipulated 
barbarians.  However,  Polybius'  intention  was  to  prove  that  Timaeus'  reasoning  was 
wrong.  It  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  he  did  not  accept  that  the  Romans  were 
Trojans. 
50  The  supposed  contradiction  has  been  refuted  by  Derow  (1979)  pp.  1-15. 
See  Walbank  (1963)  p.  10  and  (1972)  p.  163-4  for  this  argument.  Harris  (1979)  p.  114 
points  out  that  after  216BC  many  of  the  vital  parts  of  Polybius'  text  are  missing.  He 
suggests  that  had  we  access  to  the  full  text,  possibly  in  the  missing  sections  Polybius 
would  have  given  some  details  about  the  widening  of  Roman  ambitions  as  the 
Carthaginian  effort  failed,  and  the  Romans  extended  their  power  into  Spain  and  Africa. 
45 superstition,  a  typical  barbarian  characteristic,  to  keep  the 
masses  under  control.  52 
Walbank  argued  that  although  Polybius  was  cautiously 
anti-Roman  before  his  detention  and  had  a  cynical  attitude 
towards  Roman  policy  during  his  time  in  Italy,  the  catastrophic 
events  of  146BC  changed  his  attitude  into  one  of  acceptance  of 
the  Roman  presence.  3  Polybius'  connections  with  members  of 
the  Roman  elite  may  have  altered  his  attitude.  Polybius  informs 
his  readers  that  at  'the  beginning  of  his  detention  he  became 
acquainted  with  the  young  Scipio  Aemilianus  through  the  loan 
of  some  books.  This  action,  Polybius  claimed,  grew  into  a 
friendship  that  allowed  him  to  spend  much  of  the  time  he  spent 
in  detention  at  Rome  itself,  unlike  the  other  hostages  who  were 
distributed  throughout  Italy,  Polybius  presenting  himself  as  the 
younger  man's  mentor!  Aemilianus  was  the  son  of  Aemilius 
Paullus,  the  victor  over  Perseus  and  the  adoptive  grandson  of 
Scipio  Africanus;  Polybius  presents  himself  as  moving  within  the 
highest  circles  in  Roman  political  life  during  his  detention. 
The  Romans  also  appear  in  parts  of  Polybius'  histories  not 
as  barbarians  55  During  the  Second  Punic  War,  Polybius  portrays 
the  Romans  as  having  many  characteristics  that  would  be 
considered  as  being  typically  Greek,  such  as  rationality,  self- 
SZ  Polyb.  6.56.7-9. 
Walbank  (1972)  p.  82-3. 
5'  Polyb.  31.23.4. 
55  Polyb.  39.2.1-3. 
46 I 
sufficiency  and  discipline.  Polybius  portrays  the  Carthaginians 
during  this  conflict  as  having  typical  barbarian  characteristics, 
leading  some  to  suggest  that  Polybius  felt  the  Romans  were 
honorary  Greeks  56  In  the  events  surrounding  Corinth's 
destruction  in  146BC,  the  event  that  Walbank  suggests  made 
Polybius  pro-Roman,  Polybius  presents  the  Romans  behaving  in 
a  rational  fashion;  it  is  his  fellow  Achaeans  whom  he  depicts  as 
irrational. 
This  does  not  imply  that  Polybius  admired  Roman 
institutions  or  accepted  Roman  rule.  Polybius  conceived  his 
histories  as  a  means  of  providing  his  Greek  readers  with  a 
rational  explanation  as  to  why  the  Romans  were  successful;  he 
could  hardly  portray  them  in  anything  but  a  positive  light 
during  their  conquest  of  Greece  57  In  his  histories  Polybius 
assumed  the  task  of  explaining  to  his  readership  something  that 
many  of  them  probably  considered  a  complete  and  utter  reversal 
of  the  natural  order  58  Greeks  considered  themselves  distinct 
from  other  people,  viewing  non-Greeks,  whom  they  called 
barbarians,  as  irrational,  brutal,  cruel  and  superstitious; 
See  Erskine  (2000)  p.  174. 
Walbank  points  out  that  Polybius  never,  in  the  surviving  parts  of  his  work,  describes 
the  Romans  as  barbarians  in  a  direct  voice,  though  he  frequently  has  others  make  this 
claim  in  speeches.  Walbank  (1985)  pp.  152-3. 
Walbank  (1972)  pp.  3-6  collects  a  number  of  passages  which  indicate  that  Polybius 
intended  his  work  primarily  for  a  Greek  readership.  Polyb.  31.22.8.  states  that  Polybius 
47 characteristics  that  Polybius  shows  in  Roman  behaviour  at 
various  stages  of  his  work  59  Polybius'  histories  had  to  address  an 
important  question  for  his  readers.  Why,  if  the  Greeks  had  the 
characteristics  they  believed  themselves  to  possess,  were  they 
subject  to  an  alien  and  barbarian  people?  '  This  was  the  question 
that  Polybius  intended  his  histories  to  give  a  satisfactory  answer 
to. 
As  Polybius  stated,  from  220BC  onwards,  the  fates  of  the 
Achaean  league  and  Rome  had  become  linked  61  Polybius  argued 
that  a  cycle  occurred  in  the  development  of  the  systems  of 
government  in  all  poleis,  which  he  termed  anacyclosis  62  The  initial 
phase  occurs  at  a  time  when  some  great  disaster  has  left  men 
weak  and  living  in  a  primitive  condition.  A  single  strong 
individual  then  emerges,  forcing  the  people  to  obey  his  dictates, 
a  phase  that  Polybius  describes  as  monarchia.  During  this  period 
men  gradually  develop  a  sense  of  duty  and  justice  from  rearing 
their  children,  from  whom  they  expect  gratitude  and  obedience, 
which  leads  to  a  sense  of  right  and  wrong  developing.  This  in 
knows  that  Romans  will  examine  his  histories,  but  does  not  mean  that  he  wrote  for  both 
audiences. 
'  See  Erskine  (2000)  pp.  165-82  for  an  examination  of  Polybius'  depiction  of  typical 
barbarian  characteristics  in  Romans  regarding  religious  practice  and  the  sacking  of 
cities. 
60  For  a  discussion  of  the  Romans  as  barbarians  in  Greek  international  political  discourse, 
see  Deininger  (1971)  pp.  21-37. 
61  Polyb.  5.33.1-5. 
'  For  Polybius'  theory  of  constitutional  change  see  Polyb.  6.6.1-9.10. 
48 turn  leads  to  monarchy  developing,  the  king  ruling  with  the 
support  of  his  subjects  `3  According  to  Polybius,  the  king's 
descendants,  because  of  rank  and  privilege,  will  eventually 
begin  to  commit  acts  of  violence  against  their  subjects,  and 
monarchy  will  give  way  to  tyranny,  until  eventually  the  tyrant  is 
overthrown  when  his  rule  becomes  unendurable'  Aristocracy 
replaces  monarchy  in  the  second  phase  of  anacyclosis  but  the 
descendants  of  the  initial  aristocratic  leaders  abuse  their 
position,  leading  to  an  oligarchy  alongside  growing  abuses  of  the 
citizenry.  Eventually  this  type  of  government  is  overthrown  in 
favour  of  democracy.  ' 
At  the  end  of  the  cycle,  Polybius  argued  that  the  citizens  of 
the  democracy  become  so  accustomed  to  freedom  and  equality 
that  they  no  longer  value  them;  violence  erupts,  leading  to  mob- 
rule  and  the  cycle  culminates  in  a  single  great  destructive  event. 
In  the  end  anarchy  prevails  as  it  did  at  the  beginning  and  the 
cycle  of  anacyclosis  resumes  `' 
However,  as  Polybius  points  out,  Rome,  along  with  certain 
other  states,  had  managed  to  achieve  a  mixture  of  these  three 
basic  forms  of  government  in  such  a  manner  that  their  system  of 
government  was  kept  in  a  state  of  equilibrium,  delaying 
Polyb.  6.6.1-12. 
64  Polyb.  6.8.4-6. 
65  Polyb.  6.9.1-3. 
"  Polyb.  6.9.9,  "Until  they  degenerate  again  into  perfect  savages  and  find  once  more  a 
master  and  monarch.  " 
49 
6ý.  ¢. anacyclosis  67  Sparta  had  achieved  it  through  the  actions  of 
Lycurgus,  and  it  had  developed  in  Rome  through  a  process  of 
trial  and  error.  But,  as  Polybius  makes  clear,  sooner  or  later  all 
mixed  systems  of  government  in  poleis  lose  their  balance  and 
anacyclosis  resumes.  Carthage,  like  Rome,  had  a  mixed  system  of 
government  at  one  stage  but  it  eventually  broke  down,  Carthage 
entering  into  a  period  of  decline  that  eventually  led  to  its 
destruction  by  the  Romans  in  146BC.  Polybius  has  Scipio 
Aemilianus  voice  his  fear  that  the  same  fate  would  happen  to 
Rome  as  he  watched  Carthage  bum.  ' 
Polybius'  account  of  anacyclosis  is  seen  by  many  historians 
as  a  clumsy  attempt  to  impose  a  Greek  political  theory  onto  the 
mixed  Roman  constitution,  suggesting  that  it  was  a  "simple- 
minded  notion  of  a  predictable  and  unchanging  cycle  of 
constitutional  forms"  69  Was  Polybius'  account  of  anacyclosis 
merely  a  device  to  explain  the  Roman  system  of  government  to 
his  Greek  readers?  Or  rather  was  it  a  theory  that  could  be 
applied  to  the  systems  of  government  in  all  poleis  which  would 
explain  to  Polybius'  Greek  readership  why  they  found 
67  Polyb.  6.10.1-14. 
6'  Polyb.  38.22.1-3.  "A  glorious  moment,  Polybius;  but  I  have  a  dread  foreboding  that 
some  day  this  doom  will  be  pronounced  upon  my  own  country".  It  would  be  difficult  to 
mention  an  utterance  more  statesmanlike  and  more  profound". 
69  See  Cornell  (2001)  p.  47;  also  note  26,  where  he  states  that,  "I  should  also  emphasise 
that  I  agree  with  those  who  draw  a  sharp  distinction  between  Polybius  the  second-rate 
philosopher  and  Polybius  the  first-rate  historian.  " 
50 themselves  living  under  barbarian  rule?  Polybius'  intention  in 
book  six  was  not  merely  to  explain  the  working  of  the  Roman 
constitution  to  his  readers;  it  was  to  explain  how  Rome  reached 
the  position  that  allowed  it  to  achieve  mastery  over  the 
Mediterranean  world.  " 
In  his  histories  Polybius  had  to  explain  to  his  readers  why 
the  natural  order  had  been  reversed,  the  irrational  Romans 
ruling  the  rational  Greeks.  His  portrayal  of  Hellenic  behaviour 
was  bound  to  reflect  the  decline  that  had  allowed  the  Romans  to 
gain  mastery  over  Greece.  Although  not  a  polls,  similarities  to 
one  undergoing  a  transformation  through  the  workings  of 
anacyclosis  could  be  seen  in  Macedonia  where  Philip  V  began  his 
reign  by  showing  the  potential,  according  to  Polybius,  to  be  the 
greatest  of  all  the  Antigonid  monarchs.  But,  shortly  before  Rome 
became  involved  in  Greek  affairs  there  was,  as  Polybius  makes 
evident,  a  change  in  his  character  for  the  worse  and  he  was 
transformed  into  a  tyrant  capable  of  carrying  out  the  most 
heinous  of  crimes.  71  As  Polybius  states: 
70  Powell,  (2001)  p.  24. 
"  For  Polybius'  digression  Philip  V's  change  in  character,  see  Polyb.  7.11.1-12. 
51 Henceforth,  as  if  he  had  had  a  taste  of  human  blood  and  of 
the  slaughter  and  betrayal  of  his  allies,  he  did  not  change 
from  a  man  into  a  wolf,  as  in  the  Arcadian  tale  cited  by 
Plato,  but  he  changed  from  a  king  into  a  cruel  tyrant.  " 
Polybius  depicts  Philip  V  as  a  drunk  who  committed 
adultery  with  the  wives  of  his  friends.  Perseus,  who  is  described 
by  Polybius  as  a  miser  and  a  physical  coward,  then  succeeded 
him.  73  Polybius'  rather  judgmental  account  of  Philip  V's  reign 
resembles  the  depiction  he  gave  of  monarchy  when  anacyclosis 
transforms  this  institution  into  tyranny,  producing  monarchs 
who: 
Received  the  office  by  hereditary  succession  and  found 
their  safety  now  provided  for...  they  gave  way  to  their 
appetites  owing  to  this  abundance,  and  came  to  think  that 
the  rulers  must  be  distinguished  from  their  subjects  by  a 
particular  dress,  that  there  should  be  a  particular  luxury 
and  variety  in  the  presentation  of  their  food  and  drink,  and 
that  they  should  meet  with  no  denial  in  the  pursuit  of  their 
love  affairs,  however  lawless.  ' 
Tyche  played  an  important  factor  in  the  destruction  of 
Macedonia,  taking  revenge  on  Philip  V  for  the  crimes  that  he  had 
n  Polyb.  7.13.7. 
For  Polybius'  depiction  of  these  two  monarchs,  see  Eckstein  (1995)  p.  261  n.  80,  and 
p.  286  n.  3  for  the  accusation  of  drunkenness  in  Philip  V  and  Antiochus. 
74  Polyb.  6.7.7. 
52 committed.  75  Undoubtedly  tyche  had  favoured  the  Romans.  They 
were  fortunate  enough  to  fight  against  and  defeat  the 
Macedonians  at  a  time  when  the  Antigonid  monarchy  was 
degenerating  into  a  tyranny,  as  Polybius  stated  all  monarchies 
eventually  did  under  the  pressures  of  anacyclosis,  at  a  point  when 
Rome's  system  of  government  was  unaffected  by  this  process. 
Cicero  looked  back  on  the  process  that  led  to  the  formation 
of  Rome's  mixed  constitution  in  the  First  Century  BC, 
suggesting,  as  Polybius  did,  that  Rome  had  acquired  its  mixed 
system  of  government  in  or  around  449BC.  However,  Cicero 
contended  that  despite  its  difficulties  from  133BC  onwards, 
Rome  still  retained  a  mixed  system  of  government.  76  Polybius 
stresses  that  anacyclosis  was  merely  delayed  in  the  Roman  system 
of  government  and  would  resume.  Polybius  depicts  Rome  as  an 
aggressive  state,  and  during  the  First  Macedonian  War  his 
histories  portray  Greek  politicians  warning  the  Aetolian  league 
that  the  Romans  were  barbarian  aggressors  who  were  exploiting 
its  difficulties  to  further  their  imperial  ambitions.  Nor  does 
Polybius  deviate  from  his  belief  that  Rome  was  aggressive.  He 
states  that  unlike  the  Spartans,  who  remained  essentially  bound 
to  the  Peloponnese,  the  Romans  aimed  for  world  domination 
's  Eckstein  (1995)  p.  263,  commenting  on  Polyb.  15.20.5-8. 
76  Powell  (2001)  p.  24 
53 from  the  outset  and  placed  all  of  their  energies  into  achieving  it.  " 
As  he  states: 
It  is  quite  natural,  that  having  been  schooled  in  such  great 
enterprises,  they  not  only  boldly  threw  themselves  into 
gaining  the  leadership  and  mastery  of  the  world,  but  they 
succeeded  in  realising  their  aim.  " 
It  would  appear  that  the  Romans  were,  in  Polybius'  opinion, 
exploiting  their  newly  acquired  territories.  Rome's  decision  to 
seize  the  gold  and  silver  from  Syracuse  during  the  Second  Punic 
War  was  natural;  according  to  Polybius,  because  the  Romans: 
Could  not  lay  claim  to  world  power  without  taking  away  the 
resources  of  others  and  appropriating  them  for  themselves.  ' 
However,  Rome  achieved  its  mastery  over  the 
Mediterranean  world  at  a  time  when  anacyclosis  was  suspended 
in  its  system  of  government,  and  had  remained  in  force  in  other 
states  that  had  systems  of  government  similar  to  poleis,  like  the 
Achaean  league.  Polybius'  account  of  Roman  behaviour  had  to 
account  for  how  anacyclosis'  suspension  had  produced  a  society 
that  had  been  able  to  overcome  Greek  states  like  the  Achaean 
league,  which  were  undergoing  a  decline  80 
"  For  Polybius'  comments  on  Spartan  imperialism,  see  Polyb.  6.50.5. 
7B  Polyb.  1.63. 
'Polyb.  9.10.11. 
80  See  Polyb.  6.19.1-42.6,  for  Polybius'  account  of  the  Roman  military  system.  Polyb.  6  56. 
6-15  for  Roman  religious  practices. 
54 As  for  Polybius'  presentation  of  events  in  the  Peloponnese, 
although  events  at  Corinth  in  146BC  were  undoubtedly 
destructive,  they  do  not  appear  to  have  put  an  end  to  Greek 
resistance  to  Rome,  or  have  had  the  finality  that  Polybius' 
histories  suggest.  As  a  recent  re-interpretation  of  an  inscription 
from  Dyme  indicates,  it  would  appear  that  resistance  to  Rome's 
presence  existed  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of  the  Achaean  War 
and  that  there  was  no  real  change  in  Greece  81  Although  there 
was  no  known  large-scale  revolt  against  Roman  power  in  the 
Peloponnese  between  the  destruction  of  Corinth  and 
Mithridates'  invasion,  this  does  not  mean  that  Greeks  like 
Polybius  came  to  accept  Roman  rule. 
Rather,  Polybius  expected  the  Roman  system  of  government 
under  which  its  conquest  of  Greece  had  been  achieved  to  suffer 
as  the  result  of  internal  decline  and  external  pressures.  The 
implication  for  his  readers  was  that  Roman  rule  over  Greece  was 
not  permanent.  Polybius  believed  that  Rome  had  reached  its 
zenith  during  the  Hannibalic  War  ß2  In  his  last  ten  books  he 
depicts  the  senate's  foreign  policy  as  both  amoral  and  immoral 
and  the  Roman  youth  being  corrupted  by  an  influx  of  wealth, 
leading  to  idleness  and  luxury.  It  appears,  as  Eckstein  argues, 
that  tyche  was  already  punishing  the  Romans  since  the  benefits 
B1  Kallet-Marx  (1995)  pp.  129-153. 
82  Powell  (2001)  p.  23. 
55 of  empire  were  corrupting  the  very  values  that  had  achieved  it  83 
Indeed,  the  final  image  of  Roman  behaviour  that  Polybius 
presents  to  his  readership  is  of  soldiers  playing  board  games  on 
a  priceless  work  of  art  during  the  sack  of  Corinth,  acting  in  truly 
barbarian  fashion.  '  Perhaps  he  was  suggesting  that  the 
resumption  of  anacyclosis  in  the  Roman  system  of  government 
was  not  a  distant  prospect  85  Moreover,  internal  decline  at  Rome 
would  come  at  a  time  when  the  Achaean  league,  having  suffered 
the  catastrophic  event  that  Polybius  claimed  heralded  the  end  of 
every  cycle  of  anacyclosis,  would  have  emerge  renewed  " 
However,  internal  decline  was  not  the  only  result  that 
anacyclosis  had  in  its  final  stages,  though  it  was  constant.  As 
Polybius  stated,  external  pressures,  although  unknown,  also 
played  an  important  role  in  the  eventual  descent  of  the  polis  into 
anarchy  $'  Politicians  like  Callicrates  had  corrupted  the  Achaean 
league  through  the  workings  of  anacyclosis;  Roman  pressure  and 
interference  in  its  affairs  also  resulted  in  its  destruction. 
Carthage,  which  like  Rome,  at  one  point  possessed  a  mixed 
83  Eckstein  (1995)  p.  265. 
Polyb.  39.2.1-3. 
Polyb.  31.25.2-6. 
86  Polybius'  role  in  the  Roman  settlement  was  to  ensure  that  statues  of  Philopoemen 
remained  intact  (Polyb.  39.3.4-11).  Furthermore,  he  refused  a  Roman  present  of  property 
that  Diaeus  had  owned,  and  urged  his  friends  not  to  acquire  property  owned  by  the 
leadership  of  the  rebellion  when  the  Romans  sold  it  (Polyb.  39.4.1-5.  ). 
87Polyb.  6.57.2. 
56 constitution,  had  been  weakened  both  by  its  mob  and  Roman 
pressure.  Yet,  although  supernatural  forces  beyond  their  control 
had  played  a  vital  role  in  Greek  subjection  to  Roman  rule, 
ultimately  Polybius  not  deny  th  ,- 
hat  might  be  described  as 
"free  will"  was  als  an  important  actor.  As  he  stated: 
But  as  for  matters  the  efficient  and  final  cause  of  which  it  is 
possible  to  discover  we  should  not,  I  think,  put  them  down 
to  divine  action.  For  instance,  take  the  following  case.  In  our 
own  time  the  whole  of  Greece  has  been  subject  to  a  low 
birth-rate  and  a  general  decline  in  population,  owing  to 
which  poleis  have  become  deserted  and  the  land  has  ceased  to 
yield  fruit,  although  there  have  neither  been  cc,  n7,  'ni,;,  swars 
nor  epidemics.  If,  then,  any  one  had  advised  us  to  send  and 
ask  the  gods  about  this,  and  find  out  what  we  ought  to  say 
or  do,  to  increase  in  numbers  and  make  our  cities  more 
populous,  would  it  not  seem  absurd,  the  cause  of  the  evil 
being  evident  and  the  remedy  being  in  our  own  hands?.... 
About  this  it  was  of  no  use  at  all  to  ask  the  gods  to  suggest  a 
means  of  deliverance  from  such  an  evil.  For  any  ordinary 
man  will  tell  you  that  the  most  effectual  cure  had  to  be 
men's  own  action,  in  either  striving  after  other  objects.... 
Neither  prophets  nor  magic  were  here  of  any  service,  and  the 
same  holds  for  all  particulars.  " 
"  Polyb.  38.17.4-12. 
57 Tyche  had  favoured  the  Romans  during  a  period  when  it 
had  been  unfavourable  to  the  Greeks.  However,  Rome's 
conquest  could  not  be  explained  solely  by  supernatural  factors; 
all  they  had,  or  could  do  in  the  future  was  create  favourable 
circumstances.  Ultimately  the  Romans  had  achieved  world 
domination  because  they  had  desired  it  from  outset,  and  had 
placed  all  of  their  resources  into  achieving  it.  Now  that  the 
circumstances  were  going  to  be  reversed,  the  Greeks  could  not 
simply  rely  on  internal  decline  within  the  Roman  system  of 
government;  that  would  occur  naturally,  but  would  not  be 
enough.  They  themselves  had  to  be  in  a  position  to  exert 
sufficient  pressure  on  a  Roman  state  weakened  through  the 
process  of  anacyclosis.  The  readership  that  Polybius  intended  his 
histories  for,  those  interested  in  public  life,  would  only  be  able 
to  do  so  if  they  were  able  to  learn  from  the  events  and  actions 
that  Polybius  outlined,  which  had  resulted  in  their  subjection  to 
Roman  rule. 
Polybius'  Portrayal  of  the  Aetolian  league 
Polybius'  depiction  of  the  Aetolian  league  and  its  actions 
during  the  Hellenistic  period  is  of  a  piratical  and  irrational  state 
bent  on  wreaking  destruction  in  the  Peloponnese.  However,  it  is 
merely  one  opinion,  and  as  Rigsby  points  out  in  the  context  of 
asylia  decrees,  had  Polybius  been  an  Aetolian,  perhaps  scholars 
today  would  be  assessing  the  popularity  or  otherwise  of  the 
58 Aetolian  Empire  89  As  early  as  the  late  19'  century,  Woodhouse, 
one  of  the  first  scholars  to  study  Aetolian  topography  and 
archaeology,  pondered  the  question  of  how  much  longer 
childish  perception  of  the  Aetolians  as  a  nation  of  robbers  would 
persist  9° 
Woodhouse's  prediction  about  the  course  of  future 
scholarship  on  Aetolia  was  as  accurate  as  his  belief  that  the  long- 
term  consequences  of  the  revival  of  the  Olympic  games  in 
Athens  in  1896  would  be  disaster  91  Polybius  clearly  depicts  the 
Aetolians  and  their  actions  in  the  Peloponnese  in  the  worst 
possible  fashion.  It  is  merely  one  view,  and  given  that  the 
Aetolians  absorbed  many  communities  from  outside  their  ethnos 
into  their  league  in  the  late  Hellenistic  period,  it  would  appear 
that  not  all  other  Greeks  held  it.  Admittedly,  aspects  of  Aetolian 
society  were  different  from  those  found  elsewhere  in  Greece 
during  the  classical  period.  These  differences  do  not  mean  that 
during  the  Hellenistic  period  Aetolian  leaders  were  incapable  of 
conceiving  a  rational  foreign  policy. 
Yet,  if  Polybius'  account  is  to  be  believed,  the  Aetolian 
league  initiated  the  Social  War  merely  to  satisfy  its  insatiable 
desire  for  plunder  in  the  Peloponnese.  When  that  war  was  over, 
Polybius'  narrative  implies  that  a  continued  Aetolian  desire  to 
89  Rigsby  (1996)  p.  17. 
90  Woodhouse  (1897)  p.  50. 
"Woodhouse  (1897)  p.  51. 
59 amass  loot  led  to  their  alliance  with  the  Romans  during  the  First 
Macedonian  War  92 
Polybius'  intention  in  writing  history  was  to  instruct.  His 
aim  was  to  show  his  readers  the  influence  that  the  suspension  of 
anacyclosis  had  on  the  Roman  system  of  government,  and  to 
contrast  it  with  other  states  where  tyche  had  not  been  so 
favourable.  His  view  of  the  past  and  presentation  of  events  in  the 
Peloponnese  was  bound  to  reflect  his  intention  of  presenting  the 
Achaean  league  as  a  state  in  with  which  the  influence  of 
anacyclosis  could  be  compared  to  Rome.  Historia  was  for  Polybius 
a  means  of  instructing,  and  as  he  stated: 
There  are  few  occasions  which  admit  of  setting  forth  all 
possible  arguments,  most  admitting  only  of  those  brief 
arguments,  which  occur  to  one,  and  even  of  these  there  are 
certain  which  are  appropriate  to  contemporaries,  others  to 
men  of  former  times,  others  again  to  Aetolians,  others  to 
Peloponnesians  and  others  to  Athenians...  Since  the  needs 
of  the  case  vary,  we  have  need  of  special  practice  and 
principal  in  judging  how  many  and  which  of  the  possible 
arguments  we  should  employ,  that  is  to  say  if  we  mean  to 
do  good  rather  than  harm  to  our  readers.  93 
f 
92  For  Polybius'  depiction  of  Aetolian  attitudes  at  the  end  of  the  Social  War  see 
Polyb.  5.107.5-7. 
93  Polyb.  12.25I.  4-6. 
60 Does  Polybius'  failure  to  explain  other  viewpoints  affect  our 
understanding  of  events  in  the  Peloponnese  prior  to  Rome's 
intervention  in  Greece?  If  one  takes  into  account  the 
circumstances  that  le, 
.d 
to  the  decision  to  request  Macedonian 
assistance  against  Cleomenes  of  Sparta,  the  influx  of  Arcadian 
communities  such  as  Megalopolis  into  the  Achaean  league 
appears  to  have  been  a  decisive  factor  in  the  decision  to  invite 
Antigonus  Doson  to  re-enter  the  Peloponnese.  Plutarch, 
although  not  a  contemporary  source,  had  access  to  now  missing 
works  like  Aratus'  Memoirs.  Plutarch's  account  emphasises 
Aratus'  reluctance  to  call  on  Macedonia  and  mentions  his  initial 
decision  to  request  the  Aetolian  league's  assistance  before  he 
reluctantly  agreed  to  accept  Macedonian  support  94  Aratus  had 
earlier  carried  out  the  expansion  of  the  Achaean  league  into 
Arcadia  in  close  co-operation  with  the  Aetolian  league.  The 
claimed  mythical  kinship  links  between  the  Aetolians  and  Elis 
suggests  that  despite  the  Gulf  of  Corinth,  the  Peloponnese  was 
an  area  of  vital  concern  to  the  Aetolian  league.  These  factors 
indicate  that  subsequent  Aetolian  actions  in  the  Peloponnese  had 
a  justifiable  basis.  All  are  events  that  Polybius  ignores  in  his 
pragmatike  historia.  Polybius  expresses  definite  opinions  about 
Aetolian  actions  in  the  Peloponnese;  they  are  merely  his  own 
and  do  not  reflect  the  opinions  that  may  have  existed  in  states 
like  Elis  or  Sicyon. 
94  Plut.  Arat.  41.2-3. 
61 Conclusion 
Traditionally  Polybius'  narrative  has  provided  a  framework 
for  understanding  Rome's  advent  in  the  Greek  world  that  has 
largely  been  accepted,  despite  its  limitations.  As  Polybius,  who 
had  strong  opinions  about  the  writing  of  history  admits,  the 
purpose  of  historia  pragmatike  was  to  instruct;  he  intended  his 
histories  to  be  read  by  anybody  trying  to  cope  with  the 
vicissitudes  of  tyche  since,  as  he  stated,  knowledge  of  the  past 
helps  in  the  present.  Does  this  intention  distort  our 
understanding  of  how  Rome  came  to  conquer  the  Greek  world? 
Polybius  clearly  believed  that  the  Roman  system  of 
government  under  which  its  successes  had  been  achieved  would 
decline.  Corinth's  destruction  in  146BC  may  have  caused 
Polybius  to  assist  the  Romans.  This  does  not  mean  that  Polybius 
abandoned  his  belief  that  the  Roman  Republic  would  eventually 
decline  into  anarchy  through  a  resumption  of  anacyclosis  in  its 
system  of  government,  a  decline  that  had  occurred  in  the 
Achaean  league  during  the  period  covered  by  his  histories. 
Polybius  emphasises  that  the  destruction  of  Corinth  was  the 
single  greatest  misfortune  ever  to  happen  to  the  Greeks,  even 
compared  to  the  Persian  invasions  95  It  was  exactly  the  sort  of 
destructive  event  that  Polybius  claimed  heralded  the  end  of  a 
cycle  of  anacyclosis  in  democracies  like  the  Achaean  league  after 
95See  Polyb.  38.2.1-5. 
62 they  had  been  corrupted  by  mob-rule  and  dishonest  politicians, 
a  situation  that  he  describes  in  the  events  surrounding  the 
Achaean  War  96  Furthermore,  there  is  Polybius'  emphasis  on  the 
unity  of  the  Achaean  league  throughout  his  histories,  a  unity  he 
compares  to  that  found  in  a  polis.  Although  Polybius  describes  a 
situation  whereby  the  various  ethne  of  the  Peloponnese  united  to 
form  one  ethnos,  scholars  have  long  doubted  this,  suggesting  that 
the  larger  members  of  the  Achaean  league  such  as  Corinth 
would  have  acted  in  their  own  interests  as  circumstances 
dictated.  7  It  would  appear  from  the  predominance  of 
Megalopolitans  in  the  office  of  Achaean  strategos,  that  they  often 
acted  in  accordance  with  Arcadian  interests,  rather  then  those  of 
the  entire  league. 
Polybius  clearly  differentiates  pragmatike  historia  from  other 
types  of  history,  stating  that  since  his  writings  were  the  result  of 
personal  experience,  he  would  leave  matters  like  foundation 
myths  and  genealogies  to  other  historians.  One  of  the  things  that 
Polybius  criticises  Timaeus'  histories  for,  his  close  attention  to 
the  mythological  aspect  of  the  relations  between  states,  appears 
to  have  been  an  important  factor  in  interstate  relations  during 
the  Hellenistic  period.  The  closeness  of  the  relationship  between 
Elis  and  Aetolia  during  the  Hellenistic  period,  despite  their 
%  See  Polyb.  38.12.4-5. 
"  For  the  ethne  of  the  Peloponnese  merging  into  one  ethnos  see  Polyb.  2.37.7-38.4. 
Walbank  (1985)  p.  36  takes  a  slightly  more  cautious  approach  towards  Polybius' 
assertions. 
63 separation  by  the  Gulf  of  Corinth,  suggests  that  Polybius' 
decision  to  ignore  claims  of  kinship  in  his  histories  masks  one  of 
the  reasons  for  Aetolian  intervention  in  the  Peloponnese. 
Essentially  Polybius'  presents  the  evidence  in  accordance  with 
the  political  message  that  he  wished  his  contemporary  Greek 
readership  to  draw  from  his  writings.  That  the  Roman  conquest 
was  a  temporary  situation  that  had  occurred  because  of 
capricious  nature  of  tyche,  and  his  readership  should  look  to  and 
learn  from  mistakes  made  in  the  past,  drawing  lessons  that 
would  allow  them  to  renew  their  own  society. 
Polybius,  like  many  historians,  seems  to  have  interpreted 
the  past  through  his  understanding  of  the  present.  The  events 
surrounding  the  Third  Macedonian  War  found  Polybius  forcibly 
removed  to  Italy  and  detained  there  for  sixteen  years.  On  his 
return  he  witnessed  the  destruction  of  Corinth  in  the  aftermath 
of  a  failed  revolt  against  Rome.  Polybius'  need  to  explain  to  his 
Greek  readers  how  they  now  found  themselves  ruled  by  a  power 
that  many  of  them  probably  considered  as  alien  and  barbarian 
appears  to  distort  present-day  understanding  of  his  writings. 
64 Chapter  Two 
Polybius'  Presentation  of  the  Peloponnese  in  his 
pragmatike  historia;  Aetolia's  kinship  relationship  with  Elis 
and  Cleomenes'  revolution. 
Introduction 
For  most  of  the  Aetolians  themselves  are  not  Greek.  The 
countries  of  the  Agraae,  the  Apodotae  and  the 
Amphilochians  are  not  Greek.  ' 
In  some  respects  this  supposed  remark  by  Philip  V  to 
Flamininus  captures  the  problem  of  how  Polybius'  attitude  has 
influenced  modem  scholarship  on  Aetolia.  Located  in  north- 
western  Greece  in  close  proximity  to  peoples  such  as  the 
Illyrians,  the  Aetolian  league  has  acquired  a  reputation  amongst 
Hellenistic  historians  as  a  nation  of  pirates  located  at  the 
periphery  of  the  Greek  world?  This  attitude  is  seen  as  a  natural 
continuation  from  the  classical  period;  Thucydides  described  the 
Aetolians  as  a  warlike  ethnos  living  in  primitive  conditions  3 
I 
'  Polyb.  18.5.7-9.  Walbank  (1967)  p.  556  suggests  that  these  were  the  actual  words  Philip 
used.  Woodhouse  (1897)  p.  79  earlier  pointed  to  the  alliteration. 
2  For  Walbank's  comments  on  Aetolian  behaviour,  see  CAH  Vol.  7  (led)  pp.  232.  See  also 
Will's  remarks  in  the  same  volume,  p.  107. 
3  Thuc.  3.94.4-5.  Eur.  Phoen  L.  138  describes  the  clothing  of  Tydeus  as  half  barbarian. 
Antonetti  (1990)  pp.  113-43  examines  the  development  of  the  hostile  image  of  the 
Aetolians  in  Athenian  drama  and  comedy,  drawing  attention  to  the  role  that  the 
Aetolian  defeat  of  Athenian  forces  played  in  its  development.  Scholten  (2000)  p.  5.  n.  12 
65 However  it  is  from  Polybius  that  most  of  our  knowledge 
about  the  Aetolians  derives  and  they  receive  extremely  harsh 
treatment  in  his  histories.  According  to  Polybius,  such  was  the 
Aetolian  addiction  to  piracy  that  if  two  other  states  were  at  war 
they  would  take  advantage  of  the  situation  and  plunder  both 
sides  even  if  they  were  not  involved  in  the  conflict!  There  are 
few  character  faults  that  Polybius  does  not  accuse  the  Aetolians 
of  having:  violence  and  aggression  (4.3.5.  ),  cruelty  (4.18.7-9), 
impiety  (4.62.2.  ),  haughtiness  (5.64.8.  ),  inhumanity  (4.67.3-4),  and 
cowardice  (4.79.1.  ).  Polybius  depicts  the  Aetolians  as  natural 
revolutionaries  (13.1.2),  spendthrifts  (13.1.1.  ),  liars  who  find 
plundering  and  raiding  habitual  (4.3.1:  16.2)  and  a  nation  whose 
obsession  with  looting  causes  them  to  lose  battles  and  friends 
(4.29.47.  ).  According  to  Polybius,  the  ultimate  goal  of  the 
Aetolian  league  was  the  conquest  of  Greece  (2.49.3.  ).  ' 
Plausible  explanations  have  been  advanced  for  Polybius' 
attitude.  It  is  suggested  that  perhaps  Aetolian  society  evolved 
differently  from  elsewhere  in  Greece  because  the  Aetolians  lost 
control  over  their  coastline  to  the  Achaean  league  during  the 
classical  period.  '  Grainger  suggests  that  the  Aetolian  role  in  the 
suggests  that  the  stereotype  was  based  on  some  generally  recognisable  abnormality  in 
behaviour. 
`  Polyb.  18.4.8;  5.2. 
''This  list  of  crimes  is  listed  by  Sacks  (1975)  p.  92. 
6  Scholten  (2000)  p.  12  "The  rugged  isolation  environment  of  Old  Aitolia  did  little  to 
promote  change  away  from  these  earlier,  more  freewheeling  socio-economic  concepts". 
66 defence  of  Delphi  in  279BC  and  their  constant  references  to  this 
action  in  their  propaganda  might  have  annoyed  other  Greeks, 
causing  them  to  remember  Aetolian  crimes.  '  Finally  there  is  their 
position  at  the  fringe  of  the  Greek  world  as  a  possible 
explanation  for  Polybius'  invective,  the  Aetolians  appearing  to 
him  as  hill  men.  ' 
The  Aetolian  league  is  not  the  only  state  that  Polybius 
describes  in  negative  terms.  Of  extreme  relevance  for 
understanding  the  situation  in  the  Peloponnese  is  Polybius' 
depiction  of  Sparta,  especially  Nabis'  rule  there.  Polybius 
portrays  Nabis'  regime  in  the  worst  possible  light,  alleging  that 
Nabis  used  an  instrument  of  torture  built  in  the  image  of  his  wife 
to  extort  money  from  wealthy  Spartans  and  shared  out  their 
wives  and  daughters  amongst  his  supporters  as  he  shared  out 
the  land.  "  As  with  his  depiction  of  the  Aetolian  league,  plausible 
arguments  are  advanced  to  account  for  Polybius'  bias,  in 
particular  his  concern  that  rule  by  the  masses  threatened  social 
stability. 
However,  despite  Polybius'  depiction  of  it,  the  Aetolian 
league  played  an  important  role  in  Greek  history,  for  example  its 
defence  of  Delphi  against  the  Celts  in  279BC,  and  during  the 
Hellenistic  period  it  included  many  communities  in  northern- 
7  Grainger  (1999)  p:  17. 
8  Grainger  (1999)  p.  25. 
9  Polyb.  13.7.1-11;  13.6.2,16.13.1-2.  See  Eckstein  (1995)  p.  133. 
67 western  Greece  in  its  league,  along  with  controlling  the  shrine  at 
Delphi  1°  Furthermore,  the  Aetolian  league  was  the  first  state  in 
Greece  to  ally  with  Rome,  and  the  first  to  challenge  its  influence. 
The  intention  of  this  chapter  is  to  examine  whether 
Polybius'  depiction  of  both  the  Aetolian  league  and  Sparta 
during  the  Hellenistic  period  is  dispassionate.  Or  whether 
Polybius'  regional  perspective  as  an  Arcadian  and  the  rivalry 
between  various  ethnic  interests  in  the  Peloponnese  account  for 
his  partisan  representation  of  the  Aetolian  league's  actions  in 
that  region.  It  will  contend  that  Aetolian  actions  and 
interventions  in  the  Peloponnese  during  the  Hellenistic  period 
had  a  consistent  basis  and  that  Polybius'  perspective  on  events 
and  concern  with  the  situation  at  the  time  he  was  writing  masks 
the  true  situation  in  the  Peloponnese. 
Aetolia's  relationship  with  the  Peloponnese. 
This  section  will  be  a  brief  description  of  the  geographical 
relationship  between  Aetolia  and  the  Peloponnese.  The 
geographical  structure  of  Aetolia  is  relatively  simple,  consisting 
of  two  distinct  regions;  the  coastal  plain  around  Calydon  and 
Pleuron,  and  the  area  around  Lake  Thermon  with  its 
mountainous  hinterland.  Despite  Aetolia's  separation  from  the 
'o  See  Flaceliere  (1938)  for  the  Aetolian  presence  at  Delphi.  See  also  Champion  (1996)  pp. 
315-28. 
68 Peloponnese  by  the  Gulf  of  Corinth,  the  geography  of  the  region 
suggests  that  connections  between  the  two  existed. 
Strabo  describes  Aetolia  as  an  area  divided  into  two  distinct 
regions.  "  The  first  is  "old"  Aetolia,  containing  the  area  around 
the  coastal  plain;  the  second  "acquired"  Aetolia,  referring  to  the 
area  around  Lake  Thermon  and  the  mountainous  interior. 
Although  Strabo's  terminology  comes  from  the  Homeric 
tradition  about  Aetolia,  it  rightly  points  to  the  differences 
between  the  various  component  parts  of  Aetolia.  The  river 
system  and  the  influence  of  the  last  ice  age  have  created  two 
distinct  areas  in  Aetolia  that  are  at  the  same  time  connected  with 
each other. 
We  shall  start  at  the  coastal  plain,  an  area  that  poses  a 
number  of  problems.  Firstly,  there  is  the  question  of  how  far  it 
could  be  said  to  be  open  to  contact  with  the  Peloponnese.  From 
the  coastline,  the  relative  proximity  of  the  Peloponnese,  about 
ten  kilometres  distant,  is  obvious  12  A  lagoon  dominates  the 
Aetolian  coastline,  the  result  of  extensive  silting  from  the  river 
network  in  this  region.  3  In  antiquity  this  situation  manifests 
itself  in  the  inability  of  the  Aetolians  to  develop  a  commercial 
port  and  the  significant  role  that  harbours  such  as  Naupactus 
played  in  the  Aetolian  league's  strategic  calculations. 
Strabo  C450. 
'Z  Bommelje  (1988)  p.  312  states  that  until  the  Second  World  War,  shepherds  from  Aetolia 
were  more  likely  to  bring  their  flocks  to  markets  in  Patras  then  Agrinio. 
"Woodhouse  (1897)  p.  54  and  Antonetti  (1990)  p.  31. 
69 As  one  proceeds  inland  the  situation  changes.  Away  from 
the  coastline  the  coastal  plain  changes,  with  agriculture,  aided  by 
the  alluvial  soils  deposited  by  the  river  network,  playing  a 
significant  role  14  This  gave  the  area  agricultural  self-sufficiency 
during  antiquity  and  it  has  the  highest  concentration  of  urban 
centres  in  Aetolia,  containing  the  two  most  important 
settlements,  Calydon  and  Pleuron.  It  is  in  this  region  that  the 
mythological  traditions  concerning  the  Aetolian  ethnos  are 
centred.  "  The  coastal  plain  is  linked  with  the  rest  of  Aetolia 
through  the  pass  at  Kleisura  and  from  there  on  to  the  rest  of 
northern  Greece.  The  coastal  plain  is  somewhat  focused  onto  the 
Peloponnese  and  isolated  from  the  rest  of  Aetolia.  This  sense  of 
distinctiveness  seems  to  have  manifested  itself  with  the 
development  of  a  religious  centre  at  Calydon,  dedicated  to 
Artemis  Laphria,  to  act  as  a  focus  for  the  communities  on  the 
coastal  plain  16  This  site  may  have  been  an  attempt  by  the  coastal 
communities  to  try  and  counter  balance  the  dominance  of  the 
inland  areas.  "  When  the  site  fell  into  disuse,  Pausanias  informs 
us  that  the  sacred  objects  were  moved  to  Patrae  in  Achaea, 
suggesting  connections  with  the  Peloponnese.  " 
14  Woodhouse  (1897)  p.  23-41,  Antonetti  (1990)  pp.  19-23. 
`Payne  (1925-6)  pp.  124-132. 
16  Antonetti  (1990)  p.  234. 
"  Morgan  (1990)  p.  8. 
18  Paus.  7.18.8-13.  Patrae  was  the  only  Greek  polis  to  aid  the  Aetolians  in  279BC,  Paus 
7.18.5. 
70 Potentially  the  most  interesting  reference  about  the  distinct 
nature  of  the  coastal  region  comes  from  Thucydides'  account  of 
the  Athenian  expedition  to  Aetolia  in  426BC.  After  meeting 
fierce  Aetolian  resistance,  the  Athenians  and  their  allies  were 
forced  to  retreat  to  Naupactus.  A  Spartan  force  that  had  been 
sent  to  assist  the  Aetolians  saw  this  development  and  realising 
that  they  did  not  have  the  forces  necessary  to  take  Naupactus, 
according  to  Thucydides: 
Went  into  the  country  that  used  to  be  called  Aeolis  and 
is  now  called  Calydon  and  Pleuron-  also  to  other  places 
in  that  area,  and  to  Proschium  in  Aetolia.  19 
This  reference  has  provoked  much  debate,  since  it  implies 
that  Thucydides  regarded  the  coastal  region  as  distinct  from  the 
rest  of  Aetolia.  Beloch  and  Wilamowitz  both  argued  that  a  clear 
distinction  had  to  be  made  between  Homeric  and  historic 
Aetolia  2°  According  to  Beloch,  Calydon  and  Pleuron  were 
independent  poleis  during  Homeric  times  and  Thucydides' 
reference  to  Aeolis  reflects  their  Homeric  origins.  Wilamowitz 
argued  that  after  the  war  between  the  Aetolians  and  the  Curetes 
recorded  in  mythology,  the  Curetes  ruled  Aetolia  until  they  were 
driven  away  by  a  mountain  people  who  assumed  their  name, 
and  that  Thucydides'  reference  to  Aeolis  is  a  remnant  of  these 
events.  Kirsten  discusses  the  problem  at  length  from  an 
'Thuc.  3.102.5.  The  punctuation  follows  Hornblower  (1991)  p.  516. 
'  Beloch  (1897)  p.  667-672 
71 archaeological  viewpoint,  suggesting  that  in  the  sub-Mycenean 
period  groups  of  Aetolian  settlers  moved  from  the  Peloponnese 
to  the  coastal  area  of  Aetolia.  Kirsten  suggests  that  one  should 
distinguish  the  Aetolians  who  moved  to  Elis,  but  are  mentioned 
in  the  Iliad,  from  the  later  ones  who  took  over  the  coastal  area, 
displacing  the  settlers  who  had  brought  Mycenean  culture  from 
the  Peloponnese.  Kirsten  suggests  that  Thucydides  was  simply 
using  a  legendary  name  from  the  area.  21 
There  are  a  number  of  problems  with  these  arguments.  All 
assume  that  the  Homeric  tradition  can  be  taken  at  face  value  and 
that  the  Dorian  migrations  actually  happened.  Bommelje  more 
recently  argued  that  Thucydides'  reference  to  Aeolis  indicates 
that  this  area  was  under  the  control  of  the  Achaean  league.  ' 
Bommelje  contends  that  that  since  both  Calydon  and  Pleuron 
were  at  various  stages  members  of  the  Achaean  league,  that  the 
Achaean  league  controlled  the  Aetolian  coastline  at  this  point  ' 
Bommelje  is  undoubtedly  correct  in  pointing  to  the  close  links 
between  the  coastal  communities  of  Aetolia  and  the 
Peloponnese.  This  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  poleis  like 
Calydon  and  Pleuron  were  Achaean.  Calydon  may  have  been  a 
Z'  Kirsten  (1952)  pp.  241-242 
'  Bommelje  (1988)  pp  307-314.  Scholten  (2000)  pp.  12-13  follows  Bommelje,  suggesting 
that  the  loss  of  the  Aetolian  coastline  to  the  Achaean  league  may  have  caused  the 
Aetolians  to  develop  in  isolation  from  the  rest  of  Greece,  and  retain  archaic  era  attitudes 
towards  plundering. 
"  Xen.  Hell  4.6.1.  Paus.  7.11.3. 
72 member  of  the  Achaean  league  in  389BC;  that  does  not  imply 
that  it  was  in  426BC.  The  sole  reference  to  Pleuron's  membership 
of  the  Achaean  league  is  its  request  to  leave,  suggesting  an 
unwilling  association  on  its  part  with  the  Achaean  league.  What 
appears  more  likely  is  that  Aetolian  communities  on  the  coastal 
plain  had  extensive  links  with  the  Peloponnese,  not  that  their 
inhabitants  were  ethnically  Achaean. 
What  implications  does  this  have  for  our  understanding  of 
Polybius'  depiction  of  Aetolian  actions  in  the  Peloponnese? 
Although  communities  centred  on  Lake  Thermon  and  the 
surrounding  mountains  may  have  had  little  or  no  contact  with 
the  Peloponnese,  both  Calydon  and  Pleuron  had.  Though  not 
representative  of  the  league  as  a  whole,  because  of  the  fertile 
nature  of  this  region  and  its  large  population,  the  inhabitants  of 
this  area  must  have  had  a  significant  role  in  determining  the 
policy  followed  by  the  Aetolian  league.  Assuming  that  the 
Aetolian  strategos  would  act  with  the  collective  interests  of  the 
Aetolian  ethnos  as  a  whole  in  mind,  any  change  in  the 
Peloponnese  that  impinged  on  relations  between  it  and  the 
coastal  communities  of  the  Aetolian  league  would  be  reflected  in 
his  decisions. 
73 Mythical  kinship  links  between  the  Aetolian  league  and  the 
Peloponnese. 
The  geographical  structure  of  the  region  suggests  that  the 
coastal  area  of  Aetolia  had  links  with  the  Peloponnese,  though 
the  evidence  is  at  best  circumstantial.  However,  recent 
epigraphic  evidence  has  brought  to  light  the  possibility  that 
kinship  links  in  the  ancient  world  may  have  been  more 
important  than  previously  believed.  Polybius  makes  very  little 
mention  of  kinship  relationships  in  his  histories,  although  he 
was  aware  of  them,  stating  that  since  his  intention  was  to 
provide  a  history  that  would  be  of  practical  use  to  his  readers,  he 
would  ignore  this  factor  24  For  most  of  the  Hellenistic  period  the 
Aetolian  league  and  Elis  were  allied,  though  Polybius  gives  no 
explanation  as  to  why  these  two  states  co-operated  with  each 
other.  This  alliance,  especially  its  closeness,  has  been  noted;  very 
little  thought  has  been  placed  into  why  Elis  would  maintain  such 
strong  links  with  a  state  that  Polybius  describes  as  piratical'  My 
argument  in  this  section  will  be  that  the  close  relationship 
between  Elis  and  the  Aetolian  league,  and  subsequent  Aetolian 
actions  in  the  Peloponnese  during  the  Hellenistic  period  were 
24See  Polyb.  5.76.11.  "The  Selgians  after  nearly  losing  their  country  owing  to  the  impious 
treachery  of  Logbasis,  preserved  it  by  their  own  valour  and  disgraced  neither  their 
liberty  nor  their  kinship  with  the  Spartans".  See  Polyb.  9.2.1-7  for  Polybius'  attitude  to 
kinship  links  in  the  writing  of  history. 
u  Larsen  (1975)  pp.  161  suggests  that  the  Aetolians  were  in  absolute  control  over  Elis. 
74 linked  to  a  belief  hgld  by  both  the  Eleans  and  Aetolians  that  they 
shared  a  common  mythical  heritage. 
The  Xanthos/Cytenion  inscription  is  the  obvious  starting 
point  for  a  discussion  of  Aetolian  attitudes  towards  kinship 
relations.  The  inscription  itself  deals  with  the  appeal  made  by 
Cytenion  to  Xanthos  in  Lycia  asking  for  financial  aid  to  repair 
damage  caused  to  its  walls  by  earlier  Macedonian  attacks  and  an 
earthquake.  The  inscription  recording  the  appeal  and  the 
response  stresses  the  ancient  bonds  that  tied  the  two  poleis 
together  26  The  description  of  the  relationship  between  the 
Dorian  peoples  can  be  found  throughout  the  appeal  and  is 
stressed  in  lines  73-79  27  Should  the  document  be  taken  at  face 
value?  Cytenion  was  a  small  settlement  about  twenty-four 
kilometres  north  of  Delphi  subject  to  the  control  of  the  Aetolian 
league.  In  the  document,  dated  to  some  time  after  205BC,  the 
inhabitants  of  Cytenion  sought  and  received  the  permission  of 
the  Aetolian  assembly  before  making  their  appeal  28  There  was  a 
time  lapse  between  the  destruction  of  the  walls  and  the  appeal 
for  aid  and  Bousquet  suggests  that  the  inhabitants  of  Cytenion 
'  For  the  text  see  SEG  XXXVIII.  1476.  For  a  translation  of  the  document  into  French  see 
Bousquet  (1988)  p.  16ff.  See  Erskine  (1997)  pp.  133-6. 
'Hornblower  (1996)  pp.  71-72  points  out  that  Dorian  syngeneia  was  important  to  all  the 
states  involved. 
"  Walbank  (1989)  p.  192  dates  the  destruction  caused  by  the  forces  of  Antigonus  Doson 
to  shortly  before  the  embassy  of  Nicophanes  and  Cercidas  of  Megalopolis  in  225-6BC. 
75 were  adept  at  gaining  financial  contributions  from  other  states  29 
However,  a  small  community  like  Cytenion  may  have  found  it 
difficult  to  both  finance  and  organise  such  a  large  project. 
If  one  looks  at  the  inscription  for  evidence  that  Aetolian 
foreign  policy  was  influenced  by  claims  of  pan-Dorian 
brotherhood,  reference  is  made  to  Ptolemy's  descent  from 
Hercules,  the  same  descent  that  the  inhabitants  of  Cytenion  and 
Xanthos  share  30  The  embassy  was  sent  with  the  approval  of  the 
Aetolian  league's  assembly  which  stated  that  any  aid 
forthcoming  from  Xanthos  would  be  acceptable  not  only  to  the 
inhabitants  of  Cytenion,  but  also  to  the  Aetolians,  Ptolemy  and 
all  other  Dorians  31  So,  although  a  small  community  in  need  of 
financial  assistance  made  the  appeal,  it  was  done  in  a  context 
where  all  the  states  involved  publicly  acknowledged  a  belief  in  a 
common  origin.  32 
The  problem  lies  in  how  much  credence  Greeks  placed  in 
the  mythical  kinship  links  that  they  acknowledged  between  each 
other.  Curty  argues  that  kinship  relationships  were  closely 
defined  and  can  be  divided  into  three  specific  types,  philia, 
oikeiotes  and  syngeneia,  suggesting  that  the  language  employed  in 
29  Bousquet  (1988)  p.  44-5. 
30  Walbank  (1989)  p.  184  and  Hornblower  (1996)  p.  79. 
31  See  Lines  73-4  and  79-88. 
'Z  The  case  of  the  Aetolian  polis  of  Ariginoe  demonstrates  how  close  the  relationship  was, 
this  settlement  voluntarily  changed  its  name  from  Konope  to  one  derived  from  a 
member  of  the  Ptolemaic  monarchy.  Cohen  (1995)  p.  109. 
76 them  was  precise  and  rarely  interchangeable  '  Hornblower 
doubts  that  kinship  can  be  defined  this  closely  and  points  out 
that  a  certain  amount  of  caution  has  to  be  exercised,  since  much 
of  the  information  relating  to  mythical  kinship  in  Thucydides,  in 
particular  the  relationship  between  Macedonia  and  Argos,  comes 
from  Herodotus  '  However,  Hornblower  accepts  that 
Thucydides  was  aware  of  the  significance  of  these  links.  The 
problem  lies  in  the  question  of  whether  or  not  claims  of  mythical 
kinship  were  sometimes  conveniently  created  to  explain  existing 
political  alliances  '  For  example,  reference  is  made  to  the  kinship 
links  between  Aetolia  and  Axos  on  Crete  in  the  alliance  formed 
between  the  two,  where  in  reality  strategic  considerations  were 
probably  responsible 
Turning  towards  the  relationship  between  Elis  and  Aetolia, 
one  must  firstly  consider  the  mythological  record.  Starting  with 
Pausanias,  the  legends  he  records  are  confined  to  the  coastal 
plain  of  Aetolia.  According  to  Pausanias,  writing  in  the  second 
century  AD,  the  father  of  the  Aetolian  ethnos,  Aetolus,  was  born 
in  Elis  37  Aetolus  was  the  son  of  Endymion  and  the  nymph  Neis, 
and  was  forced  to  give  up  his  claim  to  the  throne  of  Elis  after  he 
33  Cumly.  (1995)  pp.  215-231. 
3'  Hornblower  (1996)  p.  70. 
'5  Erskine  (2001)  pp.  163-8. 
3'  Curty  (1995)  numbers  14  and  35. 
37  Paus.  5.1.8. 
77 killed  Apis  ?  He  moved  to  Aetolia,  which  at  the  time  was 
occupied  by  the  Curetes,  whom  he  eventually  overcame  in  the 
episode  recorded  in  the  sequence  in  the  Iliad  dealing  with 
Meleager's  boar  hunt.  39  According  to  Strabo,  the  Curetes  moved 
to  Acarnania  where  they  settled  4°  Aetolus'  sons,  Calydon  and 
Pleuron,  came  to  dominate  the  area  and  the  two  major 
communities  on  the  Aetolian  coastal  plain  were  named  after 
them.  It  was  from  Aetolus'  sons  that  famous  Aetolian  heroes 
such  as  Tydeus  of  Calydon  were  descended. 
Nor  was  this  mythical  movement  all  one-sided.  Pausanias' 
account  reflects  a  back  and  forth  migration  between  Aetolia  and 
Elis.  One  of  the  descendants  of  Aetolus,  Oxylus,  returned  to  Elis, 
where  he  was  made  king  41  Pausanias  also  states  that  the  Eleans 
had  crossed  over  from  Calydon,  suggesting  that  the  Aetolians 
claimed  that  they  originally  came  from  Elis,  and  the  Eleans  that 
they  had  originated  in  Aetolia  42 
How  important  was  this  claimed  mythical  kinship  to  the 
Eleans  and  the  Aetolians  during  the  Hellenistic  period, 
especially  since  the  majority  of  the  evidence  for  its  existence  is 
derived  from  such  a  late  source?  Although  the  relationship  was 
undoubtedly  close,  Aetolians  becoming  Elean  strategoi  during 
'8Paus.  5.1.8. 
39  Homer  I1.9.509ff. 
40  Strabo  10.3.4.  See  Bommelje  (1988)  p.  300. 
41  Paus  5.3.6.  Aristotle  Polit.  6.2.5. 
42  Paus.  5.1.3. 
78 the  Social  War,  there  may  be  reasons  for  the  alliance  other  than  a 
belief  in  a  common  origin.  Elis  had  opposed  the  formation  of  the 
Arcadian  league,  mostly  because  it  laid  claim  to  territory  that  fell 
under  Arcadian  control  during  the  fourth  century  43  Thus,  when 
the  Achaean  league  began  to  expand  a  century  later  under 
Aratus'  leadership  and  incorporated  most  of  Arcadia,  the  co- 
operation  between  the  Aetolian  league  and  Elis  was  possibly 
based  on  the  political  realties  of  the  Hellenistic  period. 
Perhaps  one  must  first  consider  the  limited  evidence  for  the 
classical  period;  in  particular  an  episode  recorded  in  Diodorus 
where  the  Aetolians  sent  a  force  of  a  thousand  men  to  assist  the 
Eleans  in  402BC.  In  discussing  the  preparations  made  in  Elis  to 
withstand  the  Spartan  onslaught,  Diodorus  states  that: 
A  short  time  before  this  they  had  got  from  the  Aetolians  a 
thousand  elite  troops  to  help  them.  ` 
Although  not  a  contemporary  source,  Diodorus  draws 
attention  to  the  significant  contribution  made  by  the  Aetolians  to 
assist  Elis  when  it  faced  almost  total  destruction  at  the  hands  of 
Sparta.  If  one  looks  at  contemporary  evidence  for  claims  of  a 
kinship  relationship  between  the  two,  there  is  a  reference  in 
Pindar  to  a  belief  in  Elis  that  the  founders  of  the  Olympic  games 
originated  in  Aetolia  45 
'3  Larsen  (1968)  pp.  189-92. 
4'  Diodorus  14.17.9.  See  Unz  (1986)  p.  33,  who  doubts  they  were  mercenaries. 
4'Pindar.  OL.  3.12. 
79 Thus,  although  the  Aetolians  may  from  time  to  time  have 
adapted  their  mythology  to  suit  political  realties,  the  fact 
remains  that  in  the  fifth  century  the  Aetolians  sent  a  sizeable 
force  across  the  Gulf  of  Corinth  to  assist  Elis  when  Sparta 
threatened  it.  Furthermore,  the  mythical  kinship  relationship 
between  the  two  was  acknowledged  in  the  fifth  century.  Does 
Polybius'  stated  belief  that  such  links  were  not  a  worthy  subject 
for  pragmatike  historia  account  for  his  failure  to  acknowledge  such 
claims  as  a  reason  for  the  alliance  between  the  two?  Elis  had 
resisted  earlier  attempts  by  the  Arcadians  to  form  a  league.  As 
an  Arcadian,  and  a  member  of  a  vastly  expanded  Achaean 
league,  Polybius  had  a  different  perspective  on  events  in  the 
Peloponnese  from  the  Aetolians  and  Eleans.  For  example, 
Cynaetha,  on  the  Arcadian/Elean  border  was  surrendered  by 
some  of  its  citizens  to  the  Aetolians  in  220BC  before  the  outbreak 
of  the  Social  War.  Although  Polybius  mentions  internal  strife  in 
this  polls  and  digresses  at  great  length  about  the  uses  of  music  in 
education,  Cynaetha  had  earlier  favoured  an  alliance  with  Elis 
and  had  been  brought  within  the  Achaean  league  against  its  will 
by  Aratus  46  Thus,  was  this  a  betrayal  by  social  revolutionaries 
from  the  lower  classes  who  hoped  for  the  re-distribution  of  land? 
Or  rather  does  it  indicate  that  Elis  used  the  kinship  bond  it  had 
with  the  Aetolians  to  appeal  for  assistance  when  it  felt  its 
'6  Walbank  (1936)  pp.  64-71. 
80 position  endangered  and  that  a  faction  in  Cynaetha  viewed  the 
Aetolians  as  the  kinsmen  of  their  allies  in  Elis? 
Aetolian  Piracy  and  the  Peloponnese?  Proxenia  and  Asylia 
Decrees. 
Of  the  epigraphic  remains  found  at  Thermon,  the  political 
centre  of  the  Aetolian  league  during  the  Hellenistic  period,  the 
number  of  proxenia  and  isopoliteia  decrees  are  the  most  abundant, 
since  the  Aetolian  league  negotiated  proxenia  relationships  with 
citizens  of  nearly  all  the  major  islands  and  seaboard  states!  7  It  is 
not  easy  to  assess  what  the  granting  of  these  honours  means  for 
our  understanding  of  the  Aetolian  league's  relations  with  other 
states.  The  intention  of  this  section  will  be  to  place  Aetolian 
proxenia  relationships  in  their  proper  context. 
According  to  Davies,  proxenia  as  a  concept  was  intended  to 
regulate  and  assist  the  flow  of  commercial  activity  between 
states.  Proxenia  was  a  necessary  part  of  trade,  since  the  recipient 
would  be  expected  to  assist  in  disputes  on  behalf  of  the  state  that 
had  awarded  him  this  honour  4S  Returning  to  Polybius' 
contention  that  the  Aetolians  were  a  nation  of  pirates  and 
brigands,  we  are  left  with  the  question  of  whether  or  not  this  was 
true.  Polybius  describes  them  as  such  only  in  regard  to  their 
actions  in  the  Peloponnese  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Social  War. 
"Benecke  (1934)  p.  31. 
''  CAH  vol.  7  (2"d  ed.  )  p.  288. 
81 If  one  accepts  that  piracy  was  an  essential  part  of  the  Aetolian 
economy  there  is  the  question  of  how  they  could  have  carried  it 
out  since  the  Aetolian  coastline  is  a  vast  lagoon,  hindering  the 
development  of  maritime  activities  49  The  only  evidence  for 
Aetolian  piracy  is  one  interpretation  of  asylia  decrees,  in  which 
one  state  promised  another  protection  from  acts  such  as  piracy. 
The  conclusion  by  the  Aetolian  league  of  asylia  agreements  with 
maritime  states  such  as  Chios,  Delos  and  Mytilene  suggests  that 
these  states  had  gained  immunity  from  Aetolian  piracy,  through 
what  Davies  describes  as  a  system  of  state  sponsored 
blackmail  50However,  asylia  has  also  been  linked  with  diplomacy, 
both  in  Aetolia  and  elsewhere  51 
Thus,  we  are  left  with  the  problem  of  whether  the  Aetolians 
concluded  proxenia  agreements  in  order  to  gain  assistance  in 
their  piratical  activities  or,  rather,  to  cement  their  commercial 
and  political  relations  with  other  states.  It  is  interesting  to  see 
how  one  recipient  of  Aetolian  proxenia  acted  during  a  period  of 
crisis.  According  to  Livy,  Euthymidas  was  exiled  from  Chalcis 
because  he  tried  to  ally  it  with  the  Aetolian  league  in  192BC  in  a 
co-ordinated  attempt  by  the  Aetolians  to  seize  control  over  key 
Greek  states  before  the  outbreak  of  war  with  Rome  52  It  appears 
certain  that  the  same  individual  became  an  Aetolian  proxenos  in 
09  Grainger  (1999)  p.  24 
50  CAH.  VII.  (2nd  ed.  )  pp.  285-90. 
51  Rigsby  (1996)  p.  17. 
52  Livy.  35.37.1-38.4. 
82 208BC  53  So  although  grants  of  proxenia  may  have  originated  on  a 
commercial  basis,  the  ties  created  probably  resulted  in  the 
recipient  favouring  the  Aetolian  league  politically.  Thus,  if  the 
grants  of  proxenia  by  the  Aetolian  league  secured  the  support  of 
individuals  in  communities  who  expounded  a  pro-Aetolian 
view,  the  extensive  network  of  proxenia  relations  that  the 
Aetolian  league  formed  begins  to  take  on  a  new  light. 
If  one  looks  at  the  Peloponnese,  the  Aetolians  concluded  a 
proxenia  alliance  with  inhabitants  of  every  major  state  there 
during  the  Hellenistic  period,  including  Polybius'  native 
Megalopolis.  Whatever  their  motives  may  have  been,  we  still 
have  to  understand  the  relationship  between  the  image  derived 
from  Polybius'  depiction  of  "  Aetolian  actions  and  the  evidence 
that  many,  presumably  influential,  citizens  in  the  Peloponnese 
were  Aetolian  proxenoi. 
Turning  firstly  towards  Dyme,  the  Aetolian  league 
concluded  a  number  of  proxenia  relationships  with  inhabitants  of 
this  polis  TM  The  decrees  themselves  remain  fairly  formulaic,  with 
just  the  names  of  the  officials  involved  and  the  recipient 
mentioned  55  A  similar  pattern  is  followed  in  the  surrounding 
poleis  that  were  the  founding  members  of  the  Achaean  league; 
the  Aetolian  league  concluded  proxenia  relationships  with  four  of 
53  IG.  IX.  1(2)1.31  Line  67. 
''  Polyb.  2.41.1-8. 
IG.  IX.  1(2)1.13  Lines  35-6;  IG  IX.  1(2)  1.34.  line  22. 
83 the  principal  poleis  that  formed  the  original  Achaean  league, 
including  Aegium,  which  was  its  capital  until  188BC.  If  one 
accepts  the  argument  that  the  Aetolians  used  proxenia  to  assist 
their  piratical  activities,  it  is  possible  that  they  were  using  these 
awards  to  further  their  position  in  coastal  areas  that  they  may 
have  wished  to  prey  on.  However,  links  between  poleis  on  either 
side  of  the  Gulf  of  Corinth  had  been  very  'strong  since  the  archaic 
period.  Craftsmen  from  Sicyon  and  Corinth  assisted  in  the 
development  of  the  Aetolians'  religious  centre  at  Thermon,  so  it 
seems  only  natural  that  there  should  have  been  proxenia  relations 
between  these  communities.  This  situation  continues  along  the 
northern  coast  of  the  Peloponnese;  inhabitants  of  Sicyon,  another 
polis  that  had  long-standing  links  with  the  Aetolian  league,  were 
Aetolian  proxenoi  56 
Apart  from  the  northern  shore  of  the  Peloponnese,  the 
Aetolian  league  seems  to  have  concentrated  proxenia  agreements 
with  individuals  in  areas  of  the  Peloponnese  that  were  of 
strategic  importance  to  them,  such  as  Messene,  Phigaleia,  Sparta, 
Telphusa,  Thurioi  and  Argos  57  The  final  polls  in  the  Peloponnese 
For  Sicyon  see  IG.  IX.  1  (2)1.17  lines  14,49,80  and  85. 
57  Messene  and  Phigaleia  IG.  IX.  1(2)  1.12H  Line  47,  IG.  IX.  1  (2)  1.17.  lines  7  and  62;  IG.  IX. 
I(2)  .  1.31  lines  23  and  34-5;  IG.  IX.  1(2)  1.13.1ine  19. 
Sparta  IG.  IX.  1(2)  1.17  line  78;  IG.  IX.  1(2)  1.29  line  11. 
Telphusa,  Thurioi  and  Argos,  see  IG.  IX.  1(2)  1.31  line  89;  IG.  IX.  1(2)  1.31  line  18  and 
IG.  IX.  1(2)  1.25  line  9. 
84 whose  inhabitants  the  Aetolians  established  proxenia  relations 
with  was  Megalopolis  58 
It  must  be  asked  whether  these  relationships  should  be  seen 
simply  in  a  commercial  context.  For  example,  proxenia 
relationships  existed  between  the  Aetolian  league  and 
individuals  in  Ambrakia,  Phaloria  and  Larisa,  all  communities 
bordering  on  Macedonia,  a  traditional  rival  of  the  Aetolian 
league,  suggesting  a  strategic  basis.  In  Italy,  the  Aetolian  league 
concluded  proxenia  relationships  with  individuals  in  most  of  the 
important  Greek  commercial  ports  59  It  is  not  inconceivable  that 
these  relationships  might  have  originated  for  commercial 
reasons,  but  once  formed,  created  a  situation  where  political 
support  ensued  when  the  Aetolian  league  faced  a  crisis,  as  the 
case  of  Euthymidas  in  192BC  suggests. 
As  with  the  claimed  mythical  kinship  link  that  existed 
between  Elis  and  the  Aetolian  league,  Polybius'  depiction  of  the 
relationship  that  the  Aetolian  league  had  with  the  Peloponnese  is 
very  different  from  what  the  evidence  provided  by  proxenia 
decrees  suggests.  The  proliferation  of  links  between  the  Aetolian 
league  and  important  and  influential  citizens  in  many  poleis  in 
the  Peloponnese  suggests  that  Aetolian  league  had  long 
established  commercial  and  strategic  interests  there. 
IG.  IX.  1(2)  1.13  lines  8  and  11;  IG.  IX.  I(2)  1.17  lines  7  and  62  and  IG.  IX.  I.  (2)1.31  line  78. 
Naples  IG.  IX.  1(2)1.33 
Tarentum  IG.  IX  I(2)1.24  lines  12,31  and  83 
Syracuse  IG.  IX.  1  (2)  1.17.  Line  67. 
85 Polybius,  the  Cleomenic  War  and  the  socio-economic  question 
in  Sparta. 
Apart  from  the  Aetolian  league,  the  other  state  that 
challenged  the  Achaean  league  for  control  over  the  Peloponnese 
during  the  Hellenistic  period,  prior  to  Roman  involvement,  was 
Sparta  and  as  with  the  Aetolians,  Hellenistic  Spartan  kings 
receive  negative  treatment  in  Polybius'  histories.  However,  we 
are  not  solely  dependent  on  Polybius  as  a  source  for  Sparta 
during  this  period  since  Plutarch  wrote  lives  of  Agis  and 
Cleomenes  in  parallel  with  the  Gracchi,  apparently  using 
Polybius'  contemporary  Phylarchus  as  his  primary  source.  This 
creates  an  interesting  situation,  since  the  existence  of  an 
alternative  source  has  drawn  historians'  attention  to  Hellenistic 
Sparta.  Of  particular  interest  are  the  reforms  of  Agis  and 
Cleomenes,  especially  their  socio-economic  aspects,  such  as  the 
re-distribution  of  land,  the  enlargement  of  the  citizen  body  and 
the  abolition  of  debts.  Sparta  during  the  Hellenistic  period  has 
been  depicted  by  historians  as  suffering  from  a  socio-economic 
crisis,  with  the  gap  between  rich  and  poor  becoming  ever  wider, 
accounting  for  Cleomenes'  popularity. 
Should  we  accept  Plutarch's  account  of  the  situation  in 
Sparta  and  his  stress  on  the  influence  that  Stoic  philosophy 
played  in  influencing  reforms  there?  Polybius  fails  to  make  any 
mention  of  Cleomenes'  social  reforms  as  a  justification  for  the 
86 Achaean  league's  decision  to  invite  the  Macedonians  to  re-enter 
the  Peloponnese.  Polybius'  only  mention  of  Cleomenes  carrying 
out  reforms  comes  in  an  indirect  reference  to  Cheilon,  a  later 
Spartan  king,  who-  ,  Polybius  stated,  believed  that: 
If  he  followed  in  Cleomenes'  footsteps  by  holding  out  to  the 
multitude  the  hope  of  allotments  and  redistribution  of  the 
lands,  he  would  soon  have  the  masses  behind  him.  60 
Polybius  extensively  discusses  -the  military  campaigns  of 
Cleomenes  in  the  part  of  his  histories  that  survive  intact,  but  this 
is  his  only  reference  to  any  of  Cleomenes'  reforms  and  no 
indication  is  given  as  to  what  stage  in  his  career  it  came.  In 
discussing  change  in  Sparta,  Polybius  merely  states  that 
Cleomenes  overthrew  the  ancient  constitution  and  turned 
himself  from  a  king  into  a  tyrant  without  elaborating  on  what 
actually  happened.  As  Piper  notes,  Cleomenes  made  no  attempt 
to  extend  his  reforms  outside  Sparta;  they  were  limited  to  the 
citizen  body.  " 
Since  Polybius  does  not  describe  the  Spartan  kings  of  the 
late  third  century  BC  as  social  revolutionaries,  it  might  be  more 
profitable  to  consider  Plutarch  who  does.  Writing  in  the  second 
century  AD,  Plutarch's  intention  was  to  compare  the  lives  of  two 
Spartan  kings,  Agis  and  Cleomenes,  with  the  Gracchi,  to  draw 
parallels  from  the  lives  of  famous  figures  in  both  Greek  and 
ti°  Po1yb.  4.81.2.  and  Polyb.  4.81.13. 
"'  Piper  (1986)  pp.  65-66. 
87 Roman  history  which  would  give  moral  instruction  to  his 
readers.  Given  that  comparisons  between  Rome  and  Sparta  were 
long  established,  Plutarch's  decision  to  choose  two  Spartan  kings 
was  natural  62 
The  extent  to  which  Plutarch's  writings  on  the  Gracchi 
influence  his  thoughts  and  presentation  of  events  in  Greece  in 
the  third  century  has  only  recently  been  considered  `  It  is 
generally  accepted  that  Plutarch  draws  much  of  his  information 
about  Cleomenes  from  Phylarchus,  but  since  the  latter  does  not 
survive  we  know  little  about  his  writings  apart  from  the  fact  that 
he  was  pro-Spartan  and  that  Polybius  criticised  his  work  as 
sensational.  Phylarchus'  philosophical  attitude,  whether  he  was 
a  Stoic  or  a  Cynic,  is  unknown.  We  have  little  knowledge  of  the 
vocabulary  that  he  used  and  it  is  evident  that  Plutarch  did  not 
copy  out  his  source,  but  re-organised  it  and  changed  the 
vocabulary.  Although  the  life  of  Cleomenes  contains  Stoic 
epithets,  they  originate  with  Plutarch'  Plutarch  presents 
Cleomenes'  actions  as  those  of  a  social  reformer  influenced  by 
Stoic  philosophy;  it  is  by  no  means  evident  that  Phylarchus  did. 
The  fear  that  the  Peloponnese  would  fall  into  the  hands  of  a 
reformer  who  favoured  the  masses  is  taken  for  granted  by  some 
historians.  It  is  based  on  evidence  provided  by  Plutarch,  a  source 
62  See  Cicero  De  Off  2.80  for  an  earlier  example. 
6'  Erskine  (1990)  p.  127-8  draws  particular  attention  to  Agis. 
"See  Erskine  (1990)  p.  132. 
88 whose  wider  picture  of  Spartan  society  has  recently  come  in  for 
re-appraisal. 
If  one  looks  at  Cleomenes'  reforms  as  detailed  by  Plutarch, 
for  the  first  five  years  of  his  reign  Cleomenes  failed  to  take  any 
action,  starting  only  after  Aratus  had  captured  the  polis  of 
Mantinea.  When  Cleomenes  tried  to  retaliate,  according  to 
Plutarch,  he  was  forced  to  bribe  the  ephors  for  permission  `0  When 
Cleomenes  tried  to  restore  the  diarchy  by  recalling  Archidamus, 
Agis'  brother,  the  ephors  had  Archidamus  murdered  before  his 
arrival66  After  this,  according  to  Plutarch,  Cleomenes  began  to 
plot  with  his  mother  Cratesicleia  and  other  prominent  citizens 
and  eventually  murdered  the  ephors  and  exiled  eighty  leading 
Spartan  citizens  67  When  this  had  been  achieved,  Cleomenes 
introduced  a  number  of  reforms;  the  ephorate  was  abolished,  the 
agoge,  the  traditional  training  of  boys  was  revived,  as  were  the 
common  messes  for  men.  With  regard  to  land,  Cleomenes 
ordered  that  it  should  be  divided  into  four  thousand  equally 
sized  plots,  that  suitable  foreigners  should  be  made  citizens,  and 
all  debts  should  be  abolished.  ' 
65  Plut.  Cleom.  6.1. 
"Plut.  Cleom.  5.2-3.  Polyb.  5.37.1-6.  suggests  that  Cleomenes,  not  the  ephors,  was 
responsible  for  this  murder. 
67Plutarch  emphasises  the  Stoic  element  in  Cleomenes'  education  by  Sphaerus  of 
Borysthenes  and  his  marriage  to  Agis'  widow.  Plut  Cleom  1.1-2,2.2.  Walbank  (1984)  p. 
456  doubts  this  element  in  the  narrative. 
`8  Plut.  Cleom.  10.6.  Shimron  (1972)  pp.  151-2. 
89 It  is  interesting  to  contrast  these  reforms  with  those  carried 
out  in  146BC,  when  the  Achaean  league  was  facing  war  with 
Rome  69  According  to  Fuks,  at  least  three  areas  of  possible  social 
revolutionary  activity  can  be  seen  in  the  actions  undertaken  by 
the  leadership  of  the  Achaean  league  that  year:  the  abolition  of 
debts,  the  freeing  of  slaves  and  the  use  of  the  wealth  of  the  elite. 
On  closer  examination  these  reforms  seem  to  be  an  attempt  by 
the  Achaean  leadership  to  gain  popular  support  in  its  struggle 
against  Rome.  '°  If  one  remembers  that  Plutarch's  intention  was  to 
write  a  parallel  life  of  the  Gracchi,  his  presentation  of 
Cleomenes'  actions  as  ones  influenced  by  Stoic  philosophy  may 
be  a  distortion  of  what  actually  happened.  Phylarchus  presented 
events  from  a  Spartan  point  of  view;  his  transmission  through 
Plutarch  leads  to  an  assumption  that  there  were  social  problems 
in  Sparta  that  are  not  evident  in  Polybius'  account  of  this  conflict. 
Cleomenes'  reforms  may  have  been  an  attempt  to  gain  popular 
support  at  a  time  when  Sparta  faced  severe  difficulties.  For 
example,  after  Macedonian  troops  had  entered  the  Peloponnese, 
in  an  attempt  to  gain  both  money  and  troops,  Cleomenes  is  said 
to  have  sold  six-thousand  helots  their  freedom  in  return  for  five 
minas  a  head.  "  Cleomenes  was  willing  to  carry  out  this  reform  to 
gain  a  short-term  advantage  at  the  end  of  the  war.  Were  his 
69  Shimron  (1972)  p.  133-4  comments  on  the  irony  in  the  reversal  of  roles,  since  at  this 
time  the  Achaeans  are  the  radicals  and  the  Spartans  the  conservatives. 
70  Fuks  (1970)  pp.  79-86. 
"  Plut.  Cleom.  23.1. 
90 earlier  reforms  influenced  by  Stoicism,  or  rather  were  they 
measures  designed  to  increase  Spartan  military  effectiveness?  72 
It  cannot  be  doubted  that  Cleomenes  did  introduce  changes 
in  Spartan  society.  Polybius'  reference  to  a  later  Spartan  king 
following  in  his  footsteps  by  holding  out  to  the  multitude  the 
hope  of  re-distributing  land  would  seem  to  indicate  that  at  some 
stage  of  his  reign  Cleomenes  proposed  this  reform.  What  is 
unclear  is  the  impetus  behind  these  reforms  and  why  Polybius 
did  not  make  any  direct  reference  to  this  aspect  of  Cleomenes' 
reign.  Erskine  suggests  that  Polybius  may  have  downplayed 
Cleomenes'  reforms  because  he  did  not  wish  to  undermine  the 
fragile  socio-economic  basis  of  the  Achaean  league.  73  He  draws 
attention  to  Polybius'  reference  to  events  at  Cynaetha,  which 
surrendered  itself  to  an  Aetolian  raiding  force  just  before  the 
outbreak  of  the  Social  War,  where  sometime  between  241  and 
229BC  there  had  been  calls  for  the  re-distribution  of  land.  74  In 
discussing  events  at  Cynaetha,  Polybius  makes  mention  of  a 
group  of  restored  exiles  whom  allowed  the  Aetolian  raiders  into 
this  polis,  and  the  calls  for  land  re-distribution  that  heralded  their 
exile. 
Should  events  at  this  polls  be  seen  solely  as  evidence  of 
socio-economic  problems  in  the  Peloponnese?  Cynaetha's 
n  For  the  earlier  use  of  slaves  in  the  Spartan  army  see  Hunt  (1998)  pp.  171-5. 
'3  Erskine  (1990)  p.  127. 
74  Polyb.  4.17.4-5.  Walbank  (1957)  p.  464  suggests  a  date  nearer  to  227BC. 
91 location  in  northern  Arcadia  suggests  that  it  favoured  allying 
with  Elis,  since  it  had  broken  away  from  the  Arcadian  league  in 
favour  of  an  alliance  with  Elis  in  244BC.  75  Aratus  had  forced 
Cynaetha  into  the  Achaean  league  by  a  surprise  attack  similar  to 
his  more  famous  assault  on  Corinth  and  the  exiles  might  have 
been  created  in  the  aftermath  of  this  episode.  In  the  context  of 
the  claimed  mythical  kinship  link  between  Elis  and  the 
Aetolians,  what  has  in  the  past  been  seen  as  evidence  of  class 
conflict  in  the  Peloponnese,  may  actually  have  been  an  attempt 
by  some  inhabitants  of  Cynaetha  to'  end  its  membership  of  the 
Achaean  league  in  favour  of  an  alliance  with  the  Eleans  and  their 
Aetolian  kinsmen. 
The  Outbreak  of  the  Cleomenic  War  and  the  Achaean  alliance 
with  Macedonia. 
Although  the  Cleomenic  War  falls  outside  the  period  that 
Polybius  states  will  be  covered  by  his  histories,  he  informs  his 
readers  that  he  will  give  a  long  digression  on  it  because: 
I  thought  that  it  would  be  of  service,  or  rather  that  the 
original  plan  of  this  work  made  it  necessary  for  me  to 
make  clearly  known  to  everybody  the  state  of  affairs  in 
Macedonia  and  Greece.  76 
75  Polyb.  4.77.9-10 
76  Polyb.  2.71.2. 
92 Why  did  Polybius  feel  it  necessary  to  have  such  a  long 
digression  on  events  in  the  Peloponnese,  especially  when, 
presumably,  Aratus  had  covered  these  events  in  his  Memoirs? 
Was  Polybius'  intention  merely  to  carry  on  from  where  Aratus 
finished  his  work,  or  was  it  to  provide  another  view  on  the 
affairs  of  the  Achaean  league?  There  is  the  problem  that 
although  we  know  that  Aratus  wrote  Memoirs,  which  Plutarch 
used,  they  do  not  survive,  except  in  fragments.  After  the  battle 
of  Sellasia,  for  the  latter  part  of  Aratus'  career,  Plutarch  used 
Polybius  as  his  source,  suggesting  that  he  began  his  histories 
from  the  point  where  Aratus  had  stopped.  '  Given  that  Aratus 
had  devoted  most  of  his  life  to  ridding  the  Peloponnese  of 
Macedonian  influence,  he  may  have  considered  that  Antigonus 
Doson  re-gaining  control  over  this  region  was  a  suitable  point 
to  finish. 
However,  despite  the  assumption  that  Polybius  started  his 
histories  from  the  point  where  Aratus  stopped,  there  are 
differences  in  the  sources  as  to  who  .  was  responsible  for  the 
outbreak  of  the  Cleomenic  War.  Furthermore,  in  his  account  of 
the  eventual  decision  to  invite  the  Macedonians  to  re-enter  the 
Peloponnese,  Polybius'  account  is  vague  as  to  the  reasons 
behind  this  decision  and  who  was  actually  responsible  for 
taking  it.  Polybius  places  the  blame  for  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
on  the  treacherous  nature  of  the  Aetolians,  Macedonians  and 
"  Porter  (1939)  p.  XIX 
93 Spartans.  After  discussing  the  early  history  and  development  of 
the  Achaean  league,  Polybius  states  that: 
The  Achaeans,  being  naturally  thus  materially  increased  in 
extent  and  power,  the  Aetolians,  owing  to  that 
unprincipled  passion  for  aggrandisement  which  is  natural 
to  them,  either  out  of  envy,  or  rather  in  the  hope  of 
partitioning  the  poleis...  joined  hands  with  Antigonus  and 
Cleomenes.  78 
As  Walbank  points  out,  this  sequence  of  events  is 
improbable.  He  suggests  that  Polybius  was  merely  reproducing 
Aratus'  tendentious  account  of  events  9  Walbank  argues  that  it 
is  doubtful  whether  it  was  with  the  acquiescence  of  the  Aetolian 
league  that  Cleomenes  seized  a  number  of  poleis  in  Arcadia, 
which  were  members  of  the  Achaean  league  80 
Plutarch's  account  of  the  outbreak  of  the  war  is  different. 
Although  Polybius  presents  the  Spartans  acting  aggressively, 
Plutarch  in  his  life  of  Cleomenes  states  that: 
Aratus,  the  most  powerful  man  amongst  the  Achaeans,  was 
from  the  start  desirous  of  bringing  the  Peloponnes`ians  into 
one  confederation...  nearly  all  of  them  adopted  his  views, 
but  the  Spartans,  Eleans  and  the  Arcadians  who  sided  with 
78  Polyb.  2.45.1. 
Walbank  (1957)  p.  239.  Followed  by  Urban  (1972)  p.  131. 
e0  Walbank  (1957)  p.  243  suggests  that  the  Aetolian  league's  interests  in  the  Peloponnese 
were  focused  elsewhere.  Cleomenes  at  the  same  time  fortified  the  temple  of  Athena  at 
Belinatis  inside  Megalopolitan  territory:  Plut.  Cleom.  4.4. 
94 the  Spartans  refused.  Therefore,  as  soon  as  Leonidas  was 
dead,  Aratus  began  to  harass  the  Arcadians,  and  ravaged 
the  territories  of  those  especially  who  were  adjacent  to  the 
Achaeans...  his  object  was  to  put  the  Spartans  to  the  test.  " 
Aratus  does  not  seem  to  have  been  the  sole  Achaean  leader 
who  favoured  an  aggressive  policy  towards  Sparta.  In  234BC 
when  Lydiades,  the  former  tyrant  who  brought  Megalopolis 
within  the  Achaean  league  was  elected  Achaean  strategos,  his 
first  action  was  to  attack  Sparta  82  Although  Polybius  places  the 
blame  for  the  outbreak  of  war  on  others;  Plutarch's  account 
suggests  that  the  Spartans  were  responding  to  provocation  by 
Aratus  and  the  Achaean  league. 
Cleomenes'  seizure  of  these  Arcadian  poleis  brought  about 
a  declaration  of  war  by  the  Achaean  league  and  later  that  year 
Aratus  captured  Caphyae  83  Cleomenes  responded  by 
advancing  into  Arcadia,  seizing  Methydrium,  which  belonged 
to  Megalopolis  '  When  in  response  the  Achaean  league's 
strategos  Aristomachus  led  an  army  consisting  of  twenty 
thousand  infantry  and  a  thousand  cavalry  against  Cleomenes' 
force  of  five  thousand  men,  Aratus  forced  the  Achaeans  to 
61  Plut.  Cleom.  3.4-5. 
az  Plut.  Arat.  30.3. 
83  Polyb.  2.46.2.  and  Plut.  Cleom 
.  4.4. 
"  Polyb.  2.46.5.  Walbank  (1957)  p.  243. 
95 retreat  after  the  two  armies  had  met  at  Pallantium,  despite  the 
massive  superiority  in  numbers  they  enjoyed  85 
Who  was  responsible  for  the  aggressive  policy  towards 
Sparta  that  the  Achaean  league  undertook?  Gruen  has  noted  the 
influence  that  Megalopolitans  had  in  defining  the  Achaean 
league's  policy  towards  Sparta  after  it  became  a  member  in 
235BC  86  The  Achaean  league  was  simultaneously  attacking  Elis, 
suggesting  an  Arcadian  dominated  policy.  "'  If  Megalopolitans 
guided  this  policy,  we  have  to  ask  how  acceptable  it  was  to 
other  members  of  the  Achaean  league.  When  Cleomenes 
captured  Leuctra  shortly  afterwards,  Aratus  refused  to  engage 
him  in  open  battle.  His  hipparch,  Lydiades  of  Megalopolis,  led 
the  cavalry  against  Cleomenes'  army  and  was  killed  88  Aratus 
was  censured  for  his  failure  to  give  battle  and  after  Lydiades' 
death,  the  Achaean  army  proceeded  to  Aegium  where  they 
voted  not  to  finance  any  further  campaigns,  a  move  that  made 
Aratus  resign  his  office  as  strategos.  According  to  Plutarch,  the 
delegates  resolved  that: 
85  Plut.  Cleom.  4.4-5.  Walbank  (1984)  p.  457  suggests  that  his  motive  was  to  retain  the 
subsidy  from  Egypt  that  the  Achaean  league  received. 
'6  See  Gruen  (1972)  p.  609-25,  Cartledge  (1989)  p.  41  and  Green  (1990)  p.  292.  Walbank 
(1933)  p.  71  commenting  on  the  earlier  difficulties  surrounding  the  entry  of  Argos  into 
the  Achaean  league,  suggests  that  the  delay  was  caused  by  Aratus'  desire  not  to  allow 
Lydiades  to  negotiate  the  conditions  of  entry,  in  case  it  would  increase  the  anti- 
Macedonian  bloc  that  existed  within  the  Achaean  league. 
87  P1ut.  Arat.  36.1-2;  Plut.  Cleom.  5.1. 
"8  Plut.  Arat.  36.1.  Cleom  6.4. 
96 If  Aratus  wanted  to  wage  war,  he  must  provide  the  means 
himself.  " 
It  appears  that  an  expanded  Achaean  league  undertook 
aggressive  actions  against  Sparta  at  the  behest  of  Megalopolis. 
Should  Cleomenes'  reforms,  which  took  place  around  this  time, 
be  seen  as  evidence  of  social  problems  in  Sparta?  Plutarch  states 
that  Cleomenes  wished  to  regenerate  Spartan  society,  in 
particular  its  citizen  body,  so  that: 
The  strongest  of  them  might  be  made  Spartan  citizens  and 
help  to  preserve  the  state  by  their  arms.  "  In  this  way"  he 
said,  "we  shall  cease  to  behold  Sparta  the  booty  of  Aetolians 
and  Illyrians  through  lack  of  men  to  defend  her".  " 
It  appears  that  Cleomenes  was  reacting  against  an 
aggressive  policy  that  the  Achaean  league  had  instituted,  after 
its  expansion  into  Arcadia  had  added  a  new  dimension  to  an 
ongoing  struggle  for  control  over  the  Peloponnese.  Gruen  has 
drawn  attention  to  the  role  that  Megalopolitans,  especially 
Lydiades,  played  in  the  conduct  of  this  conflict;  Urban  has 
pointed  out  how  Megalopolis'  desire  to  re-acquire  Triphylia 
from  Elis  may  have  been  a  possible  factor  in  provoking  the 
conflict  91  Was  this  policy  acceptable  to  the  elite  in  poleis  like 
Dyme,  Sicyon  and  Corinth,  who  would  have  had  a  different 
Walbank  (1984)  p.  458  argues  that  Lydiades'  supporters  were  to  blame  for  Aratus' 
resignation.  Plut.  Arat.  38.1. 
90  Plut.  Cleom.  10.6. 
91  Urban  (1972)  p.  115-6. 
97 regional  interest  from  their  Arcadian  counterparts  within  the 
Achaean  league?  Although  both  Plutarch  and  Polybius  present 
Aratus  as  the  dominant  figure  in  the  Achaean  league,  it  would 
appear  that  Megalopolitan  interests  dominated  the  policy 
followed  by  the  Achaean  league  after  235BC.  So  were  later 
events  credited  to  Aratus  by  Polybius  his  sole  responsibility,  or 
rather  the  result  of  Megalopolitan  pressure? 
Polybius,  the  embassy  of  Nicophanes  and  Cercidas  and  the 
Achaean  league's  appeal  to  Antigonus. 
The  most  obvious  point  at  which  Arcadian  influence  on  the 
policies  of  the  Achaean  league  can  be  seen  is  the  embassy  sent 
to  Macedonia  to  sound  out  Antigonus  Doson  about  intervening 
in  support  of  the  Achaean  league  against  Sparta.  Polybius 
claims  that  Aratus  secretly  sent  a  mission  led  by  Nicophanes 
and  Cercidas  of  Megalopolis  to  Macedonia,  because  he  could 
see  how  Megalopolis  was  suffering  in  the  face  of  Spartan 
attacks  92  Polybius  continues  to  claim  that  Aratus  did  not  make 
his  decision  to  send  this  mission  public  knowledge  and  that: 
Consequently  Aratus  was  compelled  in  public  both  to  do 
and  say  many  things  contrary  to  his  real  intention.  " 
And  as  a  result: 
92  Polyb.  2.48.1-7.  That  Aratus  was  solely  responsible  for  the  dispatch  of  this  mission  is 
generally  accepted.  See  for  example  Walbank  (1984)  pp.  461-462. 
93  Polyb.  2.47.10. 
98 For  this  reason  there  are  some  similar  matters  that  Aratus 
does  not  even  refer  to  in  his  Memoirs.  94 
However,  while  unlike  Plutarch,  we  do  not  have  Aratus' 
Memoirs  to  consult,  he  tells  us  that  when  the  decision  was  later 
taken  to  ask  for  assistance  from  Macedonia: 
Aratus  says  everything  that  he  can  in  explaining  the 
necessity  that  was  upon  him.  Polybius  however  says  that  for 
a  long  time,  and  before  the  need  arose,  Aratus  mistrusted 
the  daring  nature  of  Cleomenes  and  made  secret  approaches 
to  Antigonus,  besides  putting  the  Megalopolitans  forward 
to  beg  the  Achaeans  to  call  in  Antigonus.  95 
One  might  question  whether  Aratus,  who  had  devoted 
much  of  his  life  to  ridding  the  Peloponnese  of  the  Macedonian 
presence  would  have  initiated  secret  talks  with  Antigonus.  Orsi 
has  suggested  that  the  embassy  was  sent  with  the  intention  of 
securing  an  epimachia,  or  a  defensive  alliance;  and  unofficially  to 
sound  out  Antigonus  on  the  possibility  of  an  eventual  Achaean 
alliance  with  Macedonia  96  She  suggests  that  Aratus  later 
disowned  it  in  his  Memoirs  because  his  earlier  decision  to  seek 
an  epimachia  might  have  been  a  hindrance  to  a  full  alliance  at  a 
later  stage  97 
94  Polyb.  2.47.11.  Walbank  (1957)  p.  247  suggests  that  Polybius  got  this  story  from  his  own 
circles  in  Megalopolis. 
95  P1ut.  Arat.  38.7. 
%  Orsi  (1991)  pp.  78-79. 
97  Orsi  (1991)  p.  90-93. 
99 Should  we  accept  Polybius'  assertion  that  Aratus,  who  had 
made  his  reputation  as  an  anti-Macedonian  leader,  was  secretly 
responsible  for  sending  two  Megalopolitans  on  a  mission  to 
Macedonia,  because,  according  to  Polybius,  he  could  see  how 
Megalopolis  was  suffering  from  Cleomenes'  assaults?  Before 
Megalopolis  joined  the  Achaean  league  in  235BC  it  had  been  one 
of  Macedonia's  closest  allies  in  the  Peloponnese  98  Lydiades' 
decision  to  bring  it  within  the  Achaean  league  had  severed  the 
ties  between  the  two.  Walbank  suggested  that  his  death  would 
make  an  approach  by  Megalopolitans  to  Antigonus  easier  since 
he  could  be  blamed  for  any  sense  of  betrayal  that  might  exist' 
Polybius'  account  of  the  Cleomenic  War  comes  after  his  account 
of  the  development  of  the  Achaean  league,  with  its  stress  on 
unity  and  it  may  be  that  Polybius  was  trying  to  defend 
Megalopolitans  against  accusations  that  they  had  betrayed  the 
Achaean  league  to  suit  their  own  interests.  In  stating  that  Aratus 
was  secretly  responsible  for  this  mission,  but  that  for  reasons 
that  are  not  specified,  was  unable  to  acknowledge  his  role  in  his 
Memoirs,  Polybius'  intention  may  have  been  to  explain  this 
embassy  to  his  contemporaries;  at  times  he  even  appears  to  be 
defensive. 
98  Walbank  (1957)  p.  247  points  to  Demosthenes'  attack  on  Cercidas'  ancestral  namesake 
for  being  pro-Macedonian. 
"  Walbank  (1984)  p.  461. 
100 Regarding  the  ambassadors,  Polybius  claims  that  both  were 
family  friends  of  Aratus,  hence  his  choice  of  them  to  approach 
Macedonia.  According  to  Polybius,  although  the  ambassadors 
were  Megalopolitan  and  Aratus  had  sent  the  embassy  because  of 
Cleomenes'  attacks  on  Megalopolis: 
They  said  no  more  than  they  needed  about  their  own  polis, 
dealing  with  this  matter  briefly  and  hastily,  but  dwelt  at 
length  on  the  general  situation,  in  the  manner  that  Aratus 
had  told  them  to.  1°° 
The  threat  that  both  ambassadors  were  supposed  to  have 
related  to  Antigonus  was  that  if  Sparta  and  the  Aetolian  league 
were  to  co-operate,  or  if  Sparta  came  to  dominate  the 
Peloponnese,  Macedonia  would  find  itself  endangered. 
Although  Walbank  assumes  that  Polybius  is  repeating  Aratus' 
account  of  the  embassy,  he  admits  that  a  Spartan  dominated 
Peloponnese  was  no  threat  to  Macedonia.  Nor  does  Walbank 
accept  that  the  possibility  of  an  alliance  between  Sparta  and  the 
Aetolian  league  was  anything  more  than  a  slight  danger  to 
Antigonus'  interests  10'  The  alliance  that  the  ambassadors 
predicted  did  in  fact  emerge  during  the  Social  War  and  Polybius 
might  have  been  trying  to  persuade  his  readers  that  the  embassy 
was  an  attempt  by  Aratus  to  gain  assistance  before  this 
happened. 
10°  Polyb.  2.50.1. 
'°'  Walbank  (1957)  p.  248.  For  the  threat  see  Polyb.  2.49.1. 
101 Thus  we  are  left  with  the  problem  of  whether  Polybius' 
account  of  this  embassy  reflects  his  desire  to  portray  the  unity  of 
the  Achaean  league  so  that  anacyclosis'  influence  on  its  system  of 
government  could  be  contrasted  with  Rome.  102  In  the  period  in 
which  he  was  writing  Megalopolis  had  been  a  member  of  the 
Achaean  league  for  over  a  century:  at  the  time  that  the  embassy 
was  sent  this  membership  had  existed  for  only  a  few  years.  So  it 
should  be  asked  whether  responsibility  for  this  move  was  solely 
Aratus',  or  rather,  as  in  the  case  of  the  aggressive  policy 
undertaken  by  the  Achaean  league  towards  Sparta  and  Elis,  the 
result  of  Megalopolitan  influence  over  the  Achaean  league's 
policy. 
Polybius'  defensiveness  about  this  mission  can  be  seen  in  his 
account  of  the  Achaean  assembly  that  discussed  it.  He  states  that 
the  ambassadors  returned  with  a  letter  that  stated  that  the 
Macedonians  would  assist  them,  but  only  if  and  when  they 
received  permission  from  the  rest  of  the  Achaeans.  When  this 
was  debated  at  the  Achaean  assembly,  we  are  informed  by 
Polybius  that: 
The  Megalopolitans  appeared  before  the  council  of  the  league 
and  showed  them  the  king's  letter,  assured  them  of  his 
friendly  sentiments,  and  at  the  same  time  begged  the 
102  Eckstein  (1995)  p.  198-201  points  to  the  similarities  and  defensive  tone  both  in  this 
speech  and  Polybius'  account  of  this  mission  with  his  account  of  events  in  198BC,  when 
the  Achaean  league  under  the  leadership  of  Aristaenus  of  Megalopolis  allied  with  Rome. 
However,  Aristaenus'  speech  in  198BC  is  actually  in  Livy,  not  Polybius 
102 Achaeans  to  ask  for  his  intervention  at  once.  When  Aratus 
saw  that  this  was  the  inclination  of  the  Achaeans  he  rose, 
and  after  expressing  his  gratification  at  the  king's  readiness 
to  assist  them....  he  addressed  them,  begging  them  if 
possible  to  attempt  to  save  their  poleis  and  ethnos  by  their 
own  efforts,  that  being  the  most  honourable  and 
advantageous  action.  But  should  adverse  fortune  prevent 
this,  then,  but  only  when  they  had  no  hope  in  their  own 
efforts,  he  advised  them  to  appeal  to  their  f  riends  for  aid.  l°3 
Polybius'  account  implies  that  for  Aratus  Macedonian 
intervention  was  the  last  resort  104  If  Aratus  was  responsible  for 
opening  discussions  with  Macedonia,  it  was  a  remarkable 
change  from  his  long-established  policy.  He  had  been  in  receipt 
of  a  subsidy  from  Ptolemy  since  he  had  taken  control  over 
Sicyon  because  of  his  anti-Macedonian  actions  105  By  allowing  the 
return  of  Antigonus  Doson  to  the  Peloponnese,  the  Achaean 
league  became  a  Macedonian  client  until  198BC,  a  vassal  of  the 
state  that  Aratus  had  spent  most  of  his  adult  life  trying  to 
remove  from  the  Peloponnese. 
If  Megalopolitans  had  initiated  contact  with  Macedonia,  as 
is  likely  enough  in  view  of  the  earlier  relationship  between  the 
two,  without  Aratus'  knowledge,  it  would  naturally  be 
103  Polyb.  2.50.10-11. 
104  A  point  made  by  Eckstein  (1995)  p.  199. 
105  Plut.  Arat.  11.2.  There  is  some  ambiguity  as  to  who  is  the  king  referred  to  since  it  could 
be  either  Antigonus  or  Ptolemy,  but  Porter  (1937)  p.  XLI  suggests  Ptolemy. 
103 something  that  Polybius  would  not  emphasise  since  it  would  be 
contrary  to  his  stress  on  the  unity  of  the  Achaean  league.  By 
claiming  that  Aratus  had  knowledge  of  this  move  and  that  it  had 
been  carried  out  at  his  behest,  Polybius  was  able  to  present  what 
may  have  solely  been  a  Megalopolitan  move  as  one  that  had 
enjoyed  the  support  of  the  entire  Achaean  league. 
Why  would  Megalopolis'  inhabitants  have  acted  in  such  an 
independent  manner?  Attention  has  been  drawn  to  fear  by 
members  of  the  Achaean  league's  elite  to  Cleomenes  possibly 
extending  his  reforms  to  the  rest  of  the  Peloponnese,  and  one  of 
the  ambassadors  was  known  for  his  poetry  that  made  reference 
to  the  masses.  However,  it  is  also  evident  that  Cleomenes  was  at 
the  point  of  defeating  the  Achaean  league,  and  if  he  gained 
hegemony  over  the  Achaean  league,  would  dominate 
Megalopolis,  a  fate  her  elite  would  wish  to  avoid. 
Around  the  same  time,  Ptolemy  removed  his  subsidy  from 
the  Achaean  league  and  transferred  it  to  Sparta.  His  stated 
reason  for  doing  this  was  that  it  would  better  serve  his  purposes 
by: 
Setting  Cleomenes  on  to  attack  Antigonus,  as  he  hoped  to  be 
able  to  control  more  effectively  the  Macedonian  kings  with 
the  support  of  the  Spartans  then  with  the  Achaeans.  '°6 
It  appears  that  Ptolemy  decided  to  remove  his  subsidy 
because  Aratus  had  lost  control  over  the  policy  of  the  Achaean 
106  Po1yb.  2.51.2-3.  Walbank  (1957)  pp.  247-8  dates  this  to  the  winter  of  226/25BC. 
104 league  and  switched  his  support  to  Cleomenes  because  he 
regarded  Spartan  domination  of  the  Peloponnese  as  the  best 
means  for  securing  this  region  against  Antigonid  control. 
Cleomenes  again  took  the  offensive,  according  to  Plutarch, 
attacking  Megalopolis,  before  turning  towards  the  poleis  that 
originally  formed  the  Achaean  league,  defeating  the  Achaean 
army  at  Dyme.  107  A  truce  was  arranged  and  Cleomenes  was 
invited  to  discuss  the  question  of  hegemony  over  the  Achaean 
league.  The  first  conference  was  postponed  because  Cleomenes 
was  ill  and  another  was  convened  at  Argos.  "'  When  Aratus 
insisted  that  Cleomenes  should  not  bring  his  army  to  the 
conference,  but  only  a  bodyguard  of  three,  the  truce  broke 
down  109  Around  the  same  time,  according  to  Polybius,  Aratus 
sent  his  son  to  the  Macedonian  court  to  negotiate.  ll° 
However,  Polybius  completely  ignores  the  events 
surrounding  the  decision  to  call  on  Macedonia,  and  after  giving 
his  account  of  the  embassy  of  Nicophanes  and  Cercidas,  he 
merely  states  that  the  circumstances  brought  about  by 
Cleomenes'  onslaught  resulted  in  a  situation  whereby  the 
Achaeans  were: 
107  P1ut.  Cleom.  14.1-2.  Walbank  (1984)  p.  463. 
108  P1ut.  Cleom.  14.2.  Walbank  (1984)  p.  463. 
109  Plut.  Cleom.  15.2.,  Walbank  (1984)  p.  464  suggests  that  the  age  difference  was  an 
important  consideration;  Aratus  was  unwilling  to  hand  control  of  the  Achaean  league 
over  to  somebody  so  much  younger  than  himself,  so  he  sabotaged  the  meeting. 
70  Polyb.  2.51.4-5. 
105 Compelled  by  their  position  to  appeal  with  one  voice  to 
Antigonus, 
ill 
As  Orsi  notes,  Polybius  is  deliberately  vague  about  who 
exactly  was  responsible  for  this  action,  though  she  suggests  that 
it  was  not  the  Achaean  assembly,  but  rather  a  small  group 
centred  on  Aratus.  112  Polybius'  ambiguous  account  of  these 
events,  according  to  Orsi,  was  due  to  the  legal  position  regarding 
the  decision,  since  Aratus  was  exceeding  his  powers  as 
strategos  13 
If  one  examines  Plutarch's  account  of  the  events  leading  up 
to  the  decision,  he  states  that  when  the  decision  was  taken  to 
invite  Macedonian  forces  into  the  Peloponnese  at  a  special 
assembly  at  Sicyon  such  was  the  situation  brought  about  by 
Cleomenes'  actions,  that: 
Only  a  few  of  the  Achaeans  came  to  meet  with  Aratus. 
114 
Aratus  was  elected  as  Achaean  strategos  with  full  powers 
but  when  Aratus'  appeal  to  the  Aetolian  league  and  Athens  for 
assistance,  was  rejected,  Cleomenes  offered  Aratus  an  annuity  of 
twelve  talents  per  year,  provided  that  he  was  elected  as 
hegemon  115  Having  no  other  alternative,  according  to  Plutarch,  . 
Aratus  went  to  the  Achaean  assembly  at  Aegium  where  the 
"'  Polyb.  2.51.4 
"Z  Orsi.  (1991)  p.  93. 
13  Orsi  (1991)  p.  97. 
114  Plut.  Arat.  41.1. 
"s  P1ut.  Arat.  41.2  for  the  appeal  to  the  Aetolians  and  Athens. 
106 decision  was  taken  to  invite  Antigonus  to  the  Peloponnese  116  In 
light  of  Polybius'  account  of  subsequent  events  and  his 
allegations  about  their  culpability  in  outbreak  of  the  Cleomenic 
War,  it  is  surprising  that,  according  to  Plutarch,  Aratus  first 
appealed  to  the  Aetolian  league  for  assistance  and  only  agreed  to 
call  on  Macedonia  when  it  refused.  This  indicates  that  he 
regarded  the  Aetolian  league  as  his  first  choice  and  only  agreed 
to  accept  Macedonian  assistance  when  they  refused. 
Reaction  in  the  Achaean  league  to  Macedonian  intervention. 
When  Aratus  did  eventually  accede  to  the  pressures  exerted 
on  him  to  call  on  Antigonus  Doson  to  intervene  in  the 
Peloponnese  against  Cleomenes,  how  acceptable  was  this  to  the 
various  members  of  the  Achaean  league?  The  appeal  to 
Macedonia  was  something  Aratus  only  resorted  to  after  the 
Aetolian  league  and  Athens  refused  to  support  him.  As  Plutarch 
states  about  the  subsequent  reaction  to  excesses  carried  out  by 
Macedonian  troops  in  the  Peloponnese: 
For  these  actions  men  blamed  Aratus,  not  knowing  that, 
since  he  had  entrusted  the  reins  to  the  king,  and  was 
dragged  alongside  him,  he  was  no  longer  master  of  anything 
16  P1ut.  Arat.  45.1-3 
107 except  his  tongue,  which  it  was  dangerous  for  him  to  use 
withfreedom.  ll' 
Plutarch's  intention  was  to  portray  the  tragic  nature  of  this 
decision,  how  a  man  who  had  spent  most  of  his  life  fighting 
against  the  Macedonians  was  forced  in  the  end  to  seek  salvation 
from  his  former  enemies.  As  with  Plutarch's  emphasis  on  the 
Stoic  influence  on  Cleomenes'  reforms,  we  are  left  with  the 
problem  that  he  did  not  regard  his  lives  as  histories;  his  intention 
was  to  explore  the  character  of  those  involved.  The  decision  to 
call  in  Macedonian  troops  is  usually  seen  in  the  context  of 
possible  socio-economic  problems  in  the  Peloponnese.  The 
opposition  found  in  Sicyon  and  Corinth  indicates  that  these 
revolts  were  actually  in  opposition  to  the  Macedonian  presence 
in  the  Peloponnese  and  both  revolts  came  after  the  entry  of 
Macedonian  troops  to  the  Peloponnese,  not  before.  Although 
Walbank  states  that  these  revolts  saved  Aratus  the 
embarrassment  of  explaining  such  a  volte-face,  this  assumes; 
firstly  that  Aratus  had  sole  responsibility  for  this  decision; 
secondly,  that  the  motivation  in  both  poleis  was  socio- 
economic.  "'  Though  Plutarch  suggests  that  these  actions  were 
undertaken  because  the  common  people  wanted  the  re- 
distribution  of  land  and  the  abolition  of  debts,  he  also  states  that: 
"'  P1ut.  Arat.  45.2-3. 
1'  Walbank  (1993)  p.  198. 
108 The  leading  men  in  many  cases  were  unhappy  with  Aratus 
and  some  of  them  were  also  angry  with  him  for  bringing  the 
Macedonians  into  the  Peloponnese.  "' 
At  Corinth,  the  revolt  came  after  the  decision  to  invite  the 
Macedonians  had  already  been  taken,  suggesting  that  it  was  a 
response  to  the  decision,  not  a  cause  of  it.  Plutarch  states  that  the 
leading  citizens  allowed  the  Spartans  to  enter,  indicating  that 
although  there  is  the  possibility  that  the  lower  classes  may  have 
favoured  Cleomenes,  so  did  those  with  the  most  to  lose  had  he 
favoured  exporting  reforms  to  the  rest  of  the  Peloponnese. 
As  Urban  noted,  both  Corinth  and  Sicyon  had  traditional 
links  with  Sparta,  and  the  decision  by  members  of  their  elite  to 
allow  Spartan  troops  entry  might  reflect  the  long-standing 
association  between  these  poleis.  12°  It  is  evident  from  Polybius' 
account  of  the  decision  to  invite  Macedonian  troops  into  the 
Peloponnese  that  he  does  not  wish  to  indicate  who  exactly  was 
responsible  for  taking  the  decision.  But  if  a  small  group  took  it, 
there  is  the  possibility,  given  its  long-standing  links  with 
Macedonia,  that  the  representatives  of  Megalopolis  and  other 
Arcadian  communities  in  the  Achaean  league  may  have  been 
responsible  for  forcing  the  decision  to  call  on  Antigonus  at  the 
extraordinary  assembly  of  the  Achaean  league,  and  that 
P1ut.  Cleom.  17.3. 
120  Urban  (1972)  p.  207. 
109 Polybius'  evasiveness  was  because  of  the  role  that  they  had 
played  in  the  decision. 
Antigonus'  actions  on  entering  the  Peloponnese  appear  to 
have  been  aimed  at  securing  the  interests  of  the  Argives  and 
Arcadians  within  the  Achaean  league.  He  advanced  on  Argos, 
capturing  it  and  restored  the  statues  of  former  pro-Macedonian 
tyrants  that  Aratus  had  removed.  Cleomenes  was  forced  to 
retreat  into  the  Peloponnese  and  was  pursued  by  Antigonus, 
who  bypassed  the  major  Arcadian  communities  in  order  to  expel 
the  Spartan  garrisons  that  surrounded  Megalopolis  121  Cleomenes 
was  defeated  at  Sellasia  and  fled  to  Egypt  where  he  died  in  a 
coup  attempt.  lm  In  the  resulting  settlement  the  expanded 
Achaean  league  remained  intact.  The  Macedonians  regained 
control  over  the  Acrocorinth,  and  Antigonus  placed  garrisons, 
which  appear  to  have  had  a  coercive  role,  in  strategically 
important  locations  in  the  Peloponnese  123Taurion  was  left  in  the 
Peloponnese  to  oversee  Macedonian  interests,  and  the  Achaean 
league  became  a  Macedonian  client.  124  More  importantly,  it  also 
became  a  member  of  a  Hellenic  league,  along  with  the 
Thessalians,  Epirots,  Acarnanians,  Boeotians,  Phocians  and  other 
The  pro-Arcadian  element  in  Antigonus'  actions  was  noted  by  Larsen  (1968)  p.  321. 
For  Sellasia  see  Polyb.  2.65-69.  The  death  of  Cleomenes  see  Plut.  Cleom.  37.7. 
Larsen  (1968)  pp.  321-322. 
'Z'  Polyb.  4.6.4-6. 
110 Macedonian  clients.  Aratus  continued  as  an  advisor  to  the  future 
Philip  V,  but  died  believing  that  Philip  poisoned  him  1" 
Polybius  portrays  the  decision  to  call  on  Macedonia  as  one 
forced  upon  a  unified  Achaean  league  at  a  time  when  it  had  no 
other  option.  In  reality  it  resulted  in  the  Achaean  league 
exchanging  possible  dominance  by  Sparta  for  actual  dominance 
by  Macedonia;  domination  by  a  kingdom  that  Aratus  had  spent 
most  of  his  life  resisting,  presumably  with  the  assistance  of  many 
communities  within  the  Achaean  league.  The  unrest  within  the 
Achaean  league  that  is  taken  as  a  sign  that  Cleomenes  was 
regarded  by  the  oppressed  masses  as  a  liberator  came  after  the 
decision  to  call  on  the  Macedonians  had  been  taken,  not  before  it. 
At  Corinth,  which  was  garrisoned  by  Macedonian  troops  until 
Aratus  captured  it  and  brought  it  into  the  Achaean  league,  the 
revolt  appears  to  have  been  motivated  by  hostility  to  Macedonia, 
not  because  Cleomenes'  rule  would  lead  to  a  more  equitable 
social  order. 
However,  for  Polybius  it  was  indeed  liberation  from 
tyranny,  though  not  the  tyranny  of  rule  by  the  masses.  Rather  it 
was  a  liberation  from  the  possibility  that  Megalopolis  would  be 
forced  to  live  under  Spartan  control.  But  was  this  necessarily  in 
accordance  with  the  wishes  of  all  the  other  members  of  the 
Achaean  league?  The  reaction  to  the  decision  at  Sicyon  and 
Corinth  was  revolts  against  the  entry  of  Macedonian  troops  into 
"  Plut.  Arat.  52.1-2. 
111 the  Peloponnese.  The  fact  that  Aratus  was  a  native  of  one,  and 
owned  property  in  another,  indicates  the  extent  of  internal 
dissension  within  the  Achaean  league  over  the  decision. 
Conclusion 
Even  though  the  Cleomenic  War  falls  outside  the  time-frame 
that  Polybius  states  will  be  covered  in  his  histories,  he  gives  a 
long  account  of  it,  stating  that  clarification  of  the  situation  in  the 
Peloponnese  was  essential  for  his  readers'  understanding  of 
Rome's  advent  into  the  Greek  world.  Polybius  wished  to  instruct 
his  readership  as  to  how  Rome  had  come  to  conquer  the 
Mediterranean  world  by  showing  them  the  influence  that 
anacyclosis  had  on  systems  of  government.  Does  this  result  in  an 
account  of  events  by  Polybius  that  stresses  the  unity  of  the 
Achaean  league  and  fails  to  take  into  account  the  legitimate 
interests  that  the  Aetolian  league  had  in  the  Peloponnese? 
As  a  brief  examination  of  some  of  the  evidence 
demonstrates,  Polybius'  narrative  fails  to  mention  important 
aspects  of  the  relationship  that  the  Aetolian  league  had  with  the 
Peloponnese.  Given  the  close  geographic  proximity  of  Aetolia  to 
the  Peloponnese  it  is  surprising  that  Polybius  should  present 
their  actions  as  those  of  intruders.  The  existence  of  proxenia 
relations  between  the  Aetolian  league  and  many  communities  in 
the  Peloponnese  indicate  that  commercial  and  political 
connections  existed  across  the  Gulf  of  Corinth.  More 
112 importantly,  the  claimed  mythical  kinship  link  between  the 
Aetolian  league  and  Elis  is  another  factor  that  Polybius  states 
that  his  histories  will  not  deal  with,  but  which  appears  have  been 
an  important  factor  during  the  Hellenistic  period.  The  Aetolians 
had  crossed  the  Gulf  of  Corinth  to  assist  the  Eleans  in  402BC 
when  they  faced  virtual  destruction  at  Spartan  hands  and  it  is 
difficult  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  since  the  fifth  century,  the 
Aetolians  had  been  willing  to  assist  the  Eleans  during  times  of 
extreme  crisis. 
Turning  towards  Sparta  and  Cleomenes'  reforms  there,  it  is 
difficult  to  accuse  Polybius  of  exaggerating  the  role  that  socio- 
economic  problems  played  in  the  decision  to  invite  Antigonus 
into  the  Peloponnese,  since  he  does  not  mention  any.  Although 
Polybius  does  later  mention  in  passing  that  at  some  part  of  his 
reign  Cleomenes  proposed  the  re-distribution  of  land  to  gain 
popular  support,  he  makes  no  mention  of  the  impetus  behind 
this  offer.  Plutarch,  who  emphasises  the  role  that  Stoic 
philosophy  played  in  influencing  Cleomenes'  actions,  makes  no 
mention  of  him  exporting  his  reforms  elsewhere  in  the 
Peloponnese.  Even  if  Cleomenes  did  carry  out  reforms  to  benefit 
the  common  man  influenced  by  Stoic  philosophy,  they  were 
limited  to  residents  of  Laconia.  Polybius  does  draw  attention  to 
social  and  factional  strife  at  Cynaetha,  leading  to: 
113 Constant  mutual  massacres  between  both  sides, 
banishments,  the  robbery  of  people's  goods  and  even  the  re- 
distribution  of  lands.  126 
This  was  in  a  polis  that  was  forced  to  join  the  Achaean 
league  against  its  will  and  had  a  long  association  with  Elis.  So 
should  its  surrender  to  Aetolian  forces  be  seen  as  a  sign  of  socio- 
economic  problems  in  the  Peloponnese?  Or  does  it  indicate  that 
possibly  the  Achaean  league  was  essentially  a  political 
organisation  and  far  from  the  unified  body,  the  single  ethnos,  that 
Polybius'  histories  suggests? 
'26  Polyb.  4.17.4. 
114 Chapter  Three. 
The  evolution  of  Hellenistic  leagues. 
Introduction 
In  187BC  the  inhabitants  of  Delphi  erected  an  inscription 
recording  the  expulsion  of  citizens  of  the  Aetolian  league  from 
properties  they  owned  around  the  shrine.  However,  describing 
those  listed  as  Aetolian  is  in  some  respects  misleading.  Of  the 
fifty-nine  individuals  mentioned,  only  nine  were  from 
communities  that  would  have  been  considered  Aetolian  during 
the  archaic  and  classical  periods;  the  remainder  were  from  other 
areas  in  north-western  Greece,  notably  West  Locris.  l 
This  aspect  of  the  Aetolian  league;  its  ability  to  absorb 
communities  from  other  ethnic  areas,  has  long  been  considered  a 
paradox.  Although  Polybius  describes  the  Aetolians  in  the  worst 
possible  manner,  many  communities  voluntarily  joined  the 
Aetolian  league  during  the  Hellenistic  period.  Walbank  accepts 
that  this  expansion  was  one  of  the  few  positive  things  about  the 
Aetolians,  since  "it  demonstrated  the  continuing  ability  of  the 
Greeks  to  respond  to  a  new  political  challenge  with  new 
solutions"  .2 
Scholten  agrees,  commenting  that  the  development 
of  federal  leagues  during  the  Hellenistic  period  was,  "a  step 
towards  overcoming  the  narrow  local  and  regional  parochialism 
of  the  classical  polls,  which  had  acted  as  a  barrier  to  the  creation 
1  Sherk  RDGE  no.  37. 
2  Walbank  (1993)  p.  157. 
115 of  geographically  more  extensive  forms  of  participatory 
government"  3 
However,  the  Aetolians  were  not  alone  in  absorbing 
communities  from  other  ethnic  groups  into  their  league  during 
the  Hellenistic  period.  Scholten  has  pointed  out  how  the 
successful  expansion  of  the  Aetolian  league  may  have  suggested 
to  the  Achaeans  the  potential  of  a  similar  approach  in  the 
Peloponnese  4  Throughout  his  work,  Polybius,  though  a  native  of 
Megalopolis  in  Arcadia,  describes  himself  and  other  inhabitants 
of  his  native  polls  as  Achaeans.  In  his  account  of  the  early  history 
of  the  Achaean  league,  Polybius  states  that  its  success  was  due  to 
the  fact  that: 
One  could  not  find  a  political  system  and  principle  so 
favourable  to  equality  and  freedom  of  speech,  in  a  word  so 
sincerely  democratic 
.5 
According  to  Polybius,  the  Achaean  league  developed  into  a 
state  in  which  the  entire  Peloponnese: 
Only  fell  short  of  being  a  single  polls  in  the  fact  of  its 
inhabitants  not  being  enclosed  by  one  wall,  all  other  things 
being,  both  as  regards  the  whole  and  as  regards  each 
separate  polis  very  nearly  identical 
.6 
3  Scholten  (2000)  p.  3. 
4  Scholten  (2000)  p.  3. 
5  Polyb.  2.38.6. 
6  Polyb.  2.37.11. 
116 In  his  histories  Polybius  refers  to  the  actions  of  the  Achaean 
ethnos,  or  people,  implying  that  all  members  of  the  Achaean 
league  came  to  form  a  common  identity?  We  should  question  to 
what  extent  Polybius'  depiction  of  the  Achaean  league  was 
influenced  by  his  attitude  to  the  Roman  conquest  of  Greece.  In 
particular,  how  far  does  Polybius  over-emphasise  the  unity  of 
the  Achaean  league  so  that  he  can  emphasise  its  later  decline 
through  the  workings  of  anacyclosis?  Walbank  argued  that  the 
Achaean  league  was  a  federation  in  which  an  Arcadian  like 
Polybius  could  identify  with  an  institution  which  expanded 
under  the  leadership  of  a  Dorian  like  Aratus  to  encompass  the 
entire  Peloponnese  .8 
However,  Walbank  accepted  that  the  bigger 
poleis  in  the  Achaean  league  were  never  fully  politically  absorbed 
and  in  times  of  crisis  often  acted  independently.  As  he  admitted: 
It  is  prima  facie  absurd  to  suppose  that  cities  like  Argos, 
Corinth,  Sicyon  and  Megara  surrendered  their  political 
identity  and  felt  themselves  to  be  diminished  because  they 
had  joined  the  Achaean  federation 
.9 
Thus,  it  would  appear  that  Polybius'  claim  that  the  various 
ethne  of  the  Peloponnese  united  to  form  one  ethnos,  resulting  in  a 
distinct  Achaean  identity,  and  common  political  interests  being 
held  by  all  the  inhabitants  of  the  Peloponnese,  is  questionable. 
7  Earlier  historians  like  Herodotus  used  the  word  ethnos  in  a  very  restricted  way,  and  in 
practically  every  case  is  translated  "people"  or  "nation".  See  Jones  (1996)  p.  316. 
8  Walbank  (1985)  p.  15. 
117 Walbank  accepts  that  the  larger  poleis  in  the  Achaean  league 
were  never  fully  absorbed;  we  need  not  accept  that  the 
Megalopolitan  Polybius'  depiction  of  the  Achaean  league 
actually  represented  a  federal  state  where  Dorians,  Arcadians 
and  later  Spartans  shared  a  common  identity  and  interests.  In 
reality  members  of  Polybius'  family  like  his  father  Lycortas,  and 
other  Megalopolitans,  such  as  Philopoemen  and  Aristaenus, 
dominated  the  Achaean  league  for  long  periods. 
It  is  also  assumed  that  the  Aetolian  and  Achaean  leagues 
were  similar  to  each  other,  but  there  were  important  differences. 
Both  the  Aetolian  and  Achaean  leagues  expanded  during  the 
Hellenistic  period  far  beyond  the  base  that  they  had  had  during 
the  archaic  and  classical  periods.  The  Aetolians  during  the 
Hellenistic  period  absorbed  many  communities  into  their  league 
that  were  not  ethnically  Aetolian.  Despite  this  enlargement,  the 
majority  of  Aetolian  strategoi  during  the  Hellenistic  period  came 
from  communities  that  had  been  part  of  the  Aetolian  ethnos 
during  the  archaic  and  classical  periods,  suggesting  that  the 
Aetolians  retained  control  over  the  political  institutions  they 
created  during  the  Hellenistic  period,  or  at  the  very  least  acted  in 
unison  to  protect  their  interests.  10  In  the  Peloponnese,  the 
9  Walbank  (1985)  p.  36 
10  O'Neil  (1984-86)  pp.  45-53  points  out  that  the  majority  of  the  strategoi  of  the  Aetolian 
league  during  the  Hellenistic  period,  for  whom  we  have  a  virtually  complete  list,  come 
from  areas  that  had  always  been  Aetolian.  The  vast  majority  came  from  the  area  around 
Trichonion,  followed  in  numbers  by  those  who  originated  in  Calydon  and  Pleuron.  The 
118 Achaean  league  came  under  the  control  of  Aratus,  a  Dorian  from 
Sicyon,  and  later  of  Arcadians  from  Megalopolis  like 
Philopoemen  and  Aristaenus.  Thus,  although  the  Aetolian 
league's  policy  during  the  Hellenistic  period  was  carried  out  by 
politicians  who  were  largely  from  the  Aetolian  ethnos;  in  the 
Peloponnese  the  policy  that  Polybius  represents  as  that  of  the 
Achaean  ethnos  was  actually  carried  out  by  a  mixture  of  Dorians 
and  Arcadians. 
The  intention  in  this  chapter  will  be  to  examine  the 
evolution  of  the  Achaean  and  Aetolian  leagues  from  the  archaic 
period  onwards.  My  contention  will  be  that  although  both  the 
Aetolian  and  Achaean  leagues  changed  radically  during  the 
Hellenistic  'period,  their  evolution  from  the  archaic  period 
onwards  was  very  different.  The  Aetolians  were  a  distinct  ethnos, 
a  people  with  a  common  identity,  expressed  through  a  common 
belief  in  a  mythical  past  and  shared  religious  beliefs,  from  at 
least  the  seventh  century.  This  belief  appears  to  have  led  to  the 
Aetolians  acting  as  a  cohesive  body  within  the  political 
structures  of  their  expanded  league  during  the  Hellenis 
period. 
On  the  other  side  of  the  Gulf  of  Corinth,  the  Achaean  league 
appears  to  have  been  a  political  union  from  its  inception,  whose 
situation  in  the  Achaean  league  is  very  different:  though  we  lack  the  epigraphic 
evidence  available  from  Aetolia,  the  vast  majority  of  strategoi  mentioned  by  Polybius 
came  from  Megalopolis,  including  Philopoemen,  strategos  on  eight  occasions,  and 
Lycortas,  Polybius'  father,  strategos  on  at  least  three  occasions. 
119 founding  members  seem  not  to  have  held  the  belief  that  they 
formed  a  distinct  ethnos  as  the  Aetolians  did.  Thus,  when  both 
leagues  reacted  to  changed  political  circumstances  by  expanding 
during  the  Hellenistic  period,  the  Aetolians,  because  they  were  a 
distinct  people,  or  ethnos,  may  have  been  able  to  retain  political 
control  over  their  league,  while  the  original  members  of  the 
Achaean  league  lost  control  over  theirs. 
The  evolution  of  the  Aetolian  League. 
In  early  times.  .  .  piracy  became  a  common  profession 
amongst  the  Greeks  and  the  barbarians  who  lived  on  the 
coast  and  in  the  islands 
...  The  same  system  of  armed  robbery 
prevailed  by  land;  and  even  up  to  the  present  day  much  of 
Greece  still  follows  the  old  way  of  life-  among  the  Ozolian 
Locrians,  for  instance,  and  the  Aetolians  and  the 
Acarnanians  and  others  who  live  on  the  mainland  in  that 
area.  Amongst  these  peoples  the  custom  of  carrying  arms 
still  persists  from  the  old  days  of  robbery.  11 
In  this  passage  Thucydides  shows  how  Aetolian  society  was 
regarded  as  primitive  and  backward  during  the  classical  period. 
Despite  this,  shared  religious  beliefs  appear  to  have  played  as 
important  a  role  in  the  evolution  of  Aetolian  society  as  they  did 
li  Thuc.  1.5.1-6.1. 
120 elsewhere  in  the  Greek  world.  12  Although  aspects  of  Aetolian 
society  were  different  from  elsewhere  in  Greece,  it  appears  that 
the  Aetolians  considered  themselves,  and  were  considered  by 
others  as  an  ethnos  from  at  least  the  mid-seventh  century. 
The  role  that  religious  practice  played  in  determining  the 
character  of  the  Aetolian  ethnos  is  an  important  factor  in 
explaining  the  policies  followed  by  the  Aetolian  league  during 
the  Hellenistic  period.  Both  the  Achaean  and  Aetolian  leagues 
absorbed  new  members  during  the  Hellenistic  period.  The 
establishment  of  a  religious  centre  at  Thermon,  dating  from  the 
seventh  century,  seems  to  have  given  the  Aetolians  during  the 
Hellenistic  period  a  sense  of  being  a  single  ethnos,  which  did  not 
exist  amongst  the  members  of  the  Achaean  league.  This  might 
explain  why,  though  the  Aetolian  league  expanded  rapidly  to 
deal  with  the  threat  posed  by  Macedonia  from  280BC,  Aetolians 
from  the  ethnos  retained  control  over  the  policy  that  their  league 
followed  during  the  Hellenistic  period. 
Examining  firstly  the  coastal  plain,  its  two  principal 
settlements,  Calydon  and  Pleuron  dominate  this  area  and 
communication  links  between  Greece  and  Southern  Italy.  13 
Although  little  actually  remains  of  Calydon,  it  is  clear  that  in 
antiquity  it  was  a  large  settlement,  with  an  extensive  shrine 
12  For  the  importance  of  religious  activity  in  the  formation  of  Greek  political 
communities  see  Snodgrass  (1980)  pp.  49-65. 
13  See  Aristophanes,  Knights  L.  75  for  the  strategic  importance  this  area  had  for  the 
Athenians  in  the  fifth  century. 
121 adjacent  to  it  that  the  other  communities  in  the  coastal  plain 
appear  to  have  used.  The  other  major  settlement  situated  in  the 
coastal  plain  of  Aetolia  was  Old  and  New  Pleuron,  which 
controlled  access  to  the  pass  at  Kleisure,  connecting  the  coastal 
plain  with  the  rest  of  Aetolia.  14 
Thermon,  the  principal  Aetolian  religious  centre  from  the 
archaic  period  onwards  and  the  political  centre  of  the  Aetolian 
league  during  the  Hellenistic  period,  was  located  along  the 
transhumance  routes  between  the  fertile  area  surrounding  the 
lakes  of  the  Aetolian  interior  and  the  mountainous  area  to  the 
northeast  15  The  large  size  of  the  agora  suggests  that  the  site 
developed  as  a  convenient  meeting  point  for  trade,  and  was  in 
use  from  the  Bronze  Age  until  the  late  Hellenistic  period.  16  The 
first  building  at  the  site,  Megaron  B,  is  of  typical  mesohelladic 
construction,  and  is  a  local  adaptation  of  a  type  found  elsewhere 
in  the  Balkans.  17  Its  primary  use  is  disputed,  some  arguing  that  it 
housed  a  local  chieftain;  others  suggest  that  it  was  utilised  for 
ritual  purposes  18  Though  most  of  the  archaeological  evidence  is 
problematic,  extensive  finds  of  Mycenean  pottery  and  utensils 
14  Woodhouse  (1897)  p.  34. 
15  Antonetti  (1990)  p.  23.  For  a  more  in-depth  discussion  of  the  role  that  transhumance 
played  in  Aetolian  society  see  Bommelje  and  Doom  (1991)  pp.  81-97. 
16  See  Antonetti  (1990)  p.  153. 
17  Antonetti  (1990)  p-156- 
18  Antonetti  (1990)  p.  156.  The  discovery  of  charred  bones  at  the  site  would  seem  to 
indicate  the  latter. 
122 have  been  made  at  the  site,  and  Antonetti  suggests  that  during 
the  Bronze  Age  Aetolia  developed  a  hybrid  culture,  mixing 
elements  of  both  Mycenean  and  northern  Greek  culture.  19  At  the 
end  of  the  Bronze  Age  and  the  onset  of  the  Dark  ages,  Mycenean 
culture  in  Thermon  declined  rapidly,  and  in  its  place  the 
Aetolians  began  to  renew  their  links  with  northern  Greece, 
especially  with  Macedonia,  Epirus  and  the  Spercheios  valley.  20 
During  the  archaic  period  the  site  at  Thermon  expanded  and 
became  the  central  religious  centre  for  the  Aetolian  ethnos,  and 
three  temples  were  developed.  21  This  development  seems  to  be 
related  solely  to  religious  practice,  since  no  bouleterion  or  stoa, 
indicating  a  corresponding  political  unity,  was  built  before  the 
Hellenistic  period  22  From  the  size  and  the  extent  of  the 
buildings,  it  is  self-evident  that  some  form  of  centralised  control 
must  have  existed  to  co-ordinate  their  construction.  The  expense 
needed  to  erect  the  temples  and  employ  outside  workmen  in 
their  design  and  construction  suggests  that  some  form  of 
centralised  control  had  developed  in  Aetolia  concerning 
religious  practice,  and  that  the  Aetolians  developed  this  site  to 
reflect  their  sense  of  national  consciousness.  The  site  indicates 
19  Antonetti  (1990)  p.  160.  Aetolian  pottery  was  widely  exported  through  northern 
Greece,  as  well  as  the  Peloponnese  and  the  Ionian  Islands. 
20  Antonetti  (1990)  p.  158. 
21  For  a  description  of  the  archaic  site,  see  Antonetti  (1990)  p.  167-196. 
22  Scholten  (2000)  p.  9  describes  the  one  of  the  Temples  at  Thermon  dating  from  the 
seventh  century  as,  "architecturally  and  artistically  avant-garde" 
123 that  the  Aetolians  had  contact  with  the  Peloponnese  during  the 
archaic  period.  The  principal  temple,  dedicated  possibly  to 
Apollo  or  Artemis,  was  once  thought  to  have  been  the  work  of 
Corinthian  craftsman,  though  it  appears  that  local  craftsmen, 
possibly  under  Corinthian  supervision,  were  responsible  for  its 
construction.  23  The  metopes  themselves  cover  a  wide  range  of 
mythological  topics  and  again  show  Corinthian  influence  in  their 
design24  The  most  prominent  figure  represented  on  the  metopes 
is  Hercules,  who  is  depicted  on  two  series,  one  showing  his  entry 
into  Olympia,  and  the  other  a  hunting  scene  related  to  the 
Calydonian  boar25  Although  some  scenes  have  a  local  origin, 
there  is  a  distinct  influence  from  the  art  of  the  eastern 
Peloponnese  in  their  origins,  especially  from  Argos26  Given  the 
effort  and  co-ordination  needed  to  develop  this  site,  it  appears 
that  from  the  archaic  period  onwards  the  Aetolians  considered 
themselves  a  distinct  ethnos. 
23  Bookidis  (1976)  p.  911. 
24  Payne  (1925)  pp.  124-32  argues  that  the  metopes  are  from  a  transitional  period 
between  Proto-Corinthian  to  Corinthian. 
25  See  Antonetti  (1990)  p.  174-178.  It  is  argued  by  some  that  the  long  hair  of  the  hero  in 
the  hunting  scene  would  preclude  it  being  Hercules.  With  Hercules  playing  such  an 
important  role  in  Aetolian  mythology,  the  balance  of  probability  as  Antonetti  argues,  is 
with  identification  with  Hercules.  Other  metopes  found  at  Thermon  depict  Perseus  with 
the  head  of  Medusa,  three  goddesses  who  are  unidentified,  but  are  possibly  the  charites, 
Iris  with  a  Centaur,  the  birth  of  Athena,  and  a  Gorgon.  See  Antonetti  (1990)  p.  167-9. 
26  Antonetti  (1990)  p.  172. 
124 This  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  the  Aetolians  had 
developed  a  political  union;  later  additions  to  the  site  during  the 
Hellenistic  period  suggest  that  it  was  only  then  that  Thermon 
developed  into  a  centre  for  political  administration. 
There  was  also  a  parallel  development  of  a  religious  centre 
at  Calydon  27  Although  the  site  at  Calydon  was  destroyed  in  the 
first  century  BC,  it  is  possible  to  reconstruct  an  adequate  picture 
of  the  ceremonies  carried  out  there  from  the  description  that 
Pausanias  gives  us  of  the  ceremonies  carried  out  in  Patrae  in  the 
second  century  BC28  As  at  Thermon,  it  appears  that  the  site  at 
Calydon  was  dedicated  to  Artemis,  suggesting  that  both  the 
inhabitants  of  the  Aetolian  coastal  plain  and  those  in  the  interior 
shared  a  common  religious  heritage.  The  very  fact  that  the 
inhabitants  of  the  coastal  plain  developed  their  own  religious 
centre  at  the  same  time  as  one  was  under  construction  at 
Thermon  seems  to  indicate  that  this  area  had  a  distinct  identity 
from  the  rest  of  the  ethnos.  Morgan  suggests  that  the 
development  of  the  site  at  Calydon  may  have  been  an  attempt  by 
the  coastal  communities  to  counterbalance  the  dominance  of  the 
inland  parts  of  the  Aetolian  ethnos29  Although  there  were  shared 
elements  in  religious  practice  at  both  sites,  such  as  devotion  to 
27  Antonetti  (1990)  pp.  243. 
28  Paus.  7.18.8-13.  Patrae  was  also,  according  to  Pausanias,  the  only  Greek  State  to  aid  the 
Aetolians  in  279BC.  See  Paus.  7.18.5. 
29  Morgan  (1990)  p.  8. 
125 Artemis  and  Hercules,  the  communities  of  the  coastal  plain 
appear  to  have  remained  distinct  from  the  rest  of  Aetolia.  30 
If  a  shared  religious  experience  suggests  that  the  Aetolians 
formed  an  ethnos  from  the  seventh  century  onwards,  is  there  any 
evidence  for  corresponding  political  structures?  The  evidence  for 
the  classical  period  is  very  limited  31  From  the  archaic  period 
onwards  the  Aetolians  were  willing  to  go  to  the  effort  and 
expense  of  developing  a  religious  centre  at  Thermon  to  serve 
their  ethnos.  Despite  this,  it  appears  that  the  Aetolian  ethnos 
remained  politically  disorganised  until  the  Hellenistic  period. 
Turning  to  Thucydides'  account  '  of  the  Athenian 
expedition  to  Aetolia  in  426BC,  it  appears  that  although  the 
Aetolians  were  capable  of  co-operating  with  each  other  in 
matters  of  self-defence  and  religious  matters,  they  remained 
politically  disorganised.  Although  some  elements  of  Thucydides' 
account,  such  as  the  Messenian  accusation  that  an  Aetolian  tribe 
called  the  Eurytanians  spoke  an  almost  unintelligible  language 
and  ate  raw  meat  may  not  necessarily  be  accurate  and  are 
reported  as  hearsay,  it  appears  on  balance  to  reflect  accurately 
Aetolia's  fragmented  political  organisation.  According  to 
Thucydides,  the  Messenians  informed  Demosthenes,  the 
Athenian  commander,  that  he  should  attack  three  different 
30  Calydon  also  appears  to  have  shared  elements  of  religious  practice  with  the 
Peloponnese.  Antonetti  (1990)  p.  253. 
31  See  Larsen  (1968)  p.  79  and  pp.  195-205. 
126 Aetolian  communities  in  succession;  firstly  the  Apodotians, 
followed  by  the  Ophionians,  and  finally  the  Eurytanians  32  As 
Thucydides'  account  of  the  campaign  demonstrates,  despite 
being  split  into  different  tribes,  the  Aetolians  were  capable  of 
unifying  in  mutual  self-defence  during  times  of  crisis,  uniting  to 
defeat  the  Athenian  intruders,  and  the  three  tribes  were  capable 
of  sending  a  joint  embassy  to  seek  assistance  from  Sparta  and 
Corinth  33 
One  of  the  more  intriguing  and  elusive  comments 
regarding  the  political  situation  in  Aetolia  comes  at  the  end  of 
the  campaign,  when  a  Spartan  force,  according  to  Thucydides, 
retreated  into  an  otherwise  unknown  area  he  called  Aeolis  34 
Scholten  and  others  suggest  that  this  reference  indicate  that  poleis 
on  the  Aetolian  coastal  plain  like  Calydon  and  Pleuron  were  at 
this  point  members  of  the  Achaean  league  35  It  has  been 
suggested  that  Calydon  and  Pleuron's  membership  of  the 
Achaean  league  may  have  prompted  the  transformation  of  the 
32  The  evidence  provided  by  Thucydides  of  the  subdivision  into  tribes  is  taken  by  some 
as  evidence  of  a  primitive  society  in  Aetolia  during  this  period.  However,  as  Nielsen  and 
Roy  (1998)  pp.  5-44  point  out,  this  was  a  feature  of  ethne,  the  Arcadians  also  being 
divided  into  tribes,  such  as  the  Azanians  in  northern  Arcadia. 
33  See  Thuc.  3.100.1.  This  embassy  was  composed  of  Tolophus  an  Ophionian,  Boriades  an 
Eurytanian  and  Tisander  an  Apodotian. 
34  See  Thuc.  3.102.5.  The  text  is  disputed,  but  the  punctuation  follows  Hornblower  (1996) 
p.  516. 
35  Scholten  (2000)  p.  13. 
127 annual  gathering  at  Thermon  into  an  electoral  assembly.  36 
Scholten  argues  that  although  the  Aetolians  formed  an  ethnos, 
they  remained  politically  disorganised  until  the  Hellenistic 
period,  and  were  unable  to  take  advantage  of  their  considerable 
manpower  to  regain  control  over  Calydon  and  Pleuron,  instead 
having  to  rely  on  the  Thebans,  and  later  the  Macedonians. 
There  is  little  to  be  said  for  this  view  except  these  poleis' 
later  membership  of  the  Achaean  league  37  Thucydides  does  not 
state  that  the  Aetolian  coastal  plain  was  under.  the  control  of  the 
Achaean  league  in  426BC;  the  passage  merely  implies  that  he 
considered  this  region  distinct  from  the  rest  of  Aetolia.  Nor  is  it 
evident  that  the  Aeolis  reference  implies  an  Achaean  origin. 
Thucydides  later  describes  the  ancient  Corinthians  as  Aeolians; 
he  may  have  been  referring  to  earlier  contact  between  the 
Aetolian  coastal  plain  and  Corinth  38 
The  discovery  of  an  inscription  in  Athens  recording  the 
dispatch  of  an  embassy  to  the  Aetolian  koinon  from  Athens  in 
367BC  would  seem  to  suggest  there  was  some  form  of  central 
36  See  Bommelje  (1988)  pp.  57-61.  Scholten  (2000)  p.  9  n.  33  promises  to  discuss  the 
development  of  the  Aetolian  league  during  the  archaic  and  classical  period  in  a  further 
volume. 
37  Scholten  (2000)  p.  13.  For  the  Thebans  see  Diod.  15.75.2  and  Macedonia  under  Philip  II, 
Demosth  9.34. 
38  Thuc.  4.42.2. 
128 authority  in  Aetolia  by  the  mid-fourth  century  39  It  recorded  an 
embassy  sent  to  appeal  to  the  Aetolian  koinon  for  its  assistance  in 
gaining  the  release  of  a  number  of  Athenian  ambassadors  that 
had  been  detained  in  Trichonion.  The  Athenians  had  dispatched 
these  ambassadors  on  the  understanding  that  they  would  not  be 
detained,  since  they  had  earlier  approached  the  Aetolian  koinon 
and  received  its  assurance  that  they  would  respect  the  Sacred 
Truce.  On  publication  the  reference  to  an  Aetolian  koinon  in  the 
inscription  was  seen  as  evidence  that  the  Aetolians  had  evolved 
centralised  political  institutions;  the  date  for  the  formation  of  the 
Aetolian  league  was  duly  revised  upwards  from  314BC. 
Although  accepting  that  the  Aetolians  did  by  this  stage 
have  a  league,  Walbank  comments  that: 
It  is  perhaps  appropriate  that  our  earliest  reference  to  the 
Aetolian  confederation  should  concern  a  breach  of  generally 
accepted  convention,  for  throughout  their  history  the 
Aetolians  were  renowned  for  their  lawlessness  and  piracy. 
Scholten,  admitting  that  there  was  a  koinon  in  Aetolia  that 
was  answerable  to  the  rest  of  the  Greek  world,  argued  that  some 
residents  of  Trichonion,  if  not  the  entire  community,  felt  no 
39  This  inscription  was  first  published  by  Schweigert  (1939)  pp.  5-12.  It  has  recently  been 
re-published  by  Woodhead  (1997)  no.  48.  The  text  used  in  this  discussion  will  be  that  of 
the  1997  edition. 
40  Walbank  (1993)  p.  153. 
129 compunction  about  seizing  religious  representatives  whose 
inviolability  was  acknowledged  by  their  league  41 
However,  the  inscription  is  incomplete;  we  are  given  no 
indication  of  why  the  inhabitants  of  Trichonion  detained  these 
ambassadors.  Of  more  interest  is  what  it  tells  us  about  the 
relationship  between  Trichonion  and  the  Aetolian  koinon. 
Although  the  Aetolian  koinion  had  agreed  to  the  Sacred  Truce, 
the  inhabitants  of  Trichonion  felt  that  they  could  over-rule,  or 
ignore  this  decision.  In  view  of  Trichonion's  proximity  to 
Thermon,  it  would  seem  to  suggest  that  those  responsible,  as 
Scholten  argues,  did  not  seem  to  be  operating,  "under  any 
reciprocal  assumption  of  responsibility  to  obey  that 
government's  decisions"  42 
However,  would  the  Athenians  have  sent  an  embassy  to 
the  Aetolian  koinon  seeking  its  assistance  in  gaining  the  return  of 
their  ambassadors  if  that  body  was  powerless  to  intervene?  43  The 
inhabitants  of  Trichonion  may  have  violated  a  Sacred  Truce;  that 
does  not  mean  that  the  Aetolians  had  different  values  from  the 
rest  of  the  Greek  world  44  The  very  fact  that  the  Athenians  asked 
the  Aetolian  koinon  to  observe  the  Eleusinian  truce  in  the  first 
41  Scholten  (2000)  p.  15. 
42  Scholten  (2000)  p.  15. 
43  The  word  koinon  means  little  more  than  community.  See  Thuc.  1.83.4.  where 
Thucydides  uses  koinon  to  describe  Athens. 
44  Scholten  (2000)  p.  15. 
-ý 
130 place  suggests  that  the  behaviour  of  the  inhabitants  of 
Trichonion  was  exceptional. 
Trichonion's  action  in  seizing  these  ambassadors  would 
seem  to  indicate  that  communities  within  Aetolia  retained  a 
great  deal  of  local  independence  and  that  although  the  koinon 
seems  to  have  had  some  power,  it  was  probably  limited  to 
religious  matters.  This  would  seem  to  be  supported  by  a 
reference  in  Arrian  to  Aetolian  embassies  sent  to  Alexander  the 
Great;  each  of  the  three  Aetolian  tribes  sending  a  representative 
at  the  beginning  of  his  reign  45  Since  Arrian  was  relying  on 
primary  sources  for  his  information,  the  reference  appears  to  be 
accurate.  46  Bosworth  argued  that  an  Aetolian  league  with 
political  authority  must  have  existed  in  367BC  when  the 
Aetolians  gained  control  of  Naupactus  47  He  suggests  that  the 
reference  to  a  multiplicity  of  embassies  was  a  deliberate  ploy, 
suggesting  that  Philip  II  had  earlier  dissolved  the  Aetolian 
league  48  Since  this  action  would  have  been  sanctioned  by  the 
Common  Peace,  Bosworth  suggests  that  the  Aetolians 
deliberately  sent  a  multiplicity  of  embassies  to  give  the 
impression  that  they  were  not  united  49 
45  Arrian.  Anab.  I.  10.2. 
46  Bosworth  (1976)  pp.  164. 
47  Bosworth  (1976)  p.  164. 
48  Larsen  (1968)  p.  196  suggests  that  it  was  part  of  normal  Aetolian  diplomatic  practice. 
49  Bosworth  (1976)  pp.  166-8. 
131 There  are  problems  with  Bosworth's  argument.  The  only 
evidence  that  the  Aetolians  were  promised,  or  gained  control 
over  Naupactus,  comes  in  a  reference  in  Demosthenes  and 
another  reference  in  Strabo  that  is  directly  lifted  from 
Demosthenes  50  Bosworth  bases  his  argument  around  his 
reconstruction  of  a  text  that  claims  that  Philip  captured 
Naupactus  and  massacred  the  inhabitants  on  the  resolution  of 
the  Achaeans,  the  opposite  of  the  usual  reading  of  the  text 
involved  51  Bosworth  also  assumes  that  Philip  II  and  the  Achaean 
league  undertook  a  campaign  against  the  Aetolians,  even  though 
we  have  no  evidence  for  one.  He  also  takes  it  for  granted  that 
there  was  a  transformation  between  the  fifth  and  the  fourth 
centuries  in  Aetolian  political  structures  under  Theban  influence, 
again  an  event  for  which  there  is  no  evidence.  If  one  accepts 
Arrian's  accuracy,  it  would  appear  that  at  the  beginning  of 
Alexander  the  Great's  reign  the  Aetolians  had  not  yet  developed 
political  structures  beyond  those  needed  for  the  administration 
of  religious  matters  at  Thermon. 
Thus,  although  the  evidence  seems  to  suggest  that  the 
Aetolians  considered  themselves  a  distinct  ethnos  from  the 
archaic  period  onwards,  that  does  not  necessarily  imply  that 
political  unity  existed  before  the  Hellenistic  period.  Is  this 
evidence  that  in  some  way  Aetolian  society  was  different  from 
50  Bosworth  (1976)  p.  169.  Demosthenes  9.34.  Strabo  (427). 
51  For  Bosworth's  reconstruction  of  this  text,  see  (1976)  p.  170. 
132 elsewhere  in  Greece,  hence  Polybius'  depiction  of  their  actions  in 
the  Peloponnese  during  the  Hellenistic  period  as  irrational? 
Nielsen,  in  his  study  of  the  Arcadian  ethnos  during  the  classical 
period,  the  society  Polybius  later  came  from,  argues  that 
although  a  state  can  be  considered  an  ethnos  if  its  inhabitants 
share  certain  common  characteristics,  such  as  a  shared  history 
and  culture,  this  does  not  automatically  translate  into  political 
unity  52  As  he  points  out,  Arcadia  was  clearly  an  ethnos,  since  all 
of  its  communities  seem  to  have  shared  a  belief  that  they  were  a 
distinct  people.  Arcadians  during  the  classical  period  regarded 
themselves  and  were  regarded  by  other  Greeks  as  a  distinct 
people.  Despite  this,  the  Arcadians  never  developed  a  political 
union  during  the  classical  period,  remaining  politically  divided, 
with  some  Arcadian  poleis  enjoying  -close  and  friendly  relations 
with  Sparta.  Arcadian  society  during  the  classical  period  also 
shared  many  elements  in  common  with  that  in  Aetolia,  such  as  a 
division  of  the  ethnos  into  tribes  53 
Thus  elements  of  Aetolian  society  during  the  classical 
period  was  not  all  that  dissimilar  from  the  Arcadian  one  that 
52  See  Nielsen  (1996)  pp.  124-148,  which  discusses  Arcadia  in  the  classical  period  up  until 
the  synoecism  of  Megalopolis.  Nielsen  contends  that  at  least  four  tribal  states  can  be 
identified  in  Arcadia  during  the  classical  period,  the  Eutresians,  Kynourians,  Mainalians 
and  Parrhasians.  Nielsen  contends,  (p.  128)  that  these  tribes,  or  ethnic  units,  functioned  as 
distinct  states  and  had  defined  territories.  I  would  like  to  thank  the  author  for  sending 
me  the  relevant  sections  of  his  Ph.  D.  dissertation. 
53  Nielsen  and  Roy  (1998)  p.  6. 
133 Polybius  came  from.  Does  this  have  any  implications  for  our 
understanding  of  the  later  expansion  of  the  Aetolian  league 
during  the  Hellenistic  period?  External  threat  plays  a  significant 
role  in  the  formation  of  Greek  political  communities;  the 
epigraphic  evidence  at  Thermon  begins  to  accumulate  around 
280BC,  suggesting  that  previously  Aetolian  record  keeping  had 
been  minimal.  At  the  same  time  the  first  Aetolian  coinage 
appears,  indicating  that  radical  changes  took  place  in  Aetolia, 
suggesting  a  transformation  in  the  political  situation  related  to 
the  rise  of  Macedonia 
.% 
The  changed  political  circumstances 
brought  about  by  the  growth  of  Macedonian  power  after  the 
ascension  of  Alexander  the  Great  to  the  throne  of  Macedonia 
seem  to  have  provided  the  Aetolians  with  the  impetus  they 
needed  to  co-operate  with  each  other  to  combat  this  threat.  The 
result  was  that  the  Aetolians,  who  had  always  considered 
themselves  a  distinct  ethnos,  formed  political  institutions  to 
protect  their  interests. 
The  development  of  the  Achaean  League. 
Is  it  correct  to  assume  that  a  similar  situation  existed  in 
Achaea?  Larsen,  following  Polybius'  account  of  the  early  history 
of  the  Achaean  league,  assumed  that  the  Achaeans  formed  an 
ethnos  from  the  archaic  period  onwards.  In  reality  there  is  very 
54  Scholten  (2000)  p.  25. 
134 little  evidence  for  this,  and  most  of  what  there  is  comes  from 
Polybius.  55 
According  to  Polybius'  account,  the  Achaean  league  was  re- 
founded  in  280BC  after  the  Macedonians  had  earlier  dissolved 
it.  56  This  dissolution  was,  Polybius  stated,  a  temporary  measure, 
since  the  Achaeans  had  formed  an  ethnos  from  the  earliest  times. 
However,  Polybius  only  mentions  two  episodes  regarding  early 
Achaean  history,  an  embassy  to  Southern  Italy  to  mediate  after 
riots  against  Pythagorean  influence  in  government,  and  another 
sent  to  mediate  between  the  Spartans  and  Thebans  in  the 
aftermath  of  the  battle  of  Leuctra  57  Little  else  is  known  about  the 
Achaean  league  before  the  Hellenistic  period,  though  it  appears 
to  have  been  allied  with  Sparta  during  the  Peloponnesian  War, 
and  as  late  as  330BC  fought  for  Agis  III  58  Polybius  is  remarkably 
silent  about  the  early  history  of  the  Achaean  league,  though 
Walbank  suggests  that  possibly  he  did  not  want  to  admit  that 
there  was  no  external  evidence  of  either  achievement  or  high 
principle  in  the  Achaean  league  59 
Should  Polybius'  rather  vague  account  of  the  early  history 
and  development  of  the  Achaean  league  be  taken  at  face  value? 
55  Larsen  (1968)  pp.  80-89. 
56Polyb.  2.41.10-11.  Errington  (1969)  p.  1  suggests  that  Alexander  the  Great  was 
responsible. 
57  See  Polyb.  2.39.11-10. 
58  Thuc.  5.82.1.  Xen.  Hell.  6.4.17.  Walbank  (1957)  p.  227. 
59  Walbank  (1957)  p.  227. 
135 Polybius  like  many  historians  appears  to  have  interpreted  the 
past  though  his  understanding  of  the  present,  and  in  this  case,  it 
was  during  a  period  of  whose  history  Polybius  probably  knew 
very  little,  if  anything.  As  Catherine  Morgan  points  out, 
Polybius'  account  of  the  early  history  of  the  Achaean  league  does 
not  fit  the  archaeological  and  topographical  evidence  from  the 
archaic  period,  suggesting  that  Polybius'  account  of  its 
development  was  an  attempt  to  create  a  history  for  the  Achaean 
league  of  his  own  day.  60  She  argues  that  an  examination  of  the 
communities  that  formed  the  Achaean  league  during  the  archaic 
and  classical  period  shows  that  the  original  Achaean  league  was 
composed  of  four  geographically  diverse  areas  61  According  to 
Morgan,  there  was  nothing  pertaining  to  the  geographic 
structure  of  this  area  that  suggests  that  the  communities 
involved  came  together  naturally.  Rather,  she  contends  that  they 
created  a  political  union  to  strengthen  their  position  during  the 
classical  period.  While  other  Greek  political  communities 
developed  around  a  religious  centre,  the  Achaean  league's 
shrine  at  Aegium  was  specifically  developed  to  provide  a  focus 
for  the  newly  developed  Achaean  league  in  the  sixth  century.  As 
she  points  out,  there  is  little  or  no  evidence  for  the  existence  of 
an  Achaean  state  until  the  fifth  century,  when  Herodotus 
60See  Morgan  (1996)  p.  195.  She  states,  "It  is  important  to  recognise  that  Polybius' 
intention  is  to  establish  historical  credentials,  which  might  prove  his  contention  that  the 
Achaean  league  of  his  own  day  enshrined  age-old  principles  of  equality  and  fairness". 
61  See  Morgan  (1991)  p.  131-163. 
136 describes  the  Achaeans  as  an  ethnos;  the  epigraphic  evidence 
only  comes  at  a  later  stage  62  Though  Aegium  was  developed  to 
provide  a  focus  for  the  Achaean  league,  at  a  later  stage  even  this 
site  appears  to  have  fallen  out  of  use,  since  the  Achaean  league 
decided  in  188BC  to  stop  holding  its  meetings  there.  Instead  it 
changed  to  a  rotating  system,  meetings  alternating  between  the 
various  members  of  the  league,  although  Thermon  remained  the 
political  centre  for  the  Aetolian  league  throughout  the  Hellenistic 
period  63 
Returning  to  Walbank's  contention  that  the  Achaean  league 
during  the  Hellenistic  period  was  a  federal  state  with  which  all 
the  states  in  the  Peloponnese  could  identify,  it  would  appear  that 
as  during  the  classical  period,  the  Hellenistic  Achaean  league 
was  essentially  an  artificial  political  creation,  not  a  true  ethnos. 
Thus,  assuming  that  Polybius  adopted  an  Achaean  identity  may 
be  misleading,  and  like  other  poleis  within  the  Achaean  league, 
Megalopolis'  elite  may  have  retained  much  of  their  identity  and 
local  interests  as  a  member  of  the  Achaean  league. 
Conclusion. 
As  Larsen  pointed  out,  although  tyche  in  Polybius'  first  two 
books  is  a,  fl  important  factor,  Polybius  states  that  it  would  be 
phaulon,  a  cowardly  or  stupid  act,  to  describe  the  expansion  of 
62Hdt.  8.73.1.  See  Morgan  (1996)  p.  194  for  the  epigraphy. 
63  See  Badian  and  Errington  (1965)  pp.  13-17  for  a  discussion  of  the  decision. 
137 the  Achaean  league  as  such.  Larsen  argues  that  for  Polybius, 
along  with  the  expansion  of  Rome,  the  expansion  of  the  Achaean 
league  ranks  as  a  major  achievement,  calling  for  careful  study  of 
causation  "  According  to  Polybius  the  expansion  of  the  Achaean 
league  led  to  a  situation  where  the  various  ethne  of  the 
Peloponnese  merged  to  form  one  ethnos  65  Larsen  suggested  that 
we  should  share  the  same  wonder  that  Polybius  did  at  the  fact 
that  Spartans,  Arcadians  and  others  who  had  been  absorbed  into 
the  Achaean  league  became  content  with  this  situation  66 
This  is  exactly  the  situation  that  Polybius  describes  in  his 
histories.  However,  despite  Polybius'  assertions  about  its  unity 
during  the  Hellenistic  period,  it  would  appear  that  the  members 
of  the  Achaean  league  were  never  an  ethnos,  or  a  distinct  people. 
The  subsequent  history  of  the  Achaean  league  shows  that  Sparta 
was  far  from  happy  with  its  membership,  provoking  the  crisis 
that  led  to  the  destruction  of  Corinth  in  146BC.  67  Yet  at  the  same 
time,  Polybius  is  generally  recognised  as  an  Achaean  patriot.  As 
Golan  argues,  Polybius  was  a  "New  Achaean",  having  been  born 
in  an  Arcadian  Megalopolis  already  incorporated  and  integrated 
into  the  Achaean  league.  He  suggests  that  by  Polybius' 
formative  years  it  had  become  perfectly  clear  that  no  polls  would 
64  Larsen  (1968)  p.  218. 
65  Larsen  (1968)  p.  219.  n.  1. 
66  Larsen  (1968)  p.  219. 
67  See  Paus.  7.12.1-4. 
138 be  able  to  preserve  its  old  freedom  and  optimal  independence 
within  this  league  68 
Polybius'  intention  was  to  explain  to  his  readers  how 
through  the  workings  of  tyche  and  anacyclosis  Rome  had 
conquered  them.  Therefore  he  may  have  wished  them  to 
visualise  in  his  Res  Graecae  the  Achaean  league  as  a  unitary  body 
which  encompassed  the  entire  Peloponnese,  resembling  a  single 
polis,  so  that  he  could  contrast  its  fortunes  with  those  of  the  city 
of  Rome.  If  we  accept  Polybius'  depiction  of  the  Achaean  league 
go  unchallenged  are  we  in  danger  of  letting  an  emphasis  on 
Achaean  unity,  related  to  Polybius'  stress  on  the  role  of 
anacyclosis,  influence  our  understanding  of  Rome's  advent  into 
the  Greek  world? 
It  cannot  be  doubted  that  elements  of  Aetolian  society  were 
different  from  elsewhere  in  Greece.  Despite  these  differences,  the 
Aetolians  did  have  a  homogeneous  and  coherent  structure 
regarding  religious  practice  from  the  archaic  period  onwards, 
along  with  a  belief  in  a  shared  mythical  past.  Aetolians  were 
viewed  by  others  and  appear  to  have  regarded  themselves  as  a 
distinct  people  or  ethnos  during  the  classical  period.  That  the 
Aetolians  did  not  develop  centralised  political  structures  until 
the  Hellenistic  period  to  complement  this  is  relatively 
unimportant.  What  is  important  is  that  the  Aetolians  from  the 
archaic  period  onwards  had  a  sense  of  cohesion  and  unity, 
68  Golan  (1995)  p.  13. 
139 regarding  themselves  as  an  ethnos,  that  appears  to  have  led  them 
to  act  in  a  unified  manner  within  their  expanded  league  during 
the  Hellenistic  period. 
On  the  other  side  of  the  Gulf  of  Corinth,  in  the  Peloponnese, 
it  is  by  no  means  evident  that  the  Dorian  and  Arcadian 
communities  who  joined  the  Achaean  league  during  the 
Hellenistic  period  actually  formed  a  single  ethnos  as  Polybius 
implies.  Rather,  it  would  appear  that  communities  joined  the 
Achaean  league  because  of  their  need  for  protection,  and  that  at 
all  times  of  extreme  crisis  its  members  acted  in  accordance  with 
their  own  interests.  Although  Polybius  stresses  the  unity  of  the 
Achaean  league,  he  is  talking  about  a  political  organisation  that 
was  dominated  for  long  periods  by  Megalopolitans  like 
Philopoemen,  Diophanes,  Aristaenus  and  Lycortas.  It  is  this 
factor,  the  essentially  artificial  nature  of  the  Achaean  identity 
which  Polybius  espouses  throughout  his  histories,  that  appears 
to  have  been  an  important  factor  in  determining  the  reactions  of 
the  various  powers  with  interests  in  the  Peloponnese  in  the  lead 
up  to  Rome's  intervention  in  Greece. 
140 Chapter  Four 
The  Aetolian/Achaean  alliance  and  the  outbreak  of  the  Social 
War. 
Introduction 
Polybius  depicts  the  actions  of  the  Aetolian  league  in  the 
Peloponnese  in  the  worst  of  all  possible  terms.  However,  the  vast 
majority  of  Aetolian  crimes  and  character  defects  that  he 
mentions  come  in  the  context  of  the  Social  War  between  220- 
217BC,  fought  after  the  Achaean  league  had  decided  to  invite  the 
Macedonians  to  assist  them  against  Cleomenes.  Given  Polybius' 
desire  to  stress  the  unity  of  the  Achaean  league  and  his  stated 
purpose  to  clarify  the  situation  in  Greece  prior  to  Rome's 
involvement  in  Hellenic  affairs,  it  must  be  asked  whether  his 
account  of  events  should  be  taken  as  a  neutral  and  objective 
account  of  events.  Is  Polybius'  depiction  of  events  in  the 
Peloponnese  favourable  not  only  to  the  Achaean  league,  but  in 
particular  to  Arcadian  communities  within  it  like  Megalopolis? 
Aetolian  interests  in  the  Peloponnese,  through  their  kinship  links 
with  Elis  and  the  Peloponnesian  outlook  of  communities  like 
Calydon  and  Pleuron  were  extensive.  It  is  likely  that  any  radical 
change  in  the  strategic  situation  in  the  Peloponnese  would 
provoke  some  response.  So  should  we  regard  Aetolian  actions  in 
the  Peloponnese  as  violent  aggression  and  piracy,  or  rather  as  an 
attempt  to  undermine  an  Achaean  league  that  had  recently  allied 
with  Macedonia? 
141 The  rise  of  Macedonia,  in  particular,  the  Aetolian  policy  of 
trying  to  turn  Alexander's  successors  against  each  other,  has 
been  categorised  by  one  historian  as  a  struggle  by  the  Aetolians 
to  survive  in  a  new  hostile  environment.  '  What  gave  the 
Aetolians  the  impetus  they  needed  to  increase  co-operation  with 
each  other  and  form  a  political  union  was  the  threat  they  faced 
from  Macedonia  during  the  Hellenistic  period. 
Although  this  chapter  will  concentrate  on  events  in  the 
Peloponnese,  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  from  the  time  of 
Alexander  the  Great,  who  allegedly  threatened  to  punish  the 
Aetolians  on  his  return  to  Greece,  the  Aetolian  league  was  in  a 
state  of  almost  perpetual  conflict  with  Macedonia?  Aetolian 
actions  in  the  Peloponnese  during  the  Social  War,  as  depicted  by 
Polybius,  should  be  seen  in  this  context. 
If  the  Aetolians  were  engaged  in  a  struggle  for  control  over 
the  Peloponnese  with  the  Macedonians,  what  was  the  rationale 
behind  actions,  which  Polybius  essentially  describes  as 
irrational?  Prior  to  the  decision  taken  by  the  Achaean  league  to 
invite  the  Macedonians  into  the  Peloponnese  to  assist  them 
against  Cleomenes,  Aratus  appealed  to  the  Aetolian  league  for 
assistance,  although  this  was  denied 
.3 
This  appeal  is  not  as 
1  Mendell  (1984)  p.  129. 
2  See  Curt.  6.1.17.  for  Alexander's  remarks.  For  the  seizure  of  Acarnania  see  Scholten 
(2000)  pp.  134-36.  For  detailed  accounts  of  the  Aetolian  league  and  its  conflict  with 
Macedonia  see  Mendels  (1984)  pp.  129-80  and  Scholten  (2000)  pp.  29-95. 
3  P1ut.  Arat.  41.2. 
142 strange  as  it  might  appear.  The  Aetolian  and  Achaean  leagues 
allied  in  238BC,  and  such  was  the  level  of  co-operation  between 
them  in  the  following  years  that  Larsen  suggested  that  both  were 
considered  a  unified  body 
.4 
As  Larsen  pointed  out,  their  co- 
operation  was  as  surprising,  in  light  of  later  events,  as  the  co- 
operation  between  Athens  and  Aegina  at  Salamis,  especially  as 
the  relationship  broke  down  irrevocably  afterwards  .5 
For 
example,  in  237BC,  in  response  to  a  request  from  Corcyra,  a  fleet 
of  ten  ships  belonging  to  the  Achaean  league  was  dispatched  in 
assistance,  with  Aetolians  helping  in  manning  them  .6 
Larsen 
claimed  that  the  alliance  between  the  two  was  one  of  the  most 
hopeful  of  Hellenistic  times  and  that  its  breakdown  was  a  blow 
to  Greek  attempts  to  resist  the  growth  of  Roman  power  7  The 
alliance  lasted  for  nearly  twenty  years,  and  it  seems,  from  a 
reference  in  Polybius,  to  have  been  in  existence  as  late  as  220BC, 
just  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Social  War 
.8 
It  is  evident  that  the  Achaean  decision  to  invite  the 
Macedonians  into  the  Peloponnese  was  the  determining  factor  in 
the  breakdown  of  this  alliance.  As  Scholten  noted,  the  reasons 
behind  the  Aetolian  decision  not  to  send  assistance  to  Aratus' 
4  Larsen  (1975)  p.  165. 
5  Larsen  (1975)  p.  160. 
6  See  Polyb.  2.9-10.  Walbank  (1957)  p.  160  and  Larsen  (1975)  p.  165-66. 
7  See  Larsen  (1975)  p.  171. 
8  It  seems  to  have  been  technically  in  force  in  220BC  according  to  Polyb.  4.7.4.  See 
Walbank  (1957)  p.  238. 
143 appeal  might  be  explicable  by  the  assaults  by  the  Achaean 
league,  under  Megalopolitan  influence,  on  Elis.  9 
Again  we  should  question  to  what  extent  Polybius' 
representation  of  the  Achaean  league  and  a  common  Achaean 
identity  is  based  on  his  need  to  explain  why  the  Romans  ruled 
Greece  through  the  workings  of  anacyclosis  and  his  need  to 
present  the  Achaean  league  as  a  single  polis  for  this  purpose. 
Larsen  was  correct  in  asserting  that  the  Achaean/Aetolian 
alliance  was  remarkable  in  the  light  of  Polybius'  later  account  of 
the  relationship  between  the  two.  Both  leagues  did  co-operate 
closely  during  Aratus'  expansion  into  Arcadia.  However,  this 
alliance  was  originally  concluded  between  communities  that  had 
close  links  with  each  other  across  the  Gulf  of  Corinth.  By  the 
time  that  the  Macedonians,  Aetolia's  traditional  foe,  entered  the 
Peloponnese,  the  expansion  of  the  Achaean  league  and  its 
absorption  of  Arcadian  communities  like  Megalopolis  changed 
the  situation  in  the  Peloponnese. 
This  section  will  look  at  the  expansion  of  the  Achaean 
league  in  relation  to  Aetolian  interests  in  the  Peloponnese.  My 
contention  will  be  that  the  Aetolian/Achaean  alliance  concluded 
in  238BC  was  based  on  an  Aetolian  desire  to  develop  an  anti- 
Macedonian  bloc  in  the  Peloponnese  in  conjunction  with 
9  See  Scholten  (2000)  p.  187.  As  Urban  earlier  pointed  out,  this  assault  was  probably 
based  on  the  need  by  the  Megalopolitans  to  reacquire  Triphylia,  which  had  been  given 
to  the  Eleans  by  Lydiades,  their  former  tyrant.  Urban  (1979)  p.  115-16. 
144 communities  on  the  northern  coast  of  the  Peloponnese  with 
which  it  had  ties.  The  policy  that  Plutarch  presents  of  Aratus' 
attempt  to  rid  the  Peloponnese  of  pro-Macedonian  tyrants  was 
carried  out  in  a  situation  where  both  the  Achaean  and  Aetolian 
leagues  were  acting  in  close  co-operation,  especially  during  their 
expansion  into  Arcadia. 
However,  the  Achaean  league  expanded  rapidly  and  unlike 
the  Aetolians,  the  original  poleis  that  formed  the  Achaean  league 
appear  to  have  been  unable  to  retain  control  when  poleis  like 
Megalopolis  were  absorbed  into  it  as  members.  As  the  larger 
Arcadian  communities  were  absorbed  into  the  Achaean  league 
they  came  to  dominate  its  policy.  So  the  Aetolians,  who 
previously  had  allied  with  an  Achaean  league  dominated  by 
Aratus,  were  faced  suddenly  with  a  transformation  of  the 
situation  in  the  Peloponnese,  when  the  Macedonians  were 
invited  into  this  region  under  Megalopolitan  pressure. 
It  was  this  decision  which  explains  subsequent  Aetolian 
actions  in  the  Peloponnese.  Polybius,  as  an  Arcadian,  depicted, 
and  probably  believed  that  Aetolian  actions  in  the  Peloponnese 
intended  to  assist  the  Eleans  prior  to  the  Social  War  were 
irrational  actions  motivated  by  a  frenzied  desire  to  loot. 
However,  Aetolian  actions  in  the  Peloponnese  during  the  Social 
War  have  to  be  seen  in  the  context  of  Aetolia's  wider  conflict 
against  Macedonia  and  the  position  that  Aetolia's  allies  in  the 
145 Peloponnese  found  themselves  in  after  the  Achaean  league's 
alliance  with  Macedonia. 
Aetolian  interest  in  the  Peloponnese  and  the  expansion  of  the 
Achaean  league  under  Aratus. 
As  Larsen  noted  in  his  discussion  of  the  Aetolian/Achaean 
alliance,  before  the  expansion  of  the  Achaean  league  under 
Aratus,  the  Aetolian  league  was  one  of  the  dominant  powers  in 
the  Peloponnese  despite  the  Gulf  of  Corinth.  10  The  Achaean 
league  at  this  point  was  confined  to  a  relatively  small  area,  not 
much  larger  than  it  had  been  during  the  classical  period;  the 
Aetolians  and  their  allies  in  Elis  appear  to  have  controlled  much 
of  the  western  side  of  the  Peloponnese.  For  example,  in  240BC, 
the  Aetolian  league  mounted  a  campaign  against  Sparta,  and  at 
the  same  time  appears  to  have  mediated  a  treaty  of  isopoliteia 
between  Phigaleia  and  Messene.  li 
Aetolian  interest  in  the  Peloponnese  during  the  third 
century,  despite  its  separation  from  this  region  by  the  Gulf  of 
Corinth,  is  not  as  surprising  as  it  might  at  first  appear.  Given  the 
claims  of  mythical  kinship  between  the  Aetolians  and  Eleans,  it 
would  appear  that  the  Aetolians  were  simply  supporting  Elean 
interests  in  the  Peloponnese.  Pausanias  mentions  the  presence  of 
an  Aetolian  assisting  the  Eleans  at  Samikon  on  Elis' 
10  Larsen  (1975)  pp.  159-61. 
11  Polyb.  4.39.9;  9.34.9.  SIG'  472. 
146 southwestern  border  with  Arcadia  in  the  240s  BC.  12  The  long  list 
of  Aetolian  actions  in  the  Peloponnese  mentioned  by  Polybius  as 
having  occurred  in  the  240s  all  appear  to  be  connected  with 
Elean  expansion  in  north-western  Arcadia.  13  The  Aetolian  league 
also  seems  to  have  tried  to  assist  the  Eleans  in  their  attempt  to 
gain  control  over  Cynaetha  in  the  240s  BC,  when  Polybius 
mentions  internal  troubles  in  this  polis.  Given  that  Cynaetha 
controlled  the  routes  connecting  Elis,  Arcadia  and  central 
Achaea,  it  would  appear  that  the  Aetolians  were  attempting  to 
assist  the  Eleans  in  their  attempts  to  gain  control  over  a  disputed 
polis.  14 
Around  the  same  time  the  situation  in  the  Achaean  league 
changed.  It  would  appear,  from  the  evidence  provided  by 
Polybius,  that  the  Achaean  league  was  re-founded  in  280BC  by 
the  poleis  of  Dyme,  Patrae,  Tritaea  and  Pharae.  15  The  Achaean 
league  remained  relatively  small  until  251BC,  when  Sicyon 
joined  after  Aratus  deposed  its  pro-Macedonian  tyrant  in  a 
bloodless  coup.  It  was  under  his  leadership  that  the  Achaean 
12  Paus.  5.6.1. 
13  See  Scholten  (2000)  p.  117  for  a  list  of  Aetolian  actions  and  the  attempt  by  Elis  to  gain 
control  over  Triphylia  and  parts  of  northwestern  Arcadia. 
14  See  Scholten  (2000)  p.  119. 
15  See  Polyb.  2.41.12,  for  the  foundation  of  the  Achaean  League.  By  253BC,  it  appears  that 
Aegium,  Bura,  Carynea,  Leontium,  Aegira,  Pellene  and  Olenus  had  joined. 
Polyb.  2.41.13-15.  Walbank  (1957)  p.  233 
147 league  began  its  expansion.  16  This  appears  to  have  caused 
difficulties  with  the  Aetolians,  since  Aratus,  like  the  Eleans, 
desired  to  control  the  area  around  Cynaetha.  Following  his 
assumption  of  power  at  Sicyon,  one  of  Aratus'  first  actions  was 
to  launch  an  attack  against  Locris  and  Calydon;  he  also  seems  to 
have  tried  to  persuade  the  Boeotian  to  attack  the  Aetolians.  17 
However,  Aratus  was  a  close  ally  of  the  Ptolemaic  kingdom 
in  Egypt.  Shortly  after  assuming  power  Aratus  gained  a  subsidy 
of  twenty-five  talents  from  Ptolemy  since,  according  to  Plutarch, 
Sicyon  was  under  threat  from  Antigonus.  18  Given  the  close 
proximity  of  Sicyon  to  the  Macedonian  garrison  at  the 
Acrocorinth,  Aratus'  decision  to  join  the  Achaean  league  seems 
to  have  been  motivated  by  his  desire  to  gain  protection  from  the 
Antigonids.  Why  the  Achaeans,  if  they  were  an  ethnos  as 
Polybius  claims,  allowed  a  polls  that  claimed  a  Dorian  identity 
into  their  league  is  left  unsaid,  though  it  would  appear  to 
support  Morgan's  contention  that  the  Achaean  league  had 
always  admitted  for  membership  poleis  in  need  of  protection. 
Aratus  according  to  Plutarch,  rapidly  came  to  dominate  the 
Achaean  league,  and  in  243BC,  in  what  Plutarch  describes  as  the 
last  and  greatest  achievement  of  the  Greeks,  he  seized  control 
over  the  Acrocorinth,  removing  the  Macedonian  garrison. 
16  See  Plut.  Arat.  5.1.  and  9.3.  for  the  background  to  Aratus'  accession  to  power  in  Sicyon. 
17  For  the  Boeotian  attack  on  the  Aetolians  see  Plut.  Arat.  16.1.  Walbank  (1984)  p.  249. 
18  For  the  alliance  with  Ptolemy,  see  Plut.  Arat.  9.1-3.  Walbank  (1984)  p.  247. 
148 Shortly  afterwards  the  Achaean  and  Aetolian  leagues  allied  with 
each  other.  19 
Scholten  depicts  this  as  an  alliance  between  "Greater 
Aetolia"  and  "Greater  Achaea".  20  This  view  presupposes  a 
knowledge  of  later  events  that  was  not  evident  to  those  who 
concluded  the  alliance.  The  Achaean  league  that  allied  with  the 
Aetolian  league  in  238BC  was  still  a  relatively  small  body  whose 
membership  was  very  different  from  the  Achaean  league  that 
Polybius  would  later  identify  with.  It  would  appear  that  the 
alliance  was  framed  between  communities  that  had  a  long 
history  of  contact  with  each  other.  Scholten  points  out  the  role 
that  earlier  connections  between  the  Achaean  league  and  the 
Aetolian  coastal  plain  played  in  the  conclusion  of  this  alliance, 
since  the  Aetolian  strategos  responsible  was  Pantaelon  of 
Pleuron,  indicating  that  links  between  the  communities  on  either 
side  of  the  Gulf  of  Corinth  may  have  assisted.  21 
Soon  afterwards,  the  Achaean  league  under  Aratus  struck 
into  the  Peloponnese,  with  the  aim,  as  stated  by  Plutarch,  of 
ridding  this  region  of  its  pro-Macedonian  tyrants  22  According  to 
19  For  the  seizure  of  the  Acrocorinth  see  Plut.  Arat.  18.1-26.2. 
20  See  Scholten  (2000)  p.  136. 
21  Scholten  (2000)  p.  136-7.  He  also  suggests  that  Aratus'  Dorian  heritage  may  have  made 
him  more  open  to  contacts  with  the  Aetolians,  since  while  as  he  states,  Aratus'  motives 
are  hard  to  gauge,  he  may  not  have  had  the  same  negative  attitude  towards  the 
Aetolians  as  the  Achaeans  did. 
22  Walbank  (1984)  p.  247. 
149 a  plan  that  appears  to  have  been  co-ordinated,  both  leagues 
launched  a  joint  assault  into  Arcadia,  the  Aetolians  concentrating 
on  gaining  control  over  Mantineia,  Tegea  and  Orchomenus;  the 
Achaeans  attacking  Cleitor,  Telphusa  and  Heraea  in  an  attempt 
to  put  pressure  on  Megalopolis  23  The  intention  appears  to  have 
been  to  neutralise  the  pro-Macedonian  states  in  Arcadia,  notably 
Megalopolis.  This  policy  led  in  235BC  to  the  pro-Macedonian 
tyrant  of  Megalopolis,  Lydiades,  resigning  his  tyranny  and 
bringing  his  polis  within  the  Achaean  league24  Unlike  poleis  such 
as  Argos  and  Corinth,  it  would  appear  that  Lydiades  negotiated 
the  entry  of  Megalopolis  into  the  Achaean  league  from  a  position 
of  strength,  since  the  following  year  he  was  elected  Achaean 
strategos. 
The  entry  of  Megalopolis  and  other  Arcadian  communities 
into  the  Achaean  league  changed  the  situation  in  the 
Peloponnese.  The  original  Achaean  poleis  were  too  small  to 
counterbalance  the  rapid  influx  of  new  members  from  Arcadia 
into  their  league,  and  the  different  outlook  that  Arcadian  poleis 
had  from  the  league's  original  members  placed  Elis  under 
threat  25  As  Scholten  points  out,  the  addition  of  Megalopolis  and 
Argos  to  the  Achaean  league  had  changed  the  nature  of  the 
2'  For  Aetolian  control  over  Mantineia,  Tegea  and  Orchomenos,  see  Polyb.  2.57.1.  and 
2.46.1-2  Scholten  (2000)  p.  157-8. 
24  P1ut.  Arat.  30.2. 
25  For  the  attempts  by  the  Eleans  to  gain  control  over  northern  Arcadia  from  the  250s 
onwards,  see  Scholten  (2000)  pp.  118-123. 
150 Achaean  league,  leading  to  an  anti-Spartan  policy  which  brought 
the  newly  expanded  Achaean  league  into  conflict  with 
Cleomenes.  Furthermore,  this  resulted  in  a  softening  of  the  anti- 
Macedonian  policy  of  the  Achaean  league,  despite  Aratus' 
attempts  to  the  contrary.  26 
It  is  in  this  context  that  the  Aetolian  league's  refusal  to  grant 
assistance  when  Aratus  appealed  to  it  should  be  seen.  Scholten 
argues  that  such  was  the  pressure  on  Aratus  from  the  rest  of  the 
league  that  he  was  unable  to  arrest  the  shift  towards  Macedonia, 
and  became  the  champion  of  it  in  order  to  maintain  his  own 
position??  As  Scholten  points  out,  the  Achaean  league's  decision 
to  allow  Macedonian  troops  to  re-enter  the  Peloponnese  placed 
the  Aetolian  league  in  their  most  dangerous  position  since  the 
Celtic  invasions.  The  Macedonians  already  controlled  Opountian 
Locris,  had  allies  in  Boeotia  and  Phocis,  and  would  control  the 
Acrocorinth  after  they  defeated  Cleomenes,  and  Scholten  argues 
that  the  Aetolian  refusal  to  help  the  Achaean  league  was  epochal 
and  a  missed  opportunity.  28 
Speaking  of  an  Aetolian  refusal  to  assist  the  Achaean  league 
as  such  is  misleading.  Rather,  it  would  appear  more  accurate  to 
say  that  the  Aetolians  were  refusing  to  grant  assistance  to  an 
26  Scholten  (2000)  p.  188.  "Sparta's  resurrection  under  Kleomenes  only  reinforced  the 
Lakonophobic  legacy  these  newcomers  brought  with  them  from  generations  of  conflict, 
raising  Lakedaimon  to  the  koinon's  enemies'  list". 
27  Scholten  (2000)  p.  189. 
28  Scholten  (2000)  p.  189. 
151 Achaean  league  that  had  followed  an  aggressive  policy  under 
Megalopolitan  pressure  against  its  ally  in  Elis.  Scholten  argues 
that  the  Aetolian  refusal  to  assist  the  Achaean  league  was  "a  sign 
of  their  inability  to  see  beyond  their  old  parochial  antagonisms 
for  the  sake  of  the  common  gain"29  This  is  an  unfair  assessment. 
The  Aetolians  must  have  been  aware  that  the  newly  expanded 
Achaean  league  had  encompassed  communities  like  Megalopolis 
which  had  links  with  Macedonia  and  by  failing  to  grant 
assistance,  poleis  like  Megalopolis  would  turn  towards 
Macedonia.  We  are  told  in  fact  that  the  Aetolians  tried  to  block 
the  pass  at  Thermopylae  to  prevent  Macedonian  troops  reaching 
the  Peloponnese  30 
However,  as  Larsen  earlier  pointed  out,  after  the  death  in 
battle  of  Margos  of  Cerynea,  who  Polybius  describes  as  the  elder 
statesman  of  the  Achaean  league,  the  alliance  was  never  as  close 
as  it  once  was  31  Larsen  suggested  that  this  was  the  result  of 
Rome's  advent  into  Greek  affairs,  in  particular  the  Illyrian  Wars; 
this  ignores  the  changes  brought  about  by  the  expansion  of  the 
Achaean  league  into  the  Peloponnese.  This  expansion  had  been 
begun  by  an  alliance  between  the  Aetolian  and  Achaean  leagues. 
The  transformation  of  the  situation  in  the  Achaean  league  after 
29  See  Scholten  (2000)  p.  188. 
30  Polyb.  2.52.8.  Polybius  states  that  this  was  just  one  of  the  many  actions  that  the 
Aetolians  undertook  to  prevent  the  return  of  the  Macedonians  to  the  Peloponnese. 
31  For  a  brief  mention  of  the  circumstances  surrounding  the  death  of  Margos,  leading  a 
joint  Aetolian/Achaean  force,  see  Polyb.  2.9-10. 
152 the  entry  of  Megalopolis  and  other  Arcadian  communities,  and 
the  change  in  the  Achaean  league's  policy  that  resulted,  radically 
altered  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Peloponnese  to  the  detriment 
of  Aetolian  interests.  This  change,  and  the'  way  it  transformed 
the  situation  in  the  Peloponnese,  may  explain  subsequent 
Aetolian  actions. 
The  Social  War;  Aetolia  and  the  Peloponnese. 
After  he  had  defeated  Cleomenes  Antigonus  Doson 
founded  a  Hellenic  league,  which  the  Achaean  league  joined 
along  with  other  states  such  as  the  Thessalians,  Epirots,  Phocians 
and  Macedonians  32  Early  in  221BC,  Doson  died,  and  the  young 
Philip  V  ascended  to  the  Macedonian  throne.  This  seems  to  have 
provided  the  Aetolian  league  with  the  impetus  it  needed  to 
restart  conflict  with  Macedonia  in  an  attempt  to  recover  the 
territory  it  had  lost  to  Antigonus  Doson  in  228BC. 
It  is  in  this  context,  their  wider  conflict  with  Macedonia,  that 
Aetolian  actions  in  the  Peloponnese  before  the  outbreak  of  the 
Social  War  should  be  seen.  Although  Polybius  is  completely 
hostile  towards  the  Aetolians,  ' portraying  their  actions  in  the 
Peloponnese  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war  as  irrational,  it 
appears  that  the  Aetolians  were  attempting  to  disrupt  the 
Macedonian  presence  in  this  region.  As  Scholten  acknowledges, 
'Polybius'  natural  prejudices  and  preoccupations  as  a 
32  Walbank  (1984)  p.  468. 
153 Megalopolitan  and  an  Achaean  patriot  distort  his  analysis  and 
influence  what  he  chooses  to  narrate"  33 
Despite  this,  Scholten  argues  that  looting  was  the  important 
factor  in  defining  Aetolian  policy  towards  the  Peloponnese, 
suggesting  that,  "adherence  to  archaic  socio-economic  traditions 
appears  to  have  out  weighed  sober  strategic  thinking  in  the 
Aetolian  koinon's  decision  to  back  that  policy"  34  Did  the  Aetolian 
league's  leadership  undertake  an  aggressive  policy  in  the 
Peloponnese  merely  because  they  believed  that  the  Achaean 
league's  expansion  into  Arcadia  had  opened  up  new 
opportunities  for  looting?  It  is  what  '  Polybius'  narrative 
suggests,  but  merely  reflects  his  opinion.  Or  did  the  Aetolians 
view  the  Achaean  league  at  this  juncture  simply  as  an  extension 
of  Antigonid  power,  and  was  their  intention  in  trying  to 
dismember  it  to  undermine  the  Macedonian  position  in  the 
Peloponnese?  Aratus  had  requested  the  Aetolian  league's 
assistance  shortly  before  the  appeal  to  Macedonia 
,  and  there 
was  opposition  within  poleis  like  Corinth  and  Sicyon  over  the 
decision  to  call  on  Antigonus.  It  appears  that  many  communities 
within  the  Achaean  league  were  opposed  to  the  alliance  with 
Macedonia,  and  the  situation  in  the  Peloponnese  unsettled,  a 
situation  the  Aetolians  may  have  sought  to  exploit. 
33  Scholten  (2000)  p.  201. 
34  Scholten  (2000)  p.  201. 
154 Therefore,  my  contention  will  be  that  Aetolian  actions  in  the 
Peloponnese  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Social  War  were  not 
irrational  acts  of  piracy  as  Polybius  presents  them.  I  will  suggest 
that  Polybius'  portrayal  of  Aetolian  actions  in  this  region  was 
based  on  his  perception  of  them  as  an  Arcadian  and  that  his 
stress  on  Achaean  unity,  related  to  his  wider  intention,  fails  to 
take  into  account  the  competing  regional  and  ethnic  interests  in 
the  Peloponnese. 
According  to  Polybius,  the  instigator  of  the  conflict  was 
Dorimachus,  who  was  dispatched  to  Phigaleia  to  resolve  a 
dispute  between  the  inhabitants  of  that  polls  and  the 
Messenians  35  During  his  time  there  Dorimachus  seems  to  have 
learnt  that  the  Messenians  were  under  pressure  to  join  the 
Achaean  league  36  On  his  return  to  Aetolia  an  Aetolian  raid  was 
launched  on  the  Peloponnese,  which  appears  to  have  been  aimed 
at  dissuading  the  Messenians  from  allying  with  the  Hellenic 
league  and  joining  the  pro-Macedonian  bloc  in  the 
Peloponnese  37 
Polybius  presents  this  raid  as  an  Aetolian  crime  that  was 
hatched  as  part  of  a  private  conspiracy  between  Dorimachus  and 
Scopas;  an  action  he  considered  the  greatest  of  all  Aetolian 
outrages  in  the  aftermath  of  Antigonus's  death.  Polybius  states 
35  Polyb.  4.3.5-6. 
36  Polyb.  4.3.8-4.9. 
37  See  Scholten  (2000)  p.  204. 
155 that  on  Dorimachus'  return  from  Messene,  he  and  Scopas 
conspired  together,  ignoring  both  the  strategos  and  the  board  of 
the  apokletoi  who  formed  the  Aetolian  government,  to  launch  an 
assault  on  the  Peloponnese  38  According  to  the  plan  they  devised, 
diversionary  raids  would  be  launched  on  the  coast  of  Epirus  to 
distract  Philip  V;  at  the  same  time  a  force  led  by  Scopas  and 
Dorimachus  would  cross  into  the  Peloponnese  and  march  on 
Messene  39  The  plan  was  rapidly  enacted  and,  according  to 
Polybius,  during  their  march  across  the  territories  of  Patrae, 
Pharae  and  Tritaea,  the  Aetolians  claimed  that  it  was  not  their 
intention  to  inflict  harm  on,  anybody,  though  he  alleges  that 
looting  did  take  place  40  The  raiding  party  reached  Messene, 
avoiding  confrontation  with  the  assembled  forces  of  the  Achaean 
league  at  Megalopolis,  and  also  with  Taurion  the  Macedonian 
commander  in  the  Peloponnese  41  The  force  then  split  in  two, 
most  of  the  force  returning  to  Aetolia  via  Elis;  a  smaller  party 
proceeded  back  to  Aetolia,  launching  raids  against  Pellene  and 
Sicyon  on  the  way  42  The  Aetolian  raid  on  the  Peloponnese  was 
38  However,  Polyb.  4.5.1.  admits  that  the  Aetolian  strategos  Ariston  was  in  bad  health,  and 
had  largely  ceded  his  powers  to  the  two. 
39  Polyb.  4.5.2-10.  Walbank  (1940)  p.  28  compares  this  raid  to  the  actions  of  English 
pirates  during  the  reign  of  Elizabeth  the  First.  Scholten  (2000)  p.  204  argues  that  there  is 
some  indication  that  the  raid  received  official  approval.  See  also  Eckstein  (1995)  p.  142  for 
Polybius'  depiction  of  the  irrational  behavior  of  the  Aetolians  at  this  point. 
40  Polyb.  4.6.9. 
41  Polyb.  4.6.7-12;  9.1-10. 
42  Polyb.  4.9.10-13.5. 
156 unsuccessful,  and,  according  to  Polybius,  soon  afterwards 
Messene  joined  the  Hellenic  alliance  43 
Scholten  argues  that  an  Aetolian  desire  to  loot  explain  this 
expedition,  although  he  accepts  that  it  seems  to  have  been  also 
aimed  at  trying  to  prevent  Messene,  an  Aetolian  ally,  going  over 
to  the  Macedonian  camp.  A  subsequent  meeting  of  the  Aetolian 
assembly  voted  to  maintain  peace  with  all  parties,  provided  that 
the  Achaean  league  dropped  its  planned  alliance  with  Messene.  44 
It  is  also  probable  that  the  plan  was  intended  to  take  advantage 
of  the  relative  youth  and  inexperience  of  Philip  V.  The  raid  may 
therefore  have  been  intended  to  divert  Macedonian  attention 
towards  the  Peloponnese  and  away  from  Acarnania.  45 
A  more  problematic  event  occurred  in  220BC,  when 
Dorimachos,  Scopas  and  Agelaus  led  another  group  of  Aetolians 
into  the  Peloponnese,  this  time  with  the  intention  of  seizing  the 
polis  of  Cynaetha  located  on  the  borders  between  Elis,  Arcadia 
and  Achaea  46  According  to  Polybius,  a  faction  within  Cynaetha 
betrayed  it  to  the  raiding  party.  The  raiding  force  proceeded  on 
to  Cleitor,  which  they  were  unable  to  capture  because  of  the 
resistance  they  faced  from  its  inhabitants,  and  they  returned  to 
Cynaetha,  according  to  Polybius,  committing  a  multitude  of 
43  See  Polyb.  4.16.1. 
44  See  Polyb.  4.15.8-11. 
45  For  Aetolian  interests  outside  the  Peloponnese  during  the  Social  War,  see  Scholten 
(2000)  pp.  214-218. 
46  Polyb.  4.17.1. 
157 crimes  on  the  way  there  and  back.  7  On  their  return,  the  raiders 
offered  Cynaetha  to  the  Eleans,  but  the  latter  refused,  and  after 
an  abortive  attempt  to  install  a  garrison  there,  the  Aetolian  force 
retreated  when  the  Macedonians  advanced,  according  to 
Polybius,  destroying  Cynaetha  in  their  wake. 
We  need  to  assess  whether  Polybius'  depiction  of  Aetolian 
actions  at  this  point  should  be  taken  as  an  accurate  reflection  of 
Aetolian  intentions,  or  merely  reflect  his  own  perspective  on  this 
event,  and  his  need  to  stress  the  Achaean  league's  resemblance 
to  a  single  polis.  Scholten  argues  that  the  attack  on  Cynaetha  was 
a  private  venture,  intended  solely  to  gain  loot,  suggesting  that, 
"unlike  the  expedition  to  Messene  a  few  months  earlier  their  (the 
Aetolians)  present  escapade  at  Kynaitha  did  not  have  the 
collective  sanction  of  the  koinon",  and  was  indeed,  "an 
opportunistic  third-party  action"  48 
Should  Aetolian  actions  be  seen  in  these  terms?  Or  rather  is 
Polybius'  partisan  attitude  towards  the  Aetolians  resulting  in  an 
account  of  events  at  Cynaetha  that,  though  reflecting  an 
Arcadian's  perspective  on  Aetolian  actions,  fails  to  take  into 
account  strategic  interests  that  the  Aetolian  league  had  in  the 
Peloponnese?  If  one  considers  Cynaetha's  location,  on  the  border 
of  Arcadia,  Elis  and  Achaea,  it  controlled  the  routes  connecting 
the  three  regions.  Despite  his  dismissal  of  events  at  Cynaetha  at 
47  See  Polyb.  4.17.3-19.7. 
48  Scholten  (2000)  p.  205. 
158 this  point  as  a  looting  expedition,  as  Scholten  pointed  out  about 
earlier  Aetolian  actions  in  the  Peloponnese  in  the  240sBC: 
Certainly  strategic  considerations  make  collective  Aitolian 
involvement  in  the  northern  Peloponnese  in  the  240s 
understandable.  Kynaitha  and  Psophis,  the  main  site 
under  Eleian  control  in  221,  are  key  points  in  the  routes 
connecting  Elis,  Arkadia  and  central  Achaia.  As  events 
during  the  Social  War  were  to  demonstrate,  whoever 
controlled  these  cities  controlled  access  amongst  the  three 
regions.  49 
Elean  forces  were  to  play  a  vital  role  during  the  Social  War; 
in  the  absence  of  a  significant  contribution  by  the  Aetolian 
league  in  the  Peloponnese  during  the  Social  War,  Elean  and 
Spartan  forces  carried  out  the  bulk  of  the  fighting  on  the 
Aetolian  side  in  this  region.  The  raid  appears  to  have  been 
intended  to  gain  control  over  Cynaetha  as  a  base  for  operations 
prior  to  the  outbreak  of  war.  According  to  Polybius,  the  Aetolian 
raiding  force  attempted  to  install  a  garrison  at  Cynaetha 
commanded  by  Euripidas  before  their  withdrawal.  The  same 
individual  was  later  appointed  Elean  strategos,  commanding 
Elean  forces  in  219BC  during  the  Social  War;  he  was  re- 
appointed  to  this  position  in  217BC  50  Although  Polybius  depicts 
49  Scholten  (2000)  p.  119. 
50  For  Euripidas'  appointment  at  Cynaetha  see  Polyb.  4.19.5.  As  strategos  of  Elis  in  219BC 
Polyb.  4.59.1.  and  later  in  217BC,  Polyb.  5.94.2.  See  also  Scholten  (2000)  p.  218.  n.  54. 
159 the  Aetolian  raid  in  a  different  light,  it  appears  that  the  Aetolian 
raiders  initially  attempted  to  hand  Cynaetha  over  to  the  Eleans. 
When  the  Eleans  refused,  they  attempted  to  install  as 
commander  of  a  garrison  there  the  very  man  who  was  later  to 
co-ordinate  Elean  military  actions  against  the  Achaean  league 
during  the  Social  War.  These  two  actions  would  seem  to  suggest 
that  this  raid  was  motivated  by  a  desire  to  gain  control  over  a 
strategically  important  location  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  war.  As 
for  the  destruction  of  Cynaetha,  this  took  place  after  the  Aetolian 
attempt  to  capture  Cleitor  had  failed  and  after  the  raiders  had 
heard  about  arrival  in  the  Peloponnese  of  a  large  Macedonian 
force  led  by  Philip  V.  It  was  probably  not  an  act  of  irrational 
destructiveness  as  Polybius  depicts  it,  but  one  intended  to 
prevent  Cynaetha  from  being  re-occupied  and  used  as  a  military 
centre  against  Elis  51 
There  is  the  related  question  of  why  some  inhabitants  of 
Cynaetha  betrayed  their  polis  to  the  Aetolian  raiders.  This  action 
is  usually  seen  in  the  context  of  the  socio-economic  problems 
that  may  have  existed  in  Cynaetha.  It  is  suggested  that  the 
restored  exiles  may  have  betrayed  Cynaetha  to  the  Aetolians 
because  they  desired  land  re-distribution  52 
51  Scholten  (2000)  p.  293.  n.  132.  "The  destruction  of  the  town  (Cynaetha)  was  a  deliberate 
move  to  keep  it  from  being  reoccupied  by  forces  hostile  to  the  Aitolians  and  their  friends 
in  the  region". 
52  Erskine  (1990)  p.  127. 
160 However,  it  appears  from  earlier  events  that  a  section  of 
Cynaetha's  inhabitants  favoured  allying  with  Elis  rather  than  the 
Achaean  league.  Nor  were  the  exiles  necessarily  from  the  lower 
classes.  The  Aetolian  force  gained  entry  to  Cynaetha  because  one 
of  the  restored  exiles  held  the  office  of  polemarch,  one  of  a 
number  of  officials  who  seem  to  have  been  responsible  for 
Cynaetha's  internal  administration:  Amongst  his  duties  was 
ensuring  that  the  gates  of  the  polls  were  secured  at  night,  and 
after  overwhelming  his  colleagues,  he  opened  the  gates  to  the 
Aetolian  raiders.  3  As  recently  restored  exiles,  it  would  be  only 
natural  that  they  would  wish  re-gain  any,  property,  including 
land,  that  had  been  confiscated  at  the  time  of  their  exile.  As  for 
the  raid  being  undertaken  by  an  Aetolian  force,  the  Eleans  had 
been  trying  to  resist  an  expansionary  Achaean  league  for  much 
of  the  preceding  decade.  If  the  Achaean  league  was  continuing 
to  maintain  pressure  on  Elis,  the  Eleans  may  not  have  had 
sufficient  manpower  to  launch  an  assault  on  Cynaetha  as  well  as 
guard  against  Achaean  encroachment.  Therefore  the  Eleans  may 
have  appealed  for  assistance  to  their  claimed  mythical  kinsmen 
in  Aetolia,  who  were  also  attempting  to  combat  Macedonian 
encroachment  in  their  affairs,  as  their  forefathers  appear  to  have 
done  in  similar  desperate  circumstances  in  402BC  m  It  seems 
53  Polyb.  4.18.1-2.  This  office  is  best  attested  to  in  Athens.  Originally  a  military  figure,  by 
the  fourth  century  his  duties  were  primarily  concerned  with  internal  administrative 
tasks  within  the  polis  of  Athens. 
54  Diod.  14.17.9. 
161 natural  that  the  Aetolian  leadership  would  attempt  to  secure  a 
base  for  operations  in  the  Peloponnese  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  a 
wider  war  with  Macedonia  by  exploiting  dissatisfaction  within 
this  polls'  citizenry  over  Cynaetha's  membership  of  the  Achaean 
league  55 
Thus,  it  would  appear  that  the  raid  on  Cynaetha  was  not  an 
unofficial  venture  by  three  Aetolians  motivated  by  financial 
gain,  but  was  intended  to  gain  control  over  a  strategically 
important  location  prior  to  a  challenge  by  the  Aetolian  league 
and  its  allies  to  the  Macedonian  presence  in  the  Peloponnese. 
The  second  element  in  the  Peloponnesian  strategy  decided 
upon  by  the  Aetolian  league's  leadership  prior  to  the  outbreak  of 
the  Social  War  was  to  secure  Sparta  as  an  ally.  This  alliance  is  not 
as  surprising  as  Scholten  suggests  it  is  56  Despite  their  earlier 
differences,  it  was  in  Sparta's  interests  to  co-operate  with  the 
Aetolian  league  to  secure  its  independence  against  further 
encroachment  by  the  Achaean  league.  The  Spartans  under 
Cleomenes  had  recently  attempted  to  gain  control  over  the 
Peloponnese  and  had  only  failed  because  of  Macedonian 
55  See  Walbank  (1936)  pp.  64-71  for  Aratus'  failed  attempts  to  capture  Cynaetha. 
Polybius'  condemnation  of  the  inhabitants  of  Cynaetha  that  let  the  Aetolian  force  in  is 
not  that  they  betrayed  the  Achaean  people  or  league,  but  rather  the  Arcadians. 
Polyb.  4.20.1-21.12. 
56  Scholten  (2000)  p.  210  draws  attention  to  the  Aetolian  raid  on  Sparta  in  240BC. 
162 intervention  57  It  is  not  known  when  exactly  the  initial  Aetolian 
approach  to  Sparta  was  made  58  A  possible  indication  of  when 
this  alliance  was  concluded  comes  when  the  Achaean  league 
requested  a  further  Spartan  contribution  of  troops  in  the 
aftermath  of  the  Aetolian  raid  on  Cynaetha;  the  request  was 
refused:  Polybius  stated  that  by  this  stage  Sparta  had  already 
allied  with  the  Aetolian  league  59 
As  Walbank  points  out,  the  initial  dispatch  of  Dorimachus 
to  Phigaleia  was  probably  to  organise  an  alliance  between  Elis, 
Messene  and  Sparta.  By  gaining  the  Spartans  as  an  ally,  it  would 
appear  that  the  Aetolians  were  attempting  to  challenge  the 
Macedonian  position  in  the  Peloponnese.  As  has  been  recently 
pointed  out,  for  much  of  the  war,  "the  Achaean  league's  military 
and  political  incompetence  threatened  its  stability  and  internal 
57  Polyb.  4.9.6-7.  Sparta  was  a  member  of  the  Hellenic  league  and  had  assisted  the 
Achaean  league  on  its  mobilisation  during  the  Aetolian  raid  on  Messene  Their 
contingent  was  posted  on  the  border  with  Megalopolis  in  a  reserve  capacity,  suggesting 
that  they  were  not  trusted. 
58Scholten  (2000)  p.  211  suggests  that  Messene's  decision  to  join  the  Hellenic  league  may 
have  been  prompted  by  their  knowledge  of  an  Aetolian  approach  to  Sparta.  As  he  points 
out,  during  the  Cleomenic  War,  the  Messenians  had  offered  sanctuary  to  the  entire 
population  of  Megalopolis,  and  this  may  have  prompted  them  to  seek  closer  ties  with 
Megalopolis,  and  through  it  the  Achaean  league.  As  for  Messene,  Scholten  points  out 
that  the  disappointing  Achaean  performance  during  the  Aetolian  raids  on  the 
Peloponnese  may  have  undermined  the  position  of  those  who  wished  to  ally  with  the 
Achaeanleague. 
59  Polyb.  4.16.5.  Walbank  (1957)  p.  463  states  that  at  this  stage  Polybius  was  probably 
exaggerating  the  extent  of  Aetolian  involvement  with  Sparta. 
163 viability"  60  Far  from  being  irrational  as  Polybius'  portrays  it, 
Aetolian  policy  before  the  war  was  an  attempt  to  challenge  the 
Macedonian  position  in  the  Peloponnese,  by  taking  advantage  of 
the  relative  weakness  of  the  Achaean  league  and  possible 
dissatisfaction  amongst  its  various  members  over  the  alliance 
with  Macedonia. 
During  the  war  itself,  the  Aetolians  concentrated  their 
efforts  elsewhere,  and  apart  from  two  exceptions  in  its  opening 
stages,  left  the  fighting  in  the  Peloponnese  to  the  Spartans  and 
the  Eleans.  61  If  one  analyses  events  in  the  Peloponnese  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  Social  War  in  219BC,  the  Achaean  league  was 
forced  to  defend  itself  against  a  three  pronged  assault  without 
any  assistance  from  the  Macedonians,  who  were  campaigning 
against  the  Aetolians  in  Thessaly.  The  Spartans  launched  an 
assault  on  Megalopolis,  capturing  Athenaeum  62  The  Aetolians 
launched  a  surprise  night  attack  against  the  city  of  Aegira,  which 
failed  because  of  resistance  from  its  inhabitants,  and  Elean 
forces,  operating  under  their  Aetolian  commander  Euripidas, 
attacked  the  territories  of  Dyme,  Pharae  and  Tritaea.  63  The 
intention  appears  to  have  been  to  dismember  the  Achaean 
league.  The  response  by  the  Achaean  league  to  the  Elean  assault 
60  Scholten  (2000)  p.  220. 
61  See  Scholten  (2000)  p.  214-218  for  an  account  of  Aetolian  campaigns  elsewhere. 
62  Polyb.  4.58.2. 
63  Walbank  (1957)  pp.  513-14  suggests  that  this  was  a  coordinated  assault  on  the 
Achaean  league.  See  also  Larsen  (1968)  p.  221.  Polyb.  4.58.2. 
164 shows  the  degree  to  which  communities  within  the  Achaean 
league  retained  much  of  their  independence  and  identity,  since 
the  three  poleis  attacked  appealed  to  the  Achaean  league  for 
assistance.  The  younger  Aratus,  who  was  strategos  at  the  time, 
was  unable  to  send  any  mercenaries  through  lack  of  money.  As  a 
result,  the  poleis  involved  decided  to  withhold  their  contribution 
to  the  league  and  instead  used  it  to  defend  themselves  by  hiring 
mercenaries. 
What  is  surprising  is  the  existence  of  an  official  called  a 
hypostrategos  in  command  of  this  area,  who  played  a  vital  role  in 
defeating  the  Aetolian  attack.  The  existence  'of  an  official  who 
appears  to  have  been  in  command  of  this  area  suggests  that  the 
region  around  Dyme  retained  a  form  of  local  government 
distinct  from  the  central  administration  of  the  Achaean  league. 
Nor  was  this  an  isolated  occurrence.  In  146BC,  during  the 
Achaean  War,  Polybius  states  that  during  the  mobilisation  of 
Achaean  forces,  the  contingents  from  Elis  and  Messene  were  not 
called  to  arms,  and  that  the  men  from  the  synteleia  of  Dyme 
failed  to  appear  TM  It  would  appear  that  the  region  around  Dyme, 
which  contained  the  founding  members  of  the  Achaean  league, 
had  a  system  of  local  government  that  was  distinct  from  the  rest 
of  the  league,  something  at  variance  with  Polybius'  emphasis  on 
Achaean  unity. 
64  See  Larsen  (1968)  p.  221  for  events  in  219BC  and  Polyb.  38.16.3-4  for  the  existence  of 
this  body  in  146BC. 
165 Although  this  is  the  only  known  case  in  the  Achaean  league 
of  a  form  of  local  government,  possibly  there  were  other 
examples.  There  are  parallels  in  Aetolia,  where  areas  that  were 
absorbed  into  the  Aetolian  league  during  the  Hellenistic  period 
such  as  Acarnania  and  West  Locris  enjoyed  a  separate  status, 
being  described  as  tele  in  official  documents  65  As  Larsen  points 
out,  both  Acarnania  and  West  Locris  had  been  distinct  ethnic 
areas  before  they  became  members  of  the  Aetolian  league,  and 
they  appear  to  have  retained  some  form  of  local  government 
based  on  their  ethnic  identity  after  joining  the  Aetolian  league  66 
The  synteleia  of  Dyme  was  in  existence  from  219BC  until  146BC; 
the  possibility  exists  that  other  areaswithin  the  Achaean  league 
may  have  had  a  form  of  local  government  based  around  on 
ethnic  identity.  The  following  year,  the  Achaean  league  was  re- 
organised  into  three  distinct  zones.  The  first  centred  on  Sicyon 
and  the  Argolid,  the  second  on  Arcadia,  and  the  final  one  was 
presumably  centred  on  the  synteleia  of  Dyme.  It  was  only  after 
this,  and  at  a  comparatively  late  stage  in  the  war,  that  the 
Achaean  league  was  able  to  mount  a  successful  defence  against 
the  Aetolians  and  their  allies  in  the  Peloponnese  67 
Again,  we  need  to  question  Polybius'  stress  on  the  unity  of 
the  Achaean  league  and  to  what  extent  its  various  members 
65  See  IG  IX(2).  1.3B.  for  the  inscription.  Larsen  (1968)  p.  197. 
66  See  Larsen  (1968)  p.  197. 
67  Scholten  (2000)  p.  220. 
166 acted  in  unison,  as  Polybius  suggests,  or  in  accordance  with  their 
own  interests,:  As  Scholten  points  out,  "for  most  of  the  conflict, 
Greater  Achaia's  military  impotence  and  incompetence  left  its 
territory  such  easy  prey  to  pro-Aitolian  forces  that  the  internal 
stability  and  continued  viability  of  the  Achaean  league  became  a 
real  question"  68  Most  of  the  actual  fighting  against  the  Eleans 
and  the  Spartans  in  the  Peloponnese  was  actually  carried  out  by 
the  Macedonians.  Given  that  during  most  of  the  conflict,  it  only 
had  to  fight  against  Sparta  and  Elis,  facing  no  real  threat  from 
Aetolian  forces,  the  Achaean  league  proved  itself  to  be  powerless 
to  defend  its  position  in  the  Peloponnese  without  Macedonian 
assistance. 
The  war  ended,  according  to  Polybius,  when  news  arrived 
of  Hannibal's  victory  over  the  Romans  at  the  battle  of  Trasimene, 
and  on  the  advice  of  Demetrius  of  Pharos,  Philip  V  entered  into 
negotiations  with  the  Aetolian  league  69  At  this  point,  Polybius' 
attention  turns  towards  the  approach  of  Rome.  It  was  at  the 
peace  conference  in  Naupactus  that  ended  the  war  that  Polybius 
has  the  Aetolian  strategos  Agelaus  speak  about  the  dangers 
posed  by  the  war  in  the  west  coming  to  a  close  and  the 
possibility  of  the  victor  turning  his  attention  towards  Greece? 
68  See  Scholten  (2000)  p.  220. 
69  Polyb.  5.101.6-10. 
70  See  Polyb.  5.104.1-11. 
167 By  this  stage  the  Macedonians  had  gained  the  upper  hand  in 
the  fighting,  and  as  Philip  V's  raid  on  Thermon  demonstrates, 
the  Aetolians  were  vulnerable  to  attack?  i  Philip  V  also  gained 
control  over  Phthiotic  Thebes,  separating  the  Aetolians  from 
Thessaly,  while  the  capture  of  Zakynthos  left  Elis  vulnerable  to 
attack  from  the  sea  72  It  would  appear  that  the  Macedonians  had 
gained  the  advantage  and  that  the  Aetolians  were  ready  to  sue 
for  peace. 
However,  according  to  Polybius,  the  Aetolian  attitude 
towards  the  peace  settlement  changed,  since: 
The  Aetolians  were  at  first  quite  happy  with  the  terms  of 
their  peace  with  the  Achaeans,  as  the  fortune  of  the  war 
had  been  adverse  to  them.  They  had  in  fact  elected  Agelaus 
of  Naupactus  as  their  strategos  because  they  thought  that 
he  had  contributed  more  than  anyone  else  to  the  peace.  But 
in  less  than  no  time  they  began  to  be  dissatisfied  and  to 
blame  Agelaus  for  having  cut  off  all  their  sources  of  loot 
and  destroyed  their  future  prospects  by  making  peace  with 
all  the  Greeks  and  not  with  certain  states  only.  73 
This  reference  to  the  Aetolian  peace  with  the  Achaean 
league  is  interesting  as  it  gives  us  some  indication  of  the 
situation  in  the  Peloponnese.  The  Aetolian  tactic  of  trying  to  split 
71  Polyb.  5.8.1-9.  Polybius  5.8.6.  describes  Thermon  as  the  acropolis  of  the  Aetolians. 
72  See  Scholten  (2000)  p.  227. 
73  Polyb.  5.107.5-7. 
168 the  Achaean  league  through  the  efforts  of  its  allies  in  Elis  and 
Sparta  had  only  been  thwarted  by  Macedonian  intervention. 
This  would  seem  to  suggest  that  the  Peloponnese  would  again 
be  a  centre  for  Aetolian  attention  once  they  had  an  ally  powerful 
enough  to  assist  them. 
Conclusion. 
Polybius  devoted  a  significant  part  of  his  work  to  clarifying 
the  situation  in  the  Peloponnese  before  Rome's  advent  into  the 
Greek  world.  It  should  be  questioned  whether  or  not  his  desire 
to  explain  Roman  rule  to  his  Greek  readership  leads  to  a  stress 
on  Achaean  unity  that  might  not  actually  be  an  account  of  events 
that  is  representative  to  all  view-points. 
Polybius'  account  of  events  prior  to  the  advent  of  Rome, 
especially  the  Aetolian  league's  actions  in  the  Peloponnese 
before  the  Social  War  is  probably  what  he  sincerely  believed  to 
be  a  true  and  accurate  account  of  events.  It  is  by  no  means 
evident  that  it  was  anything  more  than  Polybius'  perspective. 
Polybius  portrays  Aetolian  actions  in  the  Peloponnese  prior  to 
the  outbreak  of  the  Social  War,  like  the  raids  on  Messene  and 
Cynaetha,  as  irrational  acts  -intended  to  loot  and  create  havoc. 
This  is  how  they  may  have  appeared  to  an  Arcadian  like 
Polybius;  it  is  by  no  means  evident  that  the  Eleans  or  Spartans 
regarded  their  Aetolian  ally's  actions  in  the  same  fashion.  The 
entry  of  Macedonian  troops  into  the  Peloponnese  placed  the 
169 Aetolian  league  in  a  dangerous  situation;  it  is  doubtful  that  they 
would  have  allowed  such  an  event  to  occur  without  challenging 
it.  Polybius  is  undoubtedly  correct  in  stating  that  the  retreating 
Aetolian  force  did  destroy  Cynaetha.  His  portrayal  of  this  action 
as  irrational  and  destructive  though,  reflects  his  own,  Arcadian, 
judgement.  It  is  evident  that  the  Aetolian  raiding  force  attempted 
to  transfer  control  of  this  strategically  important  location  to  Elis, 
and  subsequently  to  install  a  garrison  commanded  by  the 
individual  who  would  later  co-ordinate  Elis'  assault  on  the 
Achaean  league  during  the  Social  War.  The  raiders  destroyed 
Cynaetha;  it  was  because  Philip  V's  unexpected  arrival  in  the 
Peloponnese  took  them  by  surprise.  Thus,  this  raid  was  not  an 
irrational  act  of  piracy,  though  Polybius  undoubtedly  believed  it 
to  be  one.  Rather  it  was  part  of  a  plan  to  gain  an  advantageous 
position  in  the  Peloponnese  at  a  strategically  important  location 
prior  to  the  outbreak  of  war. 
Polybius  was  clarifying  events  in  the  Peloponnese  as  part  of 
his  wider  intention  of  explaining  how  the  process  of  anacyclosis 
had  influenced  the  systems  of  government  in  both  Rome  and  the 
Achaean  league.  Polybius  presented  the  Achaean  league  as  a 
single  polis  in  his  histories  for  this  purpose.  Despite  this,  it  would 
appear,  from  the  co-ordinated  assault  by  the  Eleans,  Spartan  and 
Aetolian  forces  at  the  beginning  of  the  Social  War,  that  there  was 
a  struggle  for  control  over  the  Peloponnese  between  the  Aetolian 
league  and  Macedonia  and  her  Arcadian  allies  prior  to  Rome's 
170 involvement  in  Hellenic  affairs.  Despite  Polybius'  representation 
of  their  actions  as  piracy,  the  Aetolians  had  legitimate  reasons 
for  intervening  in  the  Peloponnese  and  were  able  to  co- 
ordinating  a  sophisticated  military  strategy  with  their  allies  in 
Elis  and  Sparta.  Although  Polybius  describes  the  Aetolian 
league's  actions  in  the  Peloponnese  as  irrational,  it  would  be 
contrary  to  his  intention  of  writing  pragmatike  historia  to  give  any 
indication  of  the  motives  that  the  Aetolians  had  for  intervening 
in  the  Peloponnese.  For  Polybius  this  was  the  mistaken  approach 
to  historia  that  Timaeus  took74 
Polybius  wrote  with  the  intention  of  explaining  Roman 
imperialism  to  his  audience;  it  is  impossible  to  separate  his 
account  of  earlier  events  relating  to  the  Peloponnese  prior  to 
Rome's  involvement  in  Hellenic  affairs  from  his  intentions  at  the 
time  that  he  wrote  them.  Polybius  lived  in  a  Greece  that  was 
under  Roman  control  and  started  his  histories  when  he  was  in 
detention  in  Italy.  Given  that  he  believed  that  the  Roman  system 
of  government  would  eventually  decline  when  anacyclosis 
resumed,  the  Greeks,  who  had  reached  the  end  of  their  own 
cycle  of  anacyclosis  with  the  destruction  of  Corinth,  would  from 
that  point  onwards  be  on  the  ascendant.  Thus,  should  his 
emphasis  on  the  earlier  unity  of  the  Achaean  league  be  taken  at 
face  value?  Although  Polybius'  intention  to  clarify  the  situation 
in  the  Peloponnese  prior  to  Rome's  involvement  in  Hellenic 
74  Po1yb.  12.  I.  -6. 
171 affairs  was  genuine,  he  appears  to  have  done  so  in  a  manner  that 
was  favourable  to  Megalopolitan  interests.  The  question  should 
be  asked  whether  or  not  the  same  applies  to  his  account  of 
Rome's  later  dealings  with  Greek  states. 
172 Chapter  Five 
Polybius,  the  Peloponnese  and  the  advent  of  Rome 
Introduction 
Rome  has  long  been  considered  an  aggressive  state  that 
sought,  as  Polybius  stated,  to  bring  the  entire  Mediterranean 
world  under  its  control.  '  Despite  Rome's  known  desire  to 
expand  its  influence,  the  extent  to  which  it  manipulated  internal 
differences  between  states  in  Greece  is  a  question  that  has 
attracted  surprisingly  little  attention?  Is  this  because  Polybius' 
emphasis  on  the  unity  of  the  Achaean  league  masks  differences 
between  Greek  states  over  the  Peloponnese  that  Rome  exploited? 
According  to  Polybius,  in  207BC,  an  ambassador  from 
Rhodes  argued  that  the  Aetolian  league's  alliance  with  the 
Romans  during  the  First  Macedonian  War  was  harming  Hellenic 
interests  and  that  its  consequences  would  be  devastating  for  all 
of  Greece.  In  a  speech  begging  the  Aetolian  league  to  come  to 
terms  with  Macedonia  before  it  was  too  late,  Polybius  had  the 
Rhodian  delegate  argue  that  the  Romans  were  manipulating  the 
situation  to  further  their  imperial  ambitions.  As  he  stated: 
'See  Polyb.  1.1.5.  Harris  (1979)  is  the  fullest  detailed  exposition  of  this  case.  North  (1981) 
pp.  1-9  accepts  Harris  with  some  minor  reservations.  Even  the  word  Rome,  with  its 
similarity  to  the  Greek  word  for  strength,  had  aggressive  connotations  for  Greeks.  See 
Erskine  (1995)  pp.  368-82. 
2  See  Walbank  (1963)  pp.  1-13  for  a  discussion  of  Greek  attitudes  towards  Rome  during 
the  First  Macedonian  War.  All  future  references  are  from  his  selected  papers. 
173 It  is  only  too  evident  that  the  Romans,  if  they  get  the  war  in 
Italy  off  their  hands....  will  next  throw  themselves  with  their 
whole  strength  on  Greek  lands  on  the  pretext  that  they  are 
helping  the  Aetolians  against  Philip,  but  in  reality  with  the 
intention  of  conquering  the  whole  country.  ' 
What  should  we  make  of  this  passage?  4  In  particular  is 
Polybius  giving  us  an  accurate  indication  of  Hellenic  attitudes 
towards  Rome  at  the  time  or  one  influenced  by  later  events? 
Contacts  with  Greek  communities  in  Southern  Italy  undoubtedly 
meant  that  many  states,  including  the  Aetolian  league,  which 
had  proxenia  links  with  this  region,  were  aware  of  the  Roman 
conquest  of  that  region.  Thus,  Polybius'  portrayal  of  Greek 
attitudes  at  this  point  may  reflect  what  he  believed  to  be 
contemporary  concerns.  The  Romans  had  already  shown  their 
willingness  to  intervene  in  Illyrian  affairs  and  the  fears  that 
Polybius  has  the  Rhodian  ambassador  express  about  long-term 
Roman  intentions  seems  plausible.  ' 
In  Polybius'  account  of  the  First  Macedonian  War  he  has  a 
series  of  speeches,  which  present  Greeks  regarding  Rome  as  an 
3  Polyb.  11.6.1. 
'See  Walbank  (1985)  pp.  150-1  for  five  examples  of  Polybius  presenting  the  Romans  as 
aggressive  barbarians  during  the  First  and  Second  Macedonian  Wars.  Although 
Walbank  argued  that  these  were  an  accurate  reflection  of  what  was  said  at  the  time,  he 
compared  them  to  modem  day  anti-Americanism  and  general  Greek  prejudices  about 
outsiders.  See  pp.  153-4. 
'For  Rome's  position  in  Illyria  at  this  time,  see  Hammond  (1968)  pp.  1-21. 
174 imperialistic  barbarian  aggressor  from  an  early  stage.  How  then 
should  we  view  the  initial  alliance  between  Rome  and  the 
Aetolian  league?  The  Romans  appear  to  have  made  the  initial 
approach  to  the  Aetolian  league  to  fight  a  war  jointly  against 
Philip  V,  so  it  is  a  problem  to  explain  why  the  Aetolian  league 
accepted.  '  The  first  Greek  statesman  that  Polybius  presents 
warning  of  the  future  danger  posed  to  Greece  by  Rome  is  the 
Aetolian  strategos  Agelaus,,  several  years  before  the  alliance 
between  the  two.  '  Moreover,  the  reasoning  behind  the  Aetolian 
decision  to  ally  with  Rome  is  rarely  explored,  beyond  stating  a 
desire  for  loot 
Again  one  must  remember  that  Polybius  is  not  only  our 
only  source  for  explaining  how  Rome  came  to  control  the  Greek 
world,  but  that  he  is  virtually  our  only  source  regarding  internal 
Greek  politics  at  that  time.  Many  studies  of  Roman  imperialism 
have  been  written;  they  mostly  focus  on  Rome's  intentions  and 
actions,  ignoring  those  of  the  Greek  states  that  Rome  came  into 
contact  with,  especially  how  they  used  the  advent  of  Rome  to 
further  their  own  interests. 
Roman  intervention  in  Hellenic  affairs  did  not  suddenly 
change  the  attitudes  of  the  Greek  states  towards  each  other. 
Although  its  decision  to  ally  with  Rome  is  usually  dismissed  as 
'See  Harris  (1979)  p.  207. 
'  See  Polyb.  5.104.1-11.  For  a  recent  discussion  of  this  speech  see  Champion  (1997)  pp. 
111-128. 
8  This  is  the  implication  of  Green  (1990)  p.  299. 
175 mere  piracy,  the  Aetolian  league  had  its  own  pre-occupations  in 
212/211BC,  in  particular  its  long-standing  conflict  with 
Macedonia  and  the  alliance  between  the  Achaean  league  and 
Philip  V,  which  damaged  the  interests  of  Aetolia's  allies  in  the 
Peloponnese.  If  one  considers  the  situation  in  the  Peloponnese 
prior  to  its  alliance  with  Rome,  during  the  Social  War  the 
Aetolian  league  had  attempted  to  undermine  the  position  of  the 
pro-Macedonian  communities  within  the  Achaean  league  as  part 
of  a  wider  conflict  it  was  fighting  against  Macedonia.  The 
Romans  explicitly  promised  the  Aetolian  league  control  over 
territories  in  Acarnania  in  Livy's  account  of  the  treaty  between 
the  two,  an  area  over  which  the  Aetolian  league  had  lost  control 
to  Antigonus  Doson  in  228BC.  An  attempt  by  the  Aetolian 
league  to  use  Roman  support  to  recover  this  region  may  provide 
their  motive  for  allying  with  Rome.  "  However,  were  the 
Aetolians  the  only  Greek  league  that  attempted  to  turn  Rome's 
move  eastward  to  their  own  advantage? 
Again  there  is  the  problem  of  assessing  the  extent  to  which 
Polybius'  perspective  on  events  influences  our  understanding  of 
Roman  imperialism.  The  danger  posed  to  Arcadian  poleis  within 
the  Achaean  league  like  Megalopolis  by  Nabis'  Sparta  was  an 
important  factor  in  the  speech  made  by  Aristaenus  urging  the 
Achaean  league  to  ally  with  Rome.  Polybius  presents  the 
Achaean  league  acting  as  Rome's  equal  during  much  of  this 
Livy  26.24.11.  Scholten  (2000)  p.  230. 
176 period;  a  presentation  of  events  which  he  continues  down  to 
Callicrates'  embassy  in  180BC,  which  he  marks  as  the  decisive 
turning  point  in  the  relationship  between  the  two.  However,  in 
line  with  his  intention  of  writing  instructive  history,  Polybius 
may  have  over-emphasised  the  unity  of  the  Achaean  league 
during  its  initial  dealings  with  Rome,  so  that  he  could  account 
for  its  decline  once  its  system  of  government  was  corrupted  by 
the  onset  of  the  final  stage  of  anacyclosis.  Flamininus  removed 
Nabis  from  Argos  in  195BC,  restoring  it  to  the  Achaean  league. 
Despite  Polybius'  presentation  of  the  Achaean  league  as  Rome's 
equal  at  this  stage,  it  appears  that  the  Achaean  league's 
leadership  was  dependent,  on  Roman  support.  Should  the 
alliance  formed  between  the  two  be  seen  as  a  need  by  Rome  for 
respectable  allies?  10  Or  rather  did  Arcadian  communities  like 
Megalopolis  seek  to  use  Rome  power  to  secure  a  dominant 
position  over  the  Peloponnese? 
It  is  this  aspect  of  the  advent  of  Rome  into  the  Greek  world 
that  this  chapter  will  consider;  how  Rome  manipulated  the 
internal  differences  and  rivalries  within  the  Greek  world  to 
extend  its  control.  Although  the  Greeks  may  have  feared  the 
consequences,  allying  with  Rome  offered  them  the  opportunity 
to  further  their  own  local  ambitions.  Polybius  does  provide  a 
narrative  regarding  Rome's  advent  into  the  Greek  world;  it  is 
one  that  is  heavily  influenced  by  his  own  regional  perspective 
'°  Badian  (1970)  p.  40. 
177 and  emphasis  on  the  role  of  anacyclosis  in  history.  My  contention 
will  be  that  the  Roman/Aetolian  treaty  of  212/211BC  was  an 
attempt  by  the  Aetolian  league  to  harness  Roman  power  to 
regain  the  position  it  had  lost  in  the  Peloponnese  during  the 
Social  War. 
Once  Rome  had  entered  the  Greek  world,  other  states, 
notably  the  Achaean  league,  appear  to  have  followed  the 
Aetolian  lead  and  sought  to  ally  with  Rome  to  gain  an  advantage 
over  their  rivals.  Therefore,  Arcadian  communities  within  the 
Achaean  league  like  Megalopolis  sought  an  alliance  with  Rome 
to  further  their  regional  ambitions  under  the  leadership  of 
Megalopolitans  like  Aristaenus  and  Philopoemen. 
The  treaty  between  Rome  and  the  Aetolian  league. 
The  treaty  between  Rome  and  the  Aetolian  league  records 
the  earliest  known  alliance  between  Rome  and  any  state  in 
Greece.  Already  known  to  some  extent  from  Livy,  the  treaty 
itself  was  discovered  in  the  1950s  in  Acarnania  in  the  form  of  an 
inscription  partially  recording  its  terms.  11  The  details  of  the 
treaty,  dealing  with  the  division  of  the  spoils  from  the  actions 
that  the  allies  were  to  undertake,  appears  at  first  sight  to 
reinforce  Polybius'  presentation  of  the  Aetolian  league,  and  the 
alliance  is  seen  merely  as  a  joint  looting  expedition.  "  What  is 
"  See  Stsv  111.536.4-15  for  the  text  of  the  treaty. 
12  Harris  (1979)  p.  207. 
178 overlooked  is  that  the  Aetolian  league  was  under  the  terms  of 
this  treaty  gaining  control  over  poleis  within  a  specified 
geographic  area.  Livy  records  a  clause  stipulating  that  the 
Romans  would  return  Acarnania  to  the  control  of  the  Aetolian 
league  and  it  appears  that  the  epigraphic  text  specifically 
outlined  the  area  over  which  the  terms  of  the  treaty  were  to 
apply,  though  that  section  of  the  inscription  is  missing.  13  If  one 
examines  the  epigraphic  text,  poleis  that  were  captured  by  the 
Romans  within  the  specified  area  were  to  be  awarded  to  the 
Aetolian  league,  with  the  Romans  gaining  possession  of  the 
moveable  objects  14  If  both  were  to  capture  a  polis  jointly,  the 
Romans  undertook  to  hand  it  over  to  the  Aetolian  league  15  The 
treaty  further  specifies  that  if  any  polis  wished  to  re-enter  the 
Aetolian  league  voluntarily,  the  Romans  would  allow  this, 
presumably  a  reference  to  Poleis  that  had  previously  been 
members  of  the  Aetolian  league16 
Should  this  treaty  be  seen  in  terms  of  the  desire  for  both  for 
loot?  Green,  pointing  out  the  Roman  decision  to  set  limits  at 
Corycra,  suggests  that  the  Romans  were  aware  that  they  were 
allying  with  a  state  of  notorious  corsairs.  "  Gruen  has  drawn 
attention  to  the  fact  that  the  Romans  adopted  Hellenic  practices 
"  Sherk  (1984)  No.  2  n  1. 
14  See  Line  9. 
15  See  Lines  10-15. 
16  Scholten  (2000)  p.  230. 
"  Green  (1990)  p.  299. 
179 in  treaties  with  Greek  states,  pointing  out  that  the  practice  of 
framing  an  alliance  for  limited  and  specified  goals  was  familiar 
to  the  Aetolian  league.  As  he  argues,  the  terms  of  the  treaty 
reflect  earlier  alliances  made  by  the  Aetolian  league  with 
Alexander  II  of  Epirus  and  Antigonus  Gonatas  to  partition 
Acarnania  and  the  Achaean  league  respectively  18  However, 
Gruen  accepts  that  the  Aetolian  league's  intention  in  allying  with 
Rome  was  to  plunder,  suggesting  that  the  geographic  boundary 
set  at  Corycra  was  to  prevent  the  Aetolians  from  extending  their 
influence  into  the  Straits  of  Otranto.  19 
This  treaty  is  also  seen  as  a  Roman  response  to  the  alliance 
that  Philip  V  of  Macedonia  concluded  with  Hannibal  in  the 
aftermath  of  the  battles  of  Lake  Trasimene  and  Cannae. 
According  to  Polybius,  Philip  V  agreed  in  215BC  to  ally  with 
Hannibal  and  not  to  make  a  separate  peace  with  Rome  until  the 
Carthaginians  had  emerged  victorious  from  the  war  in  Italy.  In 
the  event  of  a  Carthaginian  victory,  the  Romans  would  be  forced 
to  withdraw  from  areas  in,. 
_ 
Illyria  where  they  had  established 
interests.  According  to  Polybius,  these  areas  would  be  returned 
to  the  control  of  Macedonian  allies,  notably  Demetrius  of  Pharos, 
who,  according  to  Polybius,  urged  Philip  V  to  make  peace  with 
1e  Gruen  (1984)  p.  19-20,  n.  30-31. 
"  Gruen  (1984)  p.  378.  Rich  (1983)  p.  187  suggests  that  the  junior  status  that  Rome  had 
during  this  conflict  was  a  source  of  resentment  later  on. 
180 the  Aetolian  league  on  hearing  of  Carthaginian  victories  in 
Italy.  ° 
All  the  above  explanations  assume  that  Rome  was  in  a 
desperate  situation  and  allied  with  the  only  possible  Greek  state 
it  could  find,  the  Aetolian  league,  which  Polybius  describes  in 
the  worst  possible  terms.  Why  the  Aetolian  league's  leadership 
allied  with  the  Romans  is  a  question  that  receives  little  attention, 
except  for  accepting  the  Polybian  depiction  of  Aetolians 
behaving  as  mindless  pirates.  Traditionally  this  conflict  is  called 
the  First  Macedonian  War;  it  is  viewed  from  a  Roman 
perspective.  It  was  not  the  First  Macedonian  War  for  the 
Aetolian  league,  which  had  been  fighting  against  the 
Macedonians  since  the  time  of  Alexander  the  Great.  It  appears 
that  the  Aetolian  league  allied  with  Rome  to  gain  its  assistance  in 
regaining  control  over  territory  that  it  had  previously  lost  to  the 
Macedonians.  After  the  Social  War  ended,  Polybius  presents 
Greek  states  approaching  both  Rome  and  Carthage,  since,  as  he 
states,  they  feared  the  danger  posed  by  the  Macedonian  victory, 
and  presumably,  the  consequences  of  Philip  V'  alliance  with 
Hannibal  if  Carthage  was  victorious  Zl  By  the  time  of  the  Roman 
20  For  the  text  of  the  treaty  see  Polyb.  7.9.1-17.  Gruen  (1984)  p.  60  has  drawn  attention  to 
the  Semitic  phraseology  in  the  text,  suggesting  that  Polybius  had  access  to  an  original 
copy  of  the  alliance  between  the  two. 
21  Polyb.  5.105.7-8.  Polybius  states  a  number  of  Greek  states  sent  embassies  to  both  the 
Romans  and  the  Carthaginians  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Social  War  because  they  were 
afraid  of  Philip's  daring. 
181 alliance  with  the  Aetolian  league  the  threat  of  Macedonian 
involvement  in  the  war  in  Italy  was  limited,  since  the  Romans 
defeated  Philip  V  and  destroyed  his  fleet  in  214BC  '  Possibly  of 
more  concern  to  the  Romans,  given  their  presence  in  the  Balkans, 
were  Philip  V's  conquest  of  Dimallum  and  the  Parthini  and 
Atintani,  all  of  which  were  within  the  Roman  area  of  interest  in 
Illyria'3  It  was  after  this  string  of  successes  by  the  Macedonians 
that  the  Roman/Aetolian  treaty  was  concluded.  The  Macedonian 
capture  of  Lissus  on  the  coast  may  also  have  been  a  determining 
factor  in  Rome's  decision  to  seek  an  ally  24 
If  the  Romans  were  defending  their  interests  in  Illyria 
against  Macedonian  encroachment,  why  would  the  Aetolian 
league  assist  them?  Returning  to  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  although 
they  are  usually  seen  as  relating  to  the  division  of  spoils,  it  is  the 
Romans  who  gain  the  portable  loot  when  they  capture  a  polis. 
The  Aetolian  league  gained  control  over  all  the  territory  seized 
within  the  area  specified  by  the  treaty,  even  if  the  Romans 
captured  it  without  any  assistance  from  Aetolian  forces. 
As  Gruen  points  out,  the  Romans  did  generally  use  Hellenic 
models  in  concluding  treaties  with  Greek  states,  so  the  terms  of 
the  treaty,  especially  those  referring  to  the  Aetolian  league 
'  Plut.  Arat.  51.2.  Both  Harris  (1979)  p.  206  and  Gruen  (1984)  p.  377  argue  that  after  the 
Roman  destruction  of  his  fleet  Philip  V  was  never  again  in  a  position  to  send  forces  to 
assist  Hannibal. 
'  Harris  (1979)  p.  206. 
"Gruen  (1984)  p.  378. 
182 gaining  territory  need  not  necessarily  be  seen as  a  sign  of  Roman 
disinterest  or  weakness.  On  the  contrary,  what  appear  to  be  the 
decisive  factors  in  the  conclusion  of  this  alliance  were  Rome's 
need  to  prevent  Philip  V  from  expanding  on  his  position  in 
Illyria,  and  the  Aetolian  league's  desire  to  recover  territory  it  had 
lost  to  the  Macedonians.  Livy  states  that  the  treaty  covered  the 
area  between  the  borders  of  Aetolia  and  Corycra.  Though  it  is 
supposed  that  this  might  refer  to  a  Roman  desire  to  keep  the 
Aetolians  confined,  this  assumes  that  their  principal  objective 
was  gaining  loot.  Livy's  specific  reference  to  the  Romans 
handing  over  Acarnania  to  the  Aetolian  league  is  perhaps  more 
significant.  '  The  Aetolian  league  had  suffered  severe  defeats  at 
the  hands  of  Philip  V  in  this  region  in  219  and  218  BC  on  top  of 
those  inflicted  earlier  by  Antigonus  Doson  26  The  clause  of  the 
treaty  relating  to  re-admission  of  poleis  into  the  Aetolian  league 
may  indicate  that  the  Aetolian  league  sought  to  recover  the 
position  that  it  had  lost  to  the  Macedonians  in  Acarnania  and  the 
Peloponnese?  '  Instead  of  being  a  piratical  adventure,  it  appears 
that  the  Aetolian  league  was  using  its  alliance  with  Rome  to 
regain  the  position  that  it  had  lost  to  the  Macedonians,  both 
during  the  Social  War  and  earlier  in  228BC. 
25  Livy.  26.24.11. 
26Scholten  (2000)  p.  230. 
ý'  See  Scholten  (2000)  p.  230. 
183 Though  specified  by  Livy,  Acarnania  was  not  the  only 
region  where  the  Aetolian  league  had  recently  lost  influence  to 
the  Macedonians.  The  alliance  between  the  Achaean  league  and 
Macedonia  had  damaged  Aetolian  interests  in  the  Peloponnese, 
and  during  the  First  Macedonian  War  much  of  the  joint  military 
effort  between  the  Aetolian  league  and  Rome  took  place  in  this 
region. 
Roman  conduct  during  this  conflict  has  long  been 
characterised  as  their  fighting  to  the  last  Aetolian  28  In  reality  it 
would  appear  that  the  Roma  i  sIrimary  role  during  the  war  was 
to  assist  the  Aetolian  league  in  its  attempt  to  re-form  the  alliance 
with  Elis  and  Sparta  that  had  existed  during  the  Social  War. 
Turning  to  events  during  the  war,  initially  the  Roman  fleet 
centred  its  operations  towards  securing  the  Aetolian,  league  from 
the  sea.  In  211BC,  Laevinus,  the  Roman  commander  captured 
Zacynthos  and  the  Acarnanian  port  of  Oeniadae  29  The  following 
year,  the  Roman  fleet,  along  with  an  Aetolian  force  led  by 
Scopas,  attacked  Anticyra  in  Phocis,  apparently  with  the 
intention  of  severing  Macedonian  communications  with  the 
Peloponnese  30  This  was  followed  by  an  Aetolian  appeal  to  the 
Spartans  recorded  in  Polybius,  and  a  counter  appeal  to  the 
'  Most  recently  this  allegation  has  been  made  by  Scholten  (2000)  p.  230. 
'Livy.  26.24.15-16. 
30Livy.  26.26.1-3.  Livy  states  that  Anticyra  was  in  Locris.  However  the  Acarnanian 
Lyciscus  shortly  afterwards  mentions  it  as  Anticyra  in  Phocis.  See  Polyb.  9.39.2-3. 
184 Spartans  to  remain  neutral  by  an  Acarnania  embassy  31  Polybius 
has  a  speech  at  this  point,  in  which  an  Acarnanian  ambassador 
states,  during  the  debate  in  Sparta  over  whether  to  ally  with  the 
Aetolian  league,  that  the  Greeks  were  at  this  point  threatened  by 
a  war  with  men  of  a  different  race  who  threatened  to  enslave 
them.  The  ambassador  continues  to  state  that  by  allying  with  the 
Romans,  the  Aetolian  league  had  chosen  to  ally  with  barbarians, 
and  that  their  actions  would  bring  disaster  on  all  the  Greeks  32 
Polybius  presents  this  alliance  as  a  betrayal  of  Greek 
interests.  In  reality  the  Aetolian  league  appears  to  have  allied 
with  Rome  to  gain  its  assistance  in  trying  to  undermine  the 
Macedonian  position  in  the  Peloponnese.  Along  with  their 
appeal  to  Sparta,  Polybius  mentions  both  Elis  and  Messene  as 
Aetolian  allies  at  this  time.  Once  the  Spartans  had  agreed  to  ally 
with  the  Aetolian  league  there  was  a  change  in  Roman 
involvement  in  the  conflict.  According  to  Livy,  Laevinus,  the 
commander  of  the  Roman  fleet  that  was  assisting  the  Aetolian 
league,  reported  to  the  senate  that  the  war  was  going  well  and 
the  legion  in  Greece  could  be  recalled  since  the  Roman  fleet 
would  be  sufficient  to  keep  the  Macedonians  away  from  Italy. 
This  advice  was  acted  upon  and  Laevinaus'  successor,  Sulpicius 
"See  Polyb.  9.28.1-39.7  for  the  speeches  by  both  delegations. 
'Polyb.  9.37.7. 
185 Galba,  was  ordered  to  send  home  all  his  troops,  apart  from  the 
socii  navales  ? 
Livy  illustrates  the  lessening  of  the  risk  of  Macedonian 
intervention  in  the  war  in  Italy  by  emphasising  the  decision  to 
withdraw  the  Legion.  Was  this  the  real  reason?  The  Romans  had 
concentrated  their  efforts  during  the  initial  phase  of  the  war  in 
assisting  the  Aetolian  league  in  recreating  the  anti-Macedonian 
alliance  that  had  existed  at  the  time  of  the  Social  War  in  the 
Peloponnese.  Although  the  Romans  may  have  been  constrained 
by  a  lack  of  resources,  it  could  also  be  postulated  that  the 
Romans  were  exploiting  the  hostility  between  the  Aetolian 
league  and  Macedonia  to  further  their  imperial  ambitions. 
Polybius  presents  the  Romans  as  acting  aggressively  during  this 
conflict.  We  might  infer  from  this  that  the  senate  was  already 
looking  towards  the  post-Punic  War  situation  when  Rome 
would  be  free  to  intervene  in  Greece,  and  the  alliance  with  the 
Aetolian  league  came  at  a  time  when  the  Romans  were 
counterattacking  after  Hannibal's  initial  successes  in  Italy.  3'  The 
decision  by  the  Aetolian  league  to  ally  with  Rome  at  an  early 
stage  suggests  that  they  regarded  the  Romans  as  the  most  likely 
victors  in  the  Punic  War,  just  as  Philip  V  had  sought  to  capitalise 
on  Hannibal's  successes  in  Italy  by  allying  with  Carthage. 
"Livy  26  28.1-9. 
'  The  possibility  of  the  Romans  attempting  to  weaken  Philip  V  is  suggested  by  Harris 
(1979)  p.  207. 
186 Nor  was  Rome  the  only  power  that  the  Aetolian  league 
sought  support  from.  It  appears  that  the  alliance  between  the 
two  was  part  of  a  policy  undertaken  by  the  Aetolian  league  to 
gain  the  support  of  other  powers  in  its  campaigns  against  the 
Macedonians.  In  211BC,  when  the  Roman  fleet  captured  the 
island  of  Aegina,  they  handed  it  over  to  the  Aetolian  league, 
which  subsequently  sold  it  to  Attalus  of  Pergamum  for  the  sum 
of  thirty  talents  35  The  following  year,  Attalus  was  elected  as  the 
Aetolian  supreme  commander,  receiving  the  title  of  strategos 
autokrator,  an  honorific  title.  Despite  this,  the  Aetolian  alliance 
with  Rome  still  remained.  When  in  the  following  year  Philip  V 
opened  talks  with  the  Aetolian  league,  so  that,  according  to  Livy, 
neither  the  Romans  nor  Attalus  would  have  any  reason  for 
invading  Greece,  the  arrival  of  the  Roman  fleet  and  Attalus 
ended  any  hopes  of  a  negotiated  settlement  36 
During  the  war,  the  Aetolian  league's  policy  towards  the 
Peloponnese  remained  focused  on  undermining  the  Macedonian 
position  there.  During  208BC,  with  Roman  assistance,  the 
Aetolians  tried  to  cut  communications  between  Macedonia  and 
central  Greece,  fortifying  the  pass  at  Thermopylae,  and  the 
Roman  fleet  attempted  to  gain  control  over  the  coast  37  Philip  V 
proceeded  to  Phocis,  where  there  was  an 
'  Polyb.  9.42.5-8. 
'  Livy.  27.33.4. 
37  Livy.  28.7.3. 
attempt  by 
187 ambassadors  from  Ptolemy  and  Rhodes  to  negotiate  between  the 
Romans  and  Macedonians.  '  The  conference  was  disrupted  by  an 
attack  by  the  Spartan  regent  Machanidas  on  the  Achaean  league, 
and  postponed. 
However,  in  205BC  a  radical  change  took  place  in  the 
Achaean  league  that  appears  to  have  had  far  reaching 
implications  for  the  Aetolian  league's  anti-Macedonian  policy  in 
the  Peloponnese,  when  Philopoemen  of  Megalopolis  was  elected 
strategos  of  the  Achaean  league.  Philopoemen  had  earlier  served 
as  Achaean  hipparch,  and  during  his  time  in  office  had  reformed 
the  Achaean  cavalry  force  39  As  strategos,  we  are  told  that  he 
reformed  the  Achaean  infantry,  re-equipping  the  lightly  armed 
troops,  previously  deployed,  with  Macedonian  equipment  such 
as  the  sarissa  pike  and  the  aspis  shield.  In  205BC  the  newly 
reformed  Achaean  army  was  paraded  at  the  Nemean  games  40 
Although  both  Polybius  and  Plutarch  discuss  the  military 
implications  of  Philopoemen's  actions,  both  are  silent  as  to  the 
political  ramifications.  Errington  suggests  that  these  reforms 
mark  the  beginning  of  a  renewal  within  the  Achaean  league, 
with  Philopoemen  wishing  to  lessen  the  Achaean  league's 
dependence  on  Macedonian  support  and  break  the  ties  that  had 
Livy.  28.7.13-14. 
39  See  Polyb.  10.22-24  and  Plut.  Philop.  7. 
40  Plut.  Philop.  7.  Paus.  8.49.7.  Livy  27.31.11.  For  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  military 
reforms  undertaken  by  Philopoemen,  see  Anderson  (1967)  p.  104-5. 
188 existed  between  the  two  since  the  end  of  the  Cleomenic  War  41 
Errington  points  to  the  attempted  plot  by  Philip  V  to  murder 
Philopoemen  in  205BC  as  evidence  that  he  was  a  threat  to  the 
Macedonian  position  in  the  Peloponnese  42 
Instead  it  appears  that  Philopoemen's  reforms  were  a  sign  of 
the  close  relationship  that  existed  between  the  Macedonians  and 
Arcadian  poleis  within  the  Achaean  league  like  Megalopolis. 
Philopoemen  had  served  Macedonian  interests  in  Crete  in  the 
period  immediately  before  his  election  as  hipparch  of  the  Achaean 
league,  and  would  do  so  again  at  a  later  stage.  It  is  unlikely  that 
Philopoemen  would  have  introduced  these  reforms  without 
Macedonian  approval43  It  would  appear  that  Philopoemen's 
reforms  indicate  increased  Megalopolitan  co-operation  with 
41  See  Errington  (1969)  p.  70.  Errington  himself  admits  that  Philip  V  had  a  possibly 
undeserved  reputation  for  assassinations.  The  number  of  failed  attempts  that  he  is 
credited  with  would  seem  to  suggest,  according  to  Errington,  that  these  accusations 
were  the  fabrications  of  hostile  contemporaries.  Polybius  portrays  Philip  as  a  tyrant  who 
frequently  murdered  his  political  opponents;  at  one  point  Polybius  presents  Flamininus 
making  a  joke  about  it,  with  Philip  replying  with  a  sardonic  smile,  Polyb.  18.7.6. 
4'  See  Plut.  Philop.  12.2. 
43  Plutarch  suggests  that  Philopoemen  refused  Antigonus'  offer  that  he  should  serve 
under  him  because  he  disliked  taking  orders,  and  instead  went  to  Crete  because  he  felt 
that  he  did  not  wish  to  be  idle  and  because  of  the  experience  he  would  gain  there. 
(Plut.  Philop.  7.  ).  As  Errington  (1968)  p.  28  points  out,  Philopoemen's  activities  in  Crete 
coincided  with  Macedonian  interests,  and  cannot  have  been  independent  of  them. 
189 Macedonia.  "  From  Philopoemen's  assumption  of  the  office  of 
Achaean  strategos  until  his  death  in  183BC,  all  the  known 
strategoi  of  the  Achaean  league  were  Megalopolitans,  with 
Philopoemen  himself  holding  the  office  on  at  least  eight 
occasions  45  In  light  of  Philopoemen's  close  association  with 
Macedonian  interests  on  Crete,  his  reforms  may  have  extended 
beyond  the  military  sphere  and  encompassed  political  reforms 
that  strengthened  the  position  of  Megalopolis  and  other 
Arcadian  poleis  within  the  Achaean  league.  Polybius,  with  his 
close  -association  with  Philopoemen  and  concern  with  showing 
the  unity  of  the  Achaean  league,  makes  no  reference  to  any 
political  implications  these  reforms  may  have  had.  Given  that  the 
Aetolian  league  appears  to  have  attempted  to  exploit  divisions  in 
the  Peloponnese  during  the  Social  War,  it  appears  probable  that 
Arcadian  communities  like  Megalopolis  would  try  to  consolidate 
44  Errington  (1969)  pp.  70ff  is  the  only  modem  scholar  to  pay  any  attention  to  the 
political  side  that  Philopoemen's  reforms  might  have  had,  since  Anderson  strictly 
discusses  the  military  implications. 
'  For  lists  of  the  strategoi  of  the  Achaean  league  between  211-179-8BC,  see  Errington 
(1968)  p.  300  (table  II),  who  also  lists  reconstruction  by  earlier  scholars.  Apart  from 
Philopoemen,  other  Megalopolitans  who  held  the  office  of  strategos  in  this  period  were: 
Aristaenus,  199-9,196-5,188-7  and  186-5  BC. 
Diophanes  in  192BC. 
Archon  in  190-89  and  187-6BCBC. 
Lycortas  in  185-4,183-2  and  182-1BC. 
190 the  dominance  they  had  achieved  within  the  Achaean  league  at 
the  end  of  the  Cleomenic  War. 
The  victory  of  the  newly  equipped  Achaean  army  over  the 
Spartans  at  Mantinea  and  the  death  of  the  Spartan  king 
Machanidas  ended  the  Aetolian  alliance  with  Sparta,  and  the 
Aetolian  league  concluded  peace  with  the  Macedonians  shortly 
afterwardsDid  the  Aetolians  conclude  a  separate  peace  with 
Macedonia  because  they  felt  that  the  Romans  had  not  adequately 
supported  them  during  the  conflict?  Or  because  the  defeat  of  the 
Spartans  destroyed  the  anti-Macedonian  alliance  that  the 
Romans  had  helped  the  Aetolian  league  create  in  the 
Peloponnese?  Rich  suggests  that  the  separate  peace  between 
Aetolia  and  Macedonia  may  have  been  the  result  of  the  Aetolian 
league  feeling  that  the  Romans  had  abandoned  them.  He 
suggests  that  the  Aetolian  decision  was  a  humiliation  for  Rome, 
because  it  came  at  a  stage  when  they  were  able  to  release 
adequate  resources  to  prosecute  the  war  successfully.  ""  This 
would  seem  to  have  some  merit,  since  shortly  after  the 
conclusion  of  peace  between  the  Aetolians  and  Macedonians,  a 
Philopoemen  himself  held  the  office  in  208-7,206-5,204-3,203-2,201-0,193-2,191-0,189- 
8  and  183-2BC.  All  the  known  strategoi  between  201  and  181BC,  when  Hyperbatus  of 
Dyme  was  elected  strategos,  were  from  Megalopolis. 
/  Gruen  (1984)  p  380  argues  that  after  the  Battle  of  Metaurus  the  Romans  were  in  a  better 
position  to  send  troops  to  the  Aetolians. 
'  Rich  (1983)  p.  139. 
191 Roman  force  under  P.  Sempronius  Tuditanus  arrived  in  Greece, 
but  was  unable  to  induce  the  Aetolian  league  to  restart  the  war  48 
However,  'it  was  not  likely  that  the  Aetolian  league  would 
wish  to  resume  war  against  Macedonia  after  the  defeat  of  Sparta, 
one  of  its  principal  allies  in  the  Peloponnese.  Furthermore,  the 
assumption  is  that  it  was  a  Roman  War,  the  First  Macedonian 
War;  it  was  for  the  Aetolian  league  the  Fifth  Macedonian  War  49 
It  was  an  attempt  by  the  Aetolian  league  to  gain  the  support  of 
other  states,  of  which  Rome  was  one,  to  counter  the  losses  that 
they  had  suffered  to  the  Antigonids  in  the  preceding  decades.  So 
should  the  dispatch  of  this  Roman  force  be  seen  as  an  attempt  by 
the  Romans  to  coerce  the  Aetolian  league  back  into  the  war?  Or 
rather  was  it  a  separate  campaign,  mounted  in  Illyria  to 
consolidate  Roman  interests?  Tuditanus,  after  failing  to  persuade 
the  Aetolian  league  to  declare  war  on  Macedonia,  consolidated 
the  Roman  presence  in  Illyria  by  regaining  control  over  the 
Parthini,  and  certain  towns  near  Dyrrhachium,  suggesting  that 
the  Romans  were  intent  on  securing  their  own  interests. 
The  Aetolian  league  was  not  mentioned  in  the  Peace  of 
Phoenice  that  ended  the  war  between  Rome  and  Macedonia. 
Despite  this  omission,  many  of  its  allies  were  listed  by  Livy  as 
Roman  adscripti  to  the  treaty;  Ilium,  Attalus,  Pleuratus  (an 
48Livy.  29.12.1-4. 
"  Scholten  (2000)  p.  230. 
192 Illyrian),  Nabis,  Elis,  Messenia  and  Athens  5°  Although  questions 
have  been  raised  as  to  the  authenticity  of  this  list,  virtually  all  of 
the  states  mentioned  had  been  allies  of  the  Aetolian  league  since 
the  time  of  the  Social  War  51  The  decision  by  the  Romans  to  list  so 
many  Aetolian  allies  as  adscripti,  would  seem  to  suggest,  as 
Harris  argues,  a  forward  looking  policy  by  the  Romans,  with 
their  presence  creating  the  conditions  for  an  almost  inevitable 
appeal  for  military  assistance  52  Though  they  were  not  included 
in  the  actual  peace  agreement,  the  Aetolian  league  had  been 
forced  by  the  changed  situation  in  the  Peloponnese  to  come  to 
separate  terms  with  the  Macedonians.  Given  that  the  Romans 
had  listed  so  many  of  their  allies  as  adscripti,  the  Aetolians  may 
have  felt  that  in  any  future  conflict  the  Romans  would  regard 
them  as  potential  allies. 
Again,  one  must  question  whether  Polybius'  depiction  of 
Aetolian  intentions  during  the  First  Macedonian  War  are  those 
50  Livy.  29.12.14.  The  description  of  Nabis  as  tyrant  of  Sparta  suggests  a  Polybian  origin. 
s'  Derow  (1979)  p.  6-7  argues  that  the  list  is  derived  from  Polybius.  Harris  (1979)  p.  207-8 
argues  that  the  Romans  intended  to  list  these  states  as  friends  of  Rome,  and  create  a 
condition  whereby  they  could  lay  the  foundations  for  a  future  appeal  by  these  states  to 
Rome.  Gruen  (1984)  p.  382  states  that  it  was  normal  Hellenic  practice.  More  recently, 
Habicht  (1995)  p.  198  is  more  sceptical  as  to  the  authenticity  of  the  list.  However,  there 
had  been  a  mythical  kinship  relationship  between  the  Aetolian  league  and  Elis  since  at 
least  the  fifth  century,  the  Illyrian  was  called  after  Pleuron  in  Aetolia,  and  Sparta  and 
Messene  had  been  Aetolian  allies  since  the  end  of  the  Cleomenic  War.  The  inclusion  of 
Ilium  as  an  adscriptus  reflects  Roman  beliefs  about  the  Aeneas  legend 
52  Harris  (1979)  p.  207-208. 
193 of  an  Arcadian  who  was  unable  to  accept  that  the  Aetolian 
league  had  legitimate  interests  in  the  Peloponnese.  The  Achaean 
league's  alliance  with  Macedonia  had  placed  the  Aetolian  league 
in  a  difficult  position.  The  Aetolians  had  been  unable  to  defeat 
the  Macedonians  by  themselves  when  they  had  tried  to  reverse 
Antigonid  gains  in  the  Peloponnese  and  defend  their  allies  Elis 
during  the  Social  War.  It  would  seem  natural  that  they  would 
seek  support  from  other  powers  to  continue  this  policy. 
Roman  intentions  are  less  easy  to  assess.  It  appears  unlikely 
that  the  Romans  allied  with  the  Aetolian  league  to  prevent  Philip 
V  intervening  on  behalf  of  the  Carthaginians  in  Italy,  though  this 
possibility  cannot  be  ruled  out  entirely.  Roman  support  for  the 
Aetolian  league  appears  to  have  been  partly  defensive, 
preventing  Philip  V  from  using  the  opportunity  posed  by  the 
Punic  War  to  detach  Roman  allies  in  the  Balkans.  It  was  also  in 
some  respects  aggressive.  By  approaching  the  Aetolians  and 
supporting  their  efforts  to  regain  control  over  territory  they  had 
lost  to  the  Macedonians,  the  Romans  were  able  to  lay  down  the 
groundwork  for  their  future  intervention  in  the  Greek  world.  As 
Polybius  has  the  Rhodian  ambassador  and  others  claim,  the 
Romans  seem  to  have  exploited  the  problems  that  the  Aetolian 
league  faced  to  extend  their  influence  over  the  Greek  world. 
In  understanding  Rome's  entry  into  the  Greek  world,  it  is 
essential  to  appreciate  both  the  conflict  between  the  Aetolian  and 
Achaean  leagues  in  the  Peloponnese  and  its  exploitation  by  the 
194 Roman  intruders.  Roman  involvement  with  the  Aetolian  league 
during  the  First  Macedonian  War  undoubtedly  led  to  them 
gaining  an  appreciation  of  the  position  in  the  Peloponnese.  After 
they  had  intervened  in  the  Greek  world,  their  decision  to  seek, 
and  later  cultivate  an  alliance  with  the  Achaean  league  after 
198BC,  may  reflect  an  attempt  by  the  Romans,  and  Flamininus  in 
particular,  to  manipulate  the  situation  in  the  Peloponnese  to 
their  own  advantage. 
Nabis,  Sparta,  the  Peloponnese  and  the  Aetolian  appeal  to 
Rome. 
The  Aetolian/Roman  alliance  of  212BC  appears  to  have 
been  motivated  by  the  Aetolian  league's  desire  to  use  Roman 
power  to  regain  its  position  in  the  Peloponnese  and  defend  its 
allies  there.  The  issues  raised  by  the  Achaean  league's  alliance 
with  Rome  in  198BC  show  how  Polybius'  emphasis  on  the  unity 
of  the  Achaean  league  distorts  our  understanding  of  Roman 
imperialism  and  Flamininus'  behaviour  in  the  Peloponnese. 
Before  considering  this  alliance  we  should  first  examine  how  the 
situation  in  the  Peloponnese  was  altered  by  the  assumption  of 
power  at  Sparta  in  205BC  by  Nabis.  Few  Spartan  kings  have 
provoked  more  controversy  than  Nabis;  Polybius  characterises 
him  as  the  worst  of  all  possible  characters.  However,  Nabis,  as 
Shimron  pointed  out,  suffers  in  that  only  Polybius'  extremely 
biased  account  of  his  reign  survives,  and  in  light  of  the  excesses 
195 he  is  accused  of  committing,  it  is  best  to  remember  that  we  have 
no  other  evidence  about  Nabis'  character  53  For  example, 
Polybius  alleges  that  Nabis  committed  robbery,  torture  and 
piracy  on  a  regular  basis  and  that  his  supporters  were  rapists, 
highwaymen  and  burglars  54  In  one  incident  Nabis  is  accused  by 
Polybius  of  using  a  device  reminiscent  of  a  medieval  iron 
maiden  made  in  the  image  of  his  wife  to  extract  taxation  from  his 
fellow  Spartans  55 
Modern  scholars  also  see  Nabis'  actions  as  a  continuation  of 
the  socio-economic  reforms  carried  out  in  Sparta  during  the  late 
Hellenistic  era.  6  Most  recently  Cartledge  has  argued  that  Nabis' 
claim  to  be  restoring  the  mythical  Lycurgan  constitution,  like 
those  of  his  predecessors,  was  merely  propaganda.  It  appears 
that  Nabis's  behaviour  was  more  akin  to  a  Hellenistic  tyrant  than 
a  Spartan  king  57 
As  in  the  case  of  Cleomenes'  reign,  Polybius  makes  no 
mention  of  Nabis  cancelling  debts  in  Sparta,  though  he  does  later 
53  Shimron  (1972)  p.  79-80. 
54Polyb.  13.6.4. 
0  Polyb.  13.7.1-11.  Shimron  (1972)  p.  87  suggests  that  there  may  have  been  some  truth  to 
these  accusations,  stating  that  many  Spartans,  especially  those  in  positions  of  authority 
or  wealth  may  have  favoured  co-operation  with  Macedonia  instead  of  reviving  the 
traditional  Spartan  regime. 
'Shimron  (1972)  p.  83  Piper  (1986)  p.  95  and  Cartledge  (1989)  p.  67  point  out  that  Nabis, 
despite  his  name,  was  actually  a  member  of  one  of  the  Spartan  royal  families. 
57  Cartledge  (1989)  p.  67-69. 
196 accuse  him  of  carrying  out  this  measure  in  Argos  58  Most  of  the 
socio-economic  reforms  that  Nabis  is  credited  with  come  from 
his  rule  in  Argos,  not  Sparta,  though  Polybius'  text  is  extremely 
fragmentary  at  this  stage.  Although  Nabis  carried  out  changes  in 
Spartan  society,  there  is  no  actual  evidence  regarding  his 
motives,  and  his  reforms  in  Argos  may  have  been  an  attempt  to 
gain  popularity. 
It  also  appears  that  Nabis  was  responding  to  the  changes 
that  were  taking  place  in  Spartan  society,  not  initiating  them. 
During  this  period  Sparta  was  undergoing  a  transformation, 
constructing  defensive  walls  for  the  first  time  in  its  history,  a 
sign  of  increased  urbanisation  in  a  city  previously  known  for  its 
rural  characteristics.  Nabis'  reign  also  saw  a  change  in  the 
structure  of  Spartan  society,  with  an  increase  in  grave  goods 
indicating  increased  wealth,  along  with  changes  in  Spartan 
sculpture,  showing  that  Sparta  was  becoming  more  open  to 
outside  influences  59  However,  many  of  these  changes  had  begun 
before  Nabis'  assumption  of  power  and  were  by  no  means 
completed  by  the  time  of  his  death  60  Nabis  was  in  many  ways  a 
product  rather  than  the  cause  of  changes  that  were  ongoing  in 
Spartan  society.  Although  Nabis  was  willing  to  use  Sparta's  once 
glorious  past  as  propaganda,  he  was  faced  with  a  changing 
"  Eckstein  (1987)  p.  228. 
s'  Cartledge  (1989)  p.  71-72 
60  Cartledge  (1989)  p.  72. 
197 situation;  his  reforms  seeming  to  have  been  undertaken  to 
strengthen  SpartaI  militarily. 
The  defensive  nature  of  Nabis'  reforms  can  be  seen  if  one 
turns  towards  his  decision  to  enfranchise  a  large  number  of 
slaves.  Again  there  are  problems.  Polybius  describes  those  who 
benefited  from  Nabis'  reforms  as  douloi  and  Livy  describing 
them  as  servi,  balanced  by  the  evidence  from  Strabo  that  the 
institution  of  helotry  survived  in  Sparta  61  The  use  of  helots  in  the 
Spartan  military  had  a  long  tradition;  Cleomenes  shortly  before 
his  defeat  had  freed  six  thousand  helots  to  serve  in  his  army  62 
Taken  in  connection  with  the  other  changes  in  Spartan  society 
that  happened  during  Nabis'  reign,  such  as  the  development  of  a 
navy  and  a  treasury  to  regulate  financial  affairs,  his  actions  were 
probably  designed  to  increase  Sparta's  military  power.  Another 
point  to  consider  is  the  role  that  Philopoemen's  reforms  in  the 
Achaean  league  had  in  prompting  these  changes.  With  the 
Achaean  army  reformed  and  apparently  under  firm 
Megalopolitan  control,  it  is  interesting  to  consider  Nabis' 
reforms  in  the  context  that  this  threat  posed  to  Sparta.  Sparta 
had,  ever  since  the  Cleomenic  War,  been  engaged  in  conflict  with 
an  expansionary  Achaean  league  in  which  Arcadian 
communities  like  Megalopolis  had  an  extremely  influential 
61  Cartledge  (1989)  p.  69.  For  the  survival  of  this  institution  in  Sparta  see  Strabo.  8.365. 
Shimron  (1972)  p.  90.  Nabis  appears  to  have  had  extensive  support  from  the  Perioeci 
towns.  See  Shimron  (1972)  p.  88. 
62  For  the  earlier  use  of  slaves  in  the  Spartan  military  see  Hunt  (1998)  pp.  171-5. 
198 position.  Philopoemen  and  a  reformed  Achaean  army  posed  a 
threat  to  Sparta;  it  would  seem  natural  that  Nabis  would 
undertake  any  measure  necessary  to  ensure  Sparta's  continued 
independence. 
Nabis'  assumption  of  power  also  presented  the  Aetolian 
league  with  an  opportunity  to  again  challenge  the  Macedonian 
position  in  the  Peloponnese,  when  in  204BC  war  broke  out 
between  the  Achaean  league  and  Sparta.  According  to  Polybius, 
war  erupted  when  Nabis  refused  to  return  a  number  of  horses 
stolen  from  Megalopolis  63  Whether  this  story  is  true,  or  was  the 
sole  cause  of  the  war  is  unknown,  but  for  the  next  three  years  a 
border  conflict  was  waged  between  Sparta  and  Megalopolis.  In 
201BC,  Nabis  attempted  to  seize  Messene,  a  move  that  Polybius 
condemns,  since  it  was  in  alliance  with  Sparta  at  the  time  `4 
However,  Messene  had  co-operated  with  the  Aetolian  league 
during  the  Social  and  First  Macedonian  Wars,  so  possibly  Nabis, 
with  Aetolian  encouragement,  was  trying  to  reform  the  anti- 
Macedonian  alliance  in  the  Peloponnese  that  had  existed  since 
the  time  of  the  Social  War. 
The  following  year,  when  Philopoemen  was  Achaean 
strategos,  he  mobilised  the  Achaean  army  secretly,  and  defeated 
Nabis'  army  at  Sellasia  65  Shortly  afterwards  Philopoemen 
6'  Polyb.  18.8.3-7. 
64  Polyb.  16.13.1-3. 
6'Polyb.  16.37.1-38. 
199 departed  for  Crete  where  he  served  Philip  V's  interests  "  This 
move  appears  surprising,  especially  as  Nabis  continued  his 
attacks  to  the  extent  that  the  inhabitants  of  Megalopolis  were 
forced  to  grow  their  crops  within  its  walls  67  Such  was  the 
resentment  felt  by  the  Megalopolitans  at  Philopoemen's 
departure  for  Crete,  according  to  Plutarch,  that  moves  were 
made  to  exile  him.  They  were  only  prevented  from  doing  so  by 
the  intervention  of  the  Achaean  league's  strategos,  Aristaenus  of 
Megalopolis,  even  though  Plutarch  states  that  he  was  a  political 
opponent  of  Philopoemen  `' 
This  episode  raises  two  questions.  Firstly,  why  did 
Philopoemen  leave  the  Peloponnese  for  Crete  at  a  time  when 
Megalopolis  was  under  attack  from  Nabis?  Secondly,  why  did 
Aristaenus  support  one  of  his  political  opponents?  The  answer 
lies  in  the  situation  in  Crete  at  this  time.  Nabis,  through  the 
development  of  a  navy,  had  made  Crete  an  important  area  of 
operations,  especially  for  mercenaries,  and  there  is  evidence  of 
an  extensive  Spartan  presence  there  during  the  Hellenistic 
period  69  There  were  also  extensive  Macedonian  interests  on  the 
island,  and  it  is  not  inconceivable  that  Philopoemen  was  sent 
66P1ut.  Philop.  13.1. 
67  P1ut.  Philop.  13.1. 
68  P1ut.  Philop.  13.4 
69  Errington  (1969)  p.  34  draws  attention  to  the  large  army  of  mercenaries  recruited  in 
Crete  by  Nabis. 
200 there  as  Philip's  representative.  "  Errington  has  suggested  that  at 
this  time  Philopoemen  and  Aristaenus  were  close  political  allies 
and  the  breakdown  in  the  relationship  between  the  two  came 
later;  this  would  seem  to  be  contradicted  by  Plutarch's  assertion 
that  they  were  not.  "  It  appears  that  Aristaenus  intervened  to 
save  Philopoemen  from  being  exiled  because  his  presence  in 
Crete  was  as  part  of  the  close  co-operation  between  the 
Macedonians  and  Arcadian  poleis  like  Megalopolis  within  the 
Achaean  league.  The  war  between  the  Achaean  league  and 
Sparta  continued  after  the  Roman  invasion  and  given  its 
seriousness  was  of  primary  importance  to  theAchaean  league 
. 
72 
Should  the  outbreak  of  war  between  Sparta  and  the 
Achaean  league  be  seen  in  a  wider  context?  Given  their  interest 
in  Greece  and  the  end  of  the  Second  Punic  War,  the  Romans  may 
have  been  aware  of  it,  along  with  the  possibilities  it  raised,  since 
Nabis  was  a  Roman  adscriptus  at  Phoenice.  For  the  Aetolian 
league,  the  resurgence  of  Sparta  and  the  attempt  by  Nabis  to 
gain  control  of  Messene  in  202BC  created  an  opportunity  for 
them  to  intervene  in  the  Peloponnese  and  undermine  the 
70  See  Errington  (1969)  pp.  34-48,  for  an  account  of  rival  Spartan  and  Macedonian  interests 
in  Crete  at  this  time.  Nabis  appears,  according  to  Errington,  to  have  had  a  close 
relationship  with  Cnossos,  while  the  Achaean  league  and  Macedonia  had  a  close 
relationship  with  Gortyn. 
"  Errington  (1969)  p  74,  suggests  that  Aristaenus'  election  as  strategos  in  199BC  was  a 
victory  for  Philopoemen's  party  and  policy. 
'  Larsen  (1968)  p.  381. 
201 Macedonian  position  there.  It  is  in  this  context  that  the  Aetolian 
embassy  asking  for  Roman  intervention  in  Greek  affairs  should 
be  seen.  The  problem  lies  with  the  dating,  since  Livy  does  not 
give  an  exact  date  and  Appian  dates  it  to  after  the  appeal  by 
Rhodes  and  Pergamum  to  Rome.  73 
Livy  informs  us  that  the  Aetolian  league  approached  the 
senate  and  requested  a  renewal  of  the  alliance  between  the  two, 
along  with  Roman  aid  to  combat  the  growth  of  Philip  V's  power. 
But  the  Romans  refused,  stating  that  they  would  not  assist 
because  of  the  Aetolian  league's  earlier  separate  peace  with 
Macedonia  ".  Regardless  of  the  dating  of  the  supposed  appeal, 
one  is  left  with  the  problem  of  why  the  Aetolians  would  have 
appealed  to  Rome,  and  why  the  senate  chose  not  to  exploit  this 
pretext  for  intervention  in  Greece.  ' 
The  Romans  may  have  refused  the  Aetolian  request  for 
assistance  because  they  felt  betrayed  by  the  decision  to  seek-  a 
separate  peace  with  Macedonia.  However,  at  the  time  it  had 
concluded  peace  with  Macedonia,  the  Aetolian  league  had  in  fact 
"  For  Livy's  account  of  the  embassy  see  Livy.  31.29.1ff,  and  the  appeal  31.29.4.  For 
Appian's  reference  and  dating  see  App.  Mac.  4.  Derow  (1979)  p.  7,  suggests  that  the  most 
likely  date  for  the  appeal  was  the  one  suggested  by  Appian,  that  is  late  201BC,  after  the 
Rhodian  appeal  to  Rome.  Earlier  Holleaux  (1921)  pp.  293-7,  rejected  the  appeal 
mentioned  by  Appian,  arguing  that  probably  after  the  battle  of  Zama,  the  Aetolians 
appealed  to  Rome  for  help  against  Philip  but  were  rebuffed;  evidence  in  Holleaux's  eyes 
that  the  Romans  did  not  wish  to  intervene  in  Greece.  Harris  (1979)  p.  213  is  sceptical 
about  the  veracity  of  Appian's  reference. 
'Briscoe  (1973)  p.  130. 
202 little  alternative,  since  Sparta  had  been  defeated,  leaving  its 
Peloponnesian  strategy  in  ruins,  and  there  was  no  sight  at  the 
time  of  the  Romans  offering  significant  assistance.  So  if  the 
Aetolian  league  did  in  fact  make  an  appeal  to  Rome,  we  are  left 
with  the  problem  why  it  was  rejected.  There  is  the  possibility  of 
hurt  Roman  pride  or  indifference,  but  if  Philip  V  was  planning  a 
campaign  in  Illyria,  it  was  in  Rome's  own  interest  to  assist  the 
Aetolians,  regardless  of  what  had  happened  at  the  end  of  the 
First  Macedonian  War.  75  If  the  Aetolian  league's  appeal  to  Rome 
ties  in  with  the  war  between  the  Achaean  league  and  Sparta,  and 
Nabis'  attempt  to  seize  Messene,  it  may  be  the  case  that  the 
Aetolians  were  again  trying  to  involve  Rome  in  their  efforts  to 
undermine  Macedonian  interests  in  the  Peloponnese.  In  light  of 
Aetolian  interests  in  this  region,  especially  the  need  to  secure 
Elis'  position,  the  resurgence  of  Sparta  under  Nabis'  leadership 
created  the  conditions  for  an  Aetolian  intervention  in  the 
Peloponnese,  hence  the  appeal  to  Rome. 
This  might  be  the  precise  reason  why  the  senate  rejected  the 
appeal.  With  the  war  with  Hannibal  virtually  over,  Rome  was 
looking  towards  expanding  eastwards,  and  probably  did  not 
wish  to  become  openly  involved  with  Aetolian  league.  76  Rome 
Badian  (1958)  p.  61-6  and  Errington  (1972)  p.  131-2  suggest  that  Illyria  was  the 
Roman's  principal  concern  at  this  time. 
76  Derow  (1979)  p.  8  argues  that  the  Romans  did  not  wish  to  return  to  Greece  as  the  allies 
of  the  Aetolians,  because  of  the  earlier  predictions  that  they  would  return  on  the  pretext 
of  assisting  the  Aetolians. 
203 was  an  aggressive  state  and  the  Aetolian  league  was  probably 
aware  of  the  threat  it  posed.  But  there  were  also  advantages  to  be 
gained  by  Greek  states  who  co-operated  with  Rome.  The 
Aetolian  league  had,  during  the  First  Macedonian  War, 
attempted  to  regain  territory  it  had  lost  to  the  Macedonians  by 
allying  with  Rome,  and  undoubtedly  wished  to  renew  their 
alliance  to  achieve  the  same  goal.  The  Roman  refusal  should  not 
be  seen  as  a  slight  to  the  Aetolian  league,  but  rather  in  terms  of 
the  Romans  trying  to  gain  maximum  flexibility  in  their  future 
operations.  If  they  had  agreed  to  renew  the  alliance  with  the 
Aetolian  league  at  this  point,  the  Romans  would  have  done  so  on 
formal  terms,  with  a  treaty  similar  to  the  one  in  212BC  concluded 
between  the  two.  In  212BC  the  Romans  needed  the  Aetolian 
league.  At  the  end  of  the  Second  Punic  War  they  were  free  to 
exploit  the  situation  in  Greece  to  their  own  advantage.  "  By 
refusing  to  enter  into  an  alliance  with  Aetolia  before  the 
outbreak  of  the  Second  Macedonian  War,  the  Romans  were 
leaving  their  options  open,  making  it  clear  that  the  alliance  they 
had  concluded  with  the  Aetolian  league  in  212BC  was  at  an  end. 
"  Derow  (1979)  p.  8  points  to  the  calculated  and  consistent  nature  of  Roman  dealings 
with  the  Aetolian  league. 
204 The  Aetolian  and  Achaean  league's  reaction  to  Roman 
intervention 
Having  rejected  the  Aetolian  league's  approach,  Rome 
entered  the  Second  Macedonian  War  in  response  to  embassies 
from  Athens  and  Rhodes  requesting  its  assistance  against  Philip 
V.  By  the  end  of  the  war,  both  the  Achaean  and  the  Aetolian 
leagues  were  Roman  allies,  with  the  Aetolians  playing  a 
significant  part  in  the  Roman  campaign.  Rome  was  in  alliance 
with  two  powers  that  had  spent  much  of  the  previous  twenty 
years  in  almost  continual  conflict  with  each  other  over  their  rival 
interests  in  the  Peloponnese.  With  Polybius,  indirectly  through 
Livy  at  times,  serving  as  our  principal  source,  we  naturally  find 
an  account  of  these  events  that  is  favourable  to  the  cause  of  the 
Achaean  league,  and  to  Megalopolitans  in  particular. 
My  contention  in  this  section  will  be  that  the  Romans  sought 
the  support  of  a  compliant  elite  who  needed  their  support  in 
order  to  secure  their  interests  in  the  Peloponnese.  Thus, 
Flamininus  exploited  the  need  by  Megalopolitans  to  remove  the 
threat  from  Nabis  and  retain  their  dominant  position  within  the 
Achaean  league.  Polybius  presents  the  relationship  of  the 
Achaean  league  and  Rome  as  one  between  equals  in  the  period 
immediately  after  the  alliance  between  the  two.  I  shall  contend 
that  the  Megalopolitan  leadership  of  the  Achaean  league  sought 
to  use  Rome's  intervention  to  secure  its  own  interests  in  the 
Peloponnese. 
205 If  one  examines  Roman  actions  during  the  war,  the  Romans 
firstly  approached  the  spring  assembly  of  the  Aetolian  league  in 
199BC,  along  with  an  embassy  from  Athens,  to  persuade  the 
delegates  to  ally  with  Rome.  '$  We  are  informed  that  the  majority 
of  the  assembly  favoured  allying  with  Rome,  but  that  the 
Aetolian  strategos  Damocritus  had  the  decision  postponed  to  an 
extraordinary  meeting,  where  the  vote  was  in  favour.  Why  did 
Damocritus  decide  to  delay  the  meeting  until  later  in  the  year? 
Gruen  suggests  that  the  delegates  were  waiting  to  see  which  side 
would  win  and  that  the  Aetolians  could  equally  have  allied  with 
the  Macedonians  since  their  only  concern  was  to  regain  the 
territories  they  had  recently  lost.  79  This  is  taking  a  naive  view  of 
Aetolian  elite's  attitude  towards  Macedonia.  In  the  light  of  the 
fact  that  both  states  had  been  in  a  state  of  almost  perpetual 
conflict  from  the  time  of  Alexander  the  Great,  Aetolian  co- 
operation  with  Macedonia  was  unlikely.  From  the  speech 
recorded  in  Livy  it  would  appear  that  the  Aetolian  league  was 
presented  with  the  choice  of  either  allying  with  Rome  or  facing 
destruction.  As  Derow  points  out,  when  the  Romans  approached 
the  assembly,  they  made  it  clear  that  the  Aetolian  league  should 
regard  itself  as  lucky  to  have  this  opportunity.  The  Roman 
attitude,  as  he  points  out,  was  that  despite  their  previous 
'h  Livy.  31.29-32. 
"  Gruen  (1984)  p.  444. 
206 alliance,  by  this  stage  the  Aetolians  were  regarded  simply  just  as 
one  other  Greek  state.  0 
However,  this  speech,  like  any  other,  should  not  necessarily 
be  taken  as  a  completely  accurate  reflection  of  what  was  said. 
Although  not  specified,  it  is  evident  that  the  Aetolian  league 
entered  into  an  alliance  with  the  Romans  under  the  impression 
that  it  would  stand  to  gain  in  the  post-war  settlement.  Judging 
from  their  reaction  these  promises  were  not  fulfilled.  As  Derow 
acknowledges: 
The  impression  one  gets  (at  the  outbreak  of  the  Aetolian/Syrian 
War)  is  that  they  (the  Aetolians)  thought  they  knew  (the  terms  of 
the  alliance)  and  were  astonished  and  angry  when  Flamininus 
informed  them  that  in  fact  they  did  not.  How  this  situation  could 
have  come  about  cannot,  be  firmly  established,  but  it  is  difficult  to 
avoid  the  conclusion  that  the  Aetolians,  when  they  joined  the 
Romans  in  199BC,  were  either  told  or  allowed  to  believe 
something  that  wasn't  true.  Or  again,  they  might  have  been  told 
something  that  was  true  in  199BC,  but  that  ceased  to  be  true  on 
the  morrow  of  Cynoscephalae.  81 
All  we  know  for  certain  is  that  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
Aetolian/Syrian  War  the  Aetolian  league  felt  that  Flamininus' 
settlement  had  betrayed  its  interests.  If  one  looks  at  the  Aetolian 
80  Derow  (1979)  p.  8.  As  he  points  out,  the  Romans  make  it  clear  who  exactly  is  the  master 
in  the  situation. 
61  Derow  (1979)  p.  12. 
207 league's  participation  during  the  war,  a  force  of  six  thousand 
men  was  sent  to  join  Flamininus  in  198BC,  and  Roman  and 
Aetolian  forces  co-operated  closely.  The  evidence  suggests  as 
Larsen  pointed  out,  that  Roman  and  Aetolian  officers  trusted 
each  other,  with  the  Aetolian  contingent  saving  the  Romans  on 
at  least  one  occasion  82  The  Aetolian  league  played  an  important 
role  in  assisting  the  Romans  during  their  the  campaigns  against 
Philip  V.  Although  they  were  traditional  rivals  of  Macedonia,  the 
conclusion  could  be  drawn  that  the  Aetolians  did  so  in  the 
expectation  that  they  would  be  rewarded  for  their  efforts.  Again, 
one  must  return  to  the  situation  in  the  Peloponnese,  in 
particular,  the  Macedonian  alliance  with  the  Achaean  league.  It 
is  not  inconceivable  that  the  Aetolian  leadership  might  have 
been  led  to  believe  that  Roman  victory  over  Macedonia  would 
secure  the  position  of  its  Peloponnesian  allies  like  Elis. 
The  Achaean  league  entered  the  Second  Macedonian  War 
allied  with  Macedonia  and  still  involved  in  a  war  with  Nabis  ' 
As  the  war  with  Rome  began  to  go  badly  for  Philip  V,  he  made 
an  overture  to  the  Achaean  league  aimed  at  trying  to  retain  its 
support.  Initially  Philip  offered  that  if  the  Achaean  league 
provided  troops  to  replace  Macedonian  forces  in  garrisons  at 
Corinth,  Chalcis  and  Oreus,  he  would  fight  their  war  against 
Nabis.  This  request  was  refused  but  Philip  returned  Hera, 
82  Polyb.  18.21.5  and  Livy  33.7.7.  Larsen  (1968)  pp.  384-  385. 
'3  Larsen  (1968)  p.  381. 
208 Alipheria,  Triphylia  and  Orchemenos  to  Achaean  jurisdiction. 
The  Achaean  league  in  return  remained  neutral  and  continued  to 
pursue  its  war  against  Nabis  85  Errington  suggests  that  the 
Achaean  strategos  Cycliades  was  exiled  because  he  was  a  pro- 
Macedonian  and  that  the  Achaean  league  was  moving  away 
from  its  alliance  with  Macedonia  under  Philopoemen's 
leadership,  though  the  possibility  that  his  exile  was  related  to  the 
war  with  Sparta  going  badly  appears  just  as  probable  86  The 
relationship  between  the  Achaean  league  and  Macedonia  formed 
at  the  end  of  the  Cleomenic  War  was  based  on  the  need  of 
Arcadian  poleis  like  Megalopolis  for  an  ally  powerful  enough  to 
ensure  their  position  against  their  rivals  in  the  Peloponnese  such 
as  Sparta,  the  Aetolian  league  and  Elis.  After  Rome  entered  the 
Greek  world,  they  may  have  begun  to  fear  the  post-war 
repercussions  of  remaining  allied  with  Macedonia,  especially  as 
Nabis  was  a  Roman  adscriptus;  a  fear  that  Flamininus  exploited 
on  Rome's  behalf. 
Flamininus  and  the  Achaean  alliance  with  Rome. 
198BC  saw  T.  Quinctius  Flamininus  appointed  as 
commander  of  the  Roman  forces  in  Greece.  He  was  to  play  a 
decisive  role  in  defining  Roman  policy  in  Greece  both  during 
''  See  Briscoe  (1973)  pp.  174-5  who  accepts  that  these  areas  were  returned  to  the  Achaean 
league  at  this  time. 
Eckstein  (1976)  p.  139. 
Polyb.  18.1.2.  Errington  (1969)  p.  87. 
209 and  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of  the  Second  Macedonian  War. 
Little  is  known  about  him  before  he  became  Consul.  He  appears 
to  have  been  born  around  229/228BC  and  only  held  relatively 
minor  appointments  before  he  was  elected  Consul  87  Flamininus 
may  have  spent  a  long  period  of  time  in  Tarentum,  gaining 
experience  of  dealing  with  Greeks  and  their  customs.  "  Given 
Flamininus'  role  in  the  foundation  of  Roman  control  in  Greece, 
his  actions  and  their  intentions  have  caused  intense  debate. 
Briscoe  described  Flamininus  as  a  man  who  used  underhand 
methods,  who  fundamentally  could  not  be  trusted  89  However, 
instead  of  seeing  Flamininus'  actions  as  his  alone,  it  might  be 
more  accurate  to  see  them  as  a  reflection  of  a  policy  decided  on 
by  the  senate,  which  Flamininus  had  to  implement.  The  Romans 
entered  the  Second  Macedonian  War  with  the  intention,  as 
Polybius  states,  of  expanding  their  power  over  Greece.  Any 
commander  sent  by  Rome  must  have  been  aware  that  this  was 
his  mission  and  would  have  used  any  opportunity  presented  to 
achieve  it. 
According  to  Livy,  when  in  198BC  Flamininus'  forces  were 
besieging  Elata,  a  delegation  arrived  informing  him  that 
a'  Badian  (1971)  p.  107. 
'  Badian  (1971)  p.  108,  Livy.  29.13.6.  For  the  debate  on  whether  Rome  had  experts  or  not, 
the  most  important  contribution  in  recent  years  is  Gruen  who  argues  that  there  were  no 
experts  on  eastern  affairs  within  the  Roman  elite,  though  in  his  discussion  of 
Flamininus,  Gruen  admits  that  he  was  an  exception.  See  Gruen  (1984)  pp.  214-17. 
B9  Briscoe  (1972)  p.  22. 
210 Aristaenus,  the  strategos  of  the  Achaean  league,  was  willing  to 
ally  with  Rome  9°  Flamininus  responded  by  sending  a  mission 
composed  of  his  brother  L.  Quinctius  along  with  representatives 
from  Attalus  and  Rhodes  to  the  Achaean  assembly  at  Sicyon. 
The  role  of  Aristaenus  and  his  exact  identity  is  a  matter  of 
some  debate,  since  there  were  two  Achaean  politicians  with  this 
name.  One,  from  Dyme,  served  as  hipparch  of  the  Achaean  league 
in  207BC.  The  other  earlier  saved  Philopoemen  from  being 
exiled,  and  is  identified  by  Plutarch  as  a  Megalopolitan  91  Which 
Aristaenus  Livy  refers  to  is  unclear,  but  the  evidence  and 
circumstances  would  seem  to  point  towards  an  identification  of 
the  Aristaenus  in  198BC  with  Aristaenus  of  Megalopolis  92 
Arcadian  communities,  within  the  Achaean  league,  in 
particular  Megalopolis,  had  played  an  important  role  in  creating 
the  alliance  between  the  Achaean  league  and  Macedonia  at  the 
end  of  the  Cleomenic  War.  Aristaenus'  willingness  to  abandon 
Macedonia  in  favour  of  an  alliance  with  Rome  was  a 
controversial  decision,  and  the  speech  recording  the  arguments 
he  made  in  favour  of  allying  with  Rome  appears  to  reflect 
'  Livy.  32.18.3-5. 
91  Eckstein  in  recent  years  has  identified  the  politician  in  198BC  not  as  a  Megalopolitan 
but  as  a  citizen  of  Dyme.  See  Eckstein  (1995)  p.  200.  However,  he  gives  no  evidence  for 
this  claim,  and  appears  ignorant  about  Deininger's  article  associating  the  Aristaenus  in 
question  with  Megalopolis. 
211 contemporary  concerns  about  the  situation  in  the  Peloponnese 
held  by  Megalopolitans  which  Flamininus  subsequently 
exploited  93  As  the  debate  of  the  Achaean  assembly  shows,  many 
of  the  delegates  felt  that  their  interests  would  not  be  served  by 
allying  with  Rome,  and  many  delegations,  including 
Megalopolitans,  wished  to  retain  the  Achaean  league's  alliance 
with  Macedonia.  Aristaenus'  speech,  in  particular  its  emphasis 
on  the  threat  from  Sparta  and  the  need  to  secure  the  Achaean 
position  against  Nabis,  gives  us  some  indication  of  why  he 
favoured  abandoning  the  alliance  with  Macedonia  in  favour  of 
one  with  Rome  94 
Aristaenus,  according  to  Livy,  argued  for  an  abandonment 
of  the  alliance  with  Macedonia,  not  out  of  fear  of  Rome  or 
necessity,  but  because  Macedonia  had  failed  to  assist  the 
Achaean  league  in  its  war  against  Nabis.  The  delegates, 
according  to  Aristaenus,  would  be  correct  in  abandoning 
Macedonia,  since  it  had  abandoned  the  Achaean  league  to 
Sparta  95  As  he  states  at  one  point  in  the  speech: 
92  See  Deininger  (1966)  pp.  376-380  for  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  evidence.  He  argues 
that  the  Aristaenus  mentioned  in  198BC  was  from  Megalopolis.  Supported  by  0'  Neil 
(1984-86)  p.  36. 
93Eckstein  (1995)  p.  200. 
94  Briscoe  (1973)  p.  203  argues  that  this  speech  contains  considerable  embellishments  over 
the  Polybian  original. 
"  For  the  speech  see  Livy  32.21ff. 
212 Then  Philip  tried  to  draw  our  fighting  men  away  into 
Euboea,  by  promising  that  he  would  carry  on  the  war 
against  Nabis.  But  when  he  saw  that  we  neither  voted  him 
that  support,  nor  were  willing  to  be  entangled  in  his  war 
with  Rome,  he  forgot  that  alliance  which  he  now  makes  so 
much  of,  and  left  us  to  be  pillaged  and  plundered  by  Nabis 
and  the  Spartans.  96 
This,  the  threat  posed  to  the  Achaean  league  by  Nabis,  and 
the  Macedonian  inability  to  assist,  permeates  Aristaenus'  speech. 
For  example  at  one  point  Aristaenus  asks: 
Why  then  does  Philip  not  defend  its,  his  old  allies,  from  Nabis 
and  the  Romans?  97 
This  theme  of  Macedonian  betrayal  of  '  Achaean  interests, 
may  have  been  an  attempt  by  Polybius  to  defend  Aristaenus 
against  accusations  that  he  had  betrayed  Greek  interests.  Philip 
V's  dubious  character,  his  alleged  murder  of  both  Arati,  his 
adultery  with  Aratus  the  younger's  wife  and  his  sexual  abuse  of 
virgins  is  also  mentioned  by  Aristaenus  as  a  justification  for 
abandoning  Macedonia  in  favour  of  Rome  98  These  were  the  sort 
of  crimes  committed  by  tyrants  before  the  working  of  anacyclosis 
transformed  this  type  of  government  into  aristocracy.  " 
Aristaenus'  speech  also  reflects  the  fear  that  if  the  Achaean 
%  Livy.  32.21.10-11. 
97Livy.  32.21.13. 
98  Livy.  32.21.24. 
Polyb.  6.7.7. 
213 league  did  not  change  sides  it  would  be  left  isolated  and 
vulnerable,  especially  in  view  of  the  Roman  alliances  with  the 
Aetolian  league  and  Nabis.  In  the  new  circumstances  brought 
about  by  the  advent  of  Rome,  Aristaenus  asks  the  delegates  to 
face  the  reality  of  the  situation  the  Achaean  league  found  itself 
in,  since  as  he  states: 
Previously  the  Romans  supported  the  Aetolians  simply  with 
their  fleet.  At  that  time  the  coastal  cities  of  Philip'  allies 
were  in  a  state  of  terror;  but  the  inland  regions  were  so  safe 
from  Roman  forces,  that  Philip  plundered  the  Aetolians 
although  they  begged  in  vain  for  Roman  aid.  But  now  the 
Punic  War  which  lasted  for  sixteen  years  in  Italy  is  over  for 
the  Romans,  and  they  have  not  merely  sent  assistance  to  the 
Aetolians  who  were  fighting  the  war;  they  themselves,  as 
leaders  in  the  war,  have  attacked  Macedonia  by  land  and  sea 
at  once.  1°° 
As  Aristaenus  states,  by  remaining  allied  with  Macedonia, 
the  Achaean  league  would  be  placed  in  an  impossible  position, 
especially  since  its  war  with  Sparta  was  still  in  progress: 
The  Peloponnese  is  a  peninsula,  attached  to  the  mainland  by 
the  narrow  strip  of  the  Isthmus,  open  and  vulnerable  above 
everything  else  to  attack  from  the  sea.  What  if  a  hundred 
decked  ships,  fifty  lemboi  and  thirty  Issaean.  cutters  begin  to 
plunder  the  coast  and  attack  our  towns  which  lie  close  to 
10°  Livy.  32.21.18-20. 
214 coast.  Yes,  we  could  retreat  to  the  inland  cities-  but  they  are 
alight  with  internal  war,  a  war  that  rages  in  our  heartland! 
When  Nabis  and  his  Spartans  press  on  us  by  land  and  the 
Romans  by  sea,  from  where  am  I  to  request  from  Philip 
Macedonian  reinforcements?  Or  shall  we  by  ourselves  with 
our  own  forces  defend  against  the  Romans  the  towns  they 
will  attack?  "' 
According  to  Livy  the  reaction  of  the  delegates  to  this 
speech  was  one  of  uproar,  and  they  were  divided  according  to 
"peoples",  not  individually  102  Although  the  assembly  voted 
narrowly  to  accept  the  measure,  the  delegates  from  Dyme,  Argos 
and  Megalopolis  walked  out  to  express  their  disapproval  at  the 
abandonment  of  the  alliance  with  Macedonia.  Again  one  can  see 
the  role  that  kinship  links  played  in  Greek  politics,  the  Argives 
claiming  that  the  Macedonian  royal  family  was  descended  from 
them.  "'  Gruen  has  remarked  on  the  bitterness  that  the  decision 
of  the  Achaean  league  caused;  even  twenty-five  years  afterwards 
'o'  Livy.  32.21.26-28. 
'o.  Livy.  32.22.1-2. 
703  See  Briscoe  (1973)  p.  211  for  the  kinship  link.  There  were  personal  ties  between 
Megalopolis  and  Macedonia,  since  Antigonus  Doson  had  helped  the  Megalopolitan 
rebuild  their  city  after  its  destruction  in  223BC  by  the  Spartans.  The  reasons  for  the 
citizens  of  Dyme  walking  out  of  the  Achaean  assembly  appeared  to  be  linked  with  the 
sacking  of  that  polis  during  the  First  Macedonian  War  by  the  Roman  fleet.  Its  inhabitants 
were  saved  from  slavery  by  the  intervention  of  Philip  V.  See  Paus.  7.17.5. 
215 Polybius  admits  there  was  some  unease  about  abandoning 
Macedonia  104 
However,  the  elite  in  Arcadian  communities  within  the 
Achaean  league  such  as  Megalopolis  had  their  own  political 
objectives  in  the  Peloponnese.  By  deciding  to  abandon  Philip  V 
and  turn  to  Rome,  Megalopolitans  like  Aristaenus  appear  to 
have  placed  their  own  interests  first  and  allied  with  Rome  while 
they  had  the  opportunity  to  do  so.  Without  any  real  effort, 
Flamininus  had  secured  the  Peloponnese  and  neutralised  Philip 
V's  potential  allies  in  this  region.  As  Eckstein  noted,  the 
campaign  of  198BC  was  a  turning  point  in  the  relations  between 
Greece  and  Rome  since  it  established  the  Roman  presence  in 
northern  and  central  Greece,  and  the  Achaean  league's  decision 
to  ally  with  Rome  played  an  important  role  in  cementing  this.  l°5 
At  the  end  of  198BC  both  the  Achaean  and  Aetolian  leagues 
were  supporting  Rome.  The  two  had  different  interests  in  the 
Peloponnese,  which  created  problems  regarding  the  post-war 
settlement.  One  could  ask  why  Flamininus  would  have  allowed 
himself  to  be  placed  in  this  position.  The  Roman  approach  to  the 
Aetolian  league  was  understandable;  the  two  had  previously 
fought  together  against  Macedonia.  It  is  less  clear  why 
'°°  Polyb.  18.6.7.  Gruen  (1984)  p.  175.  Eckstein  (1995)  pp.  200-1  dwells  on  the  moral 
reasons  behind  the  decision. 
"Eckstein  (1976)  p.  119.  Eckstein  (1995)  p.  200  notes  the  parallels  between  this  decision 
and  the  earlier  one  by  the  Achaean  league  to  ally  with  Macedonia  and  notes  Polybius' 
unwillingness  to  delve  deeply  into  the  reasons  behind  both  these  decisions. 
216 Flamininus  decided  to  ally  with  the  Achaean  league,  especially 
since  their  sole  contribution  to  Rome's  war  effort  was  to  assist  in 
the  siege  of  the  Acrocorinth.  106  Nor  does  it  appear  that  the 
Achaean  league,  especially  Arcadian  communities  within  it  like 
Megalopolis,  pre-occupied  as  they  were  with  the  war  with 
Nabis,  presented  a  threat  to  Rome's  interests,  and  that 
Flamininus  was  therefore  forced  to  come  to  an  accommodation. 
The  Achaean  league  had  made  no  effort  to  assist  Macedonia  and 
given  its  war  with  Nabis  was  unlikely  to  do  so.  107  It  also  seems 
unlikely  that  Aristaenus  would  have  approached  Flamininus 
without  some  prior  indication  that  his  offer  of  alliance  would  be 
accepted. 
Why  then  did  Flamininus  approach  Aristaenus?  There  is  the 
possibility  that  he  was  concerned  that  leaving  the  Achaean 
league  allied  with  Macedonia  would  present  a  threat  to  the 
security  of  his  army  as  Eckstein  suggests.  108  However,  Flamininus 
may  have  been  attempting  to  exploit  the  disputes  between  the 
Achaean  and  Aetolian  leagues  in  the  Peloponnese  for  Rome's 
benefit.  If  Rome's  intention  was,  as  Polybius  states,  to  bring  the 
entire  world  under  its  control,  the  suggestion  that  Rome  would 
allow  states  like  the  Aetolian  and  Achaean  leagues  to  continue 
106  Aymard  (1938)  p.  53.  If  the  Achaean  league  was  given  control  of  the  fortress  at  this 
point  is  not  made  clear 
107  Badian  (1970)  p.  47  argues  that  there  was  no  reason  for  Flamininus  to  conduct  a 
campaign  in  the  Peloponnese  at  this  time. 
10S  Eckstein  (1990)  p.  61. 
217 with  an  independent  foreign  policy  is  unrealistic.  Despite  this, 
there  was  still  much  that  a  state  could  gain  by  allying  with 
Rome.  The  approach  to  the  Aetolian  league  in  212BC  indicates 
Roman  awareness  of  the  hostility  between  the  Aetolian  league 
and  Macedonia,  and  the  Aetolian  desire  to  recover  the  position 
that  they  had  lost  to  the  Macedonians  in  the  Pelop9nnese  and 
Acarnania.  It  is  not  inconceivable  that  the  Romans  were  also 
aware  of  the  rivalries  between  various  states  in  the  Peloponnese. 
Possibly  the  Roman  approach  to,  and  its  subsequent  attitude 
towards  the  Achaean  league  was  made  in  the  knowledge  that  the 
Achaean  league  was  essentially  'a  political  union  in  which 
Arcadians,  in  particular  Megalopolitans,  played  an  important 
role.  In  this  case,  it  appears  possible  that  the  Roman  decision  to 
ally  with  the  Achaean  league  was  based  on  their  long-term 
objectives,  and  that  Flamininus  'was  exploiting  the  internal 
differences  within  the  Greek  world  in  a  calculated  manner.  Once 
Rome  had  entered  the  Greek  world  and  Philip  V  had  been 
defeated,  the  Roman  alliance  with  the  Aetolian  league  had 
served  its  usefulness.  Thus,  it  was  in  Rome's  interest  to  exploit 
Greek  differences  over  the  Peloponnese  for  its  own  benefit. 
Nabis  and  the  Roman/Achaean  treaty. 
If  the  Romans  were  exploiting  internal  divisions  within  the 
Greek  world,  who  exactly  was  responsible  for  their  policy,  and 
how  should  actions  undertaken  by  Flamininus  in  the 
218 Peloponnese  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Second  Macedonian  War  be 
viewed?  This  section  will  consider  whether  or  not  Flamininus' 
settlement  was  devised  to  take  advantage  of  the  differing 
interests  between  the  Achaean  and  Aetolian  league  in  the 
Peloponnese.  The  Aetolian  league's  subsequent  decision  to  invite 
Antiochus  to  Greece  can  only  be  understood  in  the  context  of 
how  Flamininus'  settlement  affected  its  interests  in  the 
Peloponnese. 
I  will  contend  that  Flamininus  concluded  a  treaty  of  alliance 
with,  and  then  restored  Argos  to  the  Achaean  league,  as  part  of 
his  settlement  of  Peloponnesian  affairs,  to  demonstrate  that  in 
the  future  Rome  would  recognise  the  Achaean  league's  primacy 
in  the  Peloponnese.  The  Romans  were  aware  from  a  very  early 
stage  that  the  Peloponnese  was  an  important  pre-occupation  for 
the  Aetolian  league,  having  assisted  the  Aetolians  in  creating  an 
alliance  with  Elis  and  Sparta  at  the  beginning  of  the  First 
Macedonian  War.  This  explains  the  actions  undertaken  by 
Flamininus.  Instead  of  allowing  the  Aetolian  league  to  regain  the 
position  that  it  had  in  the  Peloponnese  prior  to  the  Cleomenic 
War,  Flamininus  appears  to  have  supported  the  Achaean 
league's  claims  to  be  the  dominant  political  force  in  the 
Peloponnese,  possibly  calculating  that  this  was  best  for  Roman 
interests.  Flamininus'  campaign  against  Nabis  was  not  an  ad  hoc 
decision  because  of  his  need  to  retain  forces  in  Greece  in  order  to 
prepare  for  the  forthcoming  struggle  with  Antiochus.  Rather  it 
219 was  a  calculated  ploy  designed  to  provoke  the  Aetolian  league 
into  war.  With  the  Roman  settlement  and  an  expansionary 
Achaean  league  threatening  their  allies  in  the  Peloponnese  like 
Elis,  Messene  and  Sparta,  the  Aetolian  league,  already 
disappointed  at  the  Roman  failure  to  remove  Philip  V  from  the 
Macedonian  throne,  was  left  politically  isolated,  and  thus 
appealed  to  Antiochus. 
After  Flamininus'  Isthmian  declaration,  the  most  pressing 
problem  was  the  position  of  Argos.  "  Argos  had  objected  to  the 
Achaean  league's  decision  to  ally  with  Rome  in  198BC,  allying 
with  Philip  V,  who  in  turn  gave  the  city  to  Nabis  to  administer.  "' 
This  strengthened  Nabis'  position  in  the  Peloponnese  and,  at  the 
end  of  the  war,  the  Achaean  league,  under  Aristaenus' 
leadership  started  to  lobby  Flamininus  to  restore  Argos  to  the 
Achaean  league.  Although  Flamininus  had,  at  a  conference  in 
Mycene  in  197BC,  confirmed  Nabis'  control  over  Argos,  at  this 
point  he  decided  to  restore  Argos  to  the  Achaean  league.  "' 
It  appears  unlikely  that  Flamininus  decided  to  undertake 
this  action  without  realising  that  Arcadian  communities  within 
Polyb.  18.46.5-15. 
10  For  an  account  of  the  war  see  Harris  (1979)  pp.  218-  219. 
"'  Livy.  32.40.1-5.  Harris  (1979)  p.  219,  argues  that  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Argos  had 
wanted  Macedonian  not  Spartan  control,  Flamininus  had  to  restore  Argos  to  the  control 
of  the  Achaean  league  if  he  wished  to  have  his  declaration  taken  seriously.  Errington 
(1969)  p.  89  suggested  that  Flamininus  might  have  wished  to  keep  his  forces  in  Greece  so 
220 the  Achaean  league  like  Megalopolis  genuinely  feared  Sparta. 
One  of  the  major  themes  in  Aristaenus'  speech  urging  the 
abandonment  of  the  alliance  with  Philip  V  had  been  the  fear  that 
the  Achaean  league  would  be  placed  in  a  dangerous  position  by 
Nabis'  alliance  with  Rome.  It  appears  that  the  war  with  Nabis 
formed  part  of  a  strategy  formulated  by  Flamininus  to  gain  the 
support  of  an  Achaean  league  that  would  be  a  compliant  Roman 
subject  state.  By  supporting  the  Achaean  league's  claims  for 
control  over  Argos,  Flamininus  was  publicly  showing  that  Rome. 
would  support  Achaean,  not  Aetolian  interests  in  the 
Peloponnese,  even  though  Nabis  was  a  Roman  adscriptus  at 
Phoenice.  Flamininus'  decision  to  restore  Argos  to  the  control  of 
the  Achaean  league  was  a  complete  reversal  of  previous  Roman 
policy.  Despite  Polybius'  representation  of  this  campaign  as  a 
liberation  of  Argos  from  Sparta  tyranny,  it  is  evident  that  even 
he  was  willing  to  acknowledge  that  Flamininus'  decision  was  a 
complete  reversal  of  previous  Roman  policy. 
The  campaign  itself  was  an  easy  victory  for  the  Romans. 
Flamininus  quickly  had  Nabis  besieged  in  Sparta,  and  the  two 
leaders  met  to  discuss  the  dispute.  The  debate  that  took  place  is 
surprisingly  seen  as  a  victory  for  Nabis,  in  that  he  was  seen  to 
overcome  the  arguments  of  Flamininus  concerning  the 
that  he  could  demonstrate  Roman  strength  to  Antiochus,  possibly  fearing  that  Nabis 
would  ally  with  Antiochus. 
221 legitimacy  of  the  Roman  campaign.  "'  Flamininus  argued  that  the 
revolt  that  resulted  in  Argos  leaving  the  Achaean  league  was  the 
work  of  a  few  men  and  that  Nabis  had  no  popular  support  for 
his  continued  occupation.  Nabis  on  the  other  hand  pointed  out 
that  he  had  taken  control  of  Argos  after  it  had  left  the  Achaean 
league  and  was  allied  to  Philip  V  of  Macedonia.  Nabis  also 
argued  that  Flamininus  had  earlier  recognised  his  control 
over  Argos  and  the  Roman  decision  to  back  the  Achaean  league 
in  its  claims  was  a  complete  reversal  in  policy.  After  defending 
his  actions  in  Argos,  Nabis  stated  in  response  to  Flamininus' 
accusation  he  was  a  tyrant  that: 
As  for  the  title  (of  tyrant),  I  can  only  reply  that,  whatever 
kind  of  a  man  I  am,  I  was  no  different  when  you  yourself, 
Titus  Quinctius,  made  the  alliance  with  me.  At  that  time,  as 
I  remember,  you  addressed  me  as  king;  now  I  observe  that  I 
am  called  a  tyrant.  If  I  had  myself  altered  the  title  of  my 
own  authority,  it  would  be  up  to  me  to  explain  my 
inconsistency;  but  since  it  is  you  who  are  changing  it,  you 
must  explain  your  own.  113 
There  is  the  question  of  whether  or  not  Argos  actually 
needed  to  be  liberated.  Eckstein  doubts  that  Nabis  genuinely 
enjoyed  popular  support  in  Argos,  arguing  that  actions  he 
"Z  Oliva  (1971)  p.  291,  Gruen  (1984)  p.  454.  The  speech  is  probably  Polybian  in  origin, 
though  Livy  probably  did  make  some  adjustments,  Briscoe  (1981)  p.  98. 
13  Livy.  32.38.5-9. 
222 undertook  there  such  as  plundering  the  property  of  its  leading 
classes,  cancelling  debts  and  redistributing  lands  would  have 
caused  resentment  at  his  rule  amongst  the  Argives.  114  Given  that 
the  evidence  in  question  comes  from  Polybius,  one  could 
question  whether  Nabis  was  actually  so  unpopular.  We  are 
informed  that  two  thousand  Argives  fought  for  Nabis,  and 
although  they  might  have  been  hostages,  the  fact  that  they 
received  a  triumphant  welcome  on  their  return  suggests  that 
many  Argives  preferred  Nabis'  rule  to  membership  of  an 
Achaean  league  in  which  they  had  little  power  15 
The  war  with  Nabis  was  an  integral  part  of  Rome's 
settlement  in  the  Peloponnese  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Second 
Macedonian  War  and  it  is  unlikely  that  Flamininus  undertook 
this  action  without  being  aware  of  its  consequences.  By  returning 
Argos  to  the  Achaean  league,  Flamininus  was  able  to  deepen  the 
Achaean  league's  dependence  on  Rome,  weakening  the  position 
of  the  Aetolian  league  and  its  allies  in  the  Peloponnese  like 
Sparta  and  Elis  in  the  process.  Flamininus'  eventual  settlement  in 
the  Peloponnese  appears  to  have  been  aimed  at  securing  the 
loyalty  of  the  Arcadian  communities  within  the  Achaean  league 
for  the  alliance  with  Rome.  Nabis  was  forced  to  destroy  the  fleet 
he  had  built,  relations  between  Crete  and  Sparta  were  ended  and 
some  Laconian  coastal  communities  were  placed  under  the 
14  Eckstein  (1987)  p.  221. 
"s  Contra  Eckstein  (1987)  p.  225. 
223 control  of  the  Achaean  league.  "'  However,  Nabis  was  left  in 
power  in  Sparta  and  his  reforms  were  left  untouched.  "'  In  reality 
Flamininus'  settlement  reduced  Nabis'  usefulness  as  an  ally  to 
the  Aetolian  league,  although  his  continuation  in  power  ensured 
that  the  Achaean  league,  especially  its  Megalopolitan  leadership, 
remained  dependent  on  Roman  support.  If  the  Aetolian  league 
had  allied  with  Rome  on  the  understanding,  or  hope,  that  their 
interest  in  the  Peloponnese  and  elsewhere  would  be  served  by 
the  Roman  settlement,  Flamininus'  actions  proved  them  wrong. 
The  Roman/Achaean  treaty. 
If  Flamininus  was  supporting  the  Achaean  league's  interests 
in  the  Peloponnese  by  restoring  Argos  to  its  control,  what  was 
the  basis  of  the  relationship  between  the  two  at  this  point;  in 
particular,  was  there  a  formal  treaty?  It  has  long  been  supposed 
that  the  Achaean  league  had  a  treaty  of  alliance  with  Rome,  or  as 
Badian  argued  a  so-called  foedus  aequum.  118  The  problem  lies  in 
what  the  treaty  said  and  when  it  was  concluded,  since  as  Gruen 
points  out,  a  common  problem  with  treaties  in  the  ancient  world 
is  that  they  rarely  come  to  light  except  as  vague  generalities  or 
isolated  stipulations  119  The  first  reference  to  a  desire  by  the 
Achaean  league  for  a  formal  alliance  with  Rome  comes  in  197BC, 
16  Livy.  34.35.3. 
117  Livy.  34.35.5 
1e  Badian  (1952)  pp.  76-80. 
"9  Gruen  (1984)  p.  14 
224 when  an  embassy  led  by  Damoxenus  of  Aegae  requested  one 
from  the  senate.  This  was  opposed  by  other  Greek  states  because 
of  the  Achaean  league's  outstanding  territorial  disputes  with 
Elis,  Messene  and  the  Aetolian  league,  and  the  matter  was 
referred  to  Flamininus  and  the  ten  commissioners.  "'  The  next 
definite  reference  to  a  treaty  between  the  two  comes  in  183BC, 
when  an  embassy  was  sent  to  Rome  to  renew  the  alliance 
between  Rome  and  the  Achaean  league.  "  '  It  appears  that  a 
formal  alliance  was  concluded  between  the  Achaean  league  and 
Rome  at  some  point  between  197  and  183BC,  but  when  exactly  is 
unknown. 
Nor  is  it  known  what  the  treaty  stipulated.  Lycortas  makes 
reference  in  184BC  to  the  relationship  between  the  Achaean 
league  and  Rome  as  one  between  equals;  we  should  not 
necessarily  assume  that  the  Romans  actually  made  the  Achaean 
league  their  theoretical  equals  in  a  foedus  aequum.  122  Lycortas' 
claim  may  be  related  to  Polybius'  theory  on  the  role  that 
anacyclosis  played  in  influencing  events  and  his  desire  to  show 
the  Achaean  league  and  Rome  acting  as  equals.  As  Gruen 
pointed  out,  the  only  treaty  with  a  Greek  state  that  could  be 
described  as  a  foedus  iniquum  is  the  Roman  treaty  with  the 
120  Polyb.  18.42.6-8. 
...  Polyb.  23.4.12-13.  For  the  reference  to  a  treaty  by  Lycortas,  Livy.  39.37.9. 
'2  This  Badian's  conclusion  (1952)  pp.  76-80. 
225 Aetolian  league  in  188BC,  and  that  in  their,  relations  with  Greeks 
the  Romans  generally  used  Hellenic  models  1 
The  importance  of  the  Achaean  league's  treaty  with  Rome 
lies  not  only  in  the  date  that  it  was  concluded,  but  also  the 
motives  that  the  Romans  had  for  allying  with  the  Achaean 
league.  The  first  definite  reference  regarding  the  existence  of  a 
treaty  between  the  Achaean  league  and  Rome  comes  during 
Messene's  attempt  to  cede  from  the  Achaean  league  in  183BC, 
when  the  Achaean  league  asked  for  Roman  assistance  under  the 
terms  of  the  treaty  between  the  two.  The  senate  initially  refused 
to  assist,  and  was  only  after  the  revolt  had  been  suppressed  by 
Lycortas  that  the  senate  told  the  Achaean  envoys  that  it  had 
observed  the  terms  of  the  treaty  between  the  two.  124  Ironically, 
although  it  is  assumed  that  the  treaty  between  the  Achaean 
league  and  Rome  is  the  key  to  understanding  the  development 
of  the  relationship  between  the  two,  the  only  definite  evidence 
for  its  existence  comes  when  the  senate  appears  to  have  regarded 
the  alliance  as  expendable. 
Is  there  any  evidence  for  the  earlier  existence  of  a  treaty? 
There  is  a  reference  in  Appian,  which  states  that  after 
Flamininus'  Isthmian  proclamation,  the  Greeks,  including  the 
Achaean  league,  sent  ambassadors  to  enrol  themselves  as  Roman 
"m  Gruen  (1984)  p.  25. 
124  See  Polyb.  23.17.3-4. 
226 allies.  As  Badian  pointed  out,  this  reference  is  meaningless.  '15 
Badian  argued  that  since  there  is  no  reference  to  a  treaty  between 
the  Achaean  league  and  Rome  either  in  the  preliminaries  of  the 
war  with  Nabis,  or  its  declaration  of  war  on  Antiochus,  the  treaty 
must  have  been  concluded  shortly  after  the  Achaean  declaration 
of  war  in  192BC.  He  contends  that  Rome  rewarded  the  Achaean 
league  with  a  treaty  that  made  the  two  theoretical  equals  126 
However,  in  188BC,  Philopoemen  entered  Sparta,  which  by 
this  stage  was  a  member  of  the  Achaean  league,  to  restore  a 
number  of  exiles.  127  To  resolve  a  number  of  objections  from  the 
Spartans,  an  embassy  from  the  Achaean  league  was  sent  to  the 
senate  led  by  Diophanes  and  Lycortas  of  Megalopolis,  and 
according  to  Livy: 
Lycortas,  on  the  instructions  of  Philopoemen,  claimed  that 
the  Achaeans  should  be  allowed  to  carry  out  what  they  had 
decreed  (in  Sparta)  under  the  terms  of  the  treaty  and  in 
accordance  with  their  own  laws,  and  that  the  Romans 
should  grant  them,  unimpaired,  the  liberty  which  they 
themselves  had  guaranteed.  l28 
The  question  arises  whether  the  treaty  that  Lycortas  was 
referring  to  was  the  one  between  the  Achaean  league  and  Rome, 
or  whether  it  was  a  treaty  that  governed  the  conditions  by  which 
125  App.  Maced.  9.4.  See  Badian  (1952)  p.  76. 
126  Badian  (1952)  p.  77. 
"'  Badian  (1952)  p.  79. 
'  Livy.  38.32.8. 
227 Sparta  agreed  to  become  a  member  of  the  Achaean  league? 
Badian  dismisses  this  reference  as  inconclusive,  suggesting  that 
the  treaty  that  Lycortas  is  referring  to  was  the  treaty  that  was 
concluded  between  Sparta  and  the  Achaean  league  in  192BC.  129 
Badian  argued  that  the  subsequent  incorporation  of  Elis  and 
Messene  into  the  Achaean  league  demonstrates  a  change  in 
Achaean  attitudes  towards  Rome,  with  the  Achaean  league 
following  a  more  independent  foreign  policy  because  it  had  been 
awarded  a  treaty  giving  it  theoretical  equality  with  Rome.  13o  Did 
the  Achaean  league  incorporate  Sparta  and  Messene,  Aetolian 
allies  from  the  time  of  the  Social  War,  and  Elis,  which  claimed 
kinship  with  the  Aetolians,  gaining  control  over  the  Peloponnese 
in  the  process,  simply  because  it  believed  itself  to  be  Rome's 
theoretical  equal?... 
Accepting  that  the  Romans  would  use  a  Hellenic  model  in 
their  treaty  with  the  Achaean  league,  obvious  analogies  are  to  be 
drawn  with  similar  treaties  the  Romans  concluded  with  the 
Maronites  and  Jewish  kingdoms  during  the  Hellenistic  period  132 
In  the  case  of  the  Maronite  treaty,  there  is  a  clause  that  bears  a 
'2'  See  Badian  (1952)  p  78,  where  he  dismisses  this  reference  as  inconclusive.  He  admits 
to  the  possibility  that  the  text  may  refer  to  a  treaty  with  Rome,  as  indeed  Holleaux  (1921) 
pp.  400-22  had  earlier  argued. 
"0  Badian  (1952)  p.  79-80. 
13'  Badian  (1952)  p.  79  suggests  that  the  Achaean  league  was  previously  promised  control 
over  Messene. 
228 striking  similarity  to  a  possible  clause  in  the  Achaean  treaty. 
During  the  war  with  Messene  in  183BC  the  Achaean  league 
requested  that  the  senate  should,  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of 
the  treaty  between  the  two,  ensure  that  no  Italian  State  would 
provide  arms  or  food  to  Messene  133  A  similar  clause  is  found  in 
the  Maronite  treaty,  stating  that  both  sides,  if  at  war,  should 
ensure  that  they  should  not  provide  corn,  arms  or  ships  to  each 
other's  enemies,  and  a  similar  clause  is  found  in  the  Jewish 
treaty  1'  This  suggests  that  the  Achaean  league's  treaty  with 
Rome  was  similar  to  the  one  enjoyed  by  the  Maronites  and  the 
Jews,  for  both  of  which  we  have  the  text.  If  this  is  the  case,  there 
are  a  number  of  other  clauses  that  might  be  found  in  common 
with  the  Achaean  treaty.  For  example,  in  the  Maronite  and 
Jewish  treaties,  neither  side  is  to  allow  its  territory  or  that  of  its 
allies  to  be  used  for  an  attack  on  the  other.  Clauses  could  only  be 
removed  or  included  with  the  agreement  of  both  sides,  and  both 
should  fight  for  each  other  if  they  go  to  war  1 
Although  according  to  the  text,  these  treaties  were  to  be 
observed  for  all  time,  there  appears  to  have  been  an  opt-out 
'32  For  the  Maronite  treaty  see  Arch.  Delt.  28  (1973)  {1977}  Chron.  plate  418.  For  the  Jewish 
treaty  with  Rome  see  1.  Macc.  8.26. 
133  Polyb.  23.9.12. 
13'  1.  Macc.  8.26. 
""  Gruen  (1984)  p.  37  suggests  that  the  Achaean  treaty  contained  a  clause  stipulating  that 
the  Achaean  assembly  could  not  be  called  by  a  Roman  without  the  authority  of  the 
senate. 
229 clause,  and  the  senate's  rebuff  to  the  Achaean  league's  request 
for  aid  in  183BC  echoes  a  clause  in  the  Maronite  treaty.  '  Thus,  in 
assessing  what  the  Achaean  league's  treaty  with  Rome  probably 
contained,  the  following  clauses  seem  likely  to  have  been 
included  in  it.  The  treaty  was  not  binding,  if  one  side  did  not 
wish  to  aid  the  other  there  was  no  obligation  to  do  so.  More 
importantly,  the  reference  to  the  renewal  of  the  treaty  during  the 
Achaean  embassy  to  Rome  in  183BC  would  seem  to  suggest  that 
aid  was  not  automatic,  but  had  to  be  requested,  and  could  be 
refused.  Again  this  is  a  fairly  standard  clause  in  Hellenic  treaties. 
Circa  129BC  Pergamum  erected  an  inscription  celebrating  the 
fact  that  "goodwill,  friendship  and  alliance"  had  just  been 
concluded  with  Rome.  It  appears  that  in  the  same  year  they 
requested  that  the  senate  adjudicate  on  their  boundaries,  and  in 
the  record  we  have  of  this,  there  is  a  reference  to  the  fact  that, 
"goodwill,  friendship  and  alliance  are  to  be  renewed"  13' 
Although  there  is  some  doubt  as  to  the  date  of  the  second 
inscription,  if  a  date  around  129BC  is  accepted,  it  seems  unlikely 
a  treaty  that  had  just  recently  been  concluded  would  have  to  be 
renewed.  So  it  appears  likely  that  the  reference  by  Polybius  of 
the  proposed  renewal  of  the  treaty  between  the  Achaean  league 
and  Rome  in  183BC  means  that  one  side  is  telling  the  other  that 
"6  Polyb.  23.9.12.  Lines  33-36  of  the  Maronite  treaty. 
"7  See  SIG3  694  line  10  and  IGRR  IV  262(copy  A)  line  5. 
230 they  wanted  to  do  something  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the 
existing  treaty. 
If  the  Achaean  league's  treaty  with  Rome  was  similar  to  the 
one  concluded  between  the  Romans  and  the  Maronites  and 
Jewish  kingdoms,  did  the  Achaean  league's  Megalopolitan 
leadership  assume  that  just  because  they  had  this  treaty,  they 
could  conduct  their  affairs  in  the  Peloponnese  without  any 
reference  to  Rome?  During  the  Aetolian/Syrian  War 
Philopoemen  and  Diophanes  of  Megalopolis  took  control  over 
Elis,  Messene  and  Sparta,  three  states  that  had  a  long  history  of 
co-operation  with  the  Aetolian  league,  with  apparent  Roman 
approval.  Although  the  senate  found  some  elements  of  the 
actions  undertaken  by  Philopoemen  at  Sparta  in  188BC 
objectionable,  Lycortas'  argument  that  the  Achaean  league  had 
acted  within  the  bounds  of  the  treaty  was  accepted.  '  It  is  hard  to 
avoid  the  conclusion  that  these  three  states  were  seized  under 
the  terms  of  a  treaty  of  alliance  that  the  Achaean  league  had 
concluded  with  Rome. 
The  question  is  when  this  treaty  was  concluded.  If  one 
returns  to  the  first  reference  to  the  Achaean  league's  desire  for  a 
treaty  with  Rome  in  197BC,  the  senate,  because  of  a  number  of 
outstanding  territorial  disputes  between  Achaean  league  and 
other  Greek  states,  postponed  the  decision.  According  to 
"8  Badian  (1952)  p.  78.  "The  treaty  may  be  one  with  Rome;  it  is  perhaps  more  likely  that 
it  is  that  with  Sparta  and  therefore  irrelevant  to  our  inquiry". 
231 Polybius,  the  Eleans  claimed  control  over  Triphylia,  the 
Messenians  claimed  Asine  and  Pylus,  and  the  Aetolian  league 
claimed  control  over  Heraea.  The  decision  regarding  how  these 
disputes  should  be  resolved  was  handed  over  by  the  senate  to 
Flamininus  and  the  ten  commissioners.  139  However,  the 
absorption  of  Elis  and  Messene  by  the  Achaean  league  during 
the  Aetolian/Syrian  War,  along  with  events  at  Sparta  in  192BC, 
resolved  any  outstanding  territorial  disputes  that  may  have 
existed  in  the  Peloponnese  in  favour  of  the  Achaean  league.  If 
one  returns  to  the  reason  why  the  senate  did  not  conclude  a 
treaty  of  alliance  with  the  Achaean  league  in  197BC,  the  situation 
in  the  Peloponnese  was  unsettled;  all  the  states  with  interests  in 
this  region  were  seeking  to  gain  an  advantage  over  each other  by 
appealing  to  Rome.  By  returning  Argos  to  its  control  in  195BC, 
Flamininus  gave  the  Achaean  league  visible  Roman  support  for 
its  territorial  claims  in  the  Peloponnese.  Flamininus'  restoration 
of  Argos  to  Achaean  control  indicates  that  he  had  already 
decided  whose  interests  in  the  Peloponnese  Rome  should 
support. 
It  is  in  this  context  that  the  date  of  the  Achaean  league's 
treaty  with  Rome  should  be  assessed.  The  senate  referred  the 
question  of  deciding  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between  the 
Achaean  league  and  Rome  to  Flamininus;  it  would  appear 
probable  that  the  treaty  of  alliance  between  the  two  was  part  of 
'ý'  Po1yb.  18.42.6-8. 
232 his  settlement  of  Peloponnesian  affairs  in  the  aftermath  of  the 
Second  Macedonian  War.  There  is  the  question  of  who  was 
responsible  for  defining  Roman  policy,  Eckstein  suggesting  that 
the  Romans  muddled  through  like  the  British  in  the  19"  century, 
and  that  many  of  their  decisions  were  taken  on  an  ad  hoc  basis.  14° 
Crawford,  on  the  other  hand,  argues  that  the  senate  dictated 
Roman  foreign  policy,  and  that  officials  like  Flamininus  were 
instruments  of  senatorial  policy.  Although  they  naturally  had 
some  freedom  of  action,  they  could  not  deviate  far  from  the 
guidelines  set  before  they  were  sent  to  their  command,  since  the 
wealth  of  experience  accumulated  by  the  members  of  the  senate 
was  an  important  factor  in  determining  Roman  policy.  "' 
However,  although  the  senate  may  have  played  the  key  role 
in  defining  Roman  policy,  a  commander  in  the  field  like 
Flamininus  would  have  to  take  decisions  based  on  his  own 
judgement  and  initiative.  This  does  not  imply  that  there  was  a 
confused  or  muddled  approach  in  Roman  policy.  Flamininus 
was  probably  appointed  to  his  command  on  the  basis  of  his 
earlier  experience  of  dealing  with  Greek  states  in  Southern  Italy; 
possibly  he  was  expected  to  take  advantage  of  internal 
differences  that  he  felt  might  benefit  the  spread  of  Roman 
domination  over  the  Greek  world.  By  returning  Argos  to  the 
control  of  the  Achaean  league,  Flamininus  was  able  to 
10  See  Eckstein  (1987)  pp.  268-319  for  Flamininus  in  Greece.  See  p.  xxii  for  the  analogy. 
141  See  Crawford  (1978)  pp.  67-73. 
233 demonstrate  to  Arcadian  communities  like  Megalopolis,  some  of 
whose  inhabitants  were  unhappy  about  the  abandonment  of 
Philip  V  in  198BC,  that  the  alliance  with  Rome  would  protect 
their  interests  in  the  Peloponnese. 
In  this  case,  it  is  probable  that  the  treaty  of  alliance  between 
the  Achaean  league  and  Rome  was  concluded  shortly  after  the 
senate  handed  over  the  matter  to  Flamininus,  before  he  restored 
Argos  to  Achaean  control,  sometime  in  197/196BC.  Although 
there  is  no  reference  to  the  existence  of  a  treaty  in  the  debate 
before  the  outbreak  of  war  with  Nabis  in  195BC,  Polybius,  from 
whom  presumably  Livy  drew  his  account,  wished  to  present  this 
war  as  a  liberation  of  Argos  from  Spartan  control.  Furthermore, 
at  this  point  in  his  narrative  Polybius  wished  to  emphasise  the 
Achaean  league's  independence  and  the  soundness  of  its 
government,  to  the  extent  that  it  could  deal  with  Rome  as  an 
equal,  so  he  could  emphasise  its  later  decline  through  the 
process  of  anacyclosis.  Flamininus'  support  for  the  Achaean 
league,  despite  the  fact  that  he  earlier  appears  to  have  agreed  to 
Nabis'  continued  occupation  of  Argos,  indicates  that  by  195BC 
Flamininus  had  probably  concluded  a  treaty  with  the  Achaean 
league.  Does  it  have  any  implications  for  our  understanding  of 
subsequent  events,  especially  the  relationship  between  the 
Achaean  league  and  Rome?  It  is  indisputable  that  three 
Megalopolitan  politicians  absorbed  Elis,  Messene  and  Sparta  into 
the  Achaean  league  during  the  Aetolian/Syrian  War,  with 
234 Messene  joining  under  Flamininus'  direction.  It  appears  that  the 
treaty  between  the  two  was  an  attempt  by  Flamininus  to  exploit 
the  desire  by  Megalopolitans  like  Aristaenus  and  Philopoemen 
to  gain  dominance  over  the  Peloponnese. 
Conclusion. 
Polybius  has  a  Rhodian  ambassador  claim  in  207BC  that  the 
Romans  were  aggressive  imperialists  who  manipulated  their 
allies  and  who  would,  once  the  Second  Punic  War  was  over,  turn 
their  attention  to  Greece  and  exploit  the  problems  of  the  Aetolian 
league.  Although  possibly  this  was  Polybian  rhetoric,  influenced 
by  his  knowledge  of  later  events,  the  ambassador's  accusations 
were  an  accurate  reflection  of  events.  Once  the  Second  Punic 
War  was  over,  Rome  almost  immediately  turned  towards 
Greece,  using  the  problems  of  its  adscripti  from  the  First 
Macedonian  War  to  gain  a  pretext  for  intervention. 
Rome's  advent  in  their  affairs  presented  Greek  states  with 
the  opportunity  to  make  gains  at  the  expense  of  those  who  were 
not  fortunate  enough  to  be  offered  the  opportunity  to  ally  with 
Rome.  If  one  looks  at  the  alliance  between  Rome  and  the 
Aetolian  league  in  212/211BC,  it  is  usually  viewed  in  the  context 
of  Rome  needing  an  ally  in  Greece  to  fight  against  Philip  V  and 
an  Aetolian  desire  to  loot.  The  alliance  is  seen  in  terms  of  Roman 
desperation,  the  Aetolians,  whom  Polybius  describes  in  the 
235 worst  of  all  possible  fashions,  are  seen  as  the  only  allies  that 
Rome  could  find. 
That  ignores  the  position  that  the  Aetolian  league  found 
itself  in  at  the  end  of  the  Social  War.  Having  been  earlier 
defeated  by  Antigonus  Doson  in  Acarnania  in  228BC,  the 
Aetolian  league  had  been  placed  in  a  difficult  position  by  the 
Achaean  league's  alliance  with  Macedonia.  Arcadian 
communities  in  the  Achaean  league  like  Megalopolis  were 
threatening  their  allies  in  the  Peloponnese;  that  league  was  itself 
allied  to  Macedonia;  the  Aetolians  urgently  needed  to  take 
action. 
It  is  in  this  context  that  the  Aetolian  '  alliance  with  Rome 
should  be  seen.  Contacts  with  Greek  communities  in  southern 
Italy  suggests  the  Aetolian  league  was  probably  aware  of  events 
there  during  the  Second  Punic  War,  along  with  the  consequences 
for  them  when  the  war  was  over.  Philip  V  of  Macedonia  appears 
to  have  allied  with  Hannibal  in  the  belief  that  the  Carthaginians 
would  be  victorious,  and  thus  secure  Macedonian  interests  in 
Illyria.  The  Aetolian  league's  alliance  with  Rome  appears  to  have 
been  concluded  for  similar  reasons.  Although  the  treaty  between 
the  two  is  usually  seen  as  an  agreement  pertaining  to  the 
division  of  spoils  from  looting,  it  is  evident  from  its  provisions 
that  the  Aetolian  league  may  have  been  primarily  concerned 
with  regaining  territory  that  it  had  previously  lost  to  Macedonia. 
Livy's  reference  to  the  restoration  of  Acarnania  to  Aetolian 
236 control  by  Rome,  along  with  the  joint  actions  undertaken  by 
both,  indicates  that  the  Aetolian  league  allied  with  Rome  in  the 
belief  that  it  could  use  Roman  support  to  regain  the  position  it 
had  lost  to  Macedonia  in  the  preceding  decades. 
Once  Rome  had  entered  in  the  Greek  world  the  situation 
changed.  Despite  the  efforts  of  the  Aetolian  league  to  restore  the 
alliance  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Second  Macedonian  War,  the 
Romans  entered  the  war  without  a  formal  alliance  with  it.  Was 
this  refusal  to  ally  with  the  Aetolian  league  a  response  by  the 
Romans  to  the  separate  peace  that  they  had  made  with 
Macedonia  in  206BC?  Or  does  it  indicate  the  path  that  Roman 
policy  would  follow  once  the  Second  Punic  war  was  over?  The 
Romans  arrived  in  Greece  with  the  intention  of  imposing  their 
control.  Thus  the  senate's  refusal  to  renew  their  alliance  with  the 
Aetolian  league  prior  to  the  Second  Macedonian  War  may  have 
been  based  on  a  realisation  that  this  alliance  had  served  its 
usefulness.  The  Romans  had  assisted  the  Aetolian  league  during 
the  First  Macedonian  War  to  use  its  links  with  Elis  and  alliance 
with  Sparta  against  the  Macedonian  presence  in  the 
Peloponnese.  So  when  they  intervened  in  Greek  affairs  during 
the  Second  Macedonian  War,  they  were  undoubtedly  aware  of 
the  rival  states  that  were  contending  for  control  over  the 
Peloponnese.  Flamininus'  actions,  both  in  seeking  an  alliance 
with  the  Achaean  league,  and  later  in  restoring  Argos  to  its 
control,  appears  to  have  been  an  attempt  to  exploit  the  situation 
237 for  Rome's  benefit.  Polybius  presents  the  relationship  between 
the  Achaean  league  and  Rome  at  this  stage  as  one  between 
equals.  The  fact  that  the  Achaean  league  expanded  to  encompass 
the  entire  Peloponnese  during  the  Aetolian/Syrian  War  would 
seem  to  indicate  that  Polybius'  fellow  Megalopolitans  benefited 
from  the  situation  brought  about  by  Rome's  advent  in  Hellenic 
affairs. 
238 Chapter  Six. 
The  fruits  of  co-operation 
Introduction 
Just  before  the  evacuation  of  Roman  forces  from  Greece, 
Flamininus  called  a  conference  at  Corinth.  '  In  his  speech  he 
addressed  the  concerns  of  the  Aetolian  and  Achaean  leagues 
about  the  situation  in  the  Peloponnese  after  the  war  with  Nabis, 
and  then  turned  towards  the  evacuation  of  Roman  forces  from 
Greece.  He  announced  that  Roman  garrisons  would  be  removed 
from  the  three  fetters  of  Greece,  and  that  all  Roman  troops  would 
withdraw  to  Italy.  According  to  Livy,  Flamininus'  reasoning  was 
simple.  As  he  stated: 
He  did  this  so  that  all  men  might  know  whether  lying  was  a 
Roman  habit,  or  a  speciality  of  the  Aetolians,  who  had 
spread  the  fear  that  the  cause  of  liberty  had  been  wrongly 
entrusted  to  the  Roman  people  and  that  the  Greeks  had 
merely  exchanged  Macedonian  masters  for  Roman  lords? 
Polybius  presents  Roman  actions  at  this  stage  of  their 
involvement  in  Greek  affairs,  especially  Flamininus'  behaviour,  in 
almost  ideal  terms.  Having  liberated  Greece  from  a  tyrant  like 
Philip  V,  Rome  refused  to  take  advantage  of  its  victory,  deciding 
instead  to  withdraw,  leaving  the  Greeks  free.  It  cannot  be 
'Livy.  34.48-49.  See  also  Larsen  (1968)  p.  404  and  Gruen  (1984)  p.  455. 
2  Livy.  34.49.5-6;  Polyb.  18.45.6.  for  a  similar  charge  from  the  Aetolians  about  Roman 
duplicity. 
239 doubted  that  the  Romans  did  withdraw  their  legions  to  Italy 
shortly  after  this  conference,  and  that  a  claim  to  have  brought 
freedom  to  the  Greeks  from  Macedonian  tyranny  was  a  major 
theme  in  Roman  propaganda  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Second 
Macedonian  War.  '  It  is  also  evident  that  as  the  Romans  were 
withdrawing,  the  Aetolian  league  was  openly  stating  that  Rome 
was  a  threat  to  Greek  freedom  and  had  betrayed  its  promises.  Nor 
was  this  a  recent  accusation.  Before  the  war  against  Nabis, 
Polybius  has  an  Aetolian  called  Alexander  make  a  number  of 
accusations  about  broken  Roman  promises  regarding  their 
declaration  of  freedom,  stating  that: 
His  final  charge  was  that  they  were  making  Argos  and  Nabis 
an  excuse  for  staying  in  Greece  and  keeping  their  army  in  the 
country.  Let  them,  he  said,  transport  their  legions  to  Italy; 
and  he  stated  that  the  Aetolians  promised  that  either  Nabis 
would  withdraw  his  garrison  from  Argos  voluntarily,  on 
terms,  or  they  would  compel  him  by  force  of  arms  to  submit 
to  the  power  of  a  united  Greece.  4 
In  reply,  Aristaenus,  the  strategos  of  the  Achaean  league, 
argued  that  Flamininus  should  pay  no  attention  to  Alexander's 
offer.  Rather  he  should  instead: 
'For  the  assertion  that  Polybius  suspended  his  otherwise  negative  depiction  of  Aetolian 
behaviour  during  this  period,  see  Sacks  (1975)  pp.  92-107,  a  position  disputed  by 
Mendels  (1984-86)  pp.  63-73. 
4Livy.  34.23.9-11. 
240 Forbid  that  city  (Argos)  to  be  a  prize  to  be  contended  for 
by  a  Spartan  tyrant  and  Aetolian  pirates,  in  such  a  plight 
that  its  recovery  by  you  would  bring  greater  misery  than 
its  capture  by  him  (Nabis).  The  sea  between  us  does  not 
protect  us  from  those  brigands,  Titus  Quinctius;  and  what 
will  our  future  be  if  they  establish  their  citadel  in  the  heart 
of  the  Peloponnese?  5 
Livy,  presumably  drawing  on  Polybius,  seems  to  be  drawing 
attention  to  the  differing  interests  between  the  Aetolian  and 
Achaean  leagues  over  the  Peloponnese.  Alexander's  offer  to  have 
Nabis  withdraw  from  Argos  implies  that  the  Aetolian  league  was 
concerned  about  the  influence  on  their  Peloponnesian  interests 
were  Rome  to  restore  Argos  to  the  Achaean  league.  Aristaenus' 
reply  shows  that  he  was  concerned  with  the  possibility  of  the 
Aetolian  league  retaining  its  position  in  the  Peloponnese,  and 
sought  Roman  support  to  see  that  it  was  removed. 
Polybius'  presentation  of,  Roman  behaviour  and  its  dealings 
with  the  Achaean  league  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Second 
Macedonian  War  is  conditioned  by  his  belief  in  the  role  that 
anacyclosis  played  in  allowing  the  Romans  to  achieve  their 
conquest.  Polybius'  intention  in  writing  pragmatike  historia  was  to 
instruct  his  Greek  readership  in  a  two-fold  fashion.  Firstly,  as  to 
how  the  suspension  of  anacyclosis  over  a  prolonged  period  led  to 
the  circumstances  arising  in  the  Roman  republic's  system  of 
s  Livy.  34.24.1-3. 
241 government  that  resulted  an  almost  an  ideal  state  emerging, 
producing  highly  principled  leaders  like  Flamininus. 
Polybius'  second  purpose  was  to  demonstrate  to  his  Greek 
leadership  the  changes  that  had  taken  place  in  their  own  society 
that  had  allowed  them  to  be  conquered;  the  internal  corruption 
that  had  taken  place  in  the  Achaean  league  through  the  workings 
of  anacyclosis  in  its  system  of  government.  To  do  this  Polybius  had 
to  present  the  Achaean  league  as  a  single  democratic  polls,  which 
could  initially  deal  with  Rome  as  an  equal.  In  this  situation,  the 
Aetolian  league's  interests  in  the  Peloponnese,  no  matter  how 
legitimate,  were  contrary  to  those  of  the  Achaean  ethnos. 
It  is  in  this  context  that  Flamininus'  decision  to  restore  Argos 
to  the  control  of  the  Achaean  league  prior  to  his  evacuation  of 
Greece  should  be  seen;  it  posed  a  significant  challenge  to  the 
Aetolian  league's  interests  in  the  Peloponnese.  Derow  has  drawn 
attention  to  the  unspecified  promises  that  appear  to  have  been 
made  to  the  Aetolian  league  prior  to  their  alliance  with  Rome 
during  the  Second  Macedonian  War,  and  how  they  appear  not  to 
have  been  fulfilled  in  Flamininus'  settlement  of  Greek  affairs.  "  As 
Polybius  has  Dicaearchus,  the  Aetolian  envoy  sent  to  Antiochus 
to  gain  his  participation  in  the  Aetolian/Syrian  War,  state: 
He  began  by  saying  that  the  booty  taken  from  Philip  had 
gone  to  the  Romans;  but  the  victory  belonged  to  the 
Aetolians;  it  was  the  Aetolians  and  no  one  else  who  had 
6  Derow  (1979)  p.  8. 
242 given  the  Romans  a  foothold  in  Greece,  and  they  had 
provided  them  with  the  resources  for  victory.  ' 
Polybius,  from  whom  these  speeches  probably  derived, 
acknowledges  that  the  leadership  of  the  Aetolian  league  seems  to 
have  genuinely  felt  that  their  interests  in  the  Peloponnese  had 
been  betrayed  by  Flamininus'  decision  to  support  the  Achaean 
league  over  Argos. 
Was  Flamininus  supporting  the  Achaean  league,  or  simply 
the  interests  of  one  region  within  it?  Apart  from  its  expansion  into 
Arcadia  in  the  230s  BC,  the  next  large-scale  expansion  of  the 
Achaean  league  came  during  the  Aetolian/Syrian  War,  when  Elis, 
Messene  and  Sparta,  all  of  who  were  long-standing  allies  of  the 
Aetolian  league  and  traditional  rivals  of  Arcadia,  were 
incorporated  into  the  Achaean  league.  This  expansion  was  carried 
out  under  the  leadership  of  three  Megalopolitans:  Aristaenus, 
who  initially  argued  that  the  Achaean  league  should  ally  with 
Rome,  Diophanes  and  Philopoemen.  At  least  one  of  these 
annexations  was  carried  out  under  Flamininus'  direction. 
Again,  it  must  be  remembered  that  as  a  source  of  evidence, 
Polybius'  narrative  represents  just  one  opinion  from  the  many 
states  that  came  into  contact  with  the  Romans.  We  should,  as  so 
often  before,  question  Polybius'  assertions  regarding  their  role  in 
these  events.  More  importantly,  we  should  also  challenge  his 
depiction  of  the  actions  of  political  leaders  from  elsewhere  in  the 
'Livy.  35.12.15 
243 Peloponnese.  Callicrates,  because  of  his  actions  in  180BC  during 
an  embassy  to  Rome  to  try  and  resolve  the  question  of  the  Spartan 
exiles,  has  been  seen  as  a  pro-Roman  politician.  Should  his  actions 
be  viewed  solely  in  this  context?  Poleis  like  Leontium,  who 
founded  the  original  Achaean  league,  appear  to  have  lost  much  of 
their  power  to  Arcadian  states  like  Megalopolis  after  the  decision 
to  ally  with  Macedonia  during  the  Cleomenic  War.  As  for 
Polybius'  presentation  of  Callicrates'  actions,  this  embassy  is 
marked  as  the  decisive  turning  point  in  the  relationship  between 
Rome  and  Greece,  though  it  is  apparant  that  little  change  actually 
occurred.  Polybius  depicts  Callicrates'  embassy  in  the  manner 
that  he  does  to  demonstrate  to  his  readers  the  point  where  the 
Achaean  league  began  its  degeneration  though  the  natural 
process  of  anacyclosis  from  a  democracy  that  initially  dealt  with 
Rome  on  equal  terms  into  eventual  mob-rule  and  anarchy.  It  is  in 
this  context  that  Polybius'  presentation  of  the  events  surrounding 
the  Aetolian/Syrian  War  has  to  be  seen. 
This  chapter  will  examine  the  situation  in  the  Peloponnese 
from  the  beginning  of  the  Aetolian/Syrian  War  until  the  embassy 
of  Callicrates  and  the  resolution  of  the  Spartan  exile  question  in 
180BC.  I  will  contend  that  Aristaenus  and  Philopoemen  co- 
operated  with  the  Romans  to  foil  Aetolian  plans  at  Sparta  prior  to 
the  outbreak  of  the  Aetolian/Syrian  War,  because  it  was  in  their 
interest  to  remove  the  threat  that  they  faced  from  the  Aetolian 
league  and  its  allies  in  the  Peloponnese.  Though  Megalopolitans 
244 like  Philopoemen  and  Aristaenus  might  not  have  wished  to  see 
Rome  emerge  as  the  dominant  power  in  the  Greek  world,  they 
placed  their  own  interests  first. 
Once  the  Aetolian  league  had  been  defeated  by  the  Romans, 
and  the  Achaean  league  was  under  the  control  of  politicians  from 
Megalopolis,  under  the  guidance  of  Philopoemen,  the  Achaean 
league  started  to  follow  a  more  independent  foreign  policy, 
renewing  its  diplomatic  links  with  the  Hellenistic  monarchies.  I 
will  argue  that  the  Romans  viewed  this  action  as  a  threat  to  their 
position  in  the  Greek  world,  and  exploited  the  question  of  the 
Spartan  exiles  to  undermine  the  position  of  the  Megalopolitans 
within  the  Achaean  league.  This  resulted  in  the  emergence  of 
Callicrates,  who  used  this  opportunity  to  break  the  dominant 
position  that  Megalopolis  exercised  over  the  Achaean  league. 
The  Aetolian/Syrian  War  and  Philopoemen's  entry  into  Sparta. 
Turning  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war  itself,  the  first  action 
undertaken  by  the  Aetolians  was  an  appeal  to  Philip  V,  Antiochus 
and  Nabis  sometime  in  193BC  8  Although  these  missions  found  a 
mixed  response,  the  embassy  dispatched  to  Sparta  was 
e  See  Livy.  35.12.4-5  for  the  assembly  that  decided  on  the  dispatch  of  these  embassies. 
Deininger  (1971)  p.  73  argues  that  the  Aetolian  league  was  trying  to  use  the  differences 
within  these  states  between  pro  and  anti-Roman  factions.  It  appears  that  ambassadors 
from  Antiochus  to  Rome  may  have  conferred  with  Aetolians  on  their  return  journey, 
since  one  of  them,  Hegesianax,  was  made  an  Aetolian  proxenos  in  193BC.  See  SIG'  585. 
Line  43  and  Walbank  (1940)  p.  192  for  the  chronology. 
245 immediately  successful.  According  to  Livy,  the  Aetolian  envoy 
pointed  out  in  a  long  speech  how  Sparta's  position  in  the 
Peloponnese  had  been  weakened  by  Flamininus'  settlement.  The 
result  was  that  Nabis: 
Confined  within  his  own  walls,  (Nabis)  now  saw  the 
Achaeans  lording  it  over  the  Peloponnese;  he  would  never 
have  another  chance  of  receiving  what  was  his  if  he  let  slip 
this  opportunity...  all  this  was  said  to  arouse  the  tyrant's 
spirit,  so  that  when  Antiochus  invaded  Greece,  the 
consciousness  that  the  treaty  of  friendship  with  Rome  had 
been  violated  by  wrongs  done  to  their  allies  might  unite 
Nabis  with  Antiochus.  9 
Local  interests  appear  to  have  been  the  decisive 
consideration  in  determining  Hellenic  actions,  and  indicate  that 
Flamininus  had  placed  the  Achaean  league  in  a  dominant  position 
in  the  Peloponnese  after  the  Second  Macedonian  War.  On 
receiving  information  that  the  Aetolian  league  was  willing  to  act 
against  Rome,  according  to  Livy,  Nabis  immediately  attempted  to 
reverse  Flamininus'  settlement  by  attacking  the  coastal 
communities  awarded  to  the  Achaean  league.  "  Again  one  can  see 
9  Livy.  35.12.7-9. 
10  Livy.  35.13.1-2.  "Nevertheless  the  kings  either  made  no  move,  or  moved  too  slowly. 
Nabis  at  once  sent  agents  round  all  the  coastal  settlements  to  stir  up  civil  disorders  in 
them,  he  brought  some  of  the  leading  citizens  to  his  side  by  gifts,  while  murdering 
others  who  were  obstinate  in  their  attachment  to  the  Roman  alliance.  Titus  Quinctius 
246 the  situation  in  the  Peloponnese  being  exploited  by  the  Aetolian 
league.  By  encouraging  Nabis  to  attack,  the  Aetolians  appear  to 
have  been  trying  to  re-establish  the  alliance  that  had  existed 
between  it  and  forces  in  the  Peloponnese  from  the  time  of  the 
Social  War  onwards. 
The  Achaean  league  under  Philopoemen  reacted  by 
establishing  a  garrison  at  Gythium,  and  an  embassy  was  sent  to 
Rome  to  seek  assistance.  "  In  reply,  on  their  way  to  Antiochus,  an 
embassy  under  Flamininus  stopped  to  assist  the  Achaean  league, 
and  the  Romans  dispatched  a  fleet  of  ships  to  aid  them.  However, 
although  Nabis  was  attacking  the  Achaean  garrison  in  Gythium, 
Philopoemen  made  no  response  until  the  return  of  the  Achaean 
embassy  from  Rome.  12  When  it  returned,  a  further  embassy  was 
sent  to  Flamininus  to  seek  his  advice,  which  was  to  wait  until  the 
had  charged  the  Achaeans  with  the  responsibility  for  safeguarding  all  the  Laconian 
coastal  districts.  " 
"  Livy.  35.13.3.  Philopoemen  had  returned  from  Crete  in  194BC,  and  given  his  earlier 
association  with  Macedonia,  there  appears  to  have  been  some  difficulties  connected  with 
his  re-entry  into  Achaean  politics,  which  were  resolved  when  Philopoemen  supported  a 
number  of  small  Arcadian  communities  who  wished  to  leave  Megalopolis.  See  Plut. 
Philop.  13.5.  Errington  (1969)  p.  90  suggests  that  this  event  should  be  dated  to 
Philopoemen's  return  to  Crete  and  that  Aristaenus  opposed  his  return  over  his  supposed 
desertion  in  200BC. 
12  Livy.  35.25.3-4. 
247 arrival  of  the  Roman  fleet  13  Before  this  reply  was  relayed,  the 
Achaean  league  declared  war  against  Nabis.  14 
On  his  arrival  Flamininus  imposed  a  truce  between  the 
combatants  15  Philopoemen's  role  in  resisting  Nabis  and  appealing 
to  Rome  suggests  that  he  was  willing  to  co-operate  with  the 
Romans  as  long  as  it  was  in  his  political  interests.  The  possibility 
of  the  Aetolian  league  regaining  its  political  influence  in  the 
Peloponnese,  to  the  detriment  of  Megalopolitan  interests, 
provides  a  possible  explanation  for  the  subsequent  actions 
undertaken  by  Philopoemen  at  Sparta. 
Nabis'  Assassination. 
This  section  will  focus  on  the  reaction  of  the  Achaean  league, 
and  Megalopolitans  in  particular,  to  events  at  the  outbreak  of  war 
between  Rome  and  Antiochus  in  192BC.  It  will  examine  the 
actions  of  Philopoemen  and  other  Megalopolitans  in  bringing 
initially  Sparta,  and  subsequently,  Elis  and  Messene,  into  the 
Achaean  league.  It  will  consider  whether  Philopoemen's  actions 
"  Flamininus'  advice  for  the  Achaean  league  to  wait  for  the  Roman  fleet  was  sound, 
since  the  Achaean  flagship  fell  to  pieces  when  it  attacked  Gythium.  Plut.  Philop.  14.3 
14  Livy.  35.25.12. 
's  For  Flamininus'  intervention,  which  is  not  mentioned  by  Livy,  see  Plut.  Philop.  15,  and 
Paus.  8.50.6-10,  which  does  not  mention  Flamininus  by  name.  These  events  appear  to 
have  occurred  before  the  panaitolika,  the  regular  Spring  meeting  of  the  Aetolian  league, 
before  the  opening  of  the  campaigning  season  of  the  year,  so  in  other  words  before  the 
Aetolians  declared  war  against  Rome.  Larsen  (1968)  p.  411. 
248 along  with  those  of  other  Megalopolitan  should  be  seen  as 
evidence  that  that  they  were  acting  in  collaboration  with  Rome, 
and  whether  Polybius'  regional  perspective  and  stress  on 
Achaean  unity  in  his  histories  mask  the  situation  in  the 
Peloponnese. 
Turning  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  the  decisive  stage  of  the 
conflict  happened  before  the  arrival  of  the  Roman  army  in 
Greece.  16  Philopoemen's  actions  at  Sparta  played  an  important 
role  in  hindering  the  Aetolian  league's  plan  to  secure  a  number  of 
important  strategic  locations  in  Greece  prior  to  Antiochus'  arrival 
from  Syria.  The  Aetolian  failure  to  secure  Sparta  gave  the  Romans 
the  ability  to  react  before  Antiochus  had  moved  only  a  small  part 
of  his  force  to  Greece.  Therefore,  Polybius'  account  of  these 
events,  transmitted  through  Livy,  needs  to  be  carefully 
considered. 
According  to  Livyy  account,  after  the  Aetolian  assembly 
voted  to  invite  Antiochus  to  Greece  to  arbitrate  between  it  and 
Rome  in  192BC,  the  apokletoi  took  over,  and  it  was  they  who 
decided  on  the  course  of  action,  suggesting  that  the  move  towards 
war  was  carefully  planned.  Missions  were  sent  to  Demetrias, 
Chalcis  and  Sparta.  17  The  Aetolians  managed  to  secure  Demetrias, 
though  their  efforts  at  Chalcis  were  unsuccessful  "  It  was  the 
16  A  point  made  by  Larsen  (1968)  p.  414. 
"  Livy.  35.34-38. 
1e  See  Livy.  35.34.5-12.  for  Demetrias.  Livy  35.38.1-14.  for  Chalcis. 
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249 attempt  to  capture  Sparta  that  was  decisive,  and  the  actions 
undertaken  there  by  Philopoemen  may  be  the  key  to 
understanding  Polybius'  depiction  of  this  conflict. 
According  to  Livy,  Alexamenus,  a  former  Aetolian  strategos, 
was  sent  to  Sparta  with  a  force  of  a  thousand  infantrymen  and 
thirty  picked  cavalrymen,  along  with  secret  instructions  to  kill 
Nabis  and  bring  Sparta  into  an  alliance  with  the  Aetolian  league  19 
According  to  Livy,  the  reasons  for  carrying  out  this  plan  were 
that: 
Nabis  had  been  deprived  of  the  coastal  towns  by  the 
Romans,  and  then  actually  confined  by  the  Achaeans 
within  the  walls  of  Sparta,  and  anyone  who  took  the 
initiative  in  killing  him  would,  it  was  supposed,  win  from 
the  Spartans  the  gratitude  for  the  whole  operation.  The 
Aetolians  had  a  reason  for  sending  men  to  him  in  the  fact 
that  he  had  been  asking  them  desperately  to  send  him 
reinforcements  since  they  had  instigated  him  to  rebel.  " 
On  his  arrival,  Alexamenus  informed  Nabis  that  Antiochus 
had  already  arrived  in  Greece,  and  that  their  united  forces  would 
be  enough  to  defeat  the  Romans.  In  order  to  demonstrate  the 
potential  power  of  the  Aetolian  league,  Alexamenus  proposed  to 
Nabis  that  he  should  personally  review  the  Aetolian  force.  When 
Nabis  accepted  this  offer,  accompanied  only  by  a  few 
19  Livy.  35.35.6f. 
20  See  Livy.  35.35.1-3. 
250 bodyguards,  Alexamenus  ordered  the  Aetolian  cavalry  to  kill 
him.  21 
According  to  Livy,  after  Nabis  had  been  killed,  Alexamenus 
galloped  off  to  seize  his  palace,  and  an  assembly  was  called  at 
which  he  delivered  a  speech  regarding  the  situation.  However,  as 
Livy  states: 
But,  as  was  fitting  in  a  plan  embarked  upon  with 
treachery,  everything  conspired  to  hasten  the  downfall  of 
the  perpetrators  of  the  crime.  The  leader  shut  himself  up  in 
the  palace  and  spent  a  day  and  a  night  examining  the 
tyrant's  treasury;  the  Aetolians,  who  wished  to  appear  as 
the  liberators  of  the  city,  acted  as  if  they  had  captured  it, 
and  turned  to  plundering  it.  22 
According  to  Livy,  as  Alexamenus  was  gloating  over  Nabis' 
treasure,  the  Spartans,  after  their  initial  shock,  turned  on  the 
Aetolians,  killing  most  of  them.  According  to  Livy,  after  the 
Aetolian  force  had  been  killed  or  fled,  the  forces  of  the  Achaean 
league  intervened,  since: 
Philopoemen  had  set  out  for  Sparta  on  hearing  of  the 
tyrant's  murder.  Finding  there  a  scene  of  terror  and 
confusion,  he  summoned  the  chief  citizens  and,  after 
delivering  the  sort  of  speech  that  Alexamenus  should  have 
made,  he  attached  the  Spartans  to  the  Achaean  alliance.  He 
Z'  Livy.  35.35.8-19. 
"  Livy.  35.36.5-6. 
251 did  this  easily  because  Aulus  Atilius  happened  at  this  time 
to  have  reached  Gythium  with  twenty-four  ships.  Z3 
Plutarch  gives  a  rather  similar  account,  stating  that: 
Philopoemen,  seizing  his  opportunity,  fell  upon  the  city 
with  an  armed  force,  and  partly  by  compulsion,  partly  by 
persuasion,  brought  it  over  to  his  purposes  and  made  it  a 
member  of  the  Achaean  league.  24 
The  literary  evidence  tells  us  little  about  what  actually 
happened.  In  particular,  why  did  the  Aetolians  assassinate  Nabis, 
one  of  their  long-standing  allies  in  the  Peloponnese,  and  the  only 
monarch  of  the  three  approached  in  194BC  who  supported  the 
Aetolian  plot  to  act  against  Rome?  Sparta  had  been  an  ally  of  the 
Aetolian  league  since  the  beginning  of  the  Social  War,  and  Nabis 
was  mentioned  in  the  Peace  of  Phoenice  as  a  Roman  adscriptus, 
along  with  other  allies  of  the  Aetolian  league.  The  Aetolian  league 
had  also  attempted  to  prevent  Flamininus'  removal  of  Nabis  from 
Argos  in  195BC.  When  one  considers  the  result,  Sparta's 
absorption  into  an  Achaean  league  that  supported  Rome  during 
the  war,  Alexamenus'  decision  not  to  consolidate  the  Aetolian 
position  in  Sparta,  instead  gloating  over  Nabis'  treasury  like  a 
greedy  child,  appears  as  an  act  of  crass  stupidity. 
2'Livy.  35.37.1-3. 
24  P1ut.  Philop.  15.2-3.  Plutarch  makes  no  mention  of  the  role  that  the  Roman  fleet  played 
in  persuading  the  Spartans  to  join  the  Achaean  league. 
252 Cartledge  suggests  that  the  Aetolians  decided  to  murder 
Nabis  because  he  had  become  an  unreliable  ally,  describing  them 
as  "faithless",  a  comment  that  echoes  Larsen's  earlier  comment 
that  the  Alexamenus'  murder  of  Nabis  was  "treacherous"''  There 
is  naturally  the  possibility  that  Alexamenus  murdered  Nabis  for 
financial  reasons,  and  that  the  failure  to  capture  Sparta  was  due  to 
his  greed.  Yet,  Alexamenus  had  been  dispatched  to  Sparta  with 
instructions  from  the  Aetolian  apokletoi.  His  mission  was  part  of  a 
deliberate  plan  decided  in  advance  by  the  governing  body  of  the 
Aetolian  league.  Is  it  conceivable  that  Alexamenus  decided,  for 
some  inexplicable  reason,  to  murder  an  important  ally  of  the 
Aetolian  league,  purely  to  gloat  over  his  treasury? 
Before  the  arrival  of  the  Aetolian  force,  it  appears  that  the 
Achaean  army  under  Philopoemen  was  active  in  the  area 
surrounding  Sparta,  and  that  a  border  war  was  in  progress, 
probably  connected  to  Nabis'  attacks  on  the  Laconian  coastal 
communities  placed  under  the  Achaean  league's  control  by 
Flamininus.  Philopoemen's  swiftness  suggests  that  he  was  close 
by  with  a  substantial  force.  Possibly  Philopoemen's  reaction  to  the 
events  in  Sparta  was  not,  as  the  sources  would  have  it,  a  reaction 
to  the  unscrupulous  actions  of  the  Aetolian  league,  but  may  have 
been  an  attempt  by  Megalopolitans  within  the  Achaean  league  to 
take  advantage  of  the  situation  by  seizing  control  over  Sparta.  If 
one  considers  the  settlement  imposed  there  in  192BC,  it  would 
25  Cartledge  (1989)  p.  77  and  Larsen  (1968)  p.  413. 
253 appear  that  Philopoemen  was  concerned  with  gaining  the  support 
of  certain  members  of  the  Spartan  elite.  According  to  Plutarch, 
Philopoemen  was  successful  because: 
He  carried  with  him  the  best  men  amongst  the  Spartans,  who 
hoped  to  have  in  him  a  guardian  of  their  liberties.  " 
The  identity  of  Philopoemen's  supporters  in  Sparta  has 
divided  modem  scholars.  7  In  assessing  Philopoemen's  settlement 
at  Sparta  a  number  of  points  must  be  borne  in  mind.  Firstly,  there 
was  no  restoration  of  exiles  in  192BC,  nor  were  the  new  citizens 
created  by  Nabis  expelled.  This  suggests  that  the  liberties  that  the 
Spartans  wished  to  preserve  were  those  granted  to  them  by 
Nabis  28  Shimron  suggests  that  the  embassy  sent  to  Rome  in 
191BC  asking  for  the  restoration  of  the  coastal  communities  and 
the  hostages  taken  in  195BC  was  in  fact  from  the  Spartan 
government  Z9 
2'  Plut.  Philop.  15.3-4.  Shimron  (1972)  p.  102  suggests  that  Nabis'  supporters  were  left  in 
control  of  Sparta,  since  he  argues  that  Plutarch  is  referring  to  the  "principal"  men  in 
Sparta,  Shimron  translating  aristoi  as  principal.  However  this  is  in  order  to  reinforce  his 
own  argument.  Cartledge  (1989)  p.  78  opts  for  best. 
''  P1ut.  Philop.  15.4-6  Errington  (1969)  pp.  110-112  argues  that  they  were  members  of  the 
Spartan  elite  who  had  remained  under  Nabis'  regime,  but  who  did  not  support  his 
policies.  He  argues  that  Philopoemen  was  engaged  in  a  client-patron  relationship  with 
his  old  guest  friend  Timolaus,  who  accepted  membership  of  the  Achaean  league. 
2'Plut.  Philop.  16.4-5. 
"See  Polyb.  21.1.  This  view  is  opposed  by  Errington,  who  argues  that  there  was  a  change 
in  government  in  Sparta,  a  view  supported  by  Walbank  (1979)  p.  88. 
254 What  happened  in  Sparta  in  192BC  is  puzzling.  If  one  accepts 
Livy's  account,  before  the  Aetolian  league  invited  Antiochus  to 
Greece  they  first  murdered  one  of  their  most  important  allies  in 
the  Peloponnese  for  unspecified  and  irrational  reasons.  Then, 
Philopoemen  brought  Sparta  within  the  Achaean  league,  but 
failed  to  make  any  change  to  the  Spartan  system  of  government, 
apparently  leaving  Nabis'  reforms  intact  30 
It  is  unquestionable  that  Alexamenus  was  responsible  for 
Nabis'  assassination.  This  does  not  mean  that  Livy's  account, 
following  Polybius'  depiction  of  these  events,  is  sympathetic  to 
the  motives  that  prompted  this  action.  Nabis  was  involved  with  a 
war  with  the  Achaean  league,  and  his  primary  concern  was  to 
recover  the  coastal  communities  Flamininus  had  given  to  the 
Achaean  league  to  administer.  Nabis  may  have  believed  that  the 
Aetolian  plot  was  a  gamble  doomed  to  failure,  and  calculated  that 
Spartan  interests  were  best  served  by  refusing  to  co-operate  31 
Though  Livy,  following  Polybius,  asserted  that-  Nabis  attacked 
30  Grainger  (1999)  p.  440-41  suggests  that  Alexamenus'  failure  to  take  control  of  Sparta 
was  because  of  a  pre-arranged  plan  between  the  Aetolian  league  and  Philopoemen.  He 
argues  that  the  Aetolians  were  undoubtedly  aware  of  the  ambitions  of  the  leadership  of 
the  Achaean  league  to  unite  the  entire  Peloponnese.  Grainger  suggests  that  the 
Aetolians  murdered  Nabis  with  the  intention  of  creating  the  conditions  that  would  allow 
Philopoemen  to  intervene  and  install  a  pro-Achaean  government  in  Sparta  before  the 
Romans  could  intervene.  Grainger  does  not  specify  why  the  Aetolian  league  would  have 
wanted  Philopoemen  to  take  control  over  Sparta. 
31  See  Polyb.  21.3.4.  for  the  earlier  decision  by  the  Romans  to  release  Spartan  hostages,  but 
to  retain  Armenas,  Nabis'  son,  who  died  shortly  afterwards.  Walbank  (1979)  p.  91. 
255 these  communities  on  the  instigation  of  the  Aetolian  league  in 
194BC,  this  assault  may  in  reality  have  had  more  to  do  with  local 
rivalries  than  any  grandiose  plot  against  Rome. 
The  depiction  of  how  Nabis  was  killed  and  of  Alexamenus' 
subsequent  actions  follows  in  the  Polybian  tradition  of 
representing  the  Aetolians  as  acting  in  an  irrational  manner  in  the 
Peloponnese.  If  Alexamenus  was  acting  in  accordance  with  a  pre- 
arranged  Aetolian  plan  to  seize  control  of  strategically  important 
locations  at  the  advent  of  a  war  that  was  itself  a  highly  risky 
venture,  he  may  have  had  no  other  choice  if  Nabis  refused  to  co- 
operate.  However,  the  Aetolian  failure  to  consolidate  control  over 
Sparta  was  probably  related  more  to  Philopoemen's  sudden 
intervention  than  Alexamenus'  greed. 
The  problem  with  most  discussions  of  these  events  is  that 
they  focus  solely  on  Sparta,  without  considering  the  role  that 
Sparta  and  the  Peloponnese  played  in  the  Aetolian  league's 
strategic  thinking,  along  with  the  consequences  of  Nabis' 
assassination  32  The  Aetolian  failure  to  secure  control  over  Sparta 
did  hinder  Antiochus'  movements  on  his  arrival  in  Greece.  Soon 
afterwards  Antiochus  arrived  with  an  army  of  approximately  ten 
thousand  men  and  occupied  Demetrias,  which  the  Aetolians  had 
32  There  has  been  a  move  away  from  accepting  the  Polybian  narrative  in  recent  years, 
most  notably  by  Cartledge  (1989)  pp.  67-70.  Accepting  that  there  were  revolutionary 
aspects  of  Nabis'  regime,  Cartledge  places  them  in  a  wider  context,  arguing  that  Nabis 
had  more  in  common  with  a  Hellenistic  tyrant  than  a  traditional  Spartan  king  did. 
256 successfully  secured.  '  This  force  was  inadequate,  since  Antiochus 
needed  to  use  it  to  provide  garrisons  around  Greece,  whilst  at  the 
same  time  retain  a  force  adequate  for  battle'  Acting  under  the 
belief  that  Sparta  and  the  other  two  locations  would  be  secured  by 
the  Aetolian  league,  Antiochus  had  hastened  to  Greece  with  a 
force  inadequate  for  both  tasks.  The  failure  to  secure  Sparta 
forced  Antiochus  to  divert  a  thousand  troops  to  Elis  to  defend 
Aetolia's  Peloponnesian  allies,  weakening  the  force  that  he  hoped 
to  confront  Rome  with  35 
If  the  Achaean  league  was  supporting  Rome  in  its  conflict 
with  Antiochus,  what  did  Megalopolitans  such  as  Philopoemen 
gain  in  return?  Although  Philopoemen's  seizure  of  Sparta  was  a 
reaction  to  events  there,  it  is  evident  that  not  only  did 
Philopoemen  gain  control  over  Sparta  in  192BC,  but  that  other 
Aetolian  allies  in  the  Peloponnese,  such  as  Messene  and  Elis,  were 
later  absorbed  into  the  Achaean  league  under  Flamininus' 
direction. 
Again  the  problem  is  to  assess  how  far  the  Romans  knew 
about  and  exploited  regional  differences  within  the  Greek  world. 
After  Flamininus'  settlement  in  the  Peloponnese  had  been  so 
detrimental  to  the  interests  of  the  Aetolian  league,  the  Aetolian 
decision  to  approach  Antiochus  was  an  attempt  to  try  and  reverse 
"  Livy.  35.43.4-5. 
34  Larsen  (1968)  p.  415-416. 
`5  See  Livy.  35.43.6.  and  36.5.2-3.  Larsen  (1968)  p.  416.  They  were  probably  also  meant  to 
protect  Messene. 
257 this  settlement.  As  such,  it  was  in  the  interest  of  Megalopolitans 
like  Philopoemen  to  co-operate  with  Rome  in  order  to  secure  their 
own  position  in  the  Peloponnese. 
Philopoemen's  intervention  at  Sparta  favoured  Roman 
interests;  despite  this,  his  stated  policy  towards  Sparta  during  the 
war  was  that: 
Since  king  Antiochus  and  the  Romans  were  hovering  about 
in  Greece  with  armies  so  great,  it  behoved  the  strategos  of 
the  league  to  pay  attention  to  them,  and  not  to  stir  up 
domestic  troubles  36 
Sometime  in  191BC,  Plutarch  informs  us  that  there  were 
problems  in  Sparta,  and  in  response  the  Achaean  strategos, 
Diophanes  of  Megalopolis,  marched  on  Sparta  with  Flamininus  to 
restore  order.  Before  they  could  intervene,  Philopoemen  went  to 
Sparta  in  a  private  capacity,  and: 
Put  an  end  to  the  disorders  in  the  polis,  and  brought  the 
Lacedaemonians  back  into  the  league  as  they  were  from  the 
outset  37 
Once  the  Aetolian/Syrian  War  was  over,  in  188BC, 
Philopoemen's  reaction  was  very  different.  The  cause  of  trouble 
was  the  congregation  of  a  number  of  Spartan  exiles  at  Las,  one  of 
the  coastal  communities  over  which  the  Achaean  league  had  been 
given  protective  status  in  195BC.  The  Spartan  government 
36  P1ut.  Philop.  16.1. 
37  P1ut.  Philop.  16.2.  Aymard  (1938)  p.  337. 
258 attacked  the  exiles,  who  in  response  appealed  to  the  Achaean 
league  for  assistance.  ' 
According  to  the  sources,  Philopoemen  insisted  that  those 
responsible  be  handed  over  for  trial.  The  Spartans  refused, 
instead  killing  thirty  pro-Achaean  politicians,  and  appealed  to  the 
Roman  consul  at  Cephallonia,  who  suggested  that  all  involved 
send  embassies  to  Rome  39  Diophanes  and  Lycortas,  both 
Megalopolitans,  were  sent  to  represent  the  Achaean  league. 
Diophanes  suggested  that  the  matter  should  be  left  to  the  senate 
to  settle.  Lycortas  argued  that  the  matter  be  left  to  the  Achaean 
league,  which  would  deal  with  this  problem  under  the  terms  of 
the  treaty  4°  According  to  Livy  the  senate's  reply  was: 
So  obscurely  worded  that  while  the  Achaeans  took  it  as  a 
concession  of  their  claims  in  relation  to  Sparta,  the  Spartans 
interpreted  it  as  not  giving  the  Achaeans  all  that  they  had 
demanded  41 
Why  did  the  Romans  give  such  an  ambiguous  answer  that 
made  both  sides  believe  that  they  were  in  the  right?  42  Encouraged 
by  the  Roman  response,  Philopoemen  led  the  Achaean  army  to 
'8  See  Livy.  38.31.6-7. 
39  Livy.  38.31.5-6.  Between  their  appeal  and  the  sending  of  the  embassy  it  appears  that  the 
Achaean  league  declared  war  on  Sparta,  though  because  of  the  onset  of  winter  there  was 
little  fighting. 
40  Exrington  (1969)  p.  137. 
"  Livy.  38.32.10. 
`'  Errington  (1969)  pp.  143-4  suggests  that  the  senate  wished  not  to  get  involved. 
259 Sparta,  accompanied  by  the  exiles,  and  a  conference  was  arranged 
at  a  place  called  Compasion  43  An  affray  broke  out  and  seventeen 
Spartans  were  killed.  A  further  sixty-three  were  executed  the 
following  day  after  a  brief  trial  that  resembled  a  lynching. 
Philopoemen  entered  Sparta  and  imposed  a  settlement  designed 
to  humiliate.  The  walls  that  Nabis  built  were  pulled  down.  All  the 
slaves  and  foreign  mercenaries  that  had  been  enfranchised  were 
expelled,  and  the  constitution  and  system  of  education  of  the 
mythical  Lycurgus,  (or  those  parts  of  it  that  Nabis  had  found  it 
expedient  to  restore),  were  replaced  by  the  Achaean  model.  Those 
who  refused  to  accept  these  measures  were  rounded  up  and  sold 
into  slavery,  the  money  raised  being  used  to  repair  the  portico  in 
Megalopolis  that  had  been  damaged  by  Cleomenes'  forces.  Sparta 
was  also  forced  to  give  Belbinatis  to  Megalopolis.  " 
As  Cartledge  points  out,  the  events  of  192BC  must  have  come 
as  a  shock  and  a  humiliation  to  the  Spartans  with  their  long 
history,  and  in  reality  marked  the  end  of  Sparta's  independence  45 
Philopoemen's  brutality  four  years  after  he  had  brought  Sparta 
within  the  Achaean  league  shows  signs  of  his  Megalopolitan 
background  46  Sparta's  subjection  was  not  solely  to  the  Achaean 
league,  but  specifically  to  Megalopolis  47 
Livy.  38.33.6-11. 
"  For  Philopoemen's  settlement  see  Livy.  38.34.1-9. 
Cartledge  (1989)  p.  77-8. 
46  Errington  (1969)  p.  147.  As  Errington  argues,  many,  if  not  all  of  the  actions 
Philopoemen  undertook  show  signs  of  him  wishing  to  demonstrate  Sparta's  subjection 
260 The  key  point  in  assessing  these  events  is  the  ambiguous 
reply  from  the  senate  regarding  what  should  be  done  about  the 
Spartan  attack  on  the  exiles  at  Las.  If  Livy  is  to  be  believed,  the 
problem  was  that  both  sides  seem  to  have  regarded  it  as  giving 
them  what  they  wanted,  but  unfortunately  that  is  all  we  are  told. 
Again  one  must  remember  that  all  the  Achaean  officials  involved 
in  this  affair,  such  as  Philopoemen  and  Diophanes,  were 
Megalopolitans  intent  on  humiliating  Sparta.  As  Polybius,  in  a 
fragment  of  his  otherwise  lost  account  states: 
It  was  a  good  act  to  restore  to  their  country  the  Spartan 
exiles.  .  .  and  it  was  an  advantageous  one  to  humble  Sparta  48 
It  is  evident  that  Megalopolitan  like  Philopoemen 
considered  that  the  senate's  reply  gave  them  total  authority  to  do 
what  they  liked  in  Sparta.  It  is  arguable  whether  this  was  what  the 
senate  intended.  When  in  the  following  year  the  Spartans 
complained  to  the  senate  about  the  actions  undertaken  by 
Philopoemen,  we  are  told  that: 
to  Megalopolis.  Plutarch  mentions  that  a  Spartan  source  records  a  death  toll  of  three 
hundred  and  fifty.  Plut.  Philop  16.4. 
41  It  might  be  simply  coincidence,  but  in  188BC,  the  Achaean  league  changed  its 
assembly's  location  from  Aegium  to  a  system  where  the  assembly  met  in  different  poleis 
within  the  Achaean  league  in  rotation  (Livy.  38.30.1-6). See  Badian  and  Errington  (1965) 
p.  13-17. 
'  Polyb.  21.32C. 
261 They  finally  procured  a  letter  from  Marcus  Lepidus.... 
consul  at  that  time,  in  which  he  wrote  to  the  Achaeans 
saying  that  they  had  not  acted  rightly  in  Sparta  49 
Philopoemen  sent  an  embassy  in  response,  and  when  it 
returned  in  185BC,  it  reported  that: 
They  (the  senate)  were  displeased  at  the  destruction  of  the 
wall  at  Sparta  and  at  the...  of  those  executed  at  Compasion, 
but  that  they  did  not  revoke  their  previous  decision.  ' 
Although  the  Romans  were  displeased  with  the  actions 
undertaken  by  Philopoemen  in  188BC,  they  did  not  object  to 
Sparta'  s  membership  of  the  Achaean  league.  Their  sole  concern 
was  the  brutal  manner  in  which  Megalopolitans  like  Philopoemen 
acted  at  Sparta. 
Nor  was  Sparta  the  only  state  in  the  Peloponnese  that  came 
under  the  control  of  the  Achaean  league  during  the 
Aetolian/Syrian  War.  At  the  same  time  that  he  tried  to  invade 
Sparta  in  191BC,  according  to  Livy,  Diophanes  also  attempted  to 
invade  Messene  and  Elis.  Flamininus,  after  an  appeal  from 
Deinocrates,  which  stated  that  the  Messenians  were  willing  to 
49  Polyb.  22.3.1-2. 
50  Polyb.  22.7.5-7.  Diodorus  has  a  different  account  where  Roman  envoys  report  the 
displeasure  of  the  senate  and  states  that  it  was  displeased  at  the  construction  of  the 
walls.  Diod.  29.17.  Walbank  argues  that  Diodorus  made  a  mistake  and  that  the  senate's 
displeasure  at  the  completion  of  the  walls  should  refer  to  their  destruction.  He  suggests 
that  the  lacuna  in  the  Polybian  text  referred  to  the  senate's  displeasure  at  the  abolition  of 
the  Spartan  constitution.  Walbank  (1979)  p.  188. 
262 surrender  to  Rome  but  not  to  the  Achaean  league,  prevented  the 
invasion.  According  to  Livy,  Flamininus  set  himself  up  as  a 
neutral  arbitrator,  and  made  Messene  recall  its  exiles  and  join  the 
Achaean  league  51  Elis  also  appears  to  have  become  a  member  at 
this  point,  resulting  in  the  Achaean  league  dominating  the 
Peloponnese  52 
All  three  states  had  co-operated  with  the  Aetolian  league 
during  the  Social  and  First  Macedonian  Wars,  with  both  Elis  and 
Messene  subsequently  fighting  against  Rome  with  the  Aetolians, 
and  had  long  resisted  absorption  into  the  Achaean  league.  Does 
Flamininus'  decision  to  make  them  part  of  the  Achaean  league 
show  his  ignorance  of  the  situation  in  the  Peloponnese?  Or  rather 
was  he  rewarding  the  close  co-operation  received  from 
Megalopolitans  like  Philopoemen?  If  one  returns  to  the  situation 
before  the  war,  Aristaenus'  reaction  to  the  Aetolian  league's  offer 
to  persuade  Nabis  to  evacuate  Sparta  was  to  express  the  fear  that 
such  a  move  would  result  in  the  Aetolian  league  retaining  its 
position  in  the  Peloponnese.  Nabis'  death  and  Philopo 
;  emen's 
seizure  of  Sparta  was  a  major  blow  to  the  plot  that  the  Aetolian 
league  had  hatched.  Although  Philopoemen's  actions  in  192BC 
5'  Livy.  36.31.6-9.  See  Aymard  (1938)  pp.  343-345,  Gruen  (1984)  p.  468-70  for  these  events. 
According  to  Errington  (1969)  pp.  125-6.  Deinocrates  was  a  client  of  Flamininus. 
52  The  Achaeans  also  tried  to  gain  control  over  the  island  of  Zacynthos,  but  were 
prevented  from  doing  so  by  Flamininus,  see  Paus.  8.30.5.  Elis  was  certainly  a  member  of 
the  Achaean  league  by  189BC  according  to  Livy.  38.32.3. 
263 were  probably  not  preconceived,  they  undoubtedly  did  assist 
Rome. 
The  key-figure  surrounding  these  events  is  Flamininus,  who 
had  been  instrumental  in  the  conduct  of  the  relationship  between 
the  Achaean  league  and  Rome  since  198BC.  His  actions  in  the 
Peloponnese  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Second  Macedonian  War, 
especially  his  decision  to  remove  Nabis  from  Argos,  seem  to 
suggest  that  he  favoured  Achaean,  in  particular,  Megalopolitan, 
primacy  in  the  Peloponnese.  When  Nabis  had  attacked  the  coastal 
communities  placed  under  the  control  of  the  Achaean  league, 
Flamininus  had  intervened  to  support  Philopoemen,  and  later 
presented  Messene  and  possibly  Elis  to  the  Achaean  league.  These 
actions  would  seem  to  suggest  that  he  was  rewarding 
Megalopolitan  assistance  with  control  over  the  Aetolian  league's 
allies  in  the  Peloponnese. 
This  co-operation  does  not  mean  that  politicians  in  the 
Achaean  league  like  Aristaenus  and  Philopoemen  were  pro- 
Roman.  Again,  one  must  remember  how  the  Romans,  to  further 
their  imperial  ambitions  during  the  First  Macedonian  War, 
exploited  the  position  that  the  Aetolian  league  found  itself  in. 
Flamininus'  role  in  developing  the  relationship  between  the 
Achaean  league  and  Rome,  indicates  that  his  decision  to  support 
the  primacy  of  the  Megalopolitans  within  the  Achaean  league  was 
based  on  his  awareness  of  the  situation  in  the  Peloponnese, 
exploiting  tensions  between  Greek  states  to  further  Rome's 
264 control.  Although  the  advent  of  Rome  in  the  Greek  world  was 
undoubtedly  viewed  with  apprehension  by  many  Greek  states,  it 
also  gave  them  the  opportunity,  if  they  co-operated  with  Rome,  to 
further  their  local  ambitions.  As  Philopoemen's  actions  show,  by 
assisting  Rome  he  was  able  to  humiliate  the  Spartans  and  avenge 
all  the  perceived  wrongs  suffered  by  Megalopolis  at  Spartan 
hands  since  370BC. 
Rome,  the  Achaean  league  and  the  question  of  the  Spartan 
exiles. 
If  Megalopolitan  politicians  benefited  through  their  co- 
operation  with  Rome  during  the  Aetolian/Syrian  War,  this  raises 
questions  about  how  closely  the  Romans  exercised  their  control 
over  the  Greek  world.  Firstly  how  much  latitude  and  freedom 
Rome  gave  the  states  that  co-operated  with  them.  Secondly  how 
accurate  was  Polybius'  depiction  of  the  evolution  of  the 
relationship  between  the  Achaean  league  and  Rome.  Was  it  the 
case  that  initially  the  Achaean  league  was  able  to  maintain  its 
independence,  but  later  became  subject  to  Rome?  Or  rather  that 
Polybius  was  explaining  the  situation  between  the  two  in  terms 
of  the  influence  of  anacyclosis,  presenting  the  two  acting  as 
equals,  so  that  he  could  instruct  his  readers  about  the  decline 
that  had  taken  place  in  the  Achaean  league?  In  188BC,  when  the 
Aetolian  league  was  defeated  by  Rome  and  forced  to  conclude  a 
humiliating  treaty,  the  Achaean  league  had  expanded  to 
encompass  the  entire  Peloponnese.  Eight  years  later  came  the 
265 embassy  of  Callicrates,  who  according  to  Polybius,  first  gave  the 
Romans  the  idea  that  they  should  treat  the  Greeks  as  subjects. 
In  this  section  I  will  contend  that  when  Philopoemen  tried 
to  pursue  a  more  independent  foreign  policy,  this,  coupled  with 
his  treatment  of  Sparta  in  188BC,  caused  concern  to  the  Romans 
about  the  dangers  it  would  pose.  Fearful  about  the 
consequences,  the  senate  exploited  the  problem  of  the  Spartan 
exiles,  and  later  the  Messenian  revolt,  to  undermine  the 
dominant  position  that  Megalopolis  and  other  Arcadian 
communities  held  within  the  Achaean  league,  Callicrates  using 
Roman  support  to  gain  power  for  the  region  in  the  Peloponnese 
he  represented.  Indeed,  although  Polybius  states  that  Callicrates 
was  the  initiator  of  great  calamities  for  the  Greeks,  he  also 
admits  that  Callicrates  was  quite  unaware  of  the  role  that  he  was 
to  play  53 
For  Polybius  the  great  calamity  that  Callicrates  was 
responsible  for  in  18OBC  was  initiating  the  final  stage  of 
anacyclosis  in  the  Achaean  system  of  government,  even  though  in 
reality  Callicrates  was  probably  trying  advance  the  interests  of  his 
own  region.  Polybius  speaks  at  great  length  about  the  unified 
nature  of  the  Peloponnese  under  the  Achaean  league;  its  other 
members  probably  resented  the  dominance  exercised  by 
Megalopolitans  within  it.  I  shall  suggest  that  the  Romans 
exploited  the  situation  in  Sparta  and  Messene  to  weaken  the 
53  Polyb.  24.10.8. 
266 Megalopolitan  position  within  the  Achaean  league.  This 
encouraged  the  emergence  of  politicians  like  Callicrates  who  were 
from  states  that  had  been  excluded  from  the  centre  of  power  in 
the  Achaean  league.  Polybius'  assertions  that  Callicrates 
manipulated  the  mob  and  only  gained  election  to  the  office  of 
Achaean  strategos  though  his  use  of  bribery,  were  to  show  to  his 
readers  the  onset  of  the  last  phase  of  anacyclosis  in  the  Achaean 
system  of  government.  Prior  to  this  mission  Polybius  presents 
Achaeans  like  Philopoemen  and  Aristaenus  dealing  with  Rome  as 
equals,  portraying  Callicrates'  decision  to  tell  the  senate  that  they 
should  in  future  treat  the  Achaean  league  as  a  subject  state  as  the 
end  of  this  situation.  We  should  question  the  extent  to  which 
Polybius'  representation  of  the  earlier  interaction  between 
Achaean  leaders  such  as  Philopoemen  with  Rome  was  based  on 
his  need  to  show  an  Achaean  league  whose  democracy  declined 
under  the  influence  of  anacyclosis. 
The  first  sign  that  the  Achaean  league,  and  Philopoemen  in 
particular,  was  not  willing  to  assume  a  subservient  position 
towards  Rome  came  in  188BC,  when  Flamininus  attempted  to 
have  a  Boeotian  exile  restored,  and  requested  that  the  Achaean 
and  Aetolian  leagues  send  embassies  to  accomplish  it.  The 
Achaean  league  first  demanded  that  Boeotia  and  Megara  settle  a 
number  of  outstanding  lawsuits.  The  Boeotians  refused,  so 
Philopoemen  allowed  the  Megarians  to  seize  property  in 
compensation.  Because  of  the  tension  caused  by  these  raids, 
267 Flamininus  was  unable  to  carry  out  his  plan,  since  as  Polybius 
states: 
Had  the  senate  at  this  juncture  followed  up  its  order,  war 
would  have  erupted:  but  now  the  senate  kept  quiet? 
Philopoemen  also  seems  to  have  tried  to  interfere  with  the 
settlement  Flamininus  imposed  in  Messene  in  191BC.  From  a 
remark  made  by  Diophanes  in  185BC,  it  appears  that 
Philopoemen  tried  to  adjust  the  settlement  around  this  time.  " 
Philopoemen's  actions  at  Sparta  had  assisted  the  Romans  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  Aetolian/Syrian  War,  and  had  been  rewarded  by 
Flamininus.  Philopoemen  had  undertaken  these  actions  only 
because  they  were  in  Megalopolis'  interests.  Once  the  Aetolian 
threat  to  the  Peloponnese  had  been  neutralised,  Philopoemen  may 
have  started  to  look  towards  strengthening  the  Achaean  league's 
alliances  with  other  Greek  states  to  defend  against  further  Roman 
encroachment. 
If  this  is  the  case,  the  diplomatic  contacts  that  the  Achaean 
league  renewed  with  the  Hellenistic  monarchies  shortly 
afterwards  take  on  a  new  meaning.  Sometime  in  188BC, 
Demetrius  of  Athens  came  to  renew  the  alliance  that  Ptolemy  had 
54  Polyb.  22.4.16.  For  an  account  of  the  episode  see  Polyb.  22.4.1-17.  Megara  had  been  a 
member  of  the  Achaean  league  since  205BC.  See  Errington  (1969)  p.  153. 
Polyb.  22.10.6-7.  Errington  (1969)  p.  157  and  Walbank  (1979)  p.  193.  Errington  suggests 
that  this  restoration  would  have  caused  conflict  in  Boeotia  similar  to  that  caused  by 
Flamininus'  restoration  of  Deinocrates  in  Messene  in  191BC,  and  his  attempted  actions 
in  Sparta  in  the  same  year. 
268 with  the  Achaean  league,  and  Philopoemen  agreed,  dispatching 
an  embassy  to  Egypt.  '  The  only  problem  is  that  it  is  not  certain 
which  alliance  was  being  renewed  57  The  Achaean  league  and 
Egypt  had  earlier  been  allied.  Aratus  concluded  an  alliance  with 
Ptolemy  before  he  brought  Sicyon  into  the  Achaean  league. 
During  the  Cleomenic  War  the  Ptolemaic  monarchy  had 
withdrawn  its  subsidy  to  Aratus  in  favour  of  Cleomenes.  When 
or  whether  this  relationship  had  been  restored  is  unknown. 
When  the  embassy  from  Egypt  returned  to  the  Achaean 
assembly  at  Megalopolis  in  185BC,  two  further  ones  accompanied 
it.  58  After  hearing  a  report  regarding  the  senate's  decision  not  to 
take  any  further  action  over  Philopoemen's  actions  at  Sparta  in 
188BC,  the  representatives  of  Eumenes  of  Pergamum  requested 
that  the  alliance  between  the  two  should  be  renewed  and  offered 
one  hundred  and  twenty  talents  to  pay  the  Achaean 
assemblymen  59  The  alliance  was  renewed,  but  the  money  was 
refused  because  of  fears  that  this  would  give  Pergamum  control 
over  Achaean  affairs,  along  with  a  dispute  over  who  should 
control  Aegina  60 
'  Polyb.  22.3.5-6. 
'See  Walbank  (1979)  p.  178. 
Polyb.  22.7.1.  ff 
Polyb.  22.7.8. 
60  Po1yb.  22.8.13. 
269 Next,  the  Achaean  ambassadors  to  Egypt  reported  that  they 
had  renewed  the  alliance  with  Ptolemy  and  exchanged  gifts  61 
Aristaenus  voiced  an  objection,  asking  which  particular  alliance 
was  being  renewed.  Because  of  the  ambassador's  failure  to  be 
specific  as  to  which  alliance  they  had  renewed,  he  refused  to 
allow  ratification  of  their  actions  62  The  final  mission  was  from 
Seleucus,  who  offered  a  fleet  of  ships  and  requested  the  renewal 
of  the  alliance  between  the  two.  The  alliance  was  renewed,  but  the 
gift  refused  ' 
The  importance  of  this  conference  at  Megalopolis  on  later 
events  cannot  be  over-emphasised.  The  Achaean  league,  under 
Philopoemen's  leadership,  sought  to  broaden  its  diplomatic 
contacts,  renewing  an  alliance  with  Egypt  that  appears  to  have 
been  dormant  for  fifty  years.  The  question  is  should  these  moves 
be  seen  as  part  of  normal  Hellenistic  diplomacy?  Or  in  view  of 
Philopoemen's  earlier  moves  against  Flamininus'  settlement  in 
Boeotia  and  Messene,  as  an  attempt  to  form  a  system  of  alliances 
to  protect  the  Achaean  league  from  further  Roman  encroachment? 
Since  198BC  Megalopolitans  within  the  Achaean  league  had 
supported  Roman  interests.  This  had  been  in  a  period  when  the 
Aetolian  league  and  Sparta  had  threatened  the  Achaean  league, 
and  specifically,  Megalopolitan  interests  in  the  Peloponnese.  Once 
61  Polyb.  22.9.1. 
62  Polyb.  22.9.12.  Errington  (1969)  p.  164  suggests  that  Aristaenus  wished  to  publicly 
humiliate  Philopoemen  and  Lycortas. 
'  Polyb.  22.9.13.  Walbank  (1979)  p.  192.  possibly  because  they  had  refused  Eumenes'  gift 
270 the  Aetolian  and  Spartan  threat  had  gone,  it  would  appear  that 
Philopoemen  was  trying  to  gain  as  many  allies  as  possible  to 
prevent  further  Roman  encroachment  on  Achaean  affairs. 
Aristaenus'  role  and  his  objections  might  give  us  some 
indication  of  how  this  move  was  viewed.  He  did 
object 
to  the 
renewal  of  the  alliance  'with  Ptolemy,  but  merely  to  the  terms  on 
which  it  would  be  doing  so.  Aristaenus  did  publicly  humiliate 
Philopoemen,  making  him  and  the  ambassadors  appear 
incompetent,  so  possibly  he  was  engaged  in  political  games  with 
his  rival.  However,  this  does  not  imply  that  Aristaenus 
represented  a  pro-Roman  party;  he  had  no  objection  to  the 
Achaean  league  renewing  the  two  other  alliances.  The  Egyptians 
had  abandoned  the  Achaean  league  during  the  Cleomenic  War. 
Possibly  Aristaenus  felt  that  the  Achaean  league  should  not 
renew  its  relationship  with  a  state  that  had  earlier  abandoned  it  to 
the  mercies  of  Sparta. 
Taken  in  the  context  of  the  psychological  impact  that 
Antiochus'  and  Philip  V's  defeats  had  on  the  Greeks  if  appears 
that  the  Achaean  league  was  from  a  relatively  early  stage  acting 
against  the  possibility  of  further  Roman  encroachment,  seeking 
allies  in  the  Hellenistic  World.  Unless  they  were  invited,  it 
appears  unlikely  that  the  representatives  of  the  three  most 
important  Hellenistic  monarchs  would  try  and  renew  their 
alliances  with  the  Achaean  league  at  the  same  time. 
271 The  Roman  response  was  swift.  Shortly  after  the  conference 
at  Megalopolis,  when  the  Nemean  festival  was  in  progress, 
Quintus  Caecilius  Metellus,  a  Roman  envoy  on  his  way  back  from 
Macedonia,  arrived  "  Why  he  chose  to  make  this  detour  is  not 
made  clear,  since  he  was  not  originally  told  to  deal  with 
Peloponnesian  affairs.  As  Polybius  makes  apparent,  Caecilius  was 
dissatisfied  with  events  in  Sparta.  The  senate's  earlier  reaction, 
had  stated  that  Sparta  was  essentially  an  internal  matter  for  the 
Achaean  league.  Although  the  senate  had  sent  a  letter  expressing 
its  displeasure  at  the  way  that  Philopoemen  had  acted  in  188BC,  it 
did  not  revoke  its  previous  decision.  On  Caecilius'  arrival,  he 
requested  that  Aristaenus  summon  the  magistrates  of  the 
Achaean  league,  and  according  to  Polybius,  proceeded  to: 
Find  fault  with  them  for  having  treated  the  Spartans  with 
unwarranted  cruelty  and  severity;  and  exhorted  them  to 
correct  past  errors. 
65 
Caecilius'  intervention,  especially  as  the  senate  had  decided 
that  it  was  an  internal  matter  for  the  Achaean  league,  seems 
surprising.  Errington  suggests  that  Aristaenus  invited  him,  and 
this  is  what  Polybius  implies,  stating  that  during  Ceecilius' 
speech  Aristaenus  remained  silent,  thus  indicating  his  agreement 
with  his  remarks.  Caecilius  requested  that  the  Achaean  assembly 
Polyb.  22.10.1. 
Polyb.  22.10.2.  Erskine  (2000)  p.  175  points  to  Quintus  Caecilius'  anger,  a  typical 
barbarian  characteristic,  in  Polybius'  depiction  of  his  behaviour  at  Megalopolis. 
272 be  called  to  hear  his  complaints  about  the  league's  treatment  of 
Sparta.  The  four  officials  responsible,  Aristaenus,  Diophanes, 
Philopoemen  and  Lycortas,  all  of  whom  were  Megalopolitans, 
refused,  and  they  informed  Caecilius  that  the  assembly  could  not 
be  called  unless  there  was  written  permission  from  the  senate, 
forcing  him  to  back  down.  ' 
Caecilius'  intervention  raises  interesting  questions  about  the 
relationship  between  the  senate  and  Roman  commanders  in  the 
field.  Caecilius'  actions  contradicted  the  senate's  previous 
decision  to  leave  the  question  of  the  Spartan  exiles  to  the  Achaean 
league.  Polybius  states  that  the  Achaeans  blamed  Aristaenus  and 
Diophanes  for  his  intervention,  but  along  with  Philopoemen  and 
Lycortas  they  agreed  not  to  call  the  meeting  requested  67 
So  if  the  senate  did  not  plan  Caecilius'  intervention,  why  did 
he  choose  to  contradict  its  policy,  especially  as  Polybius  presents 
his  behaviour  as  an  angry  and  irrational  act?  One  must  consider 
whether  Philopoemen's  attempts  to  expand  the  relations  that  the 
Achaean  league  had  with  the  Hellenistic  monarchies  was  viewed 
as  a  threat  by  the  Romans;  also  the  independence  Roman 
commanders  had  to  take  action  when  they  saw  fit.  It  would 
appear  that  any  attempt  by  the  Achaean  league  to  maintain  an 
independent  foreign  policy  was  contrary  to  Roman  interests. 
Polyb.  22.10.11-12. 
67  Gruen  suggests  that  after  the  Roman/Achaean  treaty,  a  special  law  was  passed  that 
allowed  individual  Romans  to  call  assemblies  only  if  they  had  such  permission.  See 
Gruen  (1984)  p.  37. 
273 Although  Polybius  presents  these  actions  as  part  of  the  Achaean 
league  maintaining  its  independence,  in  reality  the  decision  to 
renew  alliances  with  the  Hellenistic  kingdoms  in  the  aftermath  of 
the  Aetolian/Syrian  War  would  have  been  seen  as  suspicious.  As 
the  senior  Roman  official  present  in  the  region,  Caecilius  might 
have  felt  it  necessary  to  react  to  the  challenge  posed  to  Rome  by 
the  conference  at  Megalopolis. 
The  result  of  this  intervention  was  the  dispatch  of  two 
embassies  to  Rome,  one  from  Sparta  and  another  from  the 
Achaean  league.  The  Achaean  embassy,  led  by  Apollonidas  of 
Sicyon,  was  sent  to  apologise  for  their  behaviour  towards 
Caecilius  68  Areus  and  Alcibiades,  whom  Polybius  describes  as 
old  exiles  who  had  recently  been  restored  to  Sparta  by 
Philopoemen,  led  the  Spartan  embassy  69  The  identity  of  Areus 
and  Alcibiades  is  confused,  as  is  their  official  status.  Errington 
sees  them  as  an  extremist  faction  within  Sparta  who  did  not 
represent  the  government,  but  Shimron  and  Walbank  suggest  that 
there  was  a  change  in  Sparta's  government  shortly  beforehand, 
and  that  they  were  official  representatives.  70  Polybius  merely 
states  that  they: 
8  Walbank  (1979)  p.  195.  The  identity  of  Apollonidas  and  his  association  with 
Philopoemen  is  unknown.  Walbank's  assertion  that  there  was  little  opposition  within 
the  Achaean  league  over  the  question  of  Sparta  should  be  treated  with  caution.  We  only 
have  the  evidence  provided  by  the  Megalopolitan  Polybius. 
Polyb.  22.11.6-7. 
70  Errington  (1969)  p.  175;  Shimron  (1972)  pp.  108,140-146;  Walbank  (1979)  p.  196. 
274 Went  on  a  mission  against  the  Achaeans  to  the  ruling 
power,  and  accused  those  who  had  so  unexpectedly  saved 
them  and  restored  them  to  their  homes.  " 
It  would  appear  that  Polybius  considered  this  embassy  a 
betrayal,  but  his  words  indicate  something  about  Sparta's 
willingness  to  remain  a  member  of  the  Achaean  league. 
Philopoemen  had  humiliated  Sparta  in  188BC;  it  is  reasonable  to 
suppose  that  he  left  in  control  those  who  were  most  favourably 
disposed  at  the  time  to  Spartan  membership  of  the  Achaean 
league.  Unless  there  was  a  change  of  government  in  Sparta,  which 
appears  unlikely,  it  would  appear  that  even  those  who  co- 
operated  with  Philopoemen  in  188BC  viewed  Spartan 
membership  of  the  Achaean  league  unfavourably.  It  is  also 
possible  that  the  Spartans  may  have  received  an  assurance  from 
Caecilius  that  Sparta's  membership  of  the  Achaean  league  would 
be  reviewed. 
The  senate  had  changed  its  opinion  about  the  Spartan  exile 
question  by  the  time  that  the  embassies  arrived  in  Rome.  After 
hearing  the  Spartan  complaints,  they  dispatched  a  mission  led  by 
Appius  Claudius  Pulcher  to  investigate  the  matter,  and  on  his 
arrival  he  found  that  the  Achaean  league  had  sentenced  Areus 
and  Alcibiades  to  death  in  their  absence.  In  the  following  debate, 
Lycortas  defended  Philopoemen's  actions  in  Sparta  in  a  long 
"  Polyb.  22.11.8. 
275 speech.  '  Appius'  extremely  blunt  and  brief  reaction  was  to  state 
that: 
He  strongly  advised  the  Achaeans  to  achieve  a  reconciliation 
while  it  was  still  open  to  them  to  do  so  of  their  own  free  will, 
for  fear  that  they  should  be  forced  to  it  later  against  their  will 
and  under  compulsion.  73 
Should  this  reversal  in  policy  be  seen  as  a  sign  of  Roman 
concern  about  the  fate  of  a  few  Spartan  exiles?  Caecilius' 
intervention  seems  to  have  persuaded  the  senate  to  become  more 
closely  involved  in  events  in  the  Peloponnese.  It  would  appear 
that  Roman  interest  in  the  Spartan  question  was  actually  based  on 
their  concern  about  Philopoemen's  attempt  to  renew  diplomatic 
contacts  with  other  Greek  states,  whilst  maintaining  the  fiction 
that  Rome  had  in  reality  brought  freedom  to  the  Greeks  from 
Macedonian  tyranny. 
The  result  was  the  dispatch  of  more  embassies  to  the  senate 
from  the  Peloponnese,  since  according  to  Pausanias,  Pulcher 
encouraged  the  Spartans  to  send  representatives  to  Rome.  74  At  this 
point,  events  become  confused,  since  there  were  several  missions 
from  Sparta.  The  first  was  led  by  Lysis,  who  wanted  a  complete 
restoration  of  all  the  property  he  and  his  supporters  had 
possessed  before  they  were  exiled.  The  second,  led  by  Areus  and 
n  Livy.  39.36-37. 
"  Livy.  39.37.19. 
74  Polyb.  23.4.1.  Paus.  7.9.4. 
276 Alcibiades,  wanted  the  restoration  of  all  their  property  up  to  the 
value  of  one  talent,  with  the  rest  to  be  distributed  amongst  the 
rest  of  the  citizens.  Serippus,  who  supported  the  Achaean  league, 
led  a  third  mission,  the  final  one  being  led  by  Chaeron  who 
represented  those  killed  at  Compasion.  75 
The  senate's  decision  was  to  give  the  matter  over  to  a 
commission  to  three,  composed  of  Flamininus,  Caecilius  and 
Appius  Claudius,  who  were  to  reach  a  solution  to  this  question.  76 
Badian  points  to  the  expertise  and  close  involvement  in  Greek 
affairs  that  the  three  commissioners  had.  "  Flamininus  had  been 
involved  with  attempts  to  settle  Spartan  affairs  in  191BC,  and  was 
the  key  figure  in  developing  the  relationship  between  the 
Achaean  league  and  Rome.  Caecilius  had  raised  the  issue  of  the 
Spartan  exiles  at  the  Nemean  Games  in  185BC,  after  the  senate 
had  written  saying  that  they  considered  the  matter  closed.  Appius 
Claudius  had  been  sent  by  the  senate  to  investigate  the  affairs  of 
the  Achaean  league  after  Caecilius'  intervention,  and  on  assessing 
the  situation,  supported  the  view  that  the  matter  warranted 
Roman  intervention. 
'  Who  exactly  represented  the  Spartan  government  is  a  matter  of  guesswork.  For 
example  Errington  (1969)  p.  288  argues  that  apart  from  Chaeron's  group,  all  the  others 
were  in  exile.  Shimron  (1972)  p.  149  that  all  the  Spartan  representatives  apart  from 
Serippus'  group  were  in  exile. 
76  Polyb.  23.4.7. 
Badian  (1958)  p.  90. 
277 The  commission  proposed  that  all  the  exiles  should  be 
restored  along  with  the  bodies  of  those  killed  at  Compasion,  and 
that  Sparta  should  remain  a  member  of  the  Achaean  league.  '$ 
However,  property  was  not  mentioned  in  the  settlement;  since 
this  was  the  issue  that  divided  the  Spartans  the  question  was 
essentially  left  unresolved.  To  analyse  what  the  decision  of  the 
Roman  commission  would  mean,  by  restoring  the  exiles  without 
making  any  provision  for  the  restoration  of  property,  they  might 
have  been  trying  to  weaken  the  Megalopolitan  position  within  the 
Achaean  league  by  creating  the  potential  for  further  discord. 
According  to  Polybius,  the  Achaean  envoy  Xenarchus  was 
unwilling  to  agree  to  these  measures,  and  only  did  so  because  he 
feared  the  consequences  of  not  doing  so''  This  appears  to  suggest 
that  not  only  were  the  Romans  aware  of  situation  in  the 
Peloponnese  with  various  ethnic  groups  contending  for  position 
over  each  other,  but  that  they  were  exploiting  the  situation  to 
further  their  control  over  the  Greek  world. 
The  Messenian  War  183BC 
The  process  of  subverting  the  position  that  Megalopolitans 
held  within  the  Achaean  league  by  the  senate  continued  during 
the  war  with  Messene.  The  reasons  for  this  conflict  are  quite  clear. 
Messene  had  become  a  member  of  the  Achaean  league  during  the 
Aetolian/Syrian  War  under  Flamininus'  direction.  In  view  of  its 
78  Polyb.  23.4.8-9. 
79  Polyb.  23.4.15. 
278 earlier  alliance  with  the  Aetolian  league,  and  hostility  to  the 
Achaean  league,  its  membership  was  not  voluntary. 
Philopoemen,  who  interfered  with  Flamininus'  settlement  in  some 
unspecified  manner,  made  this  situation  worse  8°  What  is  of 
interest  is  the  way  the  Romans  exploited  the  issue  to  further  their 
control  over  the  Greek  world.  Flamininus  was  responsible  for 
Messene's  membership  of  the  Achaean  league.  His  attempt  to 
assist  Messene  to  secede,  along  with  the  senate's  refusal  to  assist 
the  Achaean  league  to  regain  control  over  Messene  suggests  that 
the  relationship  between  Rome  and  Arcadian  communities  in  the 
Peloponnese  that  Flamininus  had  created  in  the  aftermath  of  the 
Second  Macedonian  War  had  broken  down.  I  shall  argue  that  the 
senate  was  exploiting  regional  differences  in  the  Peloponnese  to 
remove  the  hold  that  Megalopolitans  had  over  the  Achaean 
league  in  order  to  promote  the  interests  of  those  who  might  be 
more  favourably  disposed  to  supporting  Rome. 
According  to  Polybius,  Deinocrates  approached  Flamininus, 
sometime  in  183BC  to  discuss  Messene's  continued  membership 
of  the  Achaean  league  81  After  listening  to  Deinocrates' 
complaints,  Flamininus  requested  that  the  Achaean  popular 
assembly  be  called  to  discuss  the  matter,  but  Philopoemen 
refused  because  permission  was  not  available  from  the  senate, 
B0  How  exactly  Philopoemen  interfered  with  the  settlement  is  unknown.  According  to 
Walbank  (1979)  p.  193,  it  must  have  been  in  a  manner  that  weakened  Deinocrates' 
position. 
81  Polyb.  22.5.1f. 
279 and  Flamininus  appears  to  have  abandoned  his  attempts  to 
restore  Deinocrates,  at  least  publicly.  '  Soon  afterwards  war  broke 
out  between  the  Achaean  league  and  Messene  when  the  latter 
tried  to  secede.  Around  the  same  time,  there  appears  to  have  been 
a  change  in  the  Spartan  government,  undoubtedly  brought  about 
in  the  aftermath  of  the  Roman  commission.  As  with  so  much  else 
in  this  period  of  Spartan  history,  it  is  not  clear  who  exactly  was  in 
control  '  What  is  important  is  the  embassy  sent  by  the  Achaean 
league-to  gain  Roman  support  in  restoring  both  Messene  and 
Sparta  to  the  Achaean  league.  Before  the  senate  received  the 
ambassadors,  they  requested  that  Q.  Marcius  Philippus,  who  had 
just  returned  from  Macedonia,  give  his  opinion  on  the  matter.  He 
stated  that: 
If  the  senate  paid  no  attention  to  the  request  for  the 
present...  Sparta  would  be  reconciled  with  Messene,  upon 
which  the  Achaeans  would  be  only  too  glad  to  appeal  to  the 
Romans.  84 
This  appears  to  indicate  an  informed  knowledge  of  the 
situation  within  the  Achaean  league,  with  the  senate  drawing  on 
82  Polyb.  23.5.16-17. 
83  Errington  (1969)  p.  289  argues  that  the  group  of  Chaeron  allied  with  that  of  Serippus  to 
take  power.  Shimron  (1972)  pp.  146-8  argues  that  Lysis'  group  took  power  since  they 
were  exiled  in  185BC  by  Areus  and  Alcibiades,  who  were  exiled  after  their  embassy  to 
Rome.  He  bases  this  on  the  murder  of  two  Spartan  ambassadors  on  their  way  to  Rome. 
One  of  them,  Agesipolis,  was  a  former  Spartan  king  associated  with  Cleomenes.  See 
Polyb.  23.6.1-3. 
280 the  knowledge  and  advice  of  those  who  had  recent  experience  of 
Greek  affairs.  Thus,  when  the  embassy  from  the  Achaean  league 
requested  that  supplies  from  Italy  be  prevented  from  reaching 
Messene,  and  that  Roman  troops  be  dispatched  in  accordance 
with  the  treaty  of  alliance,  the  senate  replied  that: 
Not  even  if  the  people  of  Sparta,  Corinth  or  Argos  deserted 
the  league  should  the  Achaeans  be  surprised  if  the  senate  did 
not  think  that  it  concerned  them.  Giving  full  publicity  to 
this  reply,  which  was  a  sort  of  proclamation  that  the 
Romans  would  not  interfere  with  those  who  wished  to  desert 
the  Achaean  league,  they  continued  to  detain  the  envoys, 
waiting  to  see  how  the  Achaeans  would  get  on  at  Messene  85 
Errington  suggests  that  it  was  the  senate's  intention  to  force 
the  Achaean  league  to  negotiate  a  solution,  and  that  the 
ambassadors  were  retained  to  make  sure  the  answer  did  not 
become  public.  "  Walbank  rightly  points  out  that  there  was  no 
point  in  retaining  the  ambassadors  if  they  were  to  keep  secret 
something  that  the  Romans  wished  to  publicise  87  He  suggests 
that  the  Romans  wished  to  maintain  pressure  on  the  Achaean 
league  to  find  a  settlement  to  the  Messenian  question. 
By  refusing  to  send  assistance  to  the  Achaean  league,  and 
encouraging  other  poleis  to  leave  it,  Polybius  presents  the  senate 
Polyb.  23.9.9-10. 
Polyb.  23.9.12-14. 
Errington  (1969)  pp.  186-7. 
87  Walbank  (1979)  p.  229. 
281 laying  down  a  challenge.  However,  did  the  senate  view  the 
Achaean  league's  inability  to  restore  the  Spartan  exiles  as  a  direct 
threat?  The  Achaean  league's  request  that  supplies  from  Italy 
should  not  be  sent  to  Messene,  and  that  Roman  troops  be 
dispatched,  was  merely  a  formal  way  of  gaining  Roman  support. 
The  senate's  refusal  was  a  means  of  expressing  its  disapproval  at 
Philopoemen's  renewal  of  the  Achaean  league's  links  with  the 
Hellenistic  monarchies.  Alone,  the  Achaean  league  was  a 
relatively  small  body,  many  of  whose  members  had  been  forcibly 
incorporated.  If  Philopoemen's  intention  was  to  liberate  Greece 
from  Roman  occupation,  he  could  only  hope  to  achieve  this  goal 
in  conjunction  with  others. 
It  would  appear  that  the  senate  viewed  the  renewal  of  the 
Achaean  league's  alliances  with  the  Hellenistic  monarchies 
during  the  Megalopolis  conference  of  185BC  as  a  threat  to  their 
position  and  authority,  hence  the  refusal  to  supply  assistance.  The 
senate  appears  to  have  wished  to  avoid  conflict,  instead  opting  for 
an  indirect  approach.  With  the  Aetolian  league  reduced  in  power 
and  no  longer  able  to  intervene  in  Peloponnesian  affairs,  and 
Sparta  a  member  of  the  Achaean  league,  the  initial  reasons  that 
Megalopolitan  like  Philopoemen  had  for  supporting  Rome 
disappeared.  The  senate  was  left  with  a  political  elite  within  the 
Achaean  league,  which  by  taking  an  independent  line  in  foreign 
policy,  seemed  not  to  be  accepting  their  de  facto  status  as  Roman 
subjects,  despite  their  "liberation"  from  Macedonia.  They  might 
282 have  felt  that  it  was  better  for  Roman  interests  to  reduce  the 
dominance  that  Megalopolitan  had  over  the  Achaean  league,  and 
promote  the  interests  of  other  regions  in  the  Peloponnese,  whose 
political  representatives  would  be  dependent  on  Roman  support. 
The  senate's  answer  that  they  would  not  prevent  the  shipment  of 
arms  or  supplies  from  Italy  should  not  be  seen  as  a  direct  threat, 
since  it  is  unlikely  that  the  Messenians  relied  on  supplies  from 
Italy.  It  was  more  of  a  public  reprimand,  informing 
Megalopolitans  that  the  policy  they  were  following  was  not 
satisfactory,  since  they  were  not  acting  as  befitted  Roman  subjects. 
Indeed,  when  Lycortas  quelled  the  revolt,  and  the  senate  was 
informed  of  the  victory,  its  reaction  was  quite  different. 
According  to  Polybius,  they  recalled  the  Achaean  ambassador 
Xenarchus,  and: 
Entirely  ignoring  their  former  answer,  they  gave  another 
reply  to  the  same  envoys,  informing  them  that  they  had 
provided  that  no  one  should  import  from  Italy  arms  or  corn 
to  Messene.  88 
A  further  consequence  of  the  Messenian  revolt  was  the  death 
of  Philopoemen.  He  was  captured  and  executed  by  the 
Messenians  during  the  fighting,  leaving  a  vacuum  in  the 
leadership  of  the  Achaean  league  89 
so  Polyb.  23.17.3-4. 
89  P1ut.  Philop.  20.1-3. 
283 The  resolution  of  the  Spartan  question  and  the  embassy  of 
Callicrates. 
This  section  will  deal  with  the  resolution  of  the  Spartan  exile 
question,  in  particular  Callicrates'  actions  and  Polybius'  depiction 
of  them.  My  contention  will  be  that  Callicrates'  actions  should  not 
be  seen  as  those  of  a  traitor  to  the  Greek  world,  or  a  pro-Roman. 
Although  Golan  has  argued  that  Callicrates  and  Polybius  came 
from  similar  political  backgrounds,  this  is  based  on  the 
assumption  that  the  Achaean  league  functioned  as  Polybius 
claimed  it  did  9°  The  principal  difference  between  Callicrates  and 
Polybius  is  that  Achaean  poleis  such  as  Leontium  lost  control  of 
the  league  they  had  founded  to  Dorian  like  Aratus  and 
Arcadians  like  Polybius.  Callicrates'  actions  should  be  seen  in  the 
context  of  an  internal  struggle  for  control  over  the  Peloponnese; 
his  concern  in  180BC  was  to  challenge  the  domination  that 
Arcadians  had  over  the  Achaean  league,  and  re-assert  the  position 
of  his  own  region. 
More  importantly,  Polybius  wrote  his  histories  in  order  to 
explain  to  his  readers  how,  through  the  workings  of  anacyclosis 
and  tyche,  the  Romans  had  come  to  control  the  Greek  world. 
Polybius  states  that  it  was  Callicrates  who  gave  the  senate  the 
idea  that  the  Greeks  should  be  treated  like  subjects  for  the  first 
time.  Polybius  also  depicts  Callicrates'  mission  resulting  in  an 
'0  Golan(1995)  p.  75.  He  earlier  suggested  that  after  Megalopolis  had  been  integrated  into 
the  Achaean  league  it  was  unable  to  preserve  its  independence.  Golan  (1995)  p.  13. 
284 increased  role  for  the  mob  in  dictating  the  decisions  of  the 
Achaean  assembly  and  bringing  corrupt  politicians  into  the 
highest  offices  of  the  Achaean  league.  In  effect  Polybius  was 
presenting  to  his  readers  the  internal  decline  that  had  taken  place 
in  the  Achaean  league  at  a  time  when  Rome  was  extending  its 
control  over  the  Greek  world.  Callicrates'  entry  into  Achaean 
politics  was  therefore  part  of  the  natural  process  of  anacyclosis  that 
influenced  the  system  of  government  in  a  democracy  like  the 
Achaean  league. 
After  Messene  was  brought  under  control  it  was  decided  to 
re-admit  Sparta  to  the  Achaean  league  91  When  and  why  Sparta 
had  left  is  unknown  92  Although  the  Achaean  league  was  willing 
to  accept  Sparta,  according  to  Polybius,  it  was  unwilling  to  restore 
to  Sparta: 
Those  of  the  old  exiles  who  had  behaved  with  such 
ingratitude  and  irreverence  to  them.  93 
They  appear  to  have  been  the  remnants  of  the  group 
represented  by  Areus  and  Alcibiades  who  were  unable  to  accept 
the  Achaean  league's  authority  94  The  result  was  the  dispatch  of 
two  embassies  to  the  senate,  one  led  by  Bippus  of  Argos 
91  Polyb.  23.17.5.  -  18.5. 
92For  opinions  on  what  exactly  was  happening  in  Sparta,  see  Errington  (1969)  p.  290  and 
Shimron  (1972)  p.  114.  Both  agree  that  there  was  an  alliance  between  Serippus  and 
Chaeron  at  this  time,  but  not  on  much  else. 
93  Polyb.  23.17.10. 
94  Shimron  (1972)  p.  110  and  Walbank  (1979)  p.  252. 
285 representing  the  Achaean  league,  the  Spartans  sending  Chaeron 
and  the  exiles  Cleitis  and  Diactorius  95  When  the  exiles  appeared 
at  Rome,  the  senate,  according  to  Polybius: 
Promised  the  exiles  that  they  would  write  to  the  Achaeans 
begging  for  their  return  to  their  country  96 
When  Bippus  arrived  to  represent  the  Achaean  league  a  few 
days  later,  the  senate  gave  a  different  reply.  According  to 
Polybius: 
The  senate  gave  them  a  courteous  reception,  expressing  no 
displeasure  with  anyone  for  the  conduct  of  the  matter.  97 
Why  would  the  senate  give  two  contradictory  messages  to 
these  embassies?  Polybius  states  the  Spartans  had  gained  their 
letter  through  importunity,  though  there  is  no  evidence  of  it  98  The 
Achaean  leadership  genuinely  seem  to  have  believed  that  Bippus 
was  informed  by  the  senate  that  they  had  taken  no  action,  and 
Walbank  suggests  that  they  might  have  informed  Bippus  that  the 
Spartans  begged  for  this  letter  and  that  it  was  only  given  with  the 
greatest  reluctance' 
An  indication  of  why  the  senate  might  have  taken  this 
approach  may  be  found  in  the  embassy  composed  of  Lycortas, 
Polybius  and  Aratus  of  Sicyon,  which  was  sent  to  Ptolemy  to  take 
Polyb.  23.18.5. 
Polyb.  24.1.5. 
Polyb.  24.1.7. 
Errington  (1969)  pp.  199-200. 
Walbank  (1979)  p.  255. 
286 receipt  of  some  warships  he  had  donated  to  the  Achaean  league  100 
That  the  Romans  viewed  this  action  as  a  challenge  to  their  wider 
interests  might  explain  the  senate's  contradictory  answers. 
Although  the  Achaean  league  was  not  acting  in  a  threatening 
manner,  the  senate  might  have  feared  the  potential  threat  posed 
by  Lycortas'  continuation  of  Philopoemen's  policy  in  broadening 
the  number  of  alliances  that  the  Achaean  league  had  with  other 
Hellenistic  states.  The  very  fact  that  Lycortas  continued  this  policy 
might  have  indicated  to  the  senate  that  Flamininus'  decision  to 
support  Megalopolitan  interests  and  primacy  in  the  Peloponnese 
was  mistaken.  Both  Flamininus  and  Caecilius  had  previously 
used  the  question  of  the  Spartan  exiles  to  curb  the  power  of  the 
Megalopolitans  within  the  Achaean  League.  Again,  if  one  looks  at 
the  leadership  of  the  Achaean  league,  the  prominence  of 
Megalopolitans  is  apparent  throughout  this  episode.  As  Eckstein 
points  out,  Polybius,  in  the  fragment  following  Callicrates' 
embassy,  presents  Aristaenus  as  a  patriot  whose  actions  were  at 
all  times  honourable  lol  Regarding  Polybius'  depiction  of 
Aristaenus'  policy  towards  Rome,  Eckstein  points  out  that 
Polybius  is  actually  defending  it.  102  Although  there  appears  to 
10°  Polyb.  24.6.1-7.  Aratus  was  probably  the  grandson  of  the  earlier  Achaean  leader  and 
sent  because  of  his  family's  earlier  relationship  with  Egypt.  The  mission  was  cancelled. 
101  See  Eckstein  (1995)  p.  200-3. 
Eckstein  (1995)  p.  203.  n.  39  suggests  that  even  though  Polybius  reported  a  suspicion 
that  Aristaenus  was  responsible  for  the  intervention  of  Quintus  Caecilius  at  Megalopolis 
in  185BC,  this  does  not  undermine  his  general  assessment  of  Aristaenus  as  a  patriot. 
287 have  been  a  disagreement  between  Philopoemen  and  Aristaenus 
about  the  policy  that  the  Achaean  league  should  follow  regarding 
its  relationship  with  Rome,  Polybius  does  not  accuse  Aristaenus 
of  treachery. 
However,  Philopoemen's  death  during  the  Messenian  War 
created  a  vacuum  within  the  Achaean  league's  leadership  that  an 
aspiring  and  ambitious  politician  from  the  north-west  of  the 
Peloponnese,  who  felt  that  the  interests  of  his  region  had  been 
neglected  by  the  Achaean  league,  might  have  sought  to  fill.  Much 
of  the  trouble  that  had  arisen  between  the  Achaean  league  and 
Rome  was  due  to  the  inability  of  Megalopolitans  to  settle  the 
question  of  the  Spartan  exiles.  Sparta  was  naturally  an  important 
consideration  for  an  Arcadian  like  Polybius;  to  a  politician  from 
one  of  the  original  members  of  the  Achaean  league  like  Callicrates 
it  was  a  relatively  unimportant  matter  that  should  be  quickly 
settled  without  provoking  Rome. 
Thus,  when  there  was  a  fresh  communication  from  the  senate 
regarding  the  Spartan  exiles  in  180BC,  the  Achaean  strategos 
Hyperbatus  of  Dyme  raised  the  question  at  the  assembly.  "' 
According  to  Polybius,  the  Achaean  league  split  into  two  groups. 
One  was  led  by  Lycortas,  who  advised  that  the  Achaeans  should 
take  no  action,  arguing  that  to  do  so  would: 
103  Walbank  (1979)  p.  261  for  Hyperbatus  of  Dyme.  His  father  had  earlier  been  strategos 
during  the  Cleomenic  War.  Hyperbatus  was  the  first  non-Megalopolitan  to  hold  the 
office  of  Achaean  strategos  since  205BC 
288 Violate  our  oaths,  our  laws  and  the  inscribed  conventions 
that  hold  our  league  together.  104 
Callicrates  objected  to  this  position  stating,  according  to 
Polybius,  that  the  will  of  Rome  was  above  all  else  105  Despite  this, 
as  Derow  points  out,  it  is  important  to  remember  that  in  no  extant 
passage  of  his  work  does  Polybius  describe  Callicrates  as  pro- 
Roman.  "  Although  the  same  is  true  of  his  depiction  of 
Aristaenus,  the  difference  in  the  characterisation  of  the  two  in 
Polybius'  work  is  evident  107  If  one  considers  the  different  regional 
perspective  that  Callicrates  had  towards  Sparta  from  that  of 
Megalopolitans  like  Aristaenus  and  Lycortas,  his  intervention  and 
suggested  solution  to  the  problem  might  reflect  the  perspective  of 
one  of  the  founder  members  of  the  Achaean  league.  Compared  to 
104  Polyb.  24.8.4.  Walbank  (1979)  p.  261  argues  that  the  Achaean  league  had  introduced 
new  laws  to  prevent  any  further  discussion  of  the  Spartan  question. 
105  Polyb.  24.8.6 
106  Eckstein  (1995)  p.  205  makes  reference  to  Derow's  argument,  but  draws  attention  to 
Polybius'  account  of  others  who  describe  Callicrates  as  pro-Roman.  The  only  passage 
quoted  by  Eckstein  in  support  of  this  position,  (Polyb.  30.27.  )  does  not  describe  Polybius 
as  pro-Roman.  It  actually  states  that  after  an  attempt  to  restore  Polybius  and  the  other 
Achaean  exiles  failed,  in  the  public  bath,  bathers  refused  to  share  the  same  water  as 
Callicrates  since  they  considered  his  presence  morally  polluting.  Polybius  also  states  that 
when  Callicrates  was  declared  the  victor  at  public  festivals  some  of  the  audience  made 
noises  to  show  their  displeasure.  How  Polybius  in  Italy  knew  about  this  is  left  unsaid, 
and  Plutarch  makes  similar  references  to  expressions  of  distaste  against  Socrates' 
accusers.  See  Plut.  Mor.  538A.  cf  Walbank  (1979)  pp.  455. 
107  See  Walbank  (1979)  pp.  264-267  for  a  comparison  between  Polybius'  treatment  of 
Aristaenus  and  Callicrates. 
289 Megalopolis,  poleis  such  as  Leontium,  one  of  the  original  members 
of  the  Achaean  league,  had  no  history  of  animosity  towards 
Sparta.  There  is  also  the  possibility  of  personal  ambition  playing  a 
role;  possibly  Callicrates  saw  supporting  Rome  as  the  best  way  for 
advancing  his  own  ambitions.  However,  suggesting  that 
Callicrates'  ambition  was  purely  personal  fails  to  take  into 
consideration  the  way  that  poleis  like  Leontium  had  been 
sidelined  after  the  expansion  of  the  Achaean  league  into  Arcadia 
during  the  230s  BC.  Callicrates  may  have  seen  this  moment  as  an 
opportunity  to  re-assert  the  position  of  the  original  Achaean  poleis 
within  the  league  they  had  created. 
Returning  to  the  embassy  itself,  according  to  Polybius,  when 
the  Achaean  assembly  met  to  decide  what  action  to  take,  they 
appointed  an  embassy  consisting  of  Callicrates  of  Leontium, 
Lydiades  of  Megalopolis  and  Aratus  of  Sicyon  to  point  out  to  the 
senate  what  Polybius  states  was  Lycortas'  opinion  "'  That  they 
should  have  sent  Callicrates  to  express  Lycortas'  views  seems 
extraordinary,  especially  since  Polybius  makes  no  reference  to  the 
other  ambassadors'  comments  to  the  senate,  despite  their 
illustrious  ancestry.  109 
1..  Polyb.  24.8.8. 
109Callicrates'  two  companions  share  the  same  names  as  Lydiades  who  brought 
Megalopolis  within  the  Achaean  league  and  Aratus,  who  had  been  so  important  in 
expanding  the  Achaean  league.  It  is  usually  accepted  that  Callicrates'  fellow 
ambassadors  were  their  descendants. 
290 When  he  arrived  in  Rome,  Polybius  states  that  Callicrates 
departed  from  the  position  held  by  Lycortas  and: 
He  not  only  attempted  to  bring  audacious  accusations 
against  his  political  opponents,  but  to  lecture  the  senate'lo 
According  to  Polybius'  account  of  this  mission,  Callicrates  is 
reputed  to  have  told  the  senate  that: 
It  was  the  fault  of  the  Romans  themselves  that  the  Greeks, 
instead  of  complying  with  their  wishes,  disobeyed  their 
messages  and  orders.  "' 
Callicrates  proceeded  to  claim,  according  to  Polybius,  that 
there  were  two  parties  in  all  the  Greek  states,  one  of  which 
maintained  that  all  the  written  complaints  of  the  Romans  be 
carried  out,  no  matter  what  their  own  laws  might  state.  In  the  case 
of  the  Achaean  league,  those  who  suggested  that  their  own  laws 
took  precedent  were  in  the  ascendancy,  and  as  he  pointed  out  to 
the  assembled  senators: 
The  consequence  being  that  the  supporters  of  Rome  were 
constantly  exposed  to  the  contempt  and  slander  of  the  mob, 
while  it  was  the  reverse  with  their  opponents.  "' 
Callicrates,  according  to  Polybius,  proceeded  to  argue  that 
the  Romans  should  indicate  which  of  the  two  parties  he  indicated 
"0  Polyb.  24.8.9. 
"'  See  Polyb.  24.9.  lff  for  the  speech. 
112  Polyb.  24.9.4-5. 
291 existed  within  the  Achaean  league  they  favoured.  Were  they  to  do 
so,  Callicrates  argued  that: 
If  the  senate  now  gave  some  token  of  their  disapproval  the 
political  leaders  would  soon  go  over  to  the  side  of  Rome,  and 
the  multitude  would  follow  out  of  fear.  But  in  the  event  of 
the  senate  neglecting  to  do  so,  every  one  would  change  and 
adopt  the  other  attitude,  which  in  the  eyes  of  the  multitude 
was  more  dignified  and  honourable.  "' 
How  accurate  is  Polybius'  account  of  Callicrates'  speech? 
Polybius  states  that  Callicrates  used  these,  or  similar  words  in  his 
address  to  the  senate.  That  he  states  the  obvious  to  his  readers 
suggests  a  defensive  attitude.  114  Returning  to  his  account  of  the 
senate's  reaction  to  Callicrates'  speech,  Polybius  states  that: 
The  senate,  thinking  that  what  Callicrates  had  said  was  in 
their  interest,  and  learning  from  him  that  they  should  exalt 
those  who  supported  their  decrees,  and  humble  those  who 
opposed  them,  now  first  began  the  policy  of  weakening  those 
members  of  the  several  states  who  worked  for  the  best,  and  of 
strengthening  those,  who,  no  matter  whether  rightly  or 
wrongly,  appealed  to  its  authority  115 
Accepting  that  the  Romans  remained  ignorant  of  the 
possibilities  offered  by  exploiting  internal  divisions  within  the 
"'  Po1yb.  24.9.6-7. 
Polyb.  24.10.1. 
15  Polyb.  24.10.3-4. 
292 Greek  elite,  as  Polybius  states,  until  Callicrates  pointed  it  out  to 
them,  is  unrealistic.  From  185BC,  the  senate  had  used  the  question 
of  the  Spartan  exiles  to  weaken  the  Megalopolitan  position  within 
the  Achaean  league.  Flamininus  had  earlier  secured  the  support 
of  Megalopolitans  like  Philopoemen  and  Aristaenus  by  granting 
them  control  over  former  Aetolian  allies  in  the  Peloponnese  like 
Elis,  Sparta  and  Messene  during  the  Aetolian/Syrian  War. 
Therefore,  we  should  be  asking  whether  Polybius  portrays  the 
events  surrounding  Callicrates'  embassy  in  a  manner  intended  to 
show  to  his  readers  the  onset  of  anacyclosis  in  the  Achaean 
league's  system  of  government?  ' 
Up  to  the  20th  century,  discussions  of  Callicrates'  actions 
describe  him  as  a  traitor  to  the  Greek  world.  The  first  effort  to  see 
him  in  a  different  light  came  with  Badian,  who  argued  that 
Callicrates  was  an  ordinary  man  making  the  most  of  an 
extraordinary  situation.  116  Derow  supports  this  view,  suggesting 
that  Polybius'  depiction  of  this  mission  is  totally  utilitarian  in 
character;  Callicrates'  advice  to  the  senate  produced  no  real 
benefits  either  to  the  Greeks  or  even  to  the  Romans  themselves.  117 
Eckstein  on  the  other  hand  argues  that  Polybius  depicts 
Callicrates'  actions  as  those  of  a  profoundly  immoral  man  who 
16  Badian  (1958)  p.  90-1. 
Derow  (1970)  p.  13.  In  the  CAH,  Vol  8,  (2"d  ed),  p.  300  n.  15  Derow,  making  reference  to 
his  1970  article  states  that  "the  connection  between  Callicrates'  demarche  at  Rome  and 
Perseus'  accession  to  the  Macedonian  throne  needs  very  much  to  be  borne  in  mind". 
293 betrayed  "Achaea",  "the  best"  and  "justice".  118  Eckstein  argues 
that  to  understand  Polybius'  condemnation  of  Callicrates  it  is 
important  to  remember  that  for  Polybius  the  best  policy  was  to 
deal  with  Rome  on  almost  equal  terms  119  By  telling  the  Romans 
that  they  should  treat  the  Greeks  as  subjects,  Eckstein  argues  that 
Callicrates  changed  the  relationship,  and  this  is  why  Polybius 
holds  him  in  such  contempt.  However,  as  Derow  earlier  noted: 
Roman  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  the  league  had  been 
brought  about  by  the  returned  Spartans  in  188,  and  their 
example  was  followed  often  in  the  succeeding  years.  From 
that  point  on  (if  not  even  earlier)  Achaean  sovereignty  over 
the  internal  affairs  of  the  league  was  far  from  complete.  This 
was  recognised  by  Polybius.  120 
As  Derow  points  out,  Callicrates'  embassy  is  not  recorded  in 
Livy,  suggesting  that  the  Romans  did  not  regard  it  as  a  major 
turning  point.  12'  Though  there  is  no  evidence  for  the  Achaean 
league  for  the  following  five  years,  even  if  it  was  a  period  of 
unrest  within  the  Achaean  league,  it  produced  no  embassies  to  or 
from  Rome.  "  Derow  argues  that  Callicrates  merely  "succeeded  in 
18  Eckstein  (1995)  p.  205. 
19  Po1yb.  24.10.9.  Eckstein  (1995)  p.  205. 
120  Derow  (1970)  p.  20. 
'Z'  There  is  the  possibility  that  Livy  failed  to  include  this  embassy  since  he  may  have 
thought  it  better  not  to  mention  Polybius'  assertion  that  Roman  policy  was  made  by 
Greek  subjects. 
'u  Derow  (1970)  p.  21. 
294 introducing  Roman  support  and  fear  of  Roman  power  into  the 
local  politics  of  the  Greek  states,  and  he  was  instrumental  in  the 
adoption  of  intervention  in  local  affairs  as  a  standard  of  Roman 
diplomacy".  "  According  to  Derow,  Callicrates'  actions  paved  the 
way  for  the  emergence  of  a  new  generation  of  Greek  leaders  who 
used  Rome  and  the  fear  of  Roman  power  to  extend  their  own 
authority.  124  This  is  implied  by  Polybius  who  states  that  the  senate: 
Wrote  not  only  to  the  Achaeans  on  the  subject  of  the  return 
of  the  exiles,  begging  them  to  contribute  to  strengthening 
the  position  of  these  men,  but  to  the  Aetolians,  Epirots, 
Athenians,  Boeotians,  and  Acarnanians,  calling  them  all  as 
it  were  to  witnesses  if  for  the  express  purpose  of  crushing 
the  Achaeans.  Speaking  of  Callicrates  alone  with  no 
mention  of  the  other  envoys,  they  wrote  in  their  official 
answer  that  there  ought  to  be  more  men  in  the  several  states 
like  Callicrates.  125 
Polybius  states  that  the  senate  took  Callicrates  at  his  word, 
and  not  only  supported  him,  but  wrote  in  support  of  politicians  in 
other  states  who  like  Callicrates  were  willing  to  support  Roman 
interests  without  question.  His  implication  is  that  before  this 
point  Rome  had  no  imperialistic  designs  in  Greece.  "'  If  the  senate 
"  Derow  (1970)  p.  21 
'2'  Derow  (1970)  pp.  21-22. 
Polyb.  24.10.6-7. 
Walbank  (1979)  p.  263  suggests  that  they  were  writing  to  the  states  in  which  the  exiles 
lived. 
295 actually  wrote  to  other  Greek  states  to  indicate  that  they  regarded 
Callicrates'  embassy  as  marking  a  change  in  their  attitude 
towards  Greece,  why  does  Livy  fail  to  record  the  embassy? 
Despite  Polybius'  claims,  although  Callicrates  was  elected  as 
Achaean  strategos,  probably  in  180-79BC,  according  to  Polybius 
through  bribery  and  corruption,  as  Gruen  points  out,  the  four 
known  Achaean  strategoi  between  179-168BC  were  opponents  of 
Callicrates,  indicating  that  there  was  no  real  change  within  the 
Achaean  league-"  If  one  accepts  that  Rome  supported  Callicrates 
in  a  public  manner,  as  Polybius  argues  that  it  did,  it  is  surprising 
that  the  result  of  this  support  was  not  more  evident.  12' 
Although  Polybius  presents  it  as  such,  was  Callicrates' 
embassy  the  defining  point  in  the  evolution  of  the  relationship 
between  the  Achaean  league  and  Rome?  The  Spartan  exile 
question  was  essentially  a  Hellenic  one.  Callicrates'  handling  of 
its  settlement  and  Polybius'  depiction  of  it  should  not  be  seen 
solely  in  terms  of  the  relationship  between  the  Achaean  league 
and  Rome.  If  one  looks  at  the  eventual  settlement,  found  on  an 
inscription  erected  at  Olympia  by  the  Spartans,  no  mention  is 
"  Polyb.  24.10.15.  for  the  charge  of  bribery.  Gruen  (1984)  p.  500;  Xenarchus  in  175-4BC, 
Archon  172-1BC  and  170-69BC,  Xenon  168-7BC.  All  are  from  Megalopolis. 
"  Walbank  (1979)  p.  263  accepts  that  no  real  change  is  evident  in  the  relationship 
between  the  Achaean  league  and  Rome,  suggesting  that  Polybius  exaggerated  the 
importance  of  Callicrates'  mission. 
296 made  of  Rome  in  the  text,  and  Callicrates  alone  is  thanked  for 
having  restored  the  Spartans.  "' 
One  must  remember  that  Callicrates  represented  regional 
interests  that  were  at  variance  with  Polybius'  attitude  towards 
Sparta.  Poleis  like  Leontium  had  become  politically  isolated 
after  the  expansion  of  the  Achaean  league  into  Arcadia  during 
the  third  century.  Callicrates  may  have  seen  complying  with 
Rome  over  the  Spartan  exile  question  as  the  best  chance  to 
restore  some  of  the  position  poleis  like  Leontium  had  lost  within 
the  Achaean  league.  Possibly  Callicrates'  criticism  of  the  actions 
of  Lycortas  and  other  Megalopolitans  came  from  their 
domineering  behaviour  towards  other  states  in  the 
Peloponnese;  Polybius  attacks  Callicrates  for  raising  the 
Messenian  question,  even  though  the  Romans  had  not 
complained  about  it.  13'  It  was  not  the  relationship  between  the 
Achaean  league  and  Rome  that  changed.  Rather,  Callicrates' 
emergence  undermined  the  hold  that  Megalopolitans  like 
Polybius  held  over  the  Achaean  league. 
Does  Polybius  regard  Callicrates'  embassy  to  Rome  as  a 
major  turning  point  for  other  reasons?  During  the  period  from  the 
initial  alliance  between  the  Achaean  league  and  Flamininus  in 
198BC,  until  the  point  where  Callicrates  departed  from  the 
position  Polybius  claims  he  had  agreed  with  Lycortas  before  his 
'29  SIG3  634. 
130  See  Polyb.  24.10.13. 
297 departure,  Polybius'  histories  present  Rome  and  the  Achaean 
league  acting  almost  as  equals.  Polybius  had  to  show  his  readers 
the  point  where  the  Achaean  league's  democratic  system  of 
government  began  to  decline  through  the  workings  of  anacyclosis. 
Polybius  presents  Callicrates'  emergence  leading  to  an  increase  in 
the  role  of  the  mob  in  the  proceedings  of  the  Achaean  league's 
assembly;  Callicrates  informing  the  senate  about  the  fickleness  of 
the  mob  and  how  it  could  be  manipulated  to  Rome's  advantage  in 
increasing  its  control  over  Greece.  Polybius'  emphases  on 
Callicrates'  mission  as  a  turning  point  in  the  relationship  between 
the  Achaean  league  and  Rome  may  be  related  to  his  belief  in  the 
role  that  anacyclosis  played  in  allowing  the  Romans  to  achieve 
control  over  the  Achaean  league.  Polybius  emphasises  to  his 
readers  that  before  Callicrates'  embassy  the  Achaean  league's 
relations  with  Rome  were  on  more  or  less  equal  terms.  After 
Callicrates  had  addressed  the  senate  this  situation  changed.  As 
Polybius  states: 
For  it  was  still  possible  for  the  Achaeans  even  at  this 
stage  to  deal  with  Rome  on  more  or  less  equal  terms,  as  they 
had  remained  faithful  to  her  ever  since  they  had  taken  part 
in  the  most  important  times,  I  mean  the  wars  with  Philip 
and  Antiochus,  but  now  after  the  Achaean  league  had 
become  stronger  and  more  prosperous  than  at  any  time 
298 recorded  in  history,  this  effrontery  of  Callicrates  was  the 
beginning  of  a  change  for  the  worse. 
l31 
Finally  there  is  the  question  of  how  Rome  regarded 
Callicrates'  intervention:  That  it  played  an  important  role  in  the 
formulation  of  Roman  policy  seems  unlikely.  The  emergence  of  a 
political  challenge  to  the  status  quo  in  the  Achaean  league 
undoubtedly  worked  in  the  senate's  favour.  By  agreeing  to  settle 
the  Spartan  question  in  a  manner  that  was  acceptable  to  most 
sides,  Callicrates'  actions  suited  Roman  interests.  The  Spartan 
problem  had  emerged  as  a  result  of  Caecilius'  intervention  in 
185BC,  and  had  been  prolonged  by  the  decision  of  the  senatorial 
commission  appointed  to  resolve  the  matter.  Roman  actions 
towards  the  Achaean  league  during  this  period  should  not  be 
seen  as  a  reaction  against  the  threat  posed  by  an  anti-Roman 
faction,  but  as  an  attempt  by  Rome  to  manipulate  the  situation  in 
the  Peloponnese.  It  would  appear  that  having  brought  Greece 
under  its  control,  the  actions  of  both  Philopoemen  and  Lycortas  in 
renewing  links  with  the  Hellenistic  monarchies  were  viewed  with 
suspicion  by  the  Romans.  By  supporting  Callicrates'  restoration  of 
the  Spartan  exiles,  the  Romans  allowed  the  emergence  of  a 
politician  who  was  opposed  to  the  Megalopolitans  who  had 
dominated  the  political  institutions  of  the  Achaean  league  for  so 
long,  and  who,  more  importantly  needed  Rome  in  order  to  retain 
his  position. 
13'  Polyb.  24.10.9-10. 
299 Conclusion. 
Aristaenus'  comments  about  the  Aetolian  league's  proposal 
that  they  should  be  allowed  to  persuade  Nabis  to  evacuate  Argos 
voluntarily  is  indicative  of  the  internal  divisions  in  the  Greek 
world,  and  how  the  Romans  exploited  them  to  further  their 
control.  By  removing  Nabis  from  Argos  and  restoring  it  to  the 
Achaean  league,  Flamininus  sent  a  clear  signal  that  the 
Peloponnese  would  in  future  come  under  the  control  of  the 
Achaean  league.  During  the  Aetolian/Syrian  War  this  control 
became  apparent.  Polybius  emphasises  the  independence  of  the 
Achaean  league  during  this  conflict,  along  with  the  admirable 
behaviour  of  Romans  like  Flamininus.  However,  Polybius  was 
attempting  to  show  how  anacyclosis  had  influenced  both  the 
Achaean  and  Roman  systems  of  polity  during  the  period  covered 
in  his  histories  where  the  fates  of  the  Achaean  league  and  Rome 
had  become  intertwined.  Initially  both  had  acted  as  equals;  but 
only  because  the  suspension  of  anacyclosis  in  the  Roman  system  of 
government  had  made  it  almost  an  ideal  state,  and  the  Achaean 
league  was  a  democracy  whose  system  of  government  had  yet  to 
be  corrupted.  In  reality,  it  is  difficult  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that 
Megalopolitan  strategoi  of  the  Achaean  league  undertook  actions 
at  Sparta  in  192BC  that  were  beneficial  to  Roman  interests,  and 
300 were  rewarded  by  Flamininus  with  control  over  three  former 
allies  of  the  Aetolian  league. 
Though  Megalopolitans  did  benefit  as  a  result  of  their  co- 
operation  with  Rome,  in  particular  with  Flamininus,  this  does  not 
necessarily  imply  that  they  were  pro-Roman.  As  the  humiliating 
treatment  of  Sparta  by  Philopoemen  in  188BC  suggests,  they  co- 
operated  with  Rome  because  they  wished  to  see  their  own 
interests  in  the  Peloponnese  secured.  Megalopolitans  like 
Aristaenus  and  Philopoemen  supported  Rome  during  the 
Aetolian/Syrian  War  because  an  Aetolian  led  "liberation"  of 
Greece  would  have  been  detrimental  to  their  interests.  When  the 
war  was  over,  Philopoemen's  decision  to  open  diplomatic 
contacts  with  other  Greek  states  seems  to  indicate  that  he  wished 
the  Achaean  league  to  gain  allies  to  defend  itself  against  further 
encroachment,  once  he  had  gained  all  that  he  could  from  co- 
operating  with  Rome. 
This  provoked  a  response  from  the  senate,  who  seem  to 
have  monitored  the  activities  and  actions  of  their  subjects  in  its 
newly  acquired  area  of  influence  in  the  East  closely.  Roman  policy 
towards  the  Peloponnese  indicates  an  awareness  of  the  competing 
interests  of  both  leagues  in  that  region,  which  they  exploited. 
Initially,  Rome  used  the  desire  of  the  Aetolian  league  to  remove 
the  Macedonian  presence  from  the  Peloponnese  to  gain  a  pretext 
for  intervention  in  the  Greek  world.  When  the  Aetolians  had 
served  their  purpose,  Flamininus  exploited  the  desire  of  the 
301 Megalopolitans  to  secure  control  over  the  Peloponnese  by 
removing  the  threat  that  they  faced  from  Nabis  and  the  Aetolian 
league. 
It  is  in  this  context  that  Callicrates'  actions  should  be  seen. 
The  Romans  could  not  have  maintained  the  fiction  that  they  were 
liberators  had  they  intervened  directly.  Instead  they  exploited 
existing  tensions  within  the  Peloponnese  to  ensure  that  the  area 
remained  under  the  control  of  a  compliant  elite  that  needed  their 
support.  Callicrates'  behaviour  before  the  senate  was  not  a 
betrayal  of  Hellenic  interests  and  surrender  to  Rome.  Rather, 
Callicrates,  like  Greek  politicians  from  the  time  of  the  Aetolian 
league's  alliance  with  Rome  in  212/211BC  appears  to  have  co- 
operated  with  and  supported  Rome  to  secure  his  regional 
interests. 
302 Chapter  Seven 
Po1ybius,  the  Peloponnese  and  resistance  to  Rome 
Introduction 
Rome's  defeat  of  Antiochus  in  188BC  consolidated  its 
control  over  the  Greek  world.  In  the  resulting  peace  treaty  the 
Aetolian  league  was  made  subordinate  to  Rome!  Seventeen 
years  intervened  before  Rome  again  campaigned  in  the  -east,  a 
period  seen  as  one  of  comparative  neglect  of  Greek  affairs  by  the 
Romans? 
According  to  Polybius,  the  Third  Macedonian  War  was 
caused  by  the  preparations  made  by  the  Antigonids  to  lead  a 
war  of  liberation  against  Rome.  Polybius  states  that  before  his 
death  in  179BC,  Philip  V  was  preparing  for  war  against  Rome, 
and  that  Perseus  was  continuing  his  father's  policy!  With  the 
exception  of  Pedech,  most  scholars  discount  Polybius'  assertion 
of  Macedonian  responsibility  for  this  conflict,  arguing  that  it  was 
Rome's  decision  to  initiate  the  conflict.  "  Harris  suggests  Polybius 
blamed  the  Macedonian  kings  for  the  outbreak  of  war  because: 
He  deeply  regretted  the  war  and  the  end  of  the  precarious 
political  equilibrium  in  which  the  Greeks  had  lived  since 
189BC.  He  found  himself  with  the  impossible  choice  of 
'Harris  (1979)  p.  223. 
'Harris  (1979)  p.  227. 
3  Polyb.  22.18.10-11. 
4  Pedech  (1964)  p.  139. 
303 blaming  Perseus  or  the  senate.  Perseus  had  not  behaved 
at  all  belligerently  towards  Rome,  as  Polybius  knew;  yet 
the  historian  could  not  write,  by  the  late  140s  could 
probably  not  even  allow  himself  to  think,  that  the  senate 
had  purposefully  destroyed  the  equilibrium.  ' 
Polybius'  claims  of  Macedonian  responsibility  for  the 
outbreak  of  Third  Macedonian  War  were,  as  Harris  earlier 
stated,  understandable,  because: 
How  could  the  pro-Roman  political  agent  in  the  tragic 
Greece  of  the  late  140s  admit  that  it  was  the  Romans  who 
had  upset  the  tolerable  equilibrium  of  the  years  before  the 
Third  Macedonian  War?  6 
Polybius  does  state  that  initially  Philip  V,  and  later  Perseus, 
was  preparing  for  war  against  Rome;  he  was  actively  involved  in 
Greek  politics  during  this  period:  his  assertion  should  not  be 
discounted.  As  Harris  admitted,  the  state  of  the  evidence  is  such 
that  we  have  only  a  partial  glimpse  of  it,  and  Polybius  may  have 
expounded  his  theory  about  Macedonian  responsibility  in  book 
twenty-seven.  7 
We  do  know  certain  things.  Firstly,  whatever  Polybius' 
motivation  in  writing  his  histories,  we  have  them  because  he  had 
been  detained  in  Italy  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Third  Macedonian 
'Harris  (1979)  pp.  227-8. 
'Harris  (1979)  p.  115. 
'Harris  (1979)  p.  115 
304 War.  That  is  undisputed,  though  why  the  Romans  felt  it 
necessary  to  detain  Polybius  is  left  unsaid.  Polybius'  account  of 
why  he  was  detained  is  preserved  in  fragmentary  form,  leaving 
us  with  Pausanias,  who  appears  to  have  confused  Polybius' 
account  of  his  detention  with  Roman  practice  in  his  own  day. 
Did  the  Romans  detain  Polybius,  along  with  a  thousand  other 
hostages  from  the  Achaean  league,  and  retain  them  in  Italy  for 
sixteen  years,  merely  at  Callicrates'  prompting,  as  Polybius  and 
Pausanias  suggest?  Although  it  is  tempting  to  suppose  that  the 
events  of  146BC  led  to  Polybius  becoming  pro-Roman,  even 
some  of  those  who  suggest  this  acknowledge  that  he  felt  a 
profound  anxiety  about  the  course  of  events  in  the  years  leading 
to  the  destruction  of  Corinth! 
As  Kallet-Marx  has  recently  demonstrated,  the  Achaean 
War  of  146BC  was  not  the  decisive  break  that  it  had  been 
previously  thought  since  there  is  little  evidence  of  any  change  in 
Greece  in  its  aftermath!  The  contention  that  Polybius  became 
pro-Roman  is  partly  based  on  the  belief  that  socio-economic 
8  See  especially  Walbank  (1972)  pp.  166-83,  who  traces  the  development  of  Polybius' 
attitude  towards  Rome,  from  a  cautious  anti-Roman  position  before  his  detention  into  a 
cynical  and  detached  one  during  his  period  in  detention,  until  the  events  of  146BC  led  to 
him  embracing  the  Roman  cause.  Other  scholars,  notably  Green  (1990)  pp.  279-81  accept 
Walbank's  view.  Walbank's  view  has  not  gone  unchallenged,  see  Ferrary  (1988)  p.  327- 
34  and  Eckstein  (1995)  p.  232.  For  a  recent  re-appraisal  of  events  after  146BC  see  Kallet- 
Marx  (1995)  pp.  129-53. 
Kallet-Marx  (1996)  p.  2.  As  he  points  out  on  p.  61,  "No  evidence  collaborates  Pausanias' 
bland  assertion  of  the  levying  of  tribute  upon  Greece  in  146BC". 
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A 
issues  played  an  important  role  in  the  events  surrounding 
Corinth's  destruction,  and  that  Polybius  co-operated  with  and 
accepted  Roman  rule  because  he  feared  the  consequences  of  a 
breakdown  in  social  order  10  t  cannot  be  doubted  that  Polybius 
claimed  to  have  assisted  the  Romans  in  t  eir-set  ement  of  Greek  -tl 
affairs  in  the  aftermath  of  Corinth's  destruction.  However,  co- 
operation  with  an  imperial  regime  does  not  necessarily  imply 
acceptance  of  it.  "  As  Polybius  stated  about  his  own  behaviour 
after  Corinth's  destruction: 
In  times  of  danger  it  is  true  those  who  are  Greek  should  help 
the  Greeks  in  every  way,  by  active  support,  by  cloaking 
faults  and  by  trying  to  appease  the  anger  of  the  ruling 
power,  as  I  myself  actually  did  at  the  time  of  the 
occurrences;  but  the  literary  record  of  the  events  meant  for 
posterity  should  be  kept  free  from  any  taint  of  falsehood,  so 
that  instead  of  the  ears  of  readers  being  titillated  for  the 
present,  their  minds  may  be  reformed  in  order  to  avoid  their 
falling  more  than  once  into  the  same  error.  'Z 
70  For  the  existence  of  inscriptions  from  Megalopolis  and  Acacesium  in  Arcadia  thanking 
Polybius  for  his  help  against  Roman  vengeance,  see  Paus.  8.37.2  and  8.30.8. 
"  As  Eckstein  points  out,  Polybius'  condemnation  of  the  actions  of  the  leaders  of  the 
Achaean  revolt  show  not  that  he  disapproved  of  their  actions.  Rather  that  he  was  critical 
of  their  inability,  once  they  had  provoked  the  war,  to  prosecute  it  efficiently,  a  criticism 
he  also  applies  to  his  account  of  the  actions  of  Antiochus  and  Perseus.  See  Eckstein 
(1995)  p.  220  for  the  Achaean  leadership,  pp.  213-14  for  Antiochus  and  pp.  215-16  for 
Perseus. 
12  Polyb.  38.4.7-8. 
306 In  book  six  of  his  histories  Polybius  stresses  the  role  that  the 
suspension  of  anacyclosis  in  the  Roman  system  of  government 
played  in  allowing  it  to  achieve  control  over  the  Mediterranean 
world.  However  anacyclosis  had  not  been  suspended  in  other 
systems  of  government;  Polybius  had  to  present  to  his  readers 
the  decline  that  had  taken  place  elsewhere,  especially  in  the 
Achaean  league,  which  had  allowed  the  Romans  to  achieve  their 
mastery  over  the  Mediterranean  world.  Polybius  believed  that 
tyche  was  changeable  and,  although  it  had  benefited  Rome 
during  its  rise  to  dominance,  eventually  this  situation  would  be 
reversed.  The  final  image  that  Polybius  presented  to  his  Greek 
readership,  that  of  Roman  soldiers  using  works  of  art  for  board 
games,  came  at  the  end  of  his  depiction  of  a  steady  decline  in 
Roman  behaviour  post-Pydna.  Perhaps  he  was  implying  to  his 
readers  that  anacyclosis  had  resumed  and  that  the  Romans  were 
reverting  to  their  true  barbarian  selves.  13  Although  the 
destruction  of  Corinth  was  undoubtedly  intended  as  a 
psychological  measure  by  the  Romans  to  intimidate  their 
subjects,  it  does  not  appear  to  have  ended  Greek  hopes  for  future 
freedom  from  Roman  domination,  or  to  have  changed  the 
situation  in  Greece.  On  the  contrary,  the  experience  in  other 
societies  subject  to  imperial  rule  indicates  that  although  colonies 
can  remain  peaceful  for  long  periods  of  time,  this  does  not  imply 
13  Polyb.  39.2.1-3.  See  Erskine  (2000)  pp.  181-2  for  the  barbarian  characteristics  in  Polybius 
depiction  of  Roman  behaviour  during  the  sacking  of  cities. 
307 that  their  inhabitants  accept  the  status  quo.  14  Rather  that 
resentment  over  the  initial  conquest  lingers,  manifesting  itself  at 
an  opportune  moment.  As  Golan  has  argued,  Polybius'  emphasis 
on  the  unity  of  the  Achaean  league  might  well  have  been  to 
educate  a  future  generation  that  would  live  in  a  Greece  that  was 
free  from  Roman  domination,  since: 
Polybius  wished  to  give  the  youth  of  Greece  the  experience 
of  action  and  inaction  which  he  had  observed  and  studied: 
for  those  young  men  would  sooner  or  later  carry  on  a  more 
fortunate  life  then  his  own,  and  have  the  opportunity  to 
develop  an  uninterrupted  political  career  in  a  free  Achaea 
(and  Greece).  " 
"Because  of  Rhodesian  UDI,  Zimbabwe  was  one  of  only  four  European  colonies  in  sub- 
Saharan  Africa  to  have  a  war  of  independence,  and  the  only  one  whose  society 
anthropologists  could  examine  to  gauge  African  attitudes  towards  the  conflict  in  relative 
safety;  they  found  that  many  of  their  preconceptions  were  mistaken.  Firstly,  the  issue 
that  had  played  the  vital  role  in  mobilising  African  support  for  the  war  was  not  white 
rule  as  such,  but  rather  the  land  seizures  carried  out  by  Europeans  at  the  end  of  the  19' 
century.  Another  factor  found  was  the  extent  to  which  the  independence  movement 
stressed  the  continuation  between  their  own  campaign  and  the  earlier  revolt  against 
white  rule  in  1896.  The  liberation  war  of  the  1970s  is  called  the  Second  Chimurenga,  the 
First  being  the  revolt  of  1896;  the  term  Third  Chimurenga  being  used  to  describe 
Zimbabwe's  present  difficulties  by  the  government.  Though  between  1896  and  1972 
Rhodesia  was  peaceful,  African  resentment  at  actions  carried  out  in  the  late  19"  century 
lingered,  resulting  in  open  revolt  against  white  rule  when  conditions  were  right.  See 
Ranger  (1985)  pp.  113-78. 
`Golan  (1995)  p.  7. 
308 Again,  one  must  return  to  the  notion  of  anacyclosis;  Polybius 
believed  that  constitutional  development  occurred  in  cycles,  and 
he  implies  in  his  account  of  the  Roman  system  of  government 
that  internal  forces  within  the  Roman  republic,  combined  with 
external  pressure,  would  cause  its  eventual  decline.  "'  Polybius 
emphasises  the  madness  and  irrationality  of  both  the  mob  at  the 
Achaean  assembly  and  the  leadership  of  the  Achaean  league  in 
his  account  of  Corinth's  destruction  in  146BC;  an  emphasis  that 
has  been  taken  as  evidence  of  a  socio-economic  basis  for  this 
revolt.  However,  this  was  the  sort  of  behaviour  that  Polybius,  in 
book  six,  claimed  existed  at  the  end  of  the  cycle  of  anacyclosis  that 
democracies  like  the  Achaean  league  were  subject  to.  After 
Corinth's  destruction  the  cycle  of  anacyclosis  would  re-start  in  the 
Achaean  league  and  its  society  would  be  renewed  by  the 
emergence  of  a  single  strong  individual  who,  Polybius  stated, 
would  bring  men  salvation  from  the  desperate  situation  they 
found  themselves  in.  At  Rome,  along  with  the  internal  forces 
that  would  lead  to  its  decline,  external  pressures  would  impinge 
on  the  Roman  system  of  government  detrimentally  once 
anacyclosis  resumed,  as  indeed  the  Achaean  league  had  been 
weakened  by  increased  Roman  interference  in  its  affairs  after 
Callicrates'  embassy.  Polybius  wrote  his  histories  to  instruct  his 
readership,  so  that  they  could  learn  from  past  mistakes.  In  doing 
so  the  renewed  society  that  would  eventually  arise  in  Greece 
16  Polyb.  6.57.1-10. 
309 from  Corinth's  destruction  would  learn  from  the  mistakes  of  the 
past,  and  be  able  to  assert  external  pressure  on  a  Roman 
Republic  that  was  suffering  from  internal  decline. 
This  chapter  will  examine  resistance  to  Roman  rule  in 
Polybius'  histories  along  with  his  attitude  towards  it,  especially 
the  role  that  regional  differences  in  the  Peloponnese  played  in 
formulating  these  revolts.  Polybius'  assertion  that  Philip  V  and 
Perseus  were  planning  a  revolt  against  Rome  was  probably  an 
accurate  reflection  of  events,  especially  given  Polybius'  fellow 
Megalopolitans'  support  for  renewing  the  Achaean  league's 
alliance  with  Macedonia  prior  to  the  war.  Discontent  amongst 
Megalopolitans  like  Lycortas  and  Polybius  over  Callicrates' 
settlement  of  Spartan  affairs  in  180BC  appears  to  have  led  them 
to  approach  Perseus  in  an  attempt  to  renew  the  ties  that 
Megalopolis  had  with  Macedonia.  Callicrates  appears  to  have 
opposed  this  because  having  managed  to  re-assert  the  position 
of  the  original  members  of  the  Achaean  league  by  co-operating 
with  Rome,  he  needed  to  continue  this  support  to  maintain  his 
position. 
From  there  it  will  look  at  Roman  actions,  suggesting  that  the 
Romans,  aware  of  the  potential  threat  posed  by  Megalopolis' 
links  with  Macedonia,  exploited  the  situation  in  the 
Peloponnese,  especially  in  Elis  and  Messene,  to  ensure  that  the 
Achaean  league  was  not  in  a  position  to  support  Perseus.  I  shall 
contend  that  Polybius  was  detained  in  Italy  not  through 
310 Callicrates'  prompting,  but  because  his  actions  during  the  war 
had  caused  the  Romans  to  be  suspicious.  Pausanias'  account  of 
the  events  surrounding  Polybius'  detention  was  influenced  by 
Polybius'  desire  to  show  anacyclosis  at  work  in  the  Achaean 
league,  by  demonstrating  how  it  came  under  the  dominion  of 
corrupt  politicians  like  Callicrates. 
As  the  limited  evidence  available  for  the  Peloponnese  in  the 
period  after  the  Third  Macedonian  War  seems  to  suggest, 
Callicrates  was  by  no  means  dominant.  After  his  death  in  149BC 
and  the  emergence  of  a  new  crisis  involving  Sparta's 
membership  of  the  Achaean  league,  politicians  from  Megalopolis 
tried  to  re-assert  the  political  power  of  the  Arcadian 
communities  within  the  Achaean  league.  The  Romans,  already 
worried  about  the  situation  in  Macedonia,  intervened  to  crush 
any  possibility  that  Andriscus'  revolt  would  spread  to  the 
Peloponnese.  Polybius  marks  out  the  destruction  of  Corinth  for 
special  attention.  As  he  states: 
The  thirty-eight  book  contains  the  completion  of  the 
misfortune  of  Greece.  For  though  both  Greece  and  her 
several  parts  had  often  met  with  mischance,  yet  to  none  of 
her  former  defeats  can  we  more  fittingly  apply  the  name  of 
misfortune  with  all  it  signifies  than  to  the  events  of  my 
own  time.  " 
17  Po1yb.  38.1.1. 
311 Polybius  wrote  with  the  intention  of  explaining  to  his 
readers  how  they  came  to  find  themselves  under  Roman  rule.  It 
is  an  inescapable  fact  that  in  the  early  part  of  his  work,  in 
particular  his  first  five  books,  Romans  and  the  Roman  state  are 
described  in  almost  ideal  terms,  appearing  to  have  many 
rational,  Greek  like  qualities.  In  Polybius'  account  of  the 
Achaean  War,  the  Romans  act  rationally;  it  is  the  behaviour  of 
his  fellow  Achaeans  that  Polybius  portrays  as  irrational. 
However,  Polybius'  intention  was  to  explain  to  his  readers  how 
they  came  to  be  under  barbarian  rule.  By  emphasising  the  ideal 
nature  of  the  Roman  republic  during  its  conquest  of  Greece, 
Polybius  intention  was  to  show  his  Greek  readers  why  the 
Romans  had  been  successful  in  achieving  domination  over  them. 
Because  of  the  balance  the  Romans  had  achieved  in  their  system 
of  government  they  were  able  to  overcome  Greek  states,  like  the 
Achaean  league,  which  were  coming  to  the  end  of  their  cycle  of 
anacyclosis.  Therefore,  Polybius'  emphasis  on  the  mob  and 
anarchy  in  the  events  surrounding  the  Achaean  War  does  not 
indicate  that  it  had  a  socio-economic  basis.  Rather,  that  he 
wished  to  emphasise  to  his  readers  that  this  was  the  great 
misfortune  that  marked  the  end  of  the  cycle  of  anacyclosis  in  the 
Achaean  league,  after  which  Greek  fortunes  could  only  ascend. 
312 The  Achaean  league  and  the  Peloponnese  prior  to  the  Third 
Macedonian  War. 
From  179  to  175BC  there  is  no  mention  of  the  Achaean 
league  in  the  sources,  or  the  immediate  impact  of  Callicrates' 
embassy  on  the  Achaean  league.  Drawing  from  the  limited 
evidence  available,  I  will  suggest  that  Megalopolitans  within  the 
Achaean  league,  dismayed  at  Callicrates'  settlement  at  Sparta  in 
180BC,  tried  to  re-establish  links  with  Macedonia  prior  to  the 
outbreak  of  the  Third  Macedonian  War.  Callicrates  opposed  this 
move  because  his  position,  and  that  of  the  region  in  the 
Peloponnese  that  he  represented,  was  dependent  on  Roman 
support.  I  will  suggest  that  defining  the  divide  within  the  Greek 
elite  as  one  between  pro  and  anti-Roman  fails  to  take  into 
account  the  differences  between  the  various  ethnic  groups  in  the 
Peloponnese,  and  how  the  Romans  exploited  these  divisions. 
In  175BC  Livy  records  an  approach  from  Perseus  to  the 
Achaean  league,  the  first  mention  we  have  of  the  situation  in  the 
Peloponnese  after  Callicrates'  embassy  18  According  to  Livy, 
Perseus  wrote  to  the  Achaean  assembly  requesting  that  the  law 
that  forbade  Macedonians  entry  to  the  Achaean  league  be 
revoked  and  that  philia  between  the  two  be  renewed.  In  return, 
Perseus  offered  to  return  to  their  owners  all  the  escaped  slaves 
from  the  Achaean  league  that  had  fled  to  Macedonia  19  There 
1a  Livy.  41.23.  ff 
19  Livy.  41.23.2-3. 
313 were  probably  few  Macedonians  who  had  been  excluded  from 
the  Peloponnese,  and  few  escaped  slaves  from  the  Achaean 
league  living  in  Macedonia  2°  It  appears  that  Perseus  was  trying 
to  renew  the  alliance  formed  between  the  Achaean  league  and 
Macedonia  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Cleomenic  War.  Of  particular 
interest  are  the  speeches  in  favour  of  accepting  Perseus'  offer  by 
Archon,  a  Megalopolitan  closely  associated  with  Lycortas  and 
Polybius,  and  that  against  by  Callicrates. 
According  to  Livy,  Callicrates  argued  that  revoking  the  law 
forbidding  Macedonian  entry  into  the  Achaean  league  would 
violate  the  relationship  with  Rome.  He  goes  on  to  argue  that 
Perseus  was  set  on  provoking  war  with  Rome  since  he  had 
recently  conquered  Dolopia  and  had  marched  through  Thessaly. 
The  latter  point  is  what  Callicrates  found  the  most  objectionable. 
As  he  points  out,  the  possibility  existed  that  Perseus  was 
preparing  the  ground  for  a  revolt  against  Rome  and  his  fear  was 
that: 
We  may  soon  find  Macedonian  armies  and  even  the  king 
himself,  crossing  from  Delphi  to  the  Peloponnese  and  that 
we  may  be  involved  with  the  Macedonians  as  they  take  up 
arms  against  the  Romans.  21 
20  When  exactly  the  law  forbidding  Macedonians  to  enter  the  Achaean  league  was 
passed  is  unknown.  Aymard  (1938)  p.  112  and  Gruen  (1984)  p.  500  suggest  198BC. 
21  Livy.  41.23.16. 
314 Gruen  accuses  Callicrates  of  using  scare  tactics  in  predicting 
war,  though,  as  he  admits,  there  seems  to  be  little  evidence  of 
Roman  pressure'2  Assuming  that  Livy  left  the  speech  largely 
unaltered  it  probably  reflects  Polybius'  account.  Given  the  long 
association  that  Megalopolis  had  with  Macedonia,  Callicrates 
may  have  felt  that  the  possibility  existed  that  Arcadian 
communities  within  the  Achaean  league  like  Megalopolis  might 
seek  to  use  Macedonian  support  to  undermine  the  position  that 
he  had  gained  in  the  Achaean  league.  His  support  for  Rome  may 
have  been  due  to  his  need  to  counteract  this  possibility. 
Archon's  speech  in  favour  of  accepting  Perseus'  approach 
probably  gives  an  accurate  impression  of  the  beliefs  held  by 
Polybius  and  other  Megalopolitans  at  this  time.  Although 
Archon  stated  that  there  was  no  evidence  of  war  breaking  out 
between  Macedonia  and  Rome,  and  that  he  is  not  arguing 
against  the  Achaean  league's  alliance  with  Rome,  his  attitude 
towards  Rome  was  hostile.  Archon,  countering  the  arguments 
that  Callicrates  had  made,  pointed  out  that  the  Dolopians  were 
the  weakest  of  all  people  and  that  the  Achaean  league  was  not  as 
vulnerable  as  they  were.  Archon  directs  his  audience's  attention 
to  the  changed  circumstances  they  faced,  informing  them  that 
Rome  no  longer  supported  the  Achaean  league  as  it  once  did.  As 
he  states,  if  Macedonia  did,  as  Callicrates  suggested,  attack: 
Gruen  (1984)  p.  501 
315 We  have  no  more  claim  on  the  Romans,  no  higher  standing 
with  them,  we  who  have  always  been  their  allies  and 
friends,  than  the  Aetolians  who  were  only  a  short  time  ago 
their  enemies.  " 
This  hardly  represents  the  feelings  of  a  reliable  ally.  Archon 
continues  by  reminding  his  audience  of  why  the  Achaean  league 
had  abandoned  its  alliance  with  Macedonia  in  198BC;  as  he 
points  out,  the  Antigonid  kingdom  and  the  Achaean  league  were 
longstanding  allies,  and: 
The  services  rendered  to  us  by  former  kings  of  Macedonia 
were  so  great  as  to  wipe  out  any  wrongs  inflicted  by  Philip. 
If  there  were  such,  especially  as  he  is  now  dead.  24 
He  continues  by  reminding  his  audience  of  the  reason  they 
debated  for  so  long  in  Sicyon  in  198BC  about  abandoning  the 
alliance  with  the  Antigonids,  although  there  was  a  Roman  fleet 
at  anchor  nearby: 
There  was  no  immediate  threat  from  the  Romans  to 
persuade  us;  there  was  still  something  certainly,  which 
caused  such  prolonged  discussion;  and  that  thing  was  the 
ancient  association  with  Macedonia,  and  the  great  services 
by  their  kings  to  us  in  past  times.  ' 
'  Livy.  41.24.9. 
24  Livy.  41.24.12. 
"  Livy.  41.24.15. 
316 Archon  clearly  wished  to  renew  the  alliance  with 
Macedonia  and  had  the  backing,  according  to  Livy,  of  the 
Achaean  strategos  Xenarchus.  It  appears  unlikely  that  Perseus 
would  have  made  this  approach  unless  he  felt  that  there  was  a 
very  good  chance  if  it  being  accepted,  therefore  the  initial 
approach  to  renew  the  alliance  may  have  come  from  the 
Peloponnese.  Does  Archon's  willingness  to  renew  the  alliance 
with  Macedonia  and  the  arguments  he  used  indicate  that  this 
move  was  anti-Roman,  and  a  sign  that  he  and  others  within  the 
Achaean  league  wished  to  ally  with  Perseus  in  a  war  against 
Rome? 
Again,  the  question  is  probably  more  complex  then  merely 
seeing  the  relationship  with  Rome  as  the  sole  issue  dominating 
the  internal  affairs  of  the  Achaean  league.  Megalopolitans  like 
Archon  might  have  sought  to  renew  the  alliance  with  Macedonia 
but  this  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  they  would  blindly 
support  Perseus  in  any  future  conflict  with  Rome.  As  Polybius' 
actions  during  the  Third  Macedonian  War  suggest,  although  he 
and  other  Megalopolitans  may  have  wished  to  see  Perseus 
emerge  victorious  from  the  conflict,  they  were  unwilling  to 
commit  themselves  openly  until  it  began  to  look  as  if  Macedonia 
stood  some  chance  of  success. 
Perhaps  one  should  consider  this  approach  in  the  same 
context  as  the  earlier  ones  at  Megalopolis  in  185BC.  In  the 
immediate  aftermath  of  the  Aetolian/Syrian  War  the  Achaean 
317 league,  under  Philopoemen's  guidance,  had  decided  to  renew  its 
alliances  with  a  number  of  Hellenistic  powers.  Given  the 
changed  circumstances  brought  about  by  the  advent  of  Rome  in 
Hellenic  affairs,  it  would  appear  that  Greek  states  sought  to  try 
and  widen  their  diplomatic  contacts.  The  approach  from  Perseus 
was  not  the  only  one  that  the  Achaean  league  received  in  175BC. 
In  the  same  year,  Antiochus  promised  the  Megalopolitan  that 
he  would  construct  a  defensive  wall  around  their  polis  when 
requested  26  It  would  also  appear  that  around  the  same  time, 
circa  174BC,  the  Achaean  league  decided  to  cancel  all  the 
honours  that  it  had  awarded  to  Eumenes  of  Pergamum.  There  is 
no  record  of  when  this  took  place,  and  the  first  indication  that  it 
happened  came  in  169BC  when  Attalus  sent  a  deputation  asking 
for  their  restoration  27  Eumenes  was  a  close  Roman  ally,  who 
during  his  visit  to  Rome  in  172BC  warned  that  the  Achaean 
league  could  be  a  threat.  28 
Returning  to  Perseus'  approach,  should  it  be  taken  as  a  sign 
that  the  Arcadian  communities  within  the  Achaean  league 
favoured  forming  an  alliance  with  Macedonia  against  Rome? 
According  to  Livy,  the  Achaean  league  refused  Perseus' 
approach  not  because  of  Callicrates'  arguments,  but  because  the 
damiourgi: 
Livy.  41.20.6. 
"  Po1yb.  27.18.1-3. 
28  Livy.  42.12.6.  The  blame  for  the  Achaean  decision  was  placed  on  two  Rhodian  judges. 
318 Resented  the  idea  that  Perseus  should  obtain  by  means  of  a 
letter  a  few  lines  long  a  concession  that  he  had  not  deemed 
important  enough  for  a  delegation.  " 
Instead  of  seeing  this  affair  as  evidence  of  growing 
differences  between  the  Achaean  league  and  Rome,  it  should 
possibly  be  seen  as  part  of  an  internal  struggle  within  the 
Achaean  league.  Antiochus  approached  not  the  Achaean  league, 
but  Megalopolis,  suggesting  that  he  viewed  this  polls  as  the  key 
to  his  Peloponnesian  policy.  Possibly  Callicrates  feared  that 
Megalopolitans  like  Lycortas  and  Polybius  would  seek  to  use 
Macedonian  support  to  influence  events  in  the  Peloponnese  to 
the  detriment  of  his  own  regional  interests. 
It  would  also  appear  that  the  Romans  were  aware  of,  and 
exploited  the  regional  differences  that  existed  within  the 
Achaean  league  to  ensure  that  the  Peloponnese  remained  stable 
during  its  confrontation  with  Perseus.  In  172BC,  just  prior  to  the 
Third  Macedonian  War,  a  mission  consisting  of  the  two  Lentuli 
visited  the  Achaean  league.  They  were  detached  from  a  far 
larger  mission,  and  were  sent  to  the  Peloponnese,  where, 
according  to  Livy: 
They  toured  the  cities,  urging  all  the  communities  alike  to 
assist  the  Romans  with  the  same  intense  loyalty  as  they  had 
"  Livy.  41.24.19.  Gruen  (1984)  p.  500  suggests  that  Perseus  hurt  the  Achaean  league's 
pride. 
319 shown  in  the  first  war  against  Philip  and  then  in  the  war 
against  Antiochus.  30 
The  reaction  of  the  Achaean  assembly,  along  with  events  in 
Boeotia,  gives  us  some  indication  of  what  the  Roman  intention 
was.  After  their  tour,  the  Lentuli  went  to  the  Achaean  assembly, 
where  Livy  tells  us  that  the  delegates  were: 
Indignant  that  they,  who  had  supplied  every  help  to  the 
Romans  from  the  outbreak  of  the  Macedonian  war,  and  had 
in  the  war  been  enemies  of  Philip,  should  be  on  the  same 
level  as  Messene  and  Elis,  who  had  afterwards  borne  arms 
on  the  side  of  Antiochus  against  the  Roman  people.  And 
having  recently  been  attached  to  the  Achaean  league,  were 
complaining  that  they  were  handed  over  to  the  victorious 
Achaeans  as  a  prize  of  war.  31 
Gruen  dismisses  this  episode  as  the  Achaean  league 
professing  its  loyalty  with  a  display  of  petulance  32  Larsen  took  a 
more  realistic  view,  suggesting  that  that  the  Romans  were 
encouraging  regionalism  in  the  Achaean  league  '  He  draws 
attention  to  the  larger  mission,  which  visited  Epirus,  Aetolia, 
Acarnania,  and  Boeotia  that  the  Lentuli  were  detached  from.  In 
Boeotia,  in  response  to  a  situation  where  some  members  of  the 
Boeotian  elite  favoured  allying  with  Perseus,  the  embassy 
'°  Livy.  42.37.7. 
31  Lvy.  42.37.8-9. 
'  Gruen  (1984)  p.  505 
-"Larsen  (1968)  p.  436. 
320 exploited  the  differences  within  the  Boeotian  league,  especially 
resentment  at  Theban  dominance,  declaring  that: 
The  Romans  intended  to  give  the  individual  cities  a  chance 
of  deciding  their  own  best  interests.  34 
The  visit  of  the  Lentuli  to  Elis  and  Messene  gives  us  some 
indication,  both  of  the  situation  within  the  Achaean  league,  and 
Roman  awareness  of  and  exploitation  of  regional  differences 
within  the  Greek  world.  Flamininus  had  awarded  both  of  these 
states  to  the  Achaean  league  during  the  Aetolian/Syrian  War 
and  Elis  in  particular  had  been  a  close  Aetolian  ally,  both 
claiming  kinship  ties  with  the  other.  The  visit  by  the  Lentuli  to 
these  two  states  suggests  that  the  Romans  may  have  been 
concerned  about  the  possibility  that  Arcadian  poleis  like 
Megalopolis  might  co-operate  with  Perseus,  and  sought  to 
counteract  this  possibility  by  exploiting  Messenian  and  Elean 
dissatisfaction  at  their  membership  of  the  Achaean  league 
At  the  outbreak  of  war  this  mission  was  followed  by 
another,  which  requested  that  the  Achaean  league  send  a 
thousand  men  to  garrison  Chalcis,  a  request  that  Archon  agreed 
to  '  It  would  appear  that  Lycortas  and  his  supporters'  attempt  to 
renew  links  with  Macedonia  prior  to  the  Third  Macedonian  War 
was  viewed  by  the  Romans  with  suspicion,  hence  the  dispatch  of 
'  As  Gruen  (1984)  p.  507  and  513  points  out,  when  hostility  arose,  the  reason  for  split 
within  Boeotia  was  often  hostility  to  Thebes  rather  than  fidelity  to  Rome. 
Gruen  (1984)  p.  506-7  assumes  that  they  only  visited  Elis  and  Messene. 
Polyb.  27.2.11-12.  These  troops  were  to  hold  this  position  until  Roman  forces  arrived. 
321 the  Lentuli.  But  were  these  actions,  especially  the  attempt  to 
renew  the  alliance  with  Perseus,  part  of  a  wider  anti-Roman  plot, 
or  were  they  instead  motivated  by  the  loss  of  Arcadian  influence 
in  the  Peloponnese?  Lycortas  and  his  fellow  Megalopolitans  had 
dominated  the  Achaean  league  from  the  end  of  the  Cleomenic 
War  until  Callicrates'  embassy  to  Rome  in  180BC  and  it  would 
appear  that  even  after  Callicrates'  mission  that  Megalopolitans 
retained  an  important  position  within  the  Achaean  league.  The 
events  surrounding  the  restoration  of  the  Spartan  exiles  had 
demonstrated  to  them  that  in  future  they  would  be  subject  to 
Rome.  In  this  situation,  Polybius  and  his  fellow  Megalopolitans 
may  have  regarded  the  possibility  of  a  Macedonian  revolt 
against  Rome  favourably,  but  were  anxious  to  ensure  that  their 
own  position  remained  intact. 
The  Achaean  league  and  the  Third  Macedonian  War. 
This  section  will  deal  with  the  policy  followed  by  the 
Achaean  league  during  the  Third  Macedonian  War,  suggesting 
that  the  actions  taken  by  Polybius  during  the  war  were 
sympathetic  to  Perseus.  The  Achaean  league's  neutrality  during 
the  conflict  was  due  to  a  reluctance  to  identify  openly  with  the 
Macedonian  cause  until  it  became  apparent  that  Perseus  had  a 
chance  of  victory.  It  will  consider  the  debate  on  Achaean  policy 
that  Polybius  participated  in  before  he  assumed  the  office  of 
Achaean  hipparch  in  170/169BC,  over  the  policy  the  Achaean 
322 league  should  follow  during  his  term  in  office,  along  with 
Polybius'  actions  during  his  mission  to  Marcius  Philippus  in 
169BC.  I  will  suggest  that  Polybius  was  sent  to  assess  the 
situation  with  a  view  to  supporting  Perseus  if  the  circumstances 
were  right.  Polybius'  sixteen-year  detention  in  Italy  was 
therefore  not  solely  the  result  of  Callicrates'  intrigues,  but  of  his 
actions  during  this  conflict. 
On  the  outbreak  of  war,  the  Achaean  league  remained 
neutral  though  a  force  of  fifteen  hundred  archers  was  sent  to 
assist  the  Romans  37  There  was  no  declaration  of  war  by  the 
Achaean  league  against  Perseus,  unlike  the  situation  in  192BC, 
when  the  Achaean  league  had  been  the  first  Greek  State  to 
declare  war  on  Antiochus;  its  neutrality  was  undoubtedly  a  blow 
to  Roman  propaganda  efforts.  This  might  explain  the  subsequent 
mission  of  Gaius  Popilius  and  Gnaeus  Octavius  soon 
afterwards  38  After  visiting  Thebes,  they  proceeded  to  the 
Peloponnese,  touring  the  region  in  an  attempt  to  gain  support 
for  Rome.  39  What  is  of  more  interest  is  their  declaration, 
according  to  Polybius,  in  the  various  places  they  visited  that: 
They  knew  who  were  those  who  were  hanging  back  more 
than  they  ought,  as  well  as  who  were  the  active  and  zealous 
37  Livy.  42.44.7-8. 
Polyb.  28.3.1-10. 
Polyb.  28.3.3. 
323 men.  It  was  evident  that  they  were  just  as  unpleased  with 
the  former  as  with  their  opponents.  40 
According  to  Polybius'  account,  there  was  a  rumour  that  the 
envoys  were  intent  on  accusing  Lycortas,  Archon  and  Polybius 
of  disloyalty  and  remaining  inactive  at  the  Achaean  assembly 
because  they  were  waiting  to  see  who  would  emerge  victorious. 
When  they  arrived  at  the  Achaean  assembly  at  Aegium  the 
Roman  envoys  failed  to  make  these  accusations:  Polybius  stating 
that  they  had  no  reason  to  do  so  41 
Would  Lycortas  and  Polybius  have  supported  the 
Macedonian  cause  simply  because  they  wished  to  remove  the 
Romans?  Or  rather  was  their  primary  concern  to  ensure  that 
after  the  war,  Megalopolitan  interests  in  the  Peloponnese  were 
not  affected  detrimentally?  The  approach  made  by  Perseus  to  the 
Achaean  league  in  175BC  seems  to  have  led  the  Romans  to 
suspect  that  Arcadian  communities  like  Megalopolis  might 
declare  their  support  for  Perseus  at  a  crucial  point  in  the  conflict. 
The  envoy  "! ý  decision  to  visit"  a  number  of  poleis  individually 
90  Polyb.  28.3.4.  See  Walbank  (1979)  p.  330. 
41  Polyb.  28.3.9-10.  Errington  (1969)  p.  209-10  suggests  that  the  intention  was  to  curb  any 
possible  threat  from  the  Achaean  league,  without  making  any  accusation.  Larsen  (1968) 
p.  469  suggests  that  this  was  guesswork  by  Polybius.  Larsen  argued  that  although  the 
Romans  may  have  mentioned  that  there  was  a  disloyal  group  within  the  Achaean 
league,  they  would  not  have  mentioned  Polybius  by  name,  since  it  would  be  more 
effective  to  leave  the  threat  hanging  in  the  air. 
324 suggests  that  they  were  trying  to  gauge  the  level  of  support  for 
Rome  amongst  the  various  states  in  the  Peloponnese. 
A  clearer  indication  of  Megalopolitan  attitudes  towards 
Rome  can  be  seen  in  a  meeting  recorded  by  Polybius  at  the 
beginning  of  his  term  of  office  as  hipparch,  convened  to  discuss 
what  policies  should  be  followed  by  the  Achaean  league  in  the 
following  year.  Present  at  the  meeting  were  Lycortas,  Polybius, 
Arcesilias  and  Ariston  of  Megalopolis,  Stratius  of  Tritaea,  Xenon 
of  Patrae  and  Apollonidas  of  Sicyon  42  According  to  Polybius, 
Lycortas  argued  that  the  Achaean  league  should  remain  neutral 
during  the  war,  since  were  they  to  help  Rome  it  would  be: 
Disadvantageous  to  all  the  Greeks  as  he  foresaw  how  very 
strong  the  victors  in  the  war  would  be,  while  he  thought  it 
dangerous  to  act  against  Rome.  43 
Apollonidas  and  Stratius  argued  that  neutrality  should  be 
maintained;  though  those  who  wished  to  assist  the  Romans 
should  be  prevented  from  doing  so.  Archon  in  reply  suggested 
that  the  Achaean  league  should  act: 
As  circumstances  enjoined,  and  neither  give  their  enemies 
any  pretext  for  accusing  them,  nor  allow  themselves  to  be 
reduced  to  the  same  state  as  Nicander,  who,  even  before 
'  Polyb.  28.6.1-9.  Presumably  the  elected  officials  of  the  Achaean  league. 
43  Polyb.  28.6.5. 
325 he  experienced  the  weight  of  Roman  power,  found  himself 
in  the  utmost  distress.  ' 
It  was  Archon's  view  that  prevailed.  However,  the  decision 
to  remain  neutral  was  based  on  the  understanding  that  the 
Achaean  league  should  act  as  circumstances  dictated,  and  this 
meeting  came  shortly  after  a  number  of  victories  by  Perseus  45 
Polybius'  subsequent  embassy  to  the  Roman  consul  Marcius 
Philippus  in  Thessaly,  during  the  latter's  preparation  for  the 
invasion  of  Macedonia,  gives  some  indication  of  why  this  policy 
may  have  been  viewed  with  suspicion  by  the  Romans.  Militarily 
the  situation  was  undecided.  Perseus'  forces  had  gained  a 
number  of  victories,  having  reached  Stratus  in  Aetolia,  where 
they  were  forced  to  retreat  due  to  lack  of  support  46  Archon,  the 
Achaean  strategos,  mobilised  the  Achaean  league's  army  and 
instructed  Polybius  to  offer  its  services  to  the  Romans. 
According  to  Polybius,  Archon  had  decided  on  the  course  of 
action,  "to  refute  the  suspicions  and  accusations  of  the  Romans 
by  positive  actions"  47 
The  Achaean  embassy  went  to  the  Roman  army  that  was 
encamped  at  Perrhaebia,  between  Azorium  and  Doliche,  just  as 
the  Romans  were  about  to  cross  Mt.  Olympus  48  Here,  Polybius 
"  Polyb.  28.6.7-8. 
See  Livy.  43.18.1-11. 
46Livy.  43.21.6.  and  22.11. 
47Polyb.  28.12.1. 
48  Polyb.  28.13.1.  The  exact  location  is  unknown,  Walbank  (1979)  pp.  345-6. 
326 decided  that  the  Achaean  league's  offer  of  assistance  should  be 
delayed  because  of  the  critical  state  of  affairs.  He  and  his 
colleagues  accompanied  the  Roman  army  during  the  invasion  of 
Macedonia  but  did  not  approach  Philippus  to  offer  Achaean 
assistance  until  the  Roman  army  had  reached  Heracleium  on  the 
river  Apila  49  During  this  delay,  a  considerable  time  elapsed,  and 
the  campaign  turned  in  Rome's  favour  50 
Why  did  Polybius  delay  in  telling  Philippus  about  the 
Achaean  offer?  Walbank  suggests  that  since  the  Achaean  league 
was  committed  to  co-operating  with  the  Romans,  the  offer  was 
made  in  the  knowledge  that  it  would  not  be  accepted,  thus 
creating  an  impression  of  loyalty.  "  He  also  suggests  that  it 
would  have  been  fulfilled  had  it  been  accepted,  but  that  Achaean 
forces  would  not  have  been  useful  to  Rome.  2  Errington  draws 
attention  to  the  internal  dimensions  of  the  offer,  pointing  out 
that  it  stole  Callicrates'  thunder  by  demonstrating  loyalty  to 
Rome  53  Polybius  did  delay  in  making  his  offer  for  a  considerable 
period.  From  his  arrival  at  the  Roman  camp  until  he  approached 
Philippus,  a  considerable  time,  which  Polybius  does  not  fully 
account  for,  elapsed. 
49  Polyb.  28.13.2. 
50  Walbank  (1979)  p.  343. 
51  Walbank  (1979)  p.  344. 
52  Walbank  (1979)  p.  344-5 
53  Errington  (1969)  p.  211. 
327 Pedech  suggests  that  Polybius  had  received  secret  orders 
from  Archon,  instructing  him  only  to  make  the  offer  when  the 
Romans  were  about  to  win.  '  Walbank  discounts  this,  suggesting 
that  the  offer  was  made  in  the  knowledge  it  would  be  rejected.  If 
this  was  the  case,  why  was  it  not  made  when  Polybius  initially 
arrived  at  the  Roman  camp?  If  the  intention  was  to  create  an 
impression  of  loyalty,  surely  an  offer  prior  to  the  Roman 
invasion  of  Macedonia  would  have  been  more  beneficial  to  the 
Achaean  league  in  the  post-war  period.  Why  did  Polybius  wait 
until  Perseus  ordered  that  his  treasury  at  Pella  should  be  thrown 
into  the  sea  and  the  dockyards  at  Thessalonica  had  been  burnt?  " 
Offering  assistance  at  that  point,  especially  when  it  could  have 
been  offered  earlier,  hardly  seems  likely  to  create  an  impression 
of  loyalty. 
However,  the  Roman  march  into  Macedonia  was  a  gamble 
that  was  not  assured  of  success.  As  Livy's  narrative  points  out, 
the  Romans  took  immense  risks  in  using  the  route  they  took,  and 
could  have  faced  defeat.  Perseus  had  also  achieved  a  number  of 
victories  in  Illyria  prior  to  this  56  It  is  possible  that  Polybius 
delayed  in  making  his  offer  of  the  Achaean  league's  forces  until 
he  could  see  that  the  Roman  invasion  of  Macedonia  would  be 
successful.  Had  it  failed  he  and  his  fellow  Megalopolitans  would 
P6dech  (1969)  p.  257. 
Livy.  44.10.2. 
Polyb.  28.13.2. 
328 have  perhaps  pushed  for  an  alliance  between  the  Achaean 
league  and  Macedonia,  the  foundation  for  which  they  had  tried 
to  build  before  the  war.  Previous  Roman  missions  to  the 
Peloponnese,  especially  their  approach  to  Elis  and  Messene 
before  the  outbreak  of  war,  seem  to  show  that  the  Romans  were 
aware  of  discontent  at  their  presence  in  the  Peloponnese,  and 
sympathy  for  Macedonia.  These  missions  appear  to  have  been 
intended  to  exploit  divisions  between  the  various  members  of 
the  Achaean  league  to  counteract  the  danger  posed  by 
Megalopolitans  like  Polybius  persuading  the  Achaean  league  to 
ally  with  Perseus  at  a  crucial  moment.  Polybius'  hesitancy  in 
offering  Achaean  troops  to  assist  Philippus'  campaign  in 
Macedonia  may  have  confirmed  the  suspicions  about  the  loyalty 
of  Polybius  and  his  fellow  Megalopolitans  that  the  Romans  had 
before  the  war. 
When  Polybius  did  eventually  make  his  offer  to  Philippus, 
he  was  assured  that  the  assistance  of  the  Achaean  league  would 
not  be  necessary.  The  other  ambassadors  returned  to  the 
Peloponnese  but  Polybius  remained  with  the  Romans  57 
Eventually  he  was  asked  by  Philippus  to  return  to  the 
Peloponnese  when  another  Roman  commander,  Appius  Centho 
requested  that  the  Achaean  league  send  five  thousand  troops  to 
assist  the  Romans  in  Epirus  58  According  to  Polybius,  Philippus 
''  Po1yb.  28.13.5-6. 
-"  Polyb.  28.13.7. 
329 asked  him  to  oppose  this  move  but  at  the  debate  in  the  Achaean 
assembly  to  approve  this  request  Polybius  made  no  mention  of 
Philippus'  request.  There  is  the  further  problem  of  how 
Philippus  knew  about  Centho's  request  for  assistance  59  Walbank 
suggests  that  either  Polybius  opposed  the  move  because  of  the 
links  between  the  Achaean  league  and  Epirus  and  blamed 
Philippus  from  malice,  or  that  his  silence  indicates  a  reluctance 
to  get  involved  in  a  quarrel  between  two  Romans  60  Briscoe 
pointed  out  that  Philippus  may  actually  have  wished  to  place  the 
Achaean  league  in  an  awkward  position  since  in  183BC  he  had 
told  the  senate  that  they  should  not  assist  the  Achaean  league  in 
preventing  Messene's  defection  61  Polybius'  delay  in  offering 
support  for  the  Roman  cause  may  have  made  the  man  who  had 
earlier  argued  against  assisting  the  Achaean  league  suspicious  of 
Polybius'  actions  and  motivation.  It  might  be  that  Philippus' 
request  was  actually  made  not  to  keep  Centho  idle,  but  rather  to 
negate  the  offer  of  Achaean  troops  made  by  Polybius  62 
Polybius'  behaviour  and  caution  should  be  seen  in  the 
context  of  internal  Peloponnesian  politics.  Although 
Megalopolitans  like  Polybius  may  have  favoured  a  Macedonia 
victory,  their  primary  concern  was  to  defend  their  local  interests 
Walbank  (1979)  p.  346  suggests  that  Centho  approached  the  Achaean  assembly  at 
Aegium  directly. 
60  Walbank  (1979)  pp.  346-7. 
"  Briscoe  (1964)  p.  70.  Polyb.  23.9.4ff.  See  Gruen  (1984)  p.  509. 
bZ  Polyb.  28.13.8. 
330 in  the  Peloponnese.  The  Achaean  league  maintained  its  links 
with  other  Hellenistic  states  during  the  conflict,  sending  envoys 
to  honour  the  coming  of  age  of  Ptolemy  and  to  renew  the 
Achaean  league's  alliance  with  Egypt  in  169BC  63 
The  renewal  of  this  alliance  led  to  an  approach  from  Egypt 
in  the  winter  of  169/168BC,  requesting  military  assistance  for  the 
war  against  Antiochus  IV  and  a  debate  in  the  Achaean  assembly. 
Polybius  and  Lycortas  supported  the  dispatch  of  Achaean  forces 
to  Egypt,  while  Callicrates  opposed  it.  "  The  size  of  the  force  to  be 
sent  was  not  that  large,  consisting  of  two  hundred  cavalry  and  a 
thousand  infantry  commanded  by  Lycortas  and  Polybius  65 
Callicrates'  objection  was  that  Achaean  troops  should  not  be  sent 
overseas  at  that  point  but  should  be  retained  in  case  the  Romans 
needed  them  and  also  that  since  the  war  was  none  of  the 
Achaean  league's  business  it  should  not  intervene. 
In  reply,  Polybius  and  Lycortas  argued  that  the  Roman  had 
already  claimed  that  they  had  no  need  for  Achaean  troops,  and  it 
was  only  a  small  part  of  the  league's  total  force.  The  proposal  to 
dispatch  this  force  was  just  about  to  be  accepted  by  the 
assembly,  when  a  letter  arrived  from  Philippus  requesting  that 
the  Achaean  league  assist  Rome  in  making  peace  between  Syria 
and  Egypt.  An  embassy  was  sent  to  accomplish  this.  " 
63  Polyb.  28.12.8-9. 
6'  Polyb.  29.23.1. 
`3  Polyb.  29.23.5. 
66  Polyb.  29.25.7. 
331 Callicrates'  objection  to  this  mission  is  not  hard  to 
understand.  His  objection  on  the  grounds  that  forces  be  retained 
to  assist  Rome  against  Perseus  does  not  mean  that  his  policy  was 
total  co-operation  with  Rome;  rather  that  he  did  not  want  to  see 
his  political  foes  get  the  credit  for  a  successful  campaign  in 
Egypt.  His  argument  was  probably  just  an  excuse  67  Philippus' 
role  is  more  interesting.  Walbank  suggests  that  he  was 
upholding  senatorial  policy,  conveying  the  official  Roman  view 
as  long  as  the  Third  Macedonian  War  was  in  progress.  '  As  the 
composition  of  the  embassy  shows,  it  heavily  reflected  Arcadian 
interests  within  the  Achaean  league,  and  in  light  of 
Philopoemen's  efforts  in  185BC  to  renew  the  alliance  that  the 
Achaean  league  had  with  Egypt,  may  have  appeared  detrimental 
to  Roman  interests. 
The  Third  Macedonian  War  ended  in  Roman  victory  and  as 
Polybius  initially  devised  his  work,  this  was  the  point  where 
Rome  had  completed  its  conquest  of  the  known  world.  During 
the  war,  the  Achaean  league  had  remained  neutral.  Polybius 
along  with  other  Megalopolitans  appear  to  have  favoured 
allying  with  Perseus  prior  to  the  war,  and  it  would  seem  that 
their  preferred  outcome  would  have  been  a  Macedonian  victory. 
As  for  Callicrates,  depicting  him  as  pro-Roman  or  favourable 
'  Gruen  (1984)  p.  510.  Deininger  (1971)  p.  183  n.  34  suggests  that  Callicrates  did  favour 
total  co-operation  with  Rome. 
'  Walbank  (1979)  p.  402  accepted  by  Gruen  (1984)  p.  510. 
332 towards  Rome  fails  to  take  into  account  the  situation  in  the 
Peloponnese.  Just  as  Philopoemen's  actions  at  Sparta  had 
assisted  the  Romans  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Aetolian/Syrian  War 
in  192BC,  Callicrates  seems  to  have  realised  that  he  could  best 
advance  the  political  interests  of  the  region  of  the  Peloponnese 
he  represented  by  co-operating  with  Rome.  Roman  suspicion 
that  Arcadian  communities  within  the  Achaean  league  were 
sympathetic  to  Perseus  was  evident,  both  before  and  during  the 
Third  Macedonian  War;  a  suspicion  that  Callicrates  appears  to 
have  used  to  gain  an  advantage  over  his  rivals. 
ius'  The  aftermath  of  the  Third  Macedonian  War  and  Polybius' 
detention. 
This  section  will  deal  with  the  aftermath  of  the  Third 
Macedonian  War,  in  particular  the  decision  to  detain  Poybius  as 
a  hostage  in  Italy.  I  shall  argue  that  the  Romans  took  the  decision 
to  detain  Polybius  because  of  their  belief  that  he  had  been 
disloyal  during  the  war.  Furthermore,  that  Polybius'  decision  to 
place  the  responsibility  for  his  detention  solely  on  Callicrates, 
was  to  show  his  readers  the  Achaean  league's  system  of  polity  in 
decline  due  to  anacyclosis'  influence  on  its  political  institutions, 
resulting  in  a  once  virtuous  democracy  being  dominated  by 
corrupt  and  dishonest  politicians  like  Callicrates. 
After  the  battle  of  Pydna,  the  victor,  L.  Aemilius  Paullus, 
went  on  a  trip  around  the  Peloponnese,  visiting  Corinth,  Sicyon, 
333 Argos,  Epidaurus,  Sparta,  Megalopolis  and  Olympia  69  The 
purpose  of  this  trip  appears  to  have  been  sightseeing,  and 
according  to  Livy: 
He  avoided  any  inquiry  about  the  sentiments  of  individuals 
or  states  in  regard  to  the  war  with  Perseus,  to  avoid 
troubling  the  minds  of  allies  with  the  apprehensions  of  any 
reprisals.  " 
When  he  arrived  in  Amphipolis,  Paullus  was  approached  by 
a  number  of  embassies,  including  one  led  by  Callicrates.  " 
According  to  Polybius,  these  groups  all  worked  together  for  the 
same  end,  ridding  themselves  of  their  political  opponents. 
Eventually  the  ten  legates  came  to  use  these  groups  to  relay  their 
orders.  '  However,  the  events  surrounding  Polybius'  detention 
as  a  hostage  are  confused  since  his  own  account  ends  at  a  vital 
stage  and  instead  we  are  left  with  Pausanias'  account. 
According  to  Polybius,  Callicrates  approached  Paullus  at 
Amphipolis.  However,  he  claims  that  because  the  Romans  feared 
that  the  Achaean  league  would  not  believe  Callicrates  if  they 
used  him  to  relay  their  instructions,  they  sent  two  legates,  Gaius 
Claudius  Pulcher  and  Gnaeus  Domitius  Ahenobarbus,  to  the 
69  Polyb.  30.10.3-6. 
70  Livy.  45.28.6. 
Polyb.  30.13.3-4.  Along  with  Callicrates,  embassies  from  Boeotia,  Acarnania,  Epirus  and 
Aetolia  approached  Paullus. 
'  Polyb.  30.13.6-7. 
334 Achaean  assembly.  '  As  Polybius'  account  suggests,  the  legates 
appear  to  have  been  sent  to  investigate  correspondence  between 
Perseus  and  the  Achaean  league,  though  he  states  that  nothing 
had  been  found  in  the  Macedonian  archive  that  clearly 
implicated  any  Achaean.  74  Some  evidence  of  correspondence 
between  Perseus  and  the  Achaean  league  was  discovered  and 
forwarded  to  the  two  legates,  but  at  this  point  Polybius'  account 
ends.  75 
Pausanias'  account  states  that  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Third 
Macedonian  War  Callicrates  approached  the  Roman  commission 
sent  to  settle  the  affairs  of  Greece  and  became  friendly  with  one 
of  its  members,  described  as  dishonourable.  '  This  legate  went  to 
the  Achaean  assembly  and  asked  that  those  who  had  helped 
Perseus  be  executed,  along  with  all  those  who  had  held  office 
during  the  period.  Xenon,  the  Achaean  strategos,  objected, 
arguing  that  the  Achaean  league  had  been  loyal  to  Rome;  he 
offered  that  those  accused  be  tried  either  before  the  Achaean 
assembly  or  in  Rome.  "  The  Roman,  according  to  Pausanias: 
"  Polyb.  30.13.8-11.  Polybius  states  that  these  two  legates  were  the  two  most  senior  of  the 
ten.  As  Larsen  pointed  out,  they  were  actually  very  junior  in  status,  suggesting  that 
Polybius  was  trying  to  inflate  his  own  importance.  Larsen  (1968)  p.  479  n.  3  followed  by 
Walbank  (1979)  p.  436. 
'°  Polyb.  30.13.8-11. 
75  Polyb.  30.13.11. 
76  Paus.  7.10.7. 
Paus.  7.10.9. 
335 Took  the  pretext  offered,  and  sent  for  trial  before  Roman 
courts  all  those  whom  Callicrates  accused  of  supporting 
Perseus.  78 
How  do  we  reconcile  the  two  accounts?  Firstly  there  is  the 
question  of  Pausanias'  accuracy.  Pausanias  was  a  travel  writer, 
who  included  historical  stories  simply  to  enliven  and  illustrate 
his  description  of  sites,  since  he  assumed  that  his  readers  were 
familiar  with  what  he  was  talking  about  9  There  is  the  question 
of  whether  he  had  read  Polybius  or  not,  a  topic  that  divides 
scholars.  According  to  Meadows,  in  Pausanias'  account  of  the 
historiography  of  Sparta  until  the  end  of  the  reign  of  Cleomenes 
III,  he  appears  to  have  had  no  knowledge  of  Polybius'  writings, 
apparently  using  Aratus'  Memoirs  instead.  80  Meadows  contends 
that  a  good  deal  of  the  history  of  the  Achaean  league  recounted 
by  Pausanias  at  the  beginning  of  book  seven  clearly  did  not 
derive  from  Polybius  81  Habicht  opposes  the  view  that  Pausanias 
was  ignorant  of  Polybius'  writings,  pointing  out  that  Pausanias' 
interest  in  Greek  history  stops  in  146BC,  the  point  that  Polybius 
chose  to  end  his  histories,  suggesting  that  he  was  familiar  with 
Polybius'  works.  82  Pausanias'  emphasis  on  Callicrates'  corruption 
and  dishonest  nature  seems  to  be  in  line  with  Polybius'  depiction 
"  Paus.  7.10.10. 
7  'Habicht  (1985)  pp.  96-7. 
80  Meadows  (1995)  p.  113. 
81  Meadows  (1995)  p.  101  n.  47. 
eZ  Habicht  (1985)  p.  102. 
336 of  political  leaders  who  dominate  a  democracy  at  the  end  of  the 
process  of  anacyclosis. 
In  some  respects,  the  question  is  not  whether  Pausanias  read 
Polybius  but  whether  he  understood  him  83  The  offer  made  by 
the  Roman  legate  in  Pausanias'  account,  offering  a  trial  in  Rome 
or  in  Achaea,  reflects  legal  practice  in  the  second  century  AD,  the 
time  when  Pausanias  was  writing,  where,  as  Roman  citizens,  the 
accused  would  have  had  this  option.  Although  Polybius  records 
an  embassy  sent  to  Rome  asking  for  the  recall  of  the  hostages,  it 
appears  that  the  senate  believed  that  the  detainees  had  already 
been  tried  '  The  purpose  of  this  embassy  seems  to  have  been  to 
get  clarification  of  the  legal  position,  the  envoys  offering  to 
undertake  an  inquiry  into  the  detainees'  actions  and  to  punish 
those  found  guilty  on  Rome's  behalf.  ' 
Again  one  must  remember  the  situation  in  the  Peloponnese, 
and  the  competing  interests  of  the  various  ethnic  groups  within 
it.  Polybius  might  have  been  correct  in  asserting  that  Callicrates 
assisted  the  Romans  and  probably  did  denounce  him.  Given  his 
earlier  actions,  it  would  appear  that  the  Romans  took  the 
decision  to  remove  Polybius  and  the  other  hostages  to  Italy 
because  they  had  been  sympathetic  to  Perseus'  cause.  In  the 
aftermath  of  the  Third  Macedonian  War  the  Romans  punished 
83  Habicht  (1985)  p.  98  points  out  that  Pausanias  was  probably  writing  from  memory, 
hence  his  mistakes. 
Polyb.  30.32.2. 
Polyb.  30.32.5. 
337 any  sort  of  indiscretion  that  occurred  during  the  conflict. 
Compared  to  events  in  Aetolia  where  thousands  were 
massacred,  their  actions  in  the  Peloponnese  were  comparatively 
restrained  86  As  for  Polybius  placing  the  blame  for  his  detention 
on  Callicrates,  it  was  his  intention  to  show  Achaean  democracy 
gradually  descending  into  chaos  and  anarchy  through  the 
workings  of  anacyclosis.  Callicrates'  dishonest  and  corrupt 
behaviour,  along  with  that  of  the  Roman  legate  who  assisted 
him,  present  in  Pausanias'  account,  would  seem  to  suggest  that 
possibly  Polybius'  account  of  his  own  exile  was  a  continuation  of 
this  theme. 
Callicrates'  probable  denunciation  of  Polybius  and  others 
does  not  necessarily  imply  that  the  Romans  were  favouring  a 
pro-Roman  elite  within  the  Achaean  league.  The  fact  that  four 
embassies  were  dispatched  from  the  Achaean  league  asking  for 
the  release  of  the  detainees  would  seem  to  suggest  otherwise  87  If 
Callicrates  played  a  role  in  Polybius'  detention,  it  was  probably 
only  to  confirm  suspicions  that  the  Romans  already  held. 
Internal  Achaean  politics  167-147BC. 
While  the  hostages  were  being  kept  in  Rome,  Callicrates 
appears  to  have  been  neither  slavishly  pro-Roman,  nor  in 
8`  See  Livy.  45.28.7.  for  the  massacre.  Gruen  (1984)  p.  515  draws  attention  to  the 
endorsement  given  to  this  act  by  Paullus. 
"  Walbank  (1979)  p.  455  states  that  if  Callicrates  was  left  in  complete  control,  then  the 
dispatch  of  these  embassies  is  "strange".  See  also  Larsen  (1968)  p.  483-4. 
338 complete  command  of  the  Achaean  league;  Megalopolitans  such 
as  Thearidas,  Polybius'  brother,  remained  politically  important.  " 
It  would  appear  that  regional  tensions  remained  between  the 
various  members  of  the  Achaean  league,  and  in  164BC  a 
boundary  dispute  arose  between  Sparta  and  Megalopolis.  It 
appears  that  both  sides  appealed  to  Rome,  seeing  as  a  mission 
sent  to  the  east,  led  by  Gaius  Sulpicius  Gallus  and  Manius 
Sergius,  was  ordered  to  resolve  the  dispute.  At  this  point 
Polybius'  account  ends,  and  Pausanias  continues  the  narrative. 
This  presents  a  problem,  in  that  Pausanias  states  that  the  dispute 
was  between  Argos  and  Sparta  89  Pausanias  appears  to  have 
either  confused  Argos  with  Megalopolis,  or  possibly  there  was 
another  boundary  dispute  9°  Pausanias,  presumably  following 
Polybius,  depicts  Gallus'  intervention  as  arrogant;  stating  that 
after  insulting  those  involved  he  ordered  Callicrates  to  resolve 
the  problem  91  Then,  according  to  Pausanias,  Gallus  approached 
the  Aetolians  at  Pleuron  who  were  members  of  the  Achaean 
league  but  wished  to  leave.  He  ordered  them  to  send  an  embassy 
to  Rome  where  permission  was  granted  92  The  senate  then 
"  Polyb.  32.7.1.  SIG'  626  states  that  he  was  from  Megalopolis  and  had  a  father  called 
Lycortas  and  a  brother  called  Polybius. 
89  Paus.  7.11.1-2. 
Walbank  (1979)  p.  465  opposes  the  suggestion  that  there  were  two  disputes. 
"  Paus-7.12.1. 
'Z  Paus.  7.12.3. 
339 proceeded  to  order  Gallus  to  separate  as  many  states  as  he  could 
from  the  Achaean  league.  93 
How  accurate  is  Pausanias'  account?  Gruen  argues  that  the 
transfer  of  the  boundary  dispute  to  Callicrates  was  standard 
Roman  practice,  and  that  the  reference  in  Pausanias  to  Gallus' 
arrogant  behaviour  was  derived  from  Polybius  who  hated  him  94 
A  fragmentary  inscription  from  Olympia  suggests,  according  to 
Gruen,  that  an  Achaean  arbitration  board  gave  the  ultimate 
decision,  and  that  the  Romans  merely  affirmed  an  earlier  Greek 
decision  95  As  for  the  allegations  about  Pleuron  and  the 
dismemberment  of  the  Achaean  league,  Gruen  denies  this 
actually  happened,  suggesting  that  Gallus  would  have  had  no 
desire  to  prolong  his  stay  in  the  Peloponnese,  since  the  main 
thrust  of  his  mission  was  an  investigation  of  the  affairs  of 
Eumenes  and  Antiochus  96  Gruen  suggests  that  Pausanias 
muddled  his  facts  and  anticipated  events  twenty  years  in  the 
future  97 
This  criticism  lacks  conviction;  though  confused,  possibly 
because  he  was  writing  from  memory,  it  appears  that  Pausanias 
derived  his  account  of  this  mission  from  Polybius.  The 
instructions  given  to  Gallus  by  the  senate  before  he  set  out  on  his 
93  Paus-7.12.3. 
94  Gruen  (1976)  p.  50 
"  SIG'  665  lines  42-50. 
Polyb.  31.1.6-8. 
Gruen  (1976)  p.  51. 
340 mission  were  to  inquire  diligently  into  the  actions  of  Antiochus 
and  Eumenes  in  case  they  were  making  any  preparations  to 
attack  Rome  in  concert  98  Gallus'  actions  in  the  Peloponnese 
suggest  that  the  Romans  were  concerned  that  elements  in  the 
Achaean  league  would  assist  in  a  new  challenge  to  Rome's 
position,  and  that  he  was  sent  to  assess  the  situation.  At  the  very 
least  his  actions  would  seem  to  suggest  that  the  situation  in  the 
Peloponnese  was  unsettled. 
The  origin  of  the  Achaean  War  itself  came  in  150BC,  when 
Sparta  attempted  to  leave  the  Achaean  league.  What  type  of 
society  Sparta  had  at  this  time  is  open  to  question,  "  The  problem 
is  that  virtually  nothing  is  known  about  Sparta's  membership  of 
the  Achaean  league  between  180  and  15OBC.  The  fact  that  a 
Spartan,  Menalcides,  was  elected  Achaean  strategos,  seems  to 
suggest  that  some  members  of  the  Spartan  elite  had  reconciled 
themselves  to  Sparta's  membership  of  the  Achaean  league.  10° 
Despite  this,  it  appears  that  a  desire  to  regain  Spartan 
independence  remained. 
According  to  Pausanias,  Menalcidas,  during  his  term  as 
Achaean  strategos,  was  bribed  by  the  Oropians  to  secure  his 
assistance  in  a  dispute  they  were  having  with  the  Athenians. 
Menalcidas  in  turn  offered  Callicrates  half  of  the  bribe  to  secure 
"  Polyb.  31.1.8. 
Shi  iron  (1972)  p.  130  suggests  that  at  this  time  the  socio-economic  question  in  Sparta 
was  no  different  from  elsewhere  in  Greece,  and  indeed  may  have  been  less  serious. 
'0°  Shimron  (1972)  p.  131/132. 
341 his  assistance  in  securing  an  outcome  that  was  favourable  to  the 
Oropians.  '°'  When  the  dispute  was  resolved,  Menalcidas  refused 
to  give  Callicrates  his  share  of  the  money.  Callicrates  in 
retaliation  accused  Menalcidas  of  attempting  to  detach  Sparta 
from  the  Achaean  league  when  the  latter  was  on  an  embassy  to 
Rome,  a  capital  charge  102  So  that  he  would  not  be  brought  to  trial 
to  face  this  charge,  Menalcidas  bribed  the  new  Achaean  strategos, 
Diaeus  of  Megalopolis,  to  prevent  Callicrates  taking  action 
against  him.  However,  Diaeus  was  concerned  that  he  would 
appear  corrupt  for  accepting  a  bribe  from  Menalcidas.  According 
to  Pausanias,  Diaeus  started  a  boundary  dispute  with  Sparta  to 
divert  attention  away  from  his  own  corruption. 
It  is  unlikely  that  there  was  any  truth  behind  these 
allegations.  Pausanias  undoubtedly  drew  this  information  from 
Polybius,  who  wished  to  emphasise  the  corrupt  nature  of  the 
Achaean  leadership,  so  that  he  could  instruct  his  readers  about 
the  affect  that  anacyclosis  was  having  on  the  Achaean  league's 
system  of  government.  Accepting  that  there  was  a  dispute 
within  the  Achaean  elite  that  was  not  caused  by  corruption,  why 
did  this  crisis  spiral  out  of  control?  Though  it  may  be  tempting  to 
see  it  as  a  local  squabble,  the  situation  in  Macedonia  had  been 
disturbed  by  the  rise  of  Andriscus,  a  pretender  to  the  Antigonid 
'01  Paus.  7.12.1-4. 
102  Paus.  7.12.2. 
342 throne,  and  may  explain  both  the  subsequent  actions  of  the 
Achaean  leadership  and  the  harshness  of  the  Roman  reaction  "' 
The  Roman  response  to  Andriscus'  revolt  was  to  send  Scipio 
Nasica  to  investigate  104  Prior  to  Scipio's  arrival,  the  Thessalians 
had  appealed  to  the  Achaean  league  for  assistance  when 
Andriscus  attacked  them.  10'  Scipio  took  command  of  the  Greek 
forces  and  drove  Andriscus  out  of  Thessaly.  However, 
Andriscus  remained  in  control  of  Macedonia,  so  a  Praetor, 
Publius  Juventius,  was  sent  along  with  a  legion  to  bring  the 
situation  under  control,  but  was  defeated.  106  Andriscus  then  re- 
invaded  Thessaly,  and  the  revolt  became  a  serious  threat  to  the 
Rome's  position,  especially  since  Andriscus  enjoyed  widespread 
popular  support,  Polybius  stating  that  the  people  fought  for  him 
with  greater  enthusiasm  then  they  had  fought  for  the  real 
Antigonid  kings.  107  As  a  result,  in  148BC,  Q.  Caecilius  Metellus 
was  sent  to  crush  the  revolt  l08 
Events  in  Macedonia  are  important  for  understanding  the 
background  to  the  Achaean  War.  Simultaneous  trouble  in 
Macedonia  and  the  Peloponnese  may  have  raised  Roman  fears 
about  the  possibility  that  Diaeus  would  renew  the  traditional  ties 
103  Po1yb.  36.10.1-7. 
'04  Zonaras  9.28.  See  Larsen  (1968)  p.  488. 
Po1yb.  36.10.6. 
'06  Florus.  I.  30.5. 
'°'  Polyb.  36.17.14. 
'08  Zonarus  9.28. 
343 that  Megalopolis  had  with  Macedonia.  Although  the  Achaean 
league  had  earlier  provided  assistance  against  Andriscus,  after 
he  had  defeated  a  legion,  Greeks  like  Diaeus  may  have  felt  that 
the  time  had  come  for  a  revolt  against  Roman  domination. 
It  would  appear  that  it  was  Andriscus'  revolt  rather  than 
base  corruption  that  caused  divisions  within  the  Achaean  elite. 
The  three  politicians  involved  all  had  different  interests. 
Menalcidas  was  concerned  with  detaching  Sparta  from  the 
Achaean  league  and  restoring  its  independence,  and  had 
powerful  Roman  allies.  When  Menalcidas  was  imprisoned  in 
Alexandria  in  168BC,  he  was  freed  after  the  intervention  of  Gaius 
Popilius.  l°9  Diaeus  represented  the  traditional  anti-Spartan  view 
held  by  Megalopolitans.  As  a  grandson  of  Diophanes,  a  rival  of 
Philopoemen,  he  was  bound  to  get  an  unfavourable  reaction 
from  Polybius  110  With  the  outbreak  of  Andriscus'  revolt,  Diaeus 
may  have  felt  that  it  was  possible  to  humiliate  Sparta  by 
overturning  Callicrates'  settlement,  gaining  the  prestige  that  his 
family  had  lost  to  Philopoemen  in  191BC.  Callicrates  probably 
wished  to  retain  the  settlement  that  he  had  implemented  at 
2 
Sparta  in  180/179BC. 
Thus,  when  Callicrates  did  bring  capital  charges  against 
Menalcidas,  they  had  nothing  to  do  with  bribery;  rather  they 
109  Larsen  (1968)  p.  490. 
"o  Gruen  (1976)  p.  54.  The  two  are  linked  by  the  fact  that  Diophanes  was  a  son  of  Diaeus. 
At  the  very  least  they  came  from  the  same  family. 
344 were  probably  brought  because  Sparta  was  trying  to  secede  from 
the  Achaean  league.  Shortly  afterwards,  Diaeus  assumed  the 
office  of  Achaean  strategos,  and  the  Spartans  appealed  to  the 
senate  over  the  territory  disputed  between  itself  and 
Megalopolis.  The  reply  from  the  senate  was  that  Achaean  courts 
should  try  all  but  capital  cases.  "'  The  interpretation  placed  on 
this  statement  by  Diaeus  was  that: 
The  senate  had  committed  to  them  the  right  to  condemn  a 
Spartan  to  death. 
"' 
Diaeus  presented  the  Spartans  with  a  list  of  twenty-four 
men  whom  he  claimed  had  disturbed  the  peace.  His  intention  in 
doing  so  was  to  gain  a  pretext  for  war,  since  he  simultaneously 
mobilised  the  Achaean  league's  army.  '13  The  Spartans,  realising 
that  they  could  not  get  a  fair  trial,  appealed  to  Rome,  and  the 
Achaean  league  sent  Diaeus  and  Callicrates  in  response,  though 
Callicrates  died  on  the  way  to  Rome.  "'  The  senate  was  faced 
with  a  return  to  the  situation  that  had  prevailed  in  the  190s BC, 
when  it  had  found  it  necessary  to  curb  Megalopolitan  power 
over  the  Achaean  league.  Therefore,  they  needed  to  carefully 
consider  the  situation  before  sending  the  delegation  they 
Paus.  7.12.4. 
112  Paus.  7.12.4. 
113  Paus.  7.12.6-7. 
14  Paus.  7.12.8.  "I  do  not  know  that  he  would  have  been  of  any  assistance  to  the 
Achaeans;  perhaps  he  would  have  been  the  cause  of  greater  trouble". 
345 promised  both  sides115  Diaeus,  already  aware  of  Andriscus' 
revolt  in  Macedonia,  probably  heard  that  the  Romans  had  been 
defeated  by  Andriscus  while  in  Rome,  which  may  have 
prompted  him  to  believe,  that  the  Romans  would  be  occupied 
with  events  in  Macedonia,  and  would  ignore  events  in  the 
Peloponnese. 
As  a  result,  when  Diaeus  returned  to  the  Peloponnese  and 
approached  the  Achaean  assembly,  according  to  Pausanias  he: 
Misled  the  Achaeans  into  the  belief  that  the  Roman  senate 
had  decreed  the  complete  subjection  to  them  of  the 
Lacedaemonians.  16 
On  the  other  hand,  Menalcidas  told  the  Spartans  that  the 
Romans  had  entirely  freed  them  from  the  Achaean  league.  "" 
Which  one  was  telling  the,  truth?  Gruen  argues  that  it  was 
yet  another  case  of  the  Romans  giving  non-committal  answers 
out  of  indifference.  "'  Harris  on  the  other  hand  suggested  that  the 
confusion  was  intentional.  "'  Menalcidas  would  hardly  have  said 
what  he  did,  unless  the  senate  had  said,  or  implied,  Sparta 
would  be  allowed  to  leave  the  Achaean  league.  It  is  clear  that  by 
this  stage  the  senate  had  decided  that  events  in  the  Peloponnese 
needed  to  be  resolved.  The  reason  that  it  delayed  the  dispatch  of 
75  Paus.  7.12.9. 
116  Paus.  7.12.9. 
117  Paus.  7.12.9. 
1e  Gruen  (1976)  p.  56. 
"9  Harris  (1979)  p.  243. 
346 the  mission  that  they  promised,  and  the  contradictory  answers 
given  to  both  the  Spartan  and  Achaean  representatives  may  have 
been  intended  to  prevent  the  Achaean  league  from  sending  aid 
to  Andriscus.  120 
In  the  meantime,  the  Achaean  league,  encouraged  by  Diaeus 
and  the  new  strategos,  Damocritus  of  Megalopolis,  went  to  war 
with  Sparta  121.  Metellus,  the  Roman  commander  in  Macedonia 
asked  a  Roman  embassy  on  its  way  to  the  east  to  stop  off  in  the 
Peloponnese  and  request  that  the  Achaean  league  refrain  from 
attacking  Sparta  until  the  promised  embassy  from  the  senate 
arrived.  "  The  Achaean  league  ignored  this  request;  Damocritus 
continued  his  attacks,  quickly  defeating  the  Spartans,  though  he 
failed  to  capture  the  actual  city,  confining  his  forces  to 
plundering  the  surrounding  countryside.  '  Damocritus  was 
fined  fifty  talents  for  his  failure  to  capture  Sparta,  and  being 
unable  to  pay,  was  driven  into  exile,  Diaeus  replacing  him  as 
strategos.  124 
Metellus  sent  another  embassy,  requesting  that  the  Achaean 
league  refrain  from  further  action  against  Sparta  until  the 
120  Morgan  (1969)  p.  434. 
Paus.  7.13.1. 
Paus.  7.13.2.  Gruen  (1976)  p.  56  suggests  that  Metellus  did  not  want  any  further  trouble 
in  Greece  while  the  situation  in  Macedonia  was  unsettled. 
Paus.  7.13.3-4. 
Paus.  7.13.5.  If  for  any  reason  a  strategos  was  unable  to  finish  his  term  in  office;  the 
previous  holder  regained  it. 
347 promised  embassy  from  the  senate  arrived.  Diaeus  agreed  to  this 
request,  but  garrisoned  the  surrounding  towns  in  the  hope  of 
provoking  a  Spartan  response.  '  Menalcidas  fell  into  this  trap  by 
attacking  the  town  of  Iasus,  thus  restarting  the  war.  "'  The 
Spartans  were  completely  defeated  and  turned  on  Menalcidas, 
who  was  forced  to  commit  suicide.  127 
The  background  to  the  Achaean  War  is  important  as  it  gives 
us  some  indication  of  why  the  Romans  may  have  decided  that  it 
was  necessary  to  undertake  a  campaign  against  the  Achaean 
league.  Although  Callicrates'  death  and  the  return  of  the 
hostages  from  Rome  may  have  caused  this  dispute,  the 
emergence  of  a  new  generation  within  Megalopolis'  political 
elite  and  their  traditional  hostility  towards  Sparta  was  probably 
responsible.  Megalopolis  and  presumably  other  Arcadian  Poleis 
had  remained  politically  important  within  the  structures  of  the 
Achaean  league,  and  in  the  context  of  Andriscus'  revolt,  a  fear 
that  events  there  would  spread  to  the  Peloponnese  must  have 
been  a  cause  of  concern  to  the  senate.  Despite  Roman  requests 
for  restraint,  Megalopolitans  like  Diaeus  and  Damocritus  had 
provoked  conflict  with  Sparta,  and  the  sight  of  Greek  states 
acting  in  accordance  with  their  local  interests  and  attempting  to 
change  the  situation  in  the  Peloponnese  was  provocative. 
'u  Paus.  7.13.6. 
"  Paus.  7.13.7.  This  town  is  otherwise  unknown,  see  Frazer  (1898)  p.  134. 
'27  Paus.  7.13.8. 
348 Realising  that  they  could  no  longer  control  the  Peloponnese  by 
proxy  the  Romans  decided  to  intervene,  at  the  same  time  turning 
Macedonia  into  a  province.  The  result  was  the  embassy  of  L. 
Aurelius  Orestes. 
Orestes'  embassy  147BC. 
The  senate  had  originally  promised  this  embassy  in  149BC, 
so  when  it  did  eventually  arrive  there  had  been  a  delay  of  two 
years  128  According  to  Pausanias,  when  Orestes  arrived  in 
Corinth,  he  asked  Diaeus  and  the  magistrates  of  all  the  poleis 
who  were  members  of  the  Achaean  league  to  meet  him  at  his 
lodgings.  There,  he  told  them  the  senate  had  decreed  that: 
Neither  the  Lacedaemonians  nor  yet  Corinth  itself  should 
belong  to  the  Achaean  league,  and  that  Argos,  Heracleia  by 
Mt.  Otea  and  the  Arcadian  Orchomenus  should  be  released 
from  the  Achaean  league.  129 
The  reason  he  gave  for  this  decision  was  that  these  poleis 
were  not  originally  Achaean.  According  to  Pausanias,  this 
statement  caused  outrage,  provoking  an  attack  on  all  the 
Spartans  present,  even  those  who  took  refuge  in  Orestes' 
lodgings  130  Polybius  tells  us  that  when  Orestes  returned  to  Rome 
'  Gruen  (1976)  p.  58-9  blames  this  on  a  lack  of  direction  in  senatorial  policy.  Morgan 
argued  that  the  delay  was  due  to  the  situation  in  Macedonia,  the  Romans  delaying  the 
dispatch  of  this  mission  until  the  situation  there  was  under  control. 
Paus.  7.14.1. 
10  Paus.  7.14.2-3. 
349 he  informed  the  senate  that  he  and  his  colleague's  lives  had  been 
in  danger.  "'  Polybius  accuses  Orestes  of  exaggerating  the 
danger,  though  the  Achaean  league  did  feel  it  necessary  to 
dispatch  an  embassy  to  apologise  132 
There  are  similarities  between  Orestes'  request  and  Roman 
demands  at  the  beginning  of  the  Third  Punic  War.  Before 
hostilities  broke  out,  the  Carthaginians  were  asked  to  destroy 
their  city  and  move  to  another  site  ten  miles  inland.  '  This 
request  was  impossible  for  them  to  accept,  so  they  chose  war  1 
The  order  given  by  Orestes  seems  to  have  been  intended  to 
provoke  a  similar  reaction.  The  removal  of  the  poleis  listed  would 
in  reality  have  destroyed  the  Achaean  league.  Nor  is  there  any 
evidence  that  any  of  them,  apart  from  Sparta,  wished  to  leave  the 
Achaean  league  1  Justin  states  that  the  embassy  was  given  secret 
orders  before  it  left  Rome  to  break  up  the  Achaean  league,  since 
the  Romans  were  looking  for  an  excuse  to  provoke  war.  ' 
Although  Polybius  claims  that  the  reason  for  the  mission  was  to 
merely  to  scare  the  league  into  submission,  Walbank  dismisses 
this  view  as  patently  unconvincing,  arguing  that  the  Romans 
131  Polyb.  38.9.1. 
'32  Paus.  7.14.3  and  Polyb.  38.10.1-2. 
"'  Dio.  32.6.3. 
Harris  (1979)  pp.  234-40. 
'  Morgan  (1969)  p.  435-6. 
'ý`  Justin  34.1.1-5. 
350 intended  to  provoke  war.  137  Justin  claims  that  such  was  the  rage 
of  the  crowd: 
That  they  would  even  have  killed  the  ambassadors  of  Rome 
themselves,  had  not  the  latter  fled  in  panic  when  they  heard 
the  uproar  begin.  "' 
The  senate  had  got  the  reaction  that  it  wanted.  Despite  this, 
war  was  not  immediately  declared.  Dio  suggests  that  Orestes' 
embassy  was  intended  to  weaken  the  Achaean  league,  and  it 
probably  did  cause  splits.  139  Diaeus  was  determined  on  war; 
other  Achaean  politicians  made  moves  towards  conciliation.  An 
embassy  led  by  Thearidas,  Polybius'  brother,  was  sent  to 
apologise:  4°  With  the  revolt  in  Macedonia  over,  some  Achaean 
politicians  probably  realised  that  the  Romans  would  act  harshly, 
and  sought  to  minimise  the  damage  that  could  be  caused.  As 
Morgan  pointed  out,  there  was  no  possible  reason  for  sending 
Orestes'  mission  except  to  break  up  the  Achaean  league, 
although  the  Romans  probably  did  not  expect  such  a  violent 
reaction  to  their  message.  14'  Therefore,  a  second  embassy  led  by 
Sextus  Julius  Caesar  was  sent,  and  according  to  Polybius,  was 
instructed  by  the  senate  to: 
"7  Polyb.  38.9.6.  Walbank  (1979)  p.  700.  Gruen  (1976)  p.  60. 
Justin  34.1.9. 
Dio.  Fr.  72.1. 
140  Po1yb.  38.10.1-2.  Paus.  7.14.3.  See  Briscoe  (1974)  p.  70 
191  Morgan  (1969)  p.  437. 
351 Administer  a  mild  censure  for  what  had  taken  place,  and 
then  to  beg  and  instruct  the  Achaeans  not  to  give  further 
heed  in  future  to  those  who  urged  them  to  the  worst 
courses.  142 
Polybius  states  that  this  was  manifest  proof  that  the  senate 
did  not  want  to  dissolve  the  Achaean  league.  Since  the  senate 
made  no  mention  of  reversing  the  terms  offered  by  Orestes,  it 
must  be  assumed  that  they  were  still  intent  on  dissolving  the 
Achaean  league.  143  As  Polybius  admitted,  some  Achaeans 
believed  that  Caesar  had  been  sent  because: 
The  Romans  were  playing  false,  as  the  fate  of  Carthage  was 
undecided.  This  however  was  not  the  fact...  they  thought  it 
fit  to  alarm  the  Achaeans  and  curb  their  undue  arrogance, 
but  by  no  means  wished  to  go  to  war  with  them  or  proceed 
to  an  absolute  breech.  '" 
Caesar's  embassy  147BC. 
Caesar  met  Thearidas  on  the  way  to  Rome,  and  persuaded 
him  to  accompany  the  Roman  mission  to  the  Achaean  assembly 
at  Aegium  where,  according  to  Polybius'  account,  Caesar  barely 
mentioned  the  earlier  mistreatment  of  Orestes'  mission.  145 
According  to  Polybius'  account,  the  delegates  were  divided  into 
'"'  Polyb.  38.9.4. 
Larsen  (1968)  p.  493  and  Walbank  (1979)  p.  700  - 
'""  Polybius  states  that  this  assertion  was  untrue.  Polyb.  38.9.7 
352 three  groups,  all  with  differing  opinions  over  what  to  do.  One 
grouping  appears  to  have  been  willing  to  compromise;  their 
stated  motivation  in  accepting  the  Roman  offer  was  that  they 
had  before  them  the  fate  that  awaited  those  who  opposed 
Rome.  146  Along  with  this  group,  there  were  those  who  Polybius 
describes  as  the  majority.  He  describes  them  as  having: 
Nothing  to  say  against  the  just  strictness  of  Sextus,  and 
being  obliged  to  keep  silent,  yet  they  remained  ill 
conditioned  and  demoralised.  "' 
The  last  group  was  composed  of  Diaeus  and  Critolaus' 
supporters.  According  to  Polybius  they  were: 
A  deliberate  selection  from  each  polis  of  the  worst  men,  the 
most  wretched  and  the  greatest  corrupters  of  the  league.  "' 
Critolaus  was  the  new  strategos,  having  replaced  Diaeus 
shortly  beforehand.  "'  It  would  appear  that  the  discontent 
amongst  the  delegates  was  not  due  to  socio-economic  problems, 
but  rather  that  that  they  felt  it  was  the  opportune  moment  to  act 
against  Rome.  Just  as  Diaeus'  earlier  actions  may  have  been 
influenced  by  the  revolt  in  Macedonia,  according  to  Polybius, 
this  group  felt  that: 
145  Polyb.  38.10.3. 
'46Polyb.  38.10.6. 
147  Polyb.  38.10.7.  Fuks  (1970)  p.  85  argues  that  these  men  were  the  lower  class  supporters 
of  Diaeus  and  Critolaus. 
'48Polyb.  38.10.8. 
'49  Walbank  (1979)  p.  701. 
353 The  Romans,  owing  to  their  campaigns  in  Africa  and  Spain 
were  afraid  of  a  war  with  the  Achaeans,  and  consequently 
tolerated  everything  and  were  ready  to  say  anything.  15° 
This  grouping  requested  that  a  new  meeting  should  be  held 
at  Tegea,  at  which  the  Spartans  could  be  present.  15'  The  meeting 
was  a  disaster  since  the  Achaeans  under  Critolaus  failed  to  turn 
up,  with  Critolaus  announcing  in  response  to  the  Roman  envoys 
that  he  was: 
Not  empowered  to  arrange  anything  without  taking  the 
opinion  of  the  people,  but  that  he  would  refer  the  matter  to 
the  next  assembly  that  was  to  meet  in  six  months.  152 
His  intention  seems  to  have  been  to  insult  the  Romans,  and 
this  move  made  war  inevitable153  Gruen  suggests  that  Critolaus 
asked  the  Achaeans  not  to  attend  because  he  feared  renewed 
mob  violence.  l"  This  appears  doubtful;  Megalopolitan  politicians 
like  Critolaus  and  Diaeus  appear  to  have  been  determined  to 
force  an  internal  solution  to  Sparta's  membership  of  the  Achaean 
league  without  reference  to  Roman  interests.  The  fact  that  the 
Romans  were  engaged  in  the  Third  Punic  War,  as  well  as  in 
Spain,  may  have  encouraged  them  to  believe  that  they  would  be 
unable  to  intervene  in  the  Peloponnese.  Along  with  this,  the 
150  Polyb.  38.10.10 
15'  Polyb.  38.10.12. 
'52  Polyb.  38.11.7. 
153  Larsen  (1968)  p.  493. 
"4  Gruen  (1976)  p.  63. 
354 situation  in  Macedonia  was  tense  since  Andriscus  had  only 
recently  been  defeated  and  another  pretender  may  possibly  have 
emerged.  "'  In  the  light  of  the  links  between  Megalopolis  and 
Macedonia,  along  with  the  popularity  that  Andriscus'  revolt  had 
enjoyed,  Critolaus  may  have  felt  that  the  time  was  ripe  for  a 
revolt  against  Rome. 
Caesar  returned  to  Rome,  reporting  Critolaus'  behaviour  to 
the  senate,  stating  that  the  latter  had: 
Acted  in  a  wrong-headed  way  and  like  a  madman. 
156 
Critolaus  then  toured  the  Peloponnese,  informing  the 
people  of  what  had  happened  at  Tegea  and,  according  to 
Polybius: 
Accused  the  Romans  and  gave  the  worst  sense  to  all  that 
they  had  said. 
157 
Socio-economic  issues  and  the  Achaean  War. 
It  is  this  tour  that  has  led  some  to  suggest  that  the  Achaean 
War  was  actually  a  social  revolt.  Fuks  identified  four  areas  that 
might  be  taken  as  evidence  to  suggest  that  the  war  was  a  revolt 
by  the  lower  classes  against  the  Romans  and  their  upper-class 
allies.  In  particular  he  draws  attention  to  the  measures  taken  by 
Zonaras.  9.28.9.  Morgan  (1969)  pp.  430-33. 
Polyb.  38.11.6.  Erskine  (1990)  p.  200,  discussing  madness  in  Polybius,  argued  that 
Polybius  believed  at  this  point  that  it  was  madness  for  the  Achaeans  to  revolt  after  the 
Romans  had  brought  peace  and  order  to  Greece. 
157Polyb.  37.11.7-9. 
355 the  Achaean  league  regarding  the  cancellation  of  debt,  the 
freeing  of  slaves  and  the  financing  of  the  war  effort  by  the 
league's  elite  along  with  Polybius'  depiction  of  the  supporters  of 
the  Achaean  leadership  158 
Turning  towards  the  first  area  identified  by  Fuks,  when 
touring  the  Peloponnese,  Polybius  reports  that: 
He  (Critolaus)  advised  the  magistrates  not  to  exact 
payments  from  debtors  or  to  admit  into  prisons  those 
arrested  for  debt,  and  also  to  make  the  enforced 
contributions  permanent;  until  the  war  was  decided.  "' 
Polybius  seems  to  be  trying  to  create  impression  that  these 
were  private  instructions  from  Critolaus  to  the  local 
magistrates  160  As  Fuks  pointed  out,  this  was  an  official  decision 
by  the  league,  local  officials  were  not  to  take  into  prison  private 
debtors,  and  loans  raised  by  consortiums  for  individuals  were  to 
be  suspended  for  the  duration  of  the  war.  This  would  seem  to 
suggest  that  this  policy  was  carefully  devised  not  to  disturb  the 
social  order  since  neither  capital  nor  interest  was  to  be  touched.  "' 
These  measures  were  only  to  last  for  the  duration  of  the  war.  162 
"  Fuks  (1970)  pp.  78-89.  Shimron  (1972)  p.  133  suggests  that  it  is ironic  that  by  146BC  the 
Achaeans  are  the  radicals  and  the  Spartans  the  conservatives. 
Polyb38.11.10. 
160  Fuks  (1970)  p.  80. 
Fuks  (1970)  see  also  Walbank  (1979)  pp.  702-3  and  Briscoe  (1974)  p.  70. 
'62  Fuks  (1970)  p.  81. 
356 The  second  area,  the  freeing  of  slaves,  should  be  seen  in 
terms  of  military  necessity  at  a  time  of  extreme  crisis.  After  the 
Achaean  army  had  been  virtually  been  wiped  out,  Diaeus 
ordered  that: 
All  the  poleis  should  set  free  twelve  thousand  of  such  of  their 
home-born  and  homebred  slaves  as  were  in  the  prime  of  life 
and  after  arming  them,  send  them  to  Corinth.  163 
Again  Fuks  points  out  that  the  intention  was  defensive.  The 
fact  that  these  slaves  had  to  be  home-born  and  bred  suggests  that 
they  were  as  close  as  possible  to  free  citizens.  ''  The  financial 
effort  of  the  Achaean  elite  is  also  easily  explained.  According  to 
Polybius,  Diaeus: 
Saw  that  the  public  exchequers  were  very  badly  off  in 
consequence  of  the  war  with  Sparta,  he  compelled  them  to 
make  also  special  calls  and  to  exact  contributions  from  the 
wealthier  inhabitants,  not  only  from  the  men,  but  from 
women  also. 
165 
Fuks  points  to  an  inscription  from  Troizen,  which  illustrates 
that  these  measures  were  undertaken  to  aid  the  league,  not  as 
part  of  any  social  reform.  "  Such  was  the  enthusiastic  response  to 
these  measures,  that  according  to  Polybius: 
'  Po1yb.  39.15.3-5. 
16°  Fuks  (1970)  pp.  81-2. 
165  Po1yb.  38.15.6. 
"  IG  W.  757.  Fuks  (1970)  p.  83. 
357 The  women,  stripping  themselves  and  their  children  of  their 
jewellery,  had  to  contribute  to  this,  almost  as  of  a  set 
purpose,  to  a  fund  that  could  only  bring  destruction  on 
them.  "' 
Fuks  suggests  that  this  was  voluntary  on  the  part  of  the 
women  and  shows  their  commitment  to  the  war  effort.  16'  As  for 
the  supporters  of  the  Achaean  leadership,  from  Polybius' 
depiction  of  them  it  has  been  assumed  that  Diaeus  and  Critolaus' 
supporters  were  from  the  lower  classes  169  According  to  Fuks,  the 
key  passage  is  Polybius'  depiction  of  the  crowd  at  the  Achaean 
assembly,  where  he  says  that: 
Never  had  there  been  collected  such  a  pack  of  artisans  and 
common  men.  170 
Fuks  suggests  that  this  passage  demonstrated  that  the 
Achaean  leadership  were  supported  by  the  lower  classes,  which 
hoped  for  social  and  economic  advances  from  the  war.  "  Why 
Diaeus  would  have  desired  to  see  the  lower  classes  take  control 
over  the  Achaean  league  is  left  unsaid.  As  he  was  presumably  a 
man  of  property  himself,  there  was  no  reason  for  him  to  hope  for 
167  Po1yb.  38.15.11. 
"  Fuks  (1970)  p  p.  83-84.  Walbank  (1979)  p.  712  agrees  that  it  may  be  voluntary,  but  adds 
that  since  Polybius  mention  it  in  the  context  of  official  pressure,  that  it  may  mean  that 
the  women  had  to  sell  their  jewels  in  order  to  meet  the  official  assessment. 
"  69  Fuks  (1970)  p.  84. 
10  Polyb.  38.12.5. 
"  Fuks  (1970).  85-6. 
358 social  upheaval.  Although  the  leaders  of  revolutionary 
movements  are  often  members  of  the  elite,  it  does  not  appear 
that  Diaeus  was  concerned  with  undertaking  a  socio-economic 
revolution. 
The  Achaean  War  146BC 
After  the  Achaeans  had  rejected  the  last  chance  offered  to 
them  by  Caesar's  embassy  the  senate  responded  by  sending  the 
consul  elected  for  that  year,  Mummius,  with  a  fleet  and  an  army 
to  the  Peloponnese.  " 
Despite  the  preparations  for  war  by  both  sides,  Metellus 
sent  four  legates  to  the  Achaean  assembly  at  Corinth  since, 
according  to  Pausanias,  he  hoped  to  win  the  war  without  any 
assistance.  "  Critolaus  had  already  toured  the  Peloponnese, 
stirring  up  the  people  there.  Thus,  when  Metellus'  legates 
arrived  in  Corinth  they  received  a  hostile  reception.  '74  Which 
group  encouraged  Metellus'  belief  that  there  was  a  peace  party  is 
unknown.  Stratius,  the  only  detainee  known  by  name  apart  from 
Polybius  admitted  to  being  in  contact  with  these  legates,  along 
with  Euagoras  of  Aegium  175  According  to  Polybius,  Critolaus 
stated  that: 
'n  Paus.  7.15.11. 
173  Polyb.  38.12.1.  According  to  Paus.  7.15.2.  at  the  same  time  he  led  his  army  down  to  the 
Gulf  of  Lan-da 
14  Po1yb.  38.12.4. 
"3  Polyb.  38.13.4.. 
359 We  should  not  so  much  fear  the  Spartans  or  the  Romans,  as 
those  among  ourselves  who  are  co-operating  with  the 
enemy.  " 
Critolaus  persuaded  the  Achaean  assembly  to  declare  war 
on  Sparta,  though  as  Polybius  says  it  was  in  reality  a  declaration 
of  war  against  Rome.  "  Metellus  had  already  led  his  army 
towards  the  Peloponnese  while  the  legates  were  in  Corinth,  so 
strategic  surprise  by  the  Achaeans  was  impossible.  Critolaus 
seemed  aware  that  the  Romans  had  usually  advanced  into 
Greece  by  land  so  he  sent  the  league's  army  to  Heraclea,  which 
was  trying  to  cede  from  the  league.  ""  Metellus  surprised  it,  and 
the  Achaean  army  was  forced  to  retreat  179  Metellus  pursued  the 
retreating  Achaean  army  to  Scarphelia,  where  he  destroyed  it. 
Critolaus  disappeared  after  the  battle,  Pausanias  stating  that  his 
body  was  never  found;  though  it  probably  fell  into  the  nearby 
marshes  l80 
Diaeus  replaced  him  as  strategos.  With  the  league's  army 
gone  Diaeus  was  forced  to  recruit  slaves.  18'  This  gave  him 
fourteen  thousand  men,  four  thousand  of  whom  he  sent  to 
Polyb.  38.13.3. 
"'  Po1yb.  38.13.6. 
"8  Larsen  (1968)  p.  495  postulates  that  its  proximity  to  Thermopylae  suggests  that  the 
Achaean  league  thought  that  if  it  could  hold  this  position  against  Metellus  it  might  have 
a  chance. 
Paus.  7.15.3. 
'ý°  Paus.  7.15.4. 
360 Megara  to  defend  the  Isthmus.  The  Achaean  army  was  forced 
back  to  Corinth  when  the  Romans  approached.  "' 
Metellus  then  offered  the  Achaean  league  a  chance  to 
surrender  before  Mummius'  arrival,  possibly  because  he  wanted 
the  credit  for  this  campaign.  183  Andronidas,  a  supporter  of 
Callicrates,  was  sent  to  negotiate,  and  returned  with  terms 
which,  we  are  informed  by  Polybius,  Stratius  a  former  Roman 
detainee  begged  Diaeus  to  accept,  being  supported  by  the 
hypostrategos  Sosicrates,  who  was  tortured  for  suggesting 
surrender.  Diaeus  decided  to  fight  on.  ' 
With  Mummius'  arrival,  Metellus  retired  to  Macedonia  1"  A 
battle  was  fought  on  the  Isthmus  where  the  Achaean  army  was 
completely  defeated  186  Diaeus  fled  to  Megalopolis,  where  he 
killed  his  wife  and  committed  suicide  187  Corinth  was  left 
undefended,  most  of  its  inhabitants  fleeing  in  terror.  After 
waiting  three  days,  Mummius  stormed  the  city,  razing  it  to  the 
ground  and  looting  a  large  number  of  works  of  art  in  the 
process.  188 
1e'  Polyb.  38.15.1.  Paus.  7.15.7. 
'$Z  Paus.  7.15.10. 
'..  Paus.  7.15.11. 
"`  Polyb.  38.17.1-18.1. 
""  Paus.  7.16.1.  describes  Mummius'  force,  which  also  contained  Greek  contingents. 
'88  Paus.  7.16.3. 
187  Paus.  7.16.6. 
Polyb.  39.22,  Paus.  7.16.7-9,  Justin  34.6,  Livy  Epit  42.  The  destruction  of  Corinth  is  a 
famous  episode,  though  why  the  Romans  chose  Corinth  in  particular  for  punishment, 
361 Polybius,  tarache  and  anacyclosis.  The  Achaean  league  and 
the  Peloponnese  after  146BC. 
What  happened  in  the  Peloponnese  after  146BC  is  virtually 
unknown.  Polybius  tells  us  that  the  Romans  sent  out  ten 
commissioners  to  settle  the  region  and  that  he  was  asked  to  help 
them  on  his  return  from  Carthage.  "'  Pausanias  states  that  a 
tribute  was  imposed  on  Greece  and  that  all  the  federal  leagues 
were  abolished  for  a  short  time,  although  they  were  quickly 
restored.  However,  they  were  not  restored  on  the  model  that  had 
existed  before  146BC.  As  Pausanias  states: 
Down  to  my  day  a  Roman  governor  has  been  sent  to  the 
country.  "' 
Apart  from  this  passage  very  little  is  known  about  the 
Peloponnese  until  Mithridates'  invasion.  Polybius,  by  his  own 
admission,  helped  the  Romans  in  their  settlement  of  the 
especially  as  the  leaders  of  the  revolt  were  all  Megalopolitans,  is  unknown.  Possibly  its 
position  on  the  Isthmus,  linking  the  Peloponnese  with  the  rest  of  Greece,  indicates  that  it 
was  intended  to  serve  as  a  warning  to  the  Greeks  as  to  what  fate  befell  those  who 
rebelled  against  Rome.  Purcell  (1995)  p.  138  draws  attention  to  the  connections  between 
the  sack  of  Corinth  and  Carthage,  and  mentions  the  claim  in  the  Aeneid  that  the  sack  of 
Corinth  was  Rome's  revenge  for  the  sack  of  Troy. 
Strabo  10.486  states  that  Delos,  an  important  centre  for  Roman  negotiatores,  benefited 
from  Corinth's  destruction  and  it  has  been  plausibly  suggested  that  they  may  have 
exercised  some  influence  in  the  decision  to  destroy  it.  See  Harris  (1979)  pp.  98-99. 
189  Polyb.  39.4-5. 
190  Paus.  7.16.9-10. 
362 Peloponnese  after  the  Achaean  War.  Polybius'  co-operation  with 
the  Roman  settlement,  his  critical  attitude  towards  the  leadership 
of  the  Achaean  league,  along  with  his  emphasis  on  the  madness 
and  irrationality  of  the  mob  at  the  Achaean  assembly,  has  led  to 
an  assumption  that  Corinth's  destruction  changed  his  attitude 
towards  Rome's  presence  in  Greece  into  acceptance. 
However,  one  of  the  most  important  documents  that 
survives  from  this  period,  a  letter  from  the  proconsul  Quintus 
Fabius  to  the  citizens  of  Dyme,  dealing  with  a  case  of  arson 
there,  has  recently  been  re-appraised,  challenging  prevailing 
attitudes  about  the  situation  in  Greece  in  the  aftermath  of  the 
Achaean  War.  "'  Previously  it  was  believed  that  this  document 
dated  from  115BC,  but  a  new  version  of  the  text  suggests  that  it 
should  definitely  be  dated  to  the  period  immediately  after  the 
Achaean  War,  around  144BC.  192  How  this  piece  of  evidence 
should  be  interpreted  has  also  caused  problems.  When  it  was 
thought  that  the  document  dated  from  115BC,  most 
commentators  saw  it  as  evidence  that  Roman  commanders  in 
Macedonia  exercised  close  control  over  Greece  from  the  time  of 
the  Achaean  War.  93  It  was  also  taken  as  evidence  to  support  the 
contention  that  the  Romans  were  seeking  to  suppress  democratic 
19'  Sherk  RDGE  no.  42.  SIG3  684. 
See  Ferrary  (1988)  pp.  189-99  and  Kallet-Marx  (1995)  pp.  141-43. 
193  Kallet-Marx  (1995)  p.  129.  For  an  example  of  the  earlier  view,  see  Gruen  (1984)  p.  524. 
363 regimes  in  Greece  in  favour  of  oligarchies  because  they  were 
concerned  about  socio-economic  problems.  194 
The  new  version  of  the  text  suggests  that  what  took  place  at 
Dyme  should  be  dated  much  earlier  and  was  in  reality  a 
continuation  of  the  Achaean  War.  The  very  fact  that  Fabius  does 
not  describe  the  events  that  took  place  in  this  polls  as  a  stasis, 
would  suggest,  according  to  Kallet-Marx,  that  those  involved  in 
the  arson  mentioned  in  the  inscription  were  not  motivated  by 
socio-economic  factors  195  As  Kallet-Marx  points  out  in  his 
reconstruction  of  the  text,  there  is  no  reference  to  the  destruction 
of  records  pertaining  to  debts  in  the  fire,  simply  to  the 
destruction  of  laws.  196  Nor  were  those  responsible  from  the  lower 
classes.  On  the  contrary,  they  both  appear  to  have  held  the  office 
of  nomographoi,  suggesting  that  the  arsonists  were  members  of 
the  local  elite  197  As  Kallet-Marx  contends,  the  arsonists  intention 
was  to  incite  the  local  population  to  revolt,  and  as  he  points  out, 
during  the  Jewish  revolt  of  66AD,  the  archives  in  Jerusalem  were 
burnt  to  attract  the  support  of  the  poor,  though  the  revolt  always 
remained  nationalistic.  As  he  points  out  about  the  arson  in 
Jerusalem: 
Had  we  known  no  more  about  this  event  then  we  do  about 
the  Dyme  incident,  we  might  have  concluded  swiftly  and 
194  Fuks  (1972)  pp.  21-7. 
'95  Kallet-Marx  (1995)  pp.  131-2. 
Kallet-Marx  (1995)  p.  136. 
This  appears  to  have  been  a  local,  not  a  federal  office,  Kallet-Marx  (1995)  p.  137. 
364 with  utter  confidence  that  the  uprising  was  in  essence  a 
debtors  uprising  against  the  rich.  l98 
Dyme  had  a  long  history  of  animosity  towards  the  Romans. 
During  the  First  Macedonian  War  its  citizens  were  about  to  be 
sold  into  slavery  by  the  Romans  until  they  were  saved  by  Philip 
V,  and  in  198BC,  along  with  delegates  from  Megalopolis  and 
Argos,  they  left  the  Achaean  assembly  in  protest  over  the 
decision  to  ally  with  Rome.  199 
The  question  is  what  sort  of  constitution  was  being  restored 
by  Fabius?  When  the  inscription  was  dated  to  115BC  it  was 
believed  that  it  referred  to  the  federal  leagues  that  Pausanias 
stated  the  Romans  allowed  the  Greeks  to  form20°  An  acceptance 
of  Kallet-Marx's  proposed  new  date  would  seem  to  suggest  that 
the  events  in  Dyme  were  in  reality  associated  with  Greek 
resistance  to  the  settlement  imposed  by  Mummius  in  the 
immediate  aftermath  of  the  Achaean  War  201  This  would  seem  to 
indicate,  as  Ferrary,  who  previously  suggested  that  the 
inscription  should  be  dated  to  around  144BC,  argued,  towards  a 
restoration  of  traditional  political  structures  in  Greece  in  the 
aftermath  of  the  Achaean  War.  As  Ferrary  points  out,  Fabius 
seems  to  be  trying  to  continue  the  fiction  of  Rome  as  the  liberator 
of  Greece.  He  contends  that  since  the  perpetrators  of  the  arson 
See  Jos.  BJ.  2.427  for  events  in  Jerusalem.  Kallet-Marx  (1995)  p.  150. 
Livy.  32.22.10.  Paus.  7.17.5. 
20°  Paus.  7.16.10. 
201  Polyb.  39.5.3. 
365 were  associated  with  the  recent  leaders  of  the  Achaean  league, 
the  Romans  were  claiming  to  have  liberated  the  citizens  of  Dyme 
from  their  tyranny.  Ferrary  suggests  that  poleis  like  Dyme 
returned  to  the  independent  status  that  they  had  before  the 
foundation  of  the  Achaean  league,  as  was  stated  Roman  policy 
before  the  Achaean  War.  202 
What  this  inscription  tells  us  about  the  nature  of  Roman 
control  in  Greece  is  more  revealing.  Fabius  was  probably  given 
the  task  of  settling  matters  in  Greece  and  ensuring  that  the 
settlement  was  accepted  203  This  was  not  an  unusual  action; 
Flamininus  remained  in  Greece  for  two  years  after  his  defeat  of 
Philip  V  to  settle  outstanding  matters204  Fabius'  role  was  to 
ensure  that  Rome's  position  in  the  Peloponnese  was  respected. 
The  initial  approach  to  deal  with  the  arsonists  came  from  a 
group  within  Dyme,  who  were  probably  members  of  the  local 
elite  willing  to  co-operate  with  Rome.  What  Fabius  was  trying  to 
do  in  Dyme  was  support  those  who  realised  that,  at  that  point, 
Roman  domination  over  Greece  was  a  fact  of  life,  and  knew  that 
Rome  would  not  intervene  in  their  local  affairs  if  its  position  in 
the  Greek  world  was  not  threatened.  It  would  appear  that  at 
Dyme  Fabius  was  exploiting  differences  between  Greek 
202  Ferrary  (1988)  p.  189-99. 
203  Kallet-Marx  (1995)  p.  145  argues  that  Polybius  probably  assisted  Fabius  but  may  have 
over-emphasised  his  role  in  the  settlement 
204  Kallet-Marx  (1995)  p.  145.  Flamininus  defeated  Philip  V  in  196BC,  but  did  not  leave 
Greece  until  194BC. 
366 politicians  as  Romans  had  done  since  their  alliance  with  the 
Aetolian  league  in  212BC. 
It  would  appear  from  this  re-interpretation  of  the  inscription 
that  the  disturbances  at  Dyme  did  not  have  a  socio-economic 
basis,  but  were  rather  part  of  an  uprising  against  Roman  control. 
Should  it  change  our  understanding  of  Polybius'  depiction  of  the 
events  surrounding  the  Achaean  War?  Polybius  by  his  own 
admission  co-operated  with  Fabius  in  his  settlement  of  the 
Peloponnese  and  it  is  hard  to  escape  the  contention  that  the 
events  of  146BC  may  have  changed  his  attitude  towards  Rome 
into  one  of  compliance.  Indeed,  Polybius  states  that  he  returned 
to  the  Peloponnese  after  the  Achaean  War,  having  managed  to 
capitalise  on  the  results  of  his  previous  actions,  something  that 
was  deserved  because  of  his  goodwill  towards  Rome205 
However,  Polybius'  extension  to  his  histories  was  not 
merely  an  afterthought  that  reflected  his  experiences  in 
detention.  Polybiüs'  intention  in  writing  prägmatike  historia  was 
to  demonstrate  to  his  Greek  readership  how  the  suspension  of 
anacyclosis  had  affected  the  Roman  system  of  government, 
producing  the  circumstances  that  had  led  to  Rome  achieving 
domination  over  the  Mediterranean  world.  However,  anacyclosis 
was  not  unique  to  the  Roman  system  of  government,  only  its 
suspension  was;  the  systems  of  government  in  all  poleis  were 
subject  to  this  force,  including  states  that  resembled  poleis  like 
'Ag  Po1yb.  39.8.1-2. 
367 the  Achaean  league.  As  Polybius  states,  his  intention  in 
extending  his  histories  down  to  146BC,  explaining  the  course  of 
events  in  the  period  between  the  battle  of  Pydna  and  the 
destruction  of  Corinth,  an  account  that  is  largely  missing,  was 
because  he  believed  that  it  would  allow  his  readers  to: 
Be  able  to  see  clearly  whether  the  Roman  government  is 
acceptable  or not,  and  future  generations  whether  it  should 
be  considered  to  have  been  worthy  of  praise  and  admiration 
or  rather  of  blame.  ZO6 
Does  this  mean  that  Polybius  accepted  that  Rome  was  an 
established  presence  in  the  Greek  world?  The  events 
surrounding  Corinth's  destruction  may  have  caused  him  to  co- 
operate  with  Rome  and  intercede  on  behalf  of  communities  that 
faced  Roman  retribution.  This  does  not  mean  that  Polybius 
became  pro-Roman.  As  he  stated,  when  in  difficulty  Greeks 
should  always  assist  Greeks  207  As  with  so  much  in  his  histories, 
Polybius'  ideas  about  the  role  that  anacyclosis  played  in 
influencing  events  may  account  for  his  depiction  of  the  actions 
of  the  Achaean  leadership  in  146BC,  and  give  an  indication  of 
how  Polybius  viewed  Rome's  presence  in  the  Greek  world. 
Walbank  argued  that  Polybius'  intention  in  his  account  of 
the  Achaean  War,  despite  his  extremely  negative  and  cynical 
portrayal  of  Roman  behaviour  between  books  thirty-one  and 
206 
Polyb.  3.4.1. 
W'  Polyb.  38.4.7-8. 
368 thirty-three,  was  to  justify  Rome's  behaviour.  Walbank  suggests 
that  there  is  a  profound  change  in  Polybius'  attitude  towards 
Rome  from  book  thirty-five  onwards,  a  period  that  Polybius 
depicts  as  a  time  of  taro,  che,  or  internal  conflict,  throughout  the 
Mediterranean! 
," 
In  Greece  corrupt  politicians  controlled  the 
Achaean  league  and  its  assembly  was  dominated  by  the  mob. 
Hasdrubal,  who  Polybius  depicts  as  empty-headed  and 
pompous,  displaying  his  wealth  at  a  time  when  his  people  were 
suffering,  ruled  Carthage,  and  in  Macedonia  the  people  had 
rallied  to  the  cause  of  the  false  Philip,  Andriscus.  As  for 
Polybius'  depiction  of  Roman  actions,  Walbank  contends  in 
contrast  to  his  depiction  of  events  elsewhere  during  this  period 
of  tare  -.  -he,  that  the  debate  Polybius'  records  about  Hellenic 
attitudes  towards  Roman  actions  at  the  beginning  of  the  Third 
Punic  War  show  that  he  approved  of  Rome's  actions  in  146BC. 
According  to  Polybius'  account,  four  opinions  about  Roman 
behaviour  towards  Carthage  existed  in  Greece  at  that  point. 
Some  Greeks  argued  that  the  Roman  decision  to  be  rid  of  a 
menace  like  Carthage  was  a  wise  decision.  In  opposition  to  this 
view  there  were  those  who  considered  that  Roman  behaviour 
was  undergoing  a  change  for  the  worse,  and  that  Rome  would 
probably  come'  to  the  same  end  as  Athens  and  Sparta,  an 
argument  reinforced  by  those  who  argued  that  Rome's  action 
was  impious  and  treacherous.  The  final  argument  provided  by 
"  Walbank  (1985)  p.  336. 
369 Polybius  was  that  since  the  Carthaginians  had  broken  their 
treaty  with  Masinissa,  the  Romans  were  able  to  do  what  they 
liked'  Yet,  the  decision  that  Polybius  presented  the  Romans  as 
adopting,  embarking  on  a  policy  that  resulted  in  the  total 
destruction  of  Carthage,  was  a  decline  from  earlier  standards  of 
Roman  behaviour  210  After  Cynoscephalae  Polybius  presents 
Flamininus  stating  that  the  Romans  never  destroyed  their 
enemies  after  a  war,  and  that  although  brave  men  ought  to  press 
hard  on  their  enemies  while  fighting,  they  should  also  show 
themselves  courageous  in  defeat,  and  moderate  and  humane  in 
victory  "'  The  Romans,  in  deliberately  deciding  on  Carthage's 
annihilation  in  146BC,  were  acting  in  a  cruel  and  barbarian 
fashion. 
Walbank  contended  that  ultimately  Polybius'  stress  on 
tarx  the  in  this  period  was  related  to  his  belief  that  since  Rome 
had  by  this  point  become  the  dominant  power  in  the 
Mediterranean,  any  rising  against  it'.  rule  was  futile  and 
'  See  Polyb.  36.9.1-17.  Walbank  (1985)  p.  339  contends  that  the  arrangement  of  the 
arguments  so  that  those  favouring  Rome  begin  and  end  the  debate  and  the  extra  space 
allotted  to  the  pro-Roman  argument  shows  that  Polybius  favoured  this  policy. 
210See  Petzold  (1969)  pp.  62-63  for  the  argument  that  Polybius  was  allying  himself  with 
Rome's  critics  at  this  point. 
21  See  Polyb.  18.37.2.  Walbank  (1985)  p.  339.  While  suggesting  that  Polybius  approved  of 
Roman  policy  at  this  point,  Walbank  acknowledges  that  Polybius  was  earlier  critical  of 
Philip  V  for  destroying  Thermon  during  the  Social  War  and  other  earlier  failures  to 
show  mercy  and  compassion. 
370 meaningless  212  Should  we  accept  that  tarache  should  be  seen  in 
this  context,  especially  given  Polybius'  depiction  of  the  internal 
corruption  in  Carthage,  Achaea  and  Macedonia? 
Again  one  should  return  to  Polybius'  account  of  anacyclosis, 
an  essential  part  of  the  pre-Christian  Indo-European  belief 
structure,  and  given  Plato's  writings,  familiar  to  Polybius'  Greek 
readership,  and  its  importance  throughout  his  historin213  As 
Walbank  pointed  out,  it  was  only  after  the  destruction  of 
Corinth,  at  a  comparatively  late  date  in  the  composition  of  his 
histories,  that  Polybius  decided  to  incorporate  his  account  of  the 
evolution  of  the  Achaean  league  into  a  single  polls  into  his 
second  book  214  We  are  left  with  the  question  as  to  whether 
Polybius'  emphasis  on  the  madness  and  irrationality  of  the 
inhabitants  of  the  Achaean  league  in  146BC  was  a  deliberate 
device  to  instruct  his  Greek  readership  in  the  workings  of 
anacyclosis.  Polybius  took  what  was  in  reality  a  failed  revolt 
against  Rome,  which  he  depicted  as  forming  part  of  a  wider 
period  of  tar  ache  around  the  Mediterranean,  and  presented  it  to 
i 
his  readers  as  marking  the  end  of  the  cycle  of  anacyclosis  in  the 
Achaean  league's  system  of  government. 
Z'Z  Walbank  (1985)  p.  337. 
2'3  Polyb.  6.5.1.  "Perhaps  this  theory  of  the  natural  transformations  into  each  other  of  the 
different  forms  of  polity  is  more  elaborately  set  forth  by  Plato  and  certain  other 
Philosophers;  but  as  the  arguments  are  subtle  and  stated  at  great  length,  they  are  beyond 
the  reach  of  all  but  a  few".  See  Plato  Republic  8.544  and  Laws  4.712. 
14  Walbank  (1985)  p.  342. 
371 Eckstein  suggests  that  Polybius'  criticism  of  the  Achaean 
leadership  and  the  Achaean  people  was  due  to  the  fact  that 
Polybius  believed  their  actions  to  be  irrational,  shameful  and 
disgraceful,  suggesting  that  he  was  setting  up  idealistic 
standards  of  behaviour  that  would  have  been  familiar  to  his 
aristocratic  audience  215  This  is  a  vast  overstatement  of  the  role 
that  socio-economic  issues  played  in  the  Achaean  War.  The 
leadership  of  the  Achaean  league  did  undertake  reforms  during 
the  war;  they  were  desperate  measures  to  defend  the 
Peloponnese  against  the  Roman  onslaught,  and  were  not 
intended  to  permanently  end  social-iniquities  in  the 
Peloponnese.  The  Achaean  War  was  caused  by  a  boundary 
dispute  between  Sparta  and  Megalopolis  that  spiralled  out  of 
control  when  Diaeus  decided  to  challenge  Roman  control  over 
Greek  affairs;  it  was  not  a  socio-economic  revolt.  It  is  evident,  if 
one  examines  the  Achaean  War  and  the  limited  evidence  for  the 
period  leading  up  to  it,  that  dissatisfaction  with  the  Roman 
presence  in  Greece  existed.  Kallet-Marx's  new  text  of  the  Dyme 
inscription  indicates  that  the  destruction  of  Corinth  does  not 
appear  to  have  lessened  Greek  desires  to  be  rid  of  the  Roman 
control. 
Polybius  depicted  Rome  in  the  initial  part  of  his  histories  as 
a  state  that  was  at  the  height  of  its  powers,  led  during  its 
conquest  of  the  Mediterranean  world  and  long  struggle  with 
215  Eckstein  (1995)  p  . 221. 
372 Hannibal  in  Italy  by  virtuous  men  216  But  as  Polybius  has  Scipio 
imply  when,  according  to  Polybius,  they  watched  Carthage  burn 
together,  Rome  was  not  immune  from  a  resumption  of 
anacyclosis,  and  the  same  fate  that  befell  Carthage,  which  itself 
had  a  mixed  system  of  government  at  one  time,  could  befall 
Rome.  "' 
Polybius  believed  that  both  internal  and  external  forces 
eventually  combined  to  bring  destruction  to  every  polis.  Polybius 
stated  that  although  the  external  forces  that  played  a  part  in  the 
decline  of  poleis  were  unknown,  eventual  internal  decline  was  a 
regular  process,  and  in  his  account  of  events  at  Carthage  and  the 
Achaean  league  in  146BC,  Polybius  does  portray  internal 
conflict,  or  tarache,  in  these  poleis  Zla  Moreover,  Polybius  does 
describe  the  onset  of  internal  decline  in  the  Roman  Republic  in 
the  period  before  tara.  '  the  took  hold  elsewhere;  the  influx  of 
wealth  from  Macedonia  after  Pydna  leading  to  extravagance, 
luxury  and  the  idle  parade  of  riches  amongst  the  Roman  youth, 
with  the  exception  of  Scipio.  He  also  describes  the  senate's 
Z'6  This  was  the  point  where  Polybius  believed  Rome  reached  its  zenith.  See  Powell 
(2001)  p.  23. 
217  Polyb.  38.21.1-3.  Polyb.  38.22.1-2  states  that  while  he  watched  Carthage  burn,  Scipio 
quoted  Homer.  11.6.448-9,  and  when  questioned  by  Polybius  stated  that,  "without  any 
attempt  at  concealment  he  names  his  own  country  for  which  he  feared  when  he  reflected 
on  the  fate  of  all  things  human.  Polybius  actually  heard  him  and  recalls  it  in  his 
histories". 
218  Polyb.  6.57.2-3. 
373 actions  during  this  period  in  a  deeply  cynical  fashion  219  The 
decision  to  destroy  Carthage  in  146BC  was  a  decline  from 
Rome's  earlier  high-minded  behaviour  towards  those  it 
defeated.  Possibly  Polybius  was  indicating  to  his  readership  that 
Rome's  decline  had  already  begun. 
The  Romans  had  been  favoured  by  tyche  during  the  period 
covered  by  Polybius'  histories,  when  the  fortunes  of  the  Achaean 
league  along  with  other  states  around  the  Mediterranean  had 
become  inter-linked  with  Rome;  anacyclosis  had  been  suspended 
in  the  Roman  system  of  government  during  their  conquest  of  the 
Mediterranean  world.  It  had  not  been  in  the  Achaean  league.  It  is 
in  this  context  that  Polybius'  depiction  of  the  events  surrounding 
Corinth's  destruction  should  be  seen;  his  desire  to  demonstrate 
to  his  readers  the  completion  of  the  internal  decline  in  the 
Achaean  league's  democratic  system  of  government  which 
allowed  the  Romans  to  achieve  mastery  of  the  Mediterranean 
world.  At  the  beginning  of  his  histories,  Polybius  announced  his 
intention  to  explain  how  and  under  what  system  of  polity  the 
Romans  came  to  control  the  entire  world  22°  Polybius  had  to 
explain  to  his  Greek  readership  how  they  found  themselves 
living  under  Roman  rule,  and  his  emphasis  on  the  role  of 
anacyclosis  and  tyche  in  his  histories  was  an  attempt  to  account 
for  this  paradox,  the  rational  Greeks  finding  themselves  under 
2'9  Polyb.  31.25.3-5. 
720  Polyb.  1.1.5. 
374 the  irrational  rule  of  the  barbarian  Romans.  Polybius  depicts  a 
Roman  republic  that  is  strong  and  virtuous  because  of  the 
benefits  brought  about  by  anacyclosis'  suspension,  precisely  at 
the  time  when  Greece  suffers  from  internal  decline.  During 
Rome's  advent  into  the  Greek  world  Macedonia  has  a  ruler  like 
Philip  V,  who  in  the  lead  up  to  the  battle  of  Cynoscephalae  is 
depicted  by  Polybius  as  habitually  cruel,  treacherous  and  a 
promiscuous  drunk.  His  opponent  Flamininus  is  portrayed  by 
Polybius  as  a  highly  intelligent  young  man  whom  was  well- 
versed  in  public  affairs.  "  Rome  was  victorious,  but  only  because 
the  balance  achieved  in  its  system  of  government  by  the 
disruption  of  anacyclosis  produced  men  of  Flamininus'  character, 
while  Philip  V,  despite  the  promising  start  to  his  career,  was 
corrupted  into  a  tyranttm 
The  Achaean  league  had  a  system  of  polity  that  was  just  as 
liable  to  the  process  of  anacyclosis  as  the  Roman  one,  a  factor 
Polybius  stressed  to  his  readers  by  inserting  an  account  of  its 
development  into  book  two  after  the  events  of  146BC  tm  In  his 
account  of  the  support  that  the  leadership  of  the  Achaean  league 
received  in  146BC,  especially  at  the  assembly  in  Corinth  that 
rejected  Sextus'  offer,  Polybius  states  that  when  the  Roman 
envoys  made  their  appeal: 
Eckstein  (1995)  pp.  183-4. 
See  for  example  Polyb.  6.7.7.  where  Philip  V  shows  similar  characteristics  to  a  tyrant. 
'  Walbank  (1985)  p.  342. 
375 The  people  on  listening  to  them,  showed  no  disposition  to 
comply,  but  jeered  at  the  delegates,  hooted  and  hustled  them 
out  of  the  meeting.  For  never  had  there  been  collected  such  a 
pack  of  artisans  and  common  men.  All  the  poleis,  indeed, 
were  in  a  drivelling  state,  but  the  malady  was  universal  and 
.  most  fierce  in  Corinth.  "' 
Polybius  in  book  six  describes  three  stages  through  which 
constitutions  progressed  under  the  influence  of  anacyclosis.  The 
final  one  was  democracy,  the  stage  that  he  depicts  the  Achaean 
league  enjoying,  and  he  claims  that  democracy  eventually  ends 
in  mob-rule  and  anarchy  '  Then,  when  after  some  great  disaster 
has  left  men  weakened,  a  single  strong  individual,  who  brings 
men  together  from  the  state  of  wretchedness  they  find 
themselves  in,  emerges  "6 
Polybius  depicts  the  destruction  of  Corinth  as  the  single 
, greatest  misfortune  to  have  ever  occurred  in  Greece,  exactly  the 
sort  of  event  that  he  predicted  at  the  end  of  the  cycle  of 
anacyclosis'  In  his  account  of  the  events  leading  up  to  Corinth's 
destruction,  Polybius  emphasises  the  role  of  the  mob,  and  the 
anarchy  that  prevailed  at  the  Achaean  assembly  which  had 
fallen  under  the  sway  of  an  irrational  leadership.  This  is  exactly 
the  situation  he  stated  would  occur  at  the  end  of  the  final  stage 
224  Po1yb.  38.12.4-5. 
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376 of  anacyclosis,  when  democracy  transformed  into  mob-rule  and 
anarchy.  "  Nor  was  Polybius'  emphasis  on  the  mob  as  a  factor  in 
Achaean  politics  a  recent  occurrence.  In  his  account  of 
Callicrates'  embassy  to  Rome  in  180BC,  the  great  turning  point 
in  the  relationship  between  the  Achaean  league  and  Rome, 
Polybius  claimed  that  Callicrates  pointed  out  to  the  senate  how 
the  mob  at  the  Achaean  assembly  could  be  manipulated  to 
increase  Roman  control  over  the  Achaeans.  According  to 
Polybius,  Callicrates  was  only  successful  in  gaining  election  to 
the  office  of  Achaean  strategos  on  his  return  from  Rome  because 
he  resorted  to  bribery  '  This  accusation  has  parallels  with 
Polybius'  depiction  of  the  situation  when  democracy  transforms 
in  the  final  stage  of  anacyclosis: 
When  a  new  generation  arises  and  the  democracy  falls  into 
the  hands  of  the  grandchildren  of  its  founders,  they  have 
become  so  accustomed  to  freedom  and  equality  that  they  no 
longer  value  them  ...  so  when  they  begin  to  lust  for  power 
and  cannot  obtain  it  through  themselves  or  their  own  good 
qualities,  they  ruin  their  estates,  tempting  and  corrupting 
the  people  in  every  way.  23o 
According  to  Pausanias'  account  of  the  origin  of  the 
Achaean  War,  undoubtedly  drawn  from  Polybius,  a  dispute 
228 
Polyb.  6.9.8-9. 
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377 between  the  leadership  of  the  Achaean  league  over  the  division 
of  a  bribe  began  the  process  that  resulted  in  the  eventual 
destruction  of  Corinth  and  the  dissolution  of  the  Achaean 
league.  Similar  behaviour  occurred  when  democracy  was 
transformed  through  the  natural  cycle  of  anacyclosis,  since  as 
Polybius  earlier  stated: 
For  the  people,  having  grown  accustomed  to  feed  at  the 
expense  of  others  and  to  depend  for  their  life  on  the  property 
of  others,  as  soon  as  they  find  a  leader  who  is  enterprising 
but  is  excluded  from  the  highest  office  by  his  penury, 
institute  the  rule  of  violence;  and  now  uniting  their  forces 
massacre,  banish  and  plunder,  until  they  degenerate  again 
into  perfect  savages  and  find  once  more  a  master  and 
monarch.  23' 
Essentially  Polybius  emphasised  the  role  of  the  mob  in  the 
events  surrounding  Corinth's  destruction  not  because  he  wished 
to  show  that  it  was  a  revolt  by  the  lower  classes.  Rather  his 
account  was  intended  to  demonstrate  to  his  readers  the  effect  of 
anacyclosis  in  its  final  stage.  Corinth's  destruction  was  not 
permanent,  tyche  was  changeable,  and  though  it  had  favoured 
the  Romans  during  their  conquest  of  the  Mediterranean  world,  it 
would  turn  again  in  the  favour  of  the  Greeks.  Rome  was 
victorious  in  146BC,  but  the  only  way  that  its  system  of 
government  could  go,  was  downwards,  eventually  degenerating 
"  Polyb.  6.9.8-9. 
378 into  anarchy.  As  for  the  Achaean  league,  at  least  it  could  sink  no 
lower.  Eventually,  as  Polybius  predicted  to  his  readers,  a  single 
strong  individual  would  emerge  as  the  cycle  of  anacyclosis 
resumed.  He  would  bring  men  salvation  from  the  state  that  they 
found  themselves  in,  subjection  to  Roman  rule.  In  this  process  he 
would  be  assisted  by  Greeks  politicians  who  would  have  learnt 
the  mistakes  that  had  occurred  in  the  past  from  Polybius'  inquiry 
into  it,  and  build  a  society  that  would  be  able  to  place  external 
pressure  on  a  Roman  Republic  that  was  suffering  from  internal 
decline.  When  that  had  occurred,  the  Achaean  league  would  rise 
phoenix  like  from  the  ashes  left  from  Corinth's  destruction. 
379 Conclusion. 
Polybius,  posterity  and  the  limits  of  literary  history 
Analytical  history  has  its  origins  in  a  series  of  lectures 
given  by  Hegel  during  his  tenure  as  Professor  in  the  University 
of  Berlin  in  the  early  19`'  century.  Kant  had  earlier  argued  that 
the  task  of  historical  philosophy  was: 
To  discover  a  purpose  in  nature  behind  events,  and  to 
decide  whether  it  is  after  all  possible  to  formulate  in  terms  of 
a  definite  plan  of  nature  a  history  of  creatures  who  act 
without  a  plan  of  their  own.  ' 
In  response  to  Kant's  challenge,  Hegel  argued  to  his 
audience  that  history  was  a  rational  science,  and: 
Whoever  looks  at  the  world  rationally  will  find  that  it 
assumes  a  rational  aspect...  The  overall  content  of  world 
history  is  rational  and  indeed  has  to  be  rational;  a  divine 
will  rules  supreme  and  is  strong  enough  to  determine  the 
overall  content.  Our  aim  must  be  to  discern  this 
substance,  and  to  do  so;  we  must  bring  with  us  a  rational 
consciousness! 
'  Kant,  Idea  of  a  Universal  History  from  a  Cosmopolitan  Point  of  View  (1784),  in  P.  Gardiner 
(Ed)  Theories  of  History,  London  1959  p.  29. 
'Hegel  "  Second  draft:  The  Philosophical  History  of  the  World  (1830),  in  Lectures  on  the 
Philosophy  of  World  History  (Cambridge  1975)  pp.  26-30. 
380 According  to  Hegel,  who  essentially  secularised  the 
Calvinist  doctrine  of  predestination,  it  was  necessary  in 
understanding  history  to  realise  that  the  individual  was  an 
organic  part  of  the  wider  community.  Hegel  argued  that  just  as 
we  are  all  born  into  a  single  language  group,  we  are  also  born 
into  a  common  historical  background  and,  amongst  the  most 
important  of  all  the  "objective"  powers  for  understanding 
history  that  Hegel  emphasised  were  the  family,  civil  society  and 
the  state.  For  Hegel  the  state  was  greater  than  the  individual 
citizen  was;  it  was  moreover  more  than  the  sum  of  all  its  citizens. 
Yet  Hegel's  assertions  about  the  nature  of  history  have  been 
disputed.  Collingwood,  the  English  philosopher  of  history, 
doubted  that  history  could  be  seen  in  simple,  positive  terms.  He 
argued  that  all  historical  evidence  was  merely  a  reflection  of 
"thought";  the  most  that  the  historian  could  do  was  to 
reconstruct  or  re-enact  past  "thoughts"  inevitably  under  the 
influence  of  his  own  unique  experience.  Collingwood  concluded 
that  a  historian's  goal  could  only  be  "a  knowledge  of  the 
present",  and  specifically,  "  how  it  came  to  be  what  it  is".  Given 
that  history,  as  he  argued,  is  an  attempt  to  understand  the 
present  by  reconstructing  its  determining  conditions,  as  a  science 
it  can  only  be  teleological,  because  historians  can  write  only  from 
the  vantage  point,  and  with  the  prejudices,  of  their  own  present? 
3  Collingwood,  R.  G.  "  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  History.  1926",  in  The  idea  of  History: 
with  Lectures  (1926-1928),  ed.  J.  van  der  Dussen,  Oxford  1993.  pp  363,412,420. 
381 As  such,  present  day  historians  who  use  a  literary  source 
like  Polybius  to  reconstruct  events  and  society  during  the 
Hellenistic  period  are  faced  with  two  problems.  Firstly  they  are 
dealing  with  a  text  which  was  intended  not  merely  to  inform, 
but  also  to  instruct  an  audience  whose  society,  attitudes  and 
beliefs  are  far  removed  from  their  own.  Secondly,  it  is  an 
undeniable  fact  that  how  historians  perceive  the  past  and 
evidence  from  it  has  changed  throughout  the  ages.  If  one  takes 
Polybius  as  an  example,  his  histories  have  served  a  multitude  of 
roles  since  the  time  of  his  re-emergence  during  the  Renaissance, 
and  scholars  have  interpreted  the  information  he  provides  in 
varying  ways.  During  the  sixteenth  century  Polybius  was  used 
primarily  as  a  technical  authority  on  military  matters.  Political 
theorists  from  the  time  of  Machiavelli  have  drawn  on  Polybius' 
writings  regarding  the  mixture  and  balance  in  the  constitution  of 
states  for  ideas  on  framing  the  constitutions  of  the  ideal  republic. 
As  Eckstein  points  out,  during  the  nineteenth  century  Polybius 
was  frequently  mined  solely  as  a  source  of  information  about 
Rome.  "  In  some  regards  this  attitude  continues  to  this  day, 
Polybius'  sixth  book  in  particular  is  viewed  by  some  historians 
merely  as  a  valuable  source  of  information  about  Roman 
institutions  once  his  theory  of  anacyclosis  has  been  discarded.  ' 
`  Eckstein  (1995)  p.  17. 
'See  for  example  Luce  (1997)  pp.  138-9  who  in  his  discussion  of  book  six  remarks  that, 
"When  Polybius  gets  away  from  the  straight  jacket  of  theory,  he  comes  into  his  own  in  a 
quite  remarkable  way". 
382 Finally  along  with  other  ancient  writers,  notably  Plutarch, 
Polybius  is  used  by  historians  to  reconstruct  a  picture  of  the 
Hellenistic  world  as  a  period  of  immense  socio-economic  crisis, 
leading  to  reforms  in  Sparta  and  the  eventual  destruction  of 
Corinth. 
Yet,  as  Collingwood  would  argue,  Polybius'  purpose  in 
writing  his  histories  was  ultimately  to  understand  his  own 
present  and  to  instruct  his  contemporary  Greek  readership  about 
it,  not  to  provide  a  picture  of  the  past  for  future  generations; 
essentially  as  Collingwood  would  contend  Polybius'  writings  are 
testimony  rather  than  evidence.  Polybius'  stated  aim  was  to 
explain  to  his  contemporary  readers  how  and  under  what 
system  of  polity  Rome's  conquest  of  the  Mediterranean  world 
had  been  achieved,  by  inquiring  into  the  circumstances  that  had 
led  to  Rome's  conquest,  anacyclosis'  influence  on  systems  of 
government  all  over  the  Mediterranean.  Polybius  was 
attempting  to  rationalise  for  a  Greek  audience  something  that  for 
many  of  them  was  unthinkable,  barbarian  rule.  He  did  so  in  an 
essentially  Hegelian  fashion,  by  stressing  the  importance  of  the 
state  in-historical  events,  presenting  his  readership  with  a  picture 
of  how  tyche  had  affected  the  interaction  of  two  states  that 
resembled  poleis,  Rome  and  the  Achaean  league. 
However,  just  as  Hegel's  model  for  understanding  the 
process  of  history  results  in  the  role  of  the  individual  being 
marginalised,  in  some  respects  what  becomes  marginalised  in 
383 Polybius'  histories  is  the  individuality  of  the  various  peoples  of 
the  Peloponnese.  Polybius  presents  a  picture  of  the  different 
ethne  of  the  Peloponnese  uniting  as  one  ethnos,  coming  to 
resemble  a  single  polls.  Given  that  Polybius'  purpose  was  to 
explain  to  his  contemporary  Greek  readership  how  the  reality 
they  faced,  that  of  Roman  domination,  had  come  about,  perhaps 
this  picture  was  exaggerated  to  fit  his  purpose  of  explaining  this 
conquest  through  tyche  and  anacyclosis.  As  such,  the  extent  to 
-  which  these  concepts  influenced  Polybius'  presentation  of  events 
needs  to  be  carefully  considered  by  historians  today. 
From  the  outset  of  Polybius'  work  anacyclosis  is  essential  in 
understanding  both  his  universal  approach  and  subsequent 
narrative.  Polybius  argued  that  the  Romans  had  achieved  their 
success  through  the  agency  of  tyche,  a  supernatural  force  that 
had  suspended  the  process  of  anacyclosis  in  Rome's  system  of 
government  at  a  time  when  it  had  been  unfavourable  to  Greek 
states  like  the  Achaean  league.  Yet  tyche  was  changeable  and 
what  had  once  favoured  the  Romans  would  lead  to  their 
eventual  destruction.  Although  in  the  earlier  part  of  his  work 
Pölybius  describes  Roman  policy  and  actions  in  an  extremely 
favourable  light,  post-Pydna,  his  comments  on  Roman  actions 
and  behaviour  become  increasingly  cynical  and  critical.  In 
Greece  he  describes  a  steady  decline  in  the  fortunes  of  the 
Achaean  league,  from  the  period  when  it  could  deal  with  Rome 
on  an  equal  basis  under  the  leadership  of  Philopoemen  and 
384 Aristaenus  until  the  corruption  of  politicians  like  Callicrates  and 
Diaeus.  Eventually  these  two  strands  come  together  at  Corinth's 
destruction.  At  this  point  the  Achaean  league  had  reached  the 
end  of  its  cycle  of  anacyclosis,  while  in  Rome  anacyclosis  was 
about  to  resume;  Scipio  speculating  that  just  as  his  ancestral 
home  Troy  had  been  destroyed  at  the  hands  of  Greeks,  so  might 
Rome. 
The  problem  facing  the  present  day  historian  is  whether  or 
not  the  pragmatike  historia  Polybius  wrote  should  be  taken  at  face 
value,  especially  regarding  events  in  the  Peloponnese.  It  cannot 
be  doubted  that  Polybius'  writings  do  contain  valuable  evidence; 
the  fact  that  information  he  provides  can  be  verified  from  other 
sources  seems  to  indicate  this.  Polybius  undoubtedly  had,  like  all 
historians  in  antiquity,  to  use  a  certain  degree  of  poetic  license  in 
recounting  speeches  made  by  others;  there  is  no  indication  that 
these  speeches  were  anything  other  than  what  he  sincerely 
believed  to  be  an  accurate  reflection  of  contemporary  concerns. 
That  Polybius  provides  a  narrative  of  historical  events,  to  the 
best  of  his  ability,  should  not  be  questioned 
What  should  be  questioned  is  the  way  Polybius  presented 
the  evidence  he  collected.  If  one  takes  the  entire  concept  of 
imperium,  Polybius'  writings,  especially  his  emphasis  on  the 
virtuous  nature  of  the  Roman  republic,  has  been  taken  by 
historians  such  as  Mommsen,  Holleaux  and  Badian  as  evidence 
that,  although  the  Romans  were  aggressive,  they  were  not 
385 consciously  so.  Admittedly  Rome  fought  many  wars,  but 
Polybius'  narrative  of  the  first  two  Punic  Wars  shows  that  Rome 
was  essentially  defending  itself.  Indeed,  scholars  who  follow  in 
this  school  contend  that  it  was  only  after  148BC,  the  point  where 
Polybius'  histories  stop,  that  Rome  became  a  consciously 
imperialist  power.  Other  historians,  notably  Colin  and  Harris, 
have  used  Polybius'  writings  as  a  framework  for  arguing  that 
Rome  planned  its  conquests  in  a  systematic  fashion  and  was 
from  an  early  stage  an  imperialistic  power  that  sought  to  gain 
mastery  over  the  Mediterranean  world. 
Possibly  the  differences  between  both  schools  are  due  to  the 
fact  that  for  Polybius  history  wäs  not  a  sterile  and  neutral 
account  of  past  events.  Rather  it  was  an  active  investigation  of 
what  had  gone  before  which  he  hoped  would  provide  his 
readers  with  lessons  from  which  they  could  draw  hope  and 
inspiration  for  the  future.  Polybius  wished  to  explain  to  his 
readers  how,  through  the  workings  of  tyche  and  anacyclosis,  they 
had  become  subject  to  Roman  rule;  he  presented  a  picture  of 
Greek  society  and  the  situation  in  the  Peloponnese  that  fitted  this 
intention.  It  must  be  remembered  that  Polybius'  writings  were 
part  of  a  genre  that  could  trace  its  origins  from  the  epic  and  oral 
traditions;  a  genre  that  was  also  heavily  influenced  by 
philosophical  concepts.  '  Polybius  appears  to  have  found 
inspiration  in  his  approach  to  the  writing  of  history  from  the 
`Polybius  cites  Homer  on  no  less  than  fourteen  occasions,  see  Sacks  (1981)  p.  160. 
386 travels  of  Odysseus;  even  Romans  such  as  Cato  remarked  upon 
Polybius'  own  identification  with  the  latter.  '  In  this  light,  the 
present  day  reader  should  approach  Polybius'  text  with  some 
caution. 
If  one  turns  towards  Polybius'  presentation  of  the  Achaean 
league  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  states  in  the  Peloponnese 
belonged  to  some  form  of  political  federation  during  the 
Hellenistic  period.  This  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  Polybius' 
depiction  of  the  Achaean  league  as  a  body  where  the  entire 
Peloponnese  united  to  the  extent  that  it  resembled  a  single  polls, 
or  his  stress  on  a  common  Achaean  identity,  is  an  accurate 
depiction  of  the  situation.  Rather,  Polybius'  stress  on  the 
Achaean  leaguerutopian  unity  was  perhaps  due  to  his  need  to 
show  his  readership  how  they  had  found  themselves  living 
under  Roman  rule,  by  contrasting  the  fortunes  of  its  people  and 
their  system  of  polity  with  those  of  the  people  and  city  of  Rome. 
For  example,  in  the  period  around  the  Second  Macedonian  War, 
Polybius  portrays  the  Achaean  league  as  a  state  that  under  the 
leadership  of  Philopoemen  and  Aristaenus  dealt  with  a  Roman 
Republic  whose  motives  for  intervening  in  Greece  were 
principled  on  an  equal  basis.  It  is  doubtful  that  this  happened  in 
Walbank  (1972)  pp.  51-2.  Note  Polyb.  35.6.4.  where  Cato  makes  a  joking  analogy 
between  the  two.  However,  though  it  is  usually  considered  as  a  joking  reference  to 
Polybius'  identification  with  Odysseus,  it  is  possible  that  Cato  was  drawing  Polybius' 
attention  to  the  fact  that  the  Senate  may  have  been  reluctant  to  release  him,  and  that  he 
should  not  tempt  fate  by  "pushing  his  luck". 
387 reality.  Yet,  if  Polybius  was  to  show  his  readers  how  the 
Achaean  league  declined  through  the  workings  of  anacyclosis 
after  Callicrates'  embassy,  it  was  necessary  for  him  to  show  in  an 
idealised  fashion  how  it  had  previously  interacted  with  Rome.  In 
assessing  Polybius'  depiction  of  the  actions  of  Greek  states  in  the 
Peloponnese,  historians  are  faced  with  the  possibility  that  his 
stress  on  an  essentially  artificial  Achaean  identity  might  distort 
our  understanding  of  the  events  surrounding  Rome's  conquest 
of  Greece.  It  is  important  to  remember  that  Polybius  was  an 
inhabitant  of  a  polls  whose  raison  d'etre  was  to  provide  a  focus 
for  Arcadian  resistance  to  Spartan  imperialism.  If  this  is  the  case, 
a  present  day  historian  is  left  with  the  question  as  to  whether 
Polybius'  histories  and  attitudes  towards  various  states  in  reality 
reflect  the  interests,  pre-occupations  and  prejudices  of  a 
Megalopolitan. 
It  cannot  be  doubted  that  Polybius  portrays  the  actions  of 
the  Aetolian  league  and  Spartan  kings  such  as  Cleomenes  and 
Nabis  in  the  worst  of  all  possible  fashions.  It  is  also  an 
inescapable  fact  that  the  Aetolians  had  allies  in  the  Peloponnese 
and  a  mythical  kinship  link  with  Elis,  and  furthermore,  that  both 
Elis  and  Sparta  were  long-standing  rivals  of  Arcadia  in 
Peloponnesian  politics.  For  an  Arcadian  like  Polybius,  Aetolian 
actions  such  as  the  destruction  of  Cynaetha  prior  to  the  outbreak 
of  the  Social  War  were  acts  of  mindless  violence;  they  were  not 
to  an  Elean.  Thus,  a  historian  is  left  to  ponder  the  question  of 
388 whether  or  not  Polybius'  natural  prejudices  account  for  his 
depiction  of  events.  It  would  be  unfair  to  accuse  Polybius  of 
intending  to  mislead  or  misinform  his  readership;  it  would  in 
reality  be  a  gross  misrepresentation  of  his  intention  in  writing 
history.  Polybius'  histories,  intended  as  they  are  to  instruct, 
might  mislead  his  present  day  readers,  since  they  are  the 
writings  of  a  man  who  wrote  and  shaped  his  narrative  to 
provide  his  contemporaries  with  the  consolation  that  although 
the  Romans  had  been  successful  this  time,  they  would  not 
always  be.  Indeed  as  Polybius  had  pointed  out  about  an  earlier 
incursion  by  the  Celts,  history  was  not  merely  a  means  for 
recording  past  events;  it  served  a  more  practical  purpose,  since 
as  he  argued: 
I  think  history  has  a  special  obligation  to  record  such 
episodes  in  the  drama  of  tyche  and  to  pass  them  on  to  future 
generations  so  that  those  who  come  after  us  may  not  be 
wholly  ignorant  of  them  and  may  not  be  confounded  by  the 
sudden  and  unexpected  inroads  of  these  barbarians,  but 
instead,  having  some  appreciation  of  how  short-lived  and 
easily  repulsed  they  are,  may  stand  their  ground  under 
attack  and  do  everything  in  their  power  not  to  yield  to  them 
in  any  way.  For  I  consider  that  the  writers  who  recorded 
and  handed  down  to  its  the  story  of  the  Persian  invasion  of 
Greece  and  the  attack  of  the  Gauls  on  Delphi  have  made  no 
small  contribution  to  the  struggle  of  the  Hellenes  for  their 
389 common  liberty.  For  there  is  no  one  who  armies  of  men  or 
abundance  of  arms  or  vast  resources  could  frighten  into 
abandoning  his  last  hope,  this  is  to  fight  to  the  end  for  his 
homeland,  if  he  kept  before  his  eyes  what  part  the 
unexpected  played  in  events,  and  bore  in  mind  how  many 
different  types  of  men,  what  determined  resolve  and 
weapons  were  reduced  by  the  resolve  and  power  of  those 
who  faced  danger  with  intelligence  and  courage.  8 
e  Polyb.  2.35.5-8. 
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